I’ve written columns about wonky economic concepts such as “deadweight loss” and “public goods.” Today’s topic is “rent seeking,” which is part of “public choice” and is described by Professor Alex Tabarrok of George Mason University.
To elaborate, here’s a video from Professor Michael Munger from Duke University.
The basic message of both videos is that “rent seeking” occurs when interest groups manipulate the political system to obtain undeserved riches.
And there are all sorts of examples of policies that exist solely because interest groups get politicians to tilt the playing field – including trade barriers, farm subsidies, occupational licensing, and bureaucrat salaries.
As pointed out in the videos, these rent-seeking policies reduce prosperity.
But what’s the origin of the term? In the modern era, it’s often associated with Gordon Tullock, one of the founders of public choice…
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The looming uncertainty around Johnson’s term in office is not just a perfect setting for political intrigue, but may also have something to offer to students of constitutional law. It should draw our attention to one of the fundamental questions of the UK constitutional process – how should we choose or remove a Prime Minister between general elections? The constitutional theory is straightforward. To become a Prime Minister, an MP must enjoy the confidence of the majority of the members of the House of Commons. Constitutionally, therefore, Parliament, not the electorate, selects the PM for appointment by the Queen. Hence, the House of Commons as a whole should remove and select the PM. According to this theory, then, Johnson would be removed if he loses a vote of confidence on the floor of the House of Commons. The classical formulation is neat but incomplete. Most importantly, it does not take…

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