Somehow I missed a piece in the JDE in September by Alain de Janvrya, Marco Gonzalez-Navarrob, and Elisabeth Sadoulet. It’s called “Are land reforms granting complete property rights politically risky? Electoral outcomes of Mexico’s certification program” and it finds some really interesting results about property rights and voting patterns in Mexico. Here is the abstract:
What is the impact on voting behavior of strengthening property rights over agricultural land? To answer this question, we use the 14-year nationwide rollout of Mexico’s land certification program (Procede) and match affected communities (ejidos) before and after the change in property rights with voting outcomes in corresponding electoral sections across six federal election cycles. We find that, in accordance with the investor class theory, granting complete property rights induced a conservative shift toward the pro-market party equal to 6.8 percent of its average share of votes over the period. This shift was strongest where vested…
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