The limits of the human body
12 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in health and safety, health economics Tags: health and safety
An alternative to the no fault Accident Compensation Scheme in New Zealand
13 Feb 2015 Leave a comment
in health and safety, labour economics, law and economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, property rights Tags: ACC, accident compensation, right to sue, workers' compenstaion, workplace fatalities
New Zealand has a unique government monopoly since 1974 which provides compensation for personal injuries from accidents wherever they may occur in New Zealand.
The right to sue in court under tort law was abolished. Instead, there is a lower but more certain right to be compensated for loss of income and medical expenses and various other losses. The scheme is funded by a levy of about 1.4% on incomes earned, insurance premiums paid by employers and levies on motor car registrations.
The scheme essentially folds no fault workers compensation and no fault car accident insurance into a scheme that covers you for all other accidents.
What is peculiar is the abolition of the right to sue in court for ordinary damages. I never liked this taking away of the right of vindication in court.

In Australia, they have a much simpler system in some states. You can sue for personal injury under the common-law, but any damages you might win for loss of income, medical expenses and other losses is deducted dollar for dollar from any of damages you might be awarded under the compulsory insurance scheme for either workplace or car accidents. This system allows everyone to be compensated to some degree and protected against judgement proof employers, car owners and other wrongdoers. It also saves on legal costs.
The Australian dual system both gives people the right of vindication and allows those who are poorly compensated by the government monopoly to continue to be compensated for losses. For example, the compensation for lost income under the government monopoly is based on your last 12 months income rather than prospective income. This seriously disadvantages young people and students in particular at the start of their working lives and mothers who are out of the workforce.
Another thing I like about the Australian system and deeply dislike about the New Zealand system is you do not have the right to sue cowboy employers to bankrupt them.
The system of funding in New Zealand is simply a flat rate premium applies the different occupations. Premiums do not increase for high risk employers or employers who repeatedly have accidents because they are careless or negligent. This increases the number of accidents and deaths. The penalties for workplace accidents and deaths under New Zealand workplace safety regulation are rather weak. Reckless employers are fined, no one is bankrupted nor goes to prison.
The government monopoly insurer of personal accidents in New Zealand also doesn’t pay for pain and suffering. Initially it did, but that right of compensation was taken away as a cost-cutting measure about 20 years ago. Prior to that pain and suffering compensation was initially limited to $10,000, then increased to $17,000 before it was abolished.
This lack of a legal remedy for the pain and suffering from a personal injury is a grave injustice. The courts were pretty stingy on pain and suffering, so the government monopoly has taking away what was a pretty limited right anyway, but a very important right nonetheless. That common-law right was to be made whole again after being injured wrongfully.
The Evolution Of The Employee
09 Feb 2015 Leave a comment
in health and safety, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, managerial economics, market efficiency, occupational choice, organisational economics, personnel economics Tags: modern human resource management
The odds that a child will…
07 Feb 2015 Leave a comment
in health and safety, health economics, occupational choice Tags: anti-vaccination movement
Are Uber drivers twice as likely to be murdered as a cop?
30 Jan 2015 2 Comments
in economics of crime, economics of regulation, health and safety, labour economics, law and economics, occupational choice Tags: compensating differentials, occupational hazards, police, taxi regulation, Uber
Gordon Tullock on avoiding difficult decisions about saving lives – updated
24 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economics of bureaucracy, economics of regulation, Gordon Tullock, health and safety, health economics, income redistribution, James Buchanan, labour economics, Rawls and Nozick Tags: expressive voting, health and safety, James Buchanan, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, statistical life, veil of ignorance, veil of insignificance, veil of uncertainty

Gordon Tullock wrote a 1979 New York Law Review book about avoiding difficult choices. His review was of a book by Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt called Tragic Choices which was about the rationing: the allocation of kidney dialysis machines (a “good”), military service in wartime (a “bad”), and entitlements to have children (a mixed blessing).
Tullock argued that we make a decision about how to allocate resources, how to distribute the resources, and then how to think about the previous two choices. People do not want to face up to the fact resources are scarce and they face limits on their powers.
To reduce the personal distress of making these tragic choices, Tullock observed that people often allocate and distribute resources in a different way so as to better conceal from themselves the unhappy choices they had to make even if this means the recipients of these choices are worse off and more lives are lost than if more open and honest choices were made up about there only being so much that can be done.
The Left over Left and union movement spends a lot of time pontificating about how we must not let economics influence health and safety policy rather than help frame public policy guidance on what must be done because scarcity of resources requires the valuation of life in everything from health, safety, and environmental regulations to road building. health budgeting is full of tragic choices about how much is spend to save so lives and where and for how long.
The Left over Left and the union movement deceive themselves and others into make futile gestures to make themselves feel good. These dilettantes cannot assume that they are safely behind a veil of insignificance. They have real influence on how public policy on health and safety are made.
A major driver of the opposition among the Left over Left and the union movement to the use of cost-benefit analysis and the valuation of statistical lives is its adoption makes people confront the tragic consequence of any of the choices available to them.
By saying how dare you value a statistical life does not change the fact that choices made without this knowledge will still have tragic consequences, and more lives may be lost because people want to conceal from themselves the difficult choices that they are making about others as voters and as policy-makers.
One of the purposes of John Rawls’ veil of ignorance and Buchanan and Tullock’s veil of uncertainty is that the basic social institutions be designed and agreed when we have abstracted from the grubby particulars of our own self-interest. Buchanan and Tullock explain the thought experiment this way
Agreement seems more likely on general rules for collective choice than on the later choices to be made within the confines of certain agreed-upon rules. …
Essential to the analysis is the presumption that the individual is uncertain as to what his own precise role will be in any one of the whole chain of later collective choices that will actually have to be made.
For this reason he is considered not to have a particular and distinguishable interest separate and apart from his fellows.
This is not to suggest that he will act contrary to own interest; but the individual will not find it advantageous to vote for rules that may promote sectional, class, or group interests because, by supposition, he is unable to predict the role that he will be playing in the actual collective decision-making process at any particular time in the future.
He cannot predict with any degree of certainty whether he is more likely to be in a winning or a losing coalition on any specific issue. Therefore, he will assume that occasionally he will be in one group and occasionally in the other.
His own self-interest will lead him to choose rules that will maximize the utility of an individual in a series of collective decisions with his own preferences on the separate issues being more or less randomly distributed.
Behind the veil of ignorance and the veil of uncertainty, we would all agree that resources are limited, including in the health sector and some drugs can’t be funded – choices must be made.
Once we go in front of the veil of ignorance and find out that we are the one missing out on that drug, naturally, our views will change. We agreed to these rules as fair for the distribution of basic social resources when, as John Rawls put it:
…no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like.
Is always the case that someone just falls on the other side of any line in the sand. If you move that line, there is always another set of people who are just on the other side.

Guns will surpass cars this year as the leading killer of under 25s in America
12 Jan 2015 1 Comment
in economics of crime, health and safety
Guns will surpass cars this year as the leading killer of under 25s in America econ.st/1AQHNbe http://t.co/9FHiXtCOxp—
The Economist (@TheEconomist) January 11, 2015
The selective nature of cost benefit analysis in health and safety policy
08 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
Milton Friedman on Safety Regulations
07 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, health and safety, law and economics, Milton Friedman Tags: health and safety, Milton Friedman, offsetting behaviour, safety Nazis




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