The Most Dangerous Monopoly: When Caution Kills
25 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, economic history, economics of information, economics of regulation, health economics, law and economics Tags: drug lags
Property Rights – Do They Benefit the Rich?
25 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, development economics, economic history, law and economics, property rights
BE PRESENT | The Prince by Niccolo Machiavelli
24 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, defence economics, economics of bureaucracy, law and economics, managerial economics, organisational economics, Public Choice, war and peace Tags: Machiavelli
Press council complaint against @dompost upheld @sst_nz
24 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, law and economics, politics - New Zealand

Hillary Clinton on sexual assault issues: Crusader or hypocrite? | FACTUAL FEMINIST
23 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of crime, economics of education, gender, law and economics, politics - USA Tags: 2016 presidential election, political correctness
The supreme arrogance of @CanberraQuakers hits a new high on #SSM and antidiscrimination law exceptions
22 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in defence economics, economics of religion, law and economics
One religion lecturing another on whether their beliefs are valid, are fundamental to their faith has never ended well.

What supreme arrogance. Quakers are happy to make others obey the laws they support but claim exemption from an otherwise valid law of general application because of their religious scruples. In common with George Orwell, I have no truck with pacifists:
Pacifism is objectively pro-Fascist. This is elementary common sense. If you hamper the war effort of one side you automatically help that of the other. Nor is there any real way of remaining outside such a war as the present one. In practice, ‘he that is not with me is against me’. The idea that you can somehow remain aloof from and superior to the struggle, while living on food which British sailors have to risk their lives to bring you, is a bourgeois illusion bred of money and security. Mr Savage remarks that ‘according to this type of reasoning, a German or Japanese pacifist would be “objectively pro-British”.’ But of course he would be! That is why pacifist activities are not permitted in those countries (in both of them the penalty is, or can be, beheading) while both the Germans and the Japanese do all they can to encourage the spread of pacifism in British and American territories. The Germans even run a spurious ‘freedom’ station which serves out pacifist propaganda indistinguishable from that of the P.P.U. They would stimulate pacifism in Russia as well if they could, but in that case they have tougher babies to deal with. In so far as it takes effect at all, pacifist propaganda can only be effective against those countries where a certain amount of freedom of speech is still permitted; in other words it is helpful to totalitarianism.
Quakers would be most upset if there was no conscientious objection provisions from military service but they will not grant the right to hold foolish moral and religious views to reactionary religions over same-sex marriage.
If the separation of church and state means anything, the views of one religion of another carries no weight. The wall separating the church and the state is equally high for all religions. It is not for the state to judge some religions as more sensible.
Quakers and other pacifists stand back on high, feeling good about themselves when others do the dirty work of keeping the world safe for democracy and freedom. Churchill said
We sleep safely at night because rough men stand ready to visit violence on those who would harm us.
Pacifists are no better than those deserters at the fall of Singapore, arrested by military police and led away but laughing at those soldiers who stood to fight the Japanese. They were laughing because they expected to survive because there is no death penalty for cowardice and desertion in the Australian Army. The brave died to protect their liberties. The English actor Donald Pleasence was a pacifist once:
Having registered as a conscientious objector, he joined the RAF when he saw how fellow-pacifists regarded without apparent emotion or guilt the Nazi bombing of London; and as a member of a bomber’s crew he flew 60 missions over Germany before being shotdown and imprisoned.
John Rawls’ Law of Peoples had as its key point that the fundamental division is not between democratic and non-democratic peoples or liberal and non-liberal, but decent and non-decent or outlaw peoples. Decent peoples allow toleration and subscribe to eight principles:
- Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples.
- Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
- Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.
- Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
- Peoples have the right of self-defence but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defence.
- Peoples are to honour human rights.
- Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.
- Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.
An individual’s religious beliefs does not excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law of general application prohibiting conduct that governments are free to regulate. Justice Frankfurter wrote in 1940:
conscientious scruples have not in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities
Religious freedom bars laws that prohibit:
- the holding of a religious belief,
- the right to communicate those beliefs to others, and
- the right of parents to direct the religious education of their children.
This approach has the advantage of not placing courts into the position of having to determine the importance of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim when weighing it against government interests and the objectives of the disputed law.
It might be said that there should be a compelling government interest before a religious objection can be overridden. Deciding what is a compelling government interest raises questions of public policy.
Men and women decide what is more or less important in the course of making legislation goes to the very heart of democratic decision-making. This clash of opinions and visions of the good society and what laws should be passed or not are all resolved peacefully through the ballot box and free speech even in the most desperate times.
This is not to say that a parliament may if it wishes exempt people from certain obligations on the basis of religious objections or making other accommodations. What it does require is that religions take their chances in democratic politics like the rest of us when seeking exemptions from a law.
It is up to the political process to decide whether to disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in, but a unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself. To quote Frankfurter again:
Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma. Religious loyalties may be exercised without hindrance from the state, not the state may not exercise that which except by leave of religious loyalties is within the domain of temporal power. Otherwise each individual could set up his own censor against obedience to laws conscientiously deemed for the public good by those whose business it is to make laws…
The validity of secular laws cannot be measured by their conformity to religious doctrines. It is only in a theocratic state that ecclesiastical doctrines measure legal right or wrong
Quakers want to be a law unto themselves when it comes to military service but are just as hectoring as all the other God bothers when it comes to same-sex marriage and discrimination laws. My religious scruples are superior to your religious scruples.
I am all for exemptions from antidiscrimination laws for religions but not because I wish them well. Napoleon said never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake.
I have no wish to drag any church into the Age of Enlightenment, kicking and screaming. I want everyone to see them for what they, warts and all. They have made no positive contribution to civilisation as Bertrand Russell explained
My own view on religion is that of Lucretius. I regard it as a disease born of fear and as a source of untold misery to the human race. I cannot, however, deny that it has made some contributions to civilization. It helped in early days to fix the calendar, and it caused Egyptian priests to chronicle eclipses with such care that in time they became able to predict them. These two services I am prepared to acknowledge, but I do not know of any others….
What is true of Christianity is equally true of Buddhism. The Buddha was amiable and enlightened; on his deathbed he laughed at his disciples for supposing that he was immortal. But the Buddhist priesthood – as it exists, for example, in Tibet – has been obscurantist, tyrannous, and cruel in the highest degree
I want religions to have these exemptions because it makes them look ridiculous. If you do not think casinos and poker machines are a good thing, do not support laws that make casinos and poker machine halls more inviting. Same goes for religion.
Kill Climate Deniers: The Explosive Inside Story – @sarahinthesen8 should report this too?
20 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, environmental economics, global warming, law and economics, politics - Australia Tags: Australian Greens, political correctness
A gender gap in crime waves
20 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, law and economics Tags: law and order
Is @SenSanders happy that lithium could not be patented?
19 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in health economics, politics - USA, property rights
Lithium is a naturally occurring substance so it is not possible to patent it. In consequence, there is no way of recovering any investments in working out how to handle its sometimes toxic side effects.
The first patients treated with lithium in 1949 were well within 2 weeks. Their discharge from the asylum where they had been living for years was delayed for a couple of months just to make sure that the medicine lithium was actually working. It was such a stunning success that their doctors had to check. The inability to patented lithium delayed its commercial availability by over two decades.

From Wikipedia at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Cade
Does @OxfamNZ know of this shakedown? Any in the Pacific? @TaxpayersUnion #oxfamscandal
19 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in development economics, economics of bureaucracy, economics of crime, growth disasters, politics - New Zealand
Japanese ODA agencies budget 10% for donations. Their main interest is making sure that these donations go to the politicians who can actually deliver on removing roadblocks to their aid delivery rather than chancers who try it on and never deliver. Benazir Bhutto’s husband was Mr. 10% when she was first prime minister. He was a net plus to the country according to The Economist Magazine article of say 20 years ago because investors only had to pay him rather than dozens of petty bureaucrats, each wanting a taste. These payments are lawful under the laws of Western countries because they are facilitation payments. They are not bribes because the foreign company is only paying the politician or bureaucrat to do what is his duty to do in the first place rather than stall the process in the hope of a bribe.

From The Dictator’s Handbook.
Walter E. Williams: How urban economic policy creates a Ferguson and Baltimore
18 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, labour economics, law and economics, poverty and inequality, urban economics Tags: child poverty, crime and punishment, family poverty
Women can say things about the gender wage gap that men cannot
16 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of love and marriage, gender, labour economics
September 11th Airspace Shutdown With Timeline
16 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in defence economics, economics of crime, law and economics, politics - Australia Tags: 9/11
My Submission to the Select Committee on the End of Life Choice Bill
15 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, health economics, liberalism, politics - New Zealand
Assisted suicide has had popular support for many decades. The two previous attempts at passing a Death with Dignity Bill failed despite widespread public support:
- In 1995, Michael Laws introduced a Death with Dignity Bill. It failed by 61 votes against and 29 for the Bill. His Bill could only become law after a binding nationwide referendum to be held at the 1996 General Election.
- Peter Brown, a list MP for New Zealand First, introduced a Death with Dignity Bill in 2003 that was defeated by 59 votes to 58 votes.
The reason political parties do not act is those who are against assisted suicide are passionately against it and will change their vote because of such a bill. Those who are for assisted suicide are unlikely to change their vote if a bill is not passed by Parliament.
Parliament will be divided into thirds
Any bill that does go for on assisted dying will divide Parliament in much the way it divides the community which is into three equally sized groups.
- One-third will be against assisted dying on moral or religious principle.
- One-third will be for it.
- One-third will be for it will be but will be riddled with doubts about the ability to draft a bill that safeguards against abuse and misadventure.
Those doubts are legitimate and entitled to be satisfied before an MP votes for the bill.
Many who support euthanasia in principle have serious reservations about the ability to craft a Bill that prevents abuses. Parliaments have an interest in protecting vulnerable groups–including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons–from abuse, neglect, and mistakes.
The sanctity of life is the first rule of law
Many people have strong views on exactly when and when not euthanasia is permissible because of their views about the sanctity of life and the risk of abuse. The recent High Court judgement on an unsuccessful application for an exception to the criminal law on assisted suicide said that:
The sanctity of human life principle underpins the criminal law relating to culpable homicide. It was said by Blackstone to be the first rule of English law.
When making an exception to the first rule of law, people want to know exactly what they are voting for and exactly what safeguards apply the proposed exceptions. A badly drafted bill may offer insufficient assurances to some MPs about preventing abuse and ensuring people who are depressed are not offered options that are not in their best interests.
Others have moral or religious objections. The religious objections were summarised by Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, where suicide was also a spiritual offence:
…in evading the prerogative of the Almighty, and rushing into his immediate presence uncalled for
The importance of getting the details right
Many Bills have failed such as recently in the Scottish Parliament and in 2003 in the New Zealand Parliament because they were badly drafted and were considered to offer insufficient protection of the vulnerable against abuse and melancholy.
Even when courts rule favourably on the matter, such as in Canada with its recent Supreme Court decision under its Bill of Rights, that court suspended its judgement upholding the right to euthanasia for 12 month so that the Canadian Parliament could work out the ever so vital details by passing a Bill. As the Supreme Court of United Kingdom recently ruled:
… unless the court can be satisfied that any exception to the subsection can be operated in such a way as to generate an acceptably small risk that assistance will be afforded to those vulnerable to pressure to seek to commit suicide, it cannot conclude that the absolute prohibition in the subsection is disproportionate to its legitimate aim.
Blackstone’s ratio
That is the essence of reservations about end of life choice. Blackstone’s ratio applies to standards of proof in criminal proceedings: it is better that 10 guilty go free than one innocent suffer.

Those with reservations about end of life choice have the same concerns that motivated Blackstone’s ratio. Their reservations are focused on few cases of abuse not justifying the benefits of going gently into that good night by making exceptions from an absolute prohibition under the criminal law against assisted suicide for the terminally ill despite they being of sound mind and independent judgement.
The law has long acted to prevent, by force if necessary, suicide – including suicide by refusing to take appropriate measures necessary to preserve one’s life after the point at which life become unbearable. Whether the patient’s wishes to be honoured in this area is left to elected representatives to legislate. Justice Scalia asks
Are there, then, no reasonable and humane limits that ought not to be exceeded in requiring an individual to preserve his own life? There obviously are, but they are not set forth in the Due Process Clause.
What assures us that those limits will not be exceeded is the same constitutional guarantee that is the source of most of our protection – what protects us, for example, from being assessed a tax of 100% of our income above the subsistence level, from being forbidden to drive cars, or from being required to send our children to school for 10 hours a day, none of which horribles is categorically prohibited by the Constitution.
Our salvation is the Equal Protection Clause, which requires the democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on you and me.
It is a decision for Parliament
The biggest threat to an End of Life Choice bill passing the New Zealand Parliament was judicial intervention in this charged social issue that will only mobilises the opponents of the right the applicants to the court seek. Scalia again this time on the risks of the courts moving in advance of the popular will, and thereby poisoning the democratic process:
Leaving this matter to the political process is not only legally correct, it is pragmatically so. That alone… can produce compromises satisfying a sufficient mass of the electorate that this deeply felt issue will cease distorting the remainder of our democratic process.
As an example of the importance of democratic compromises in securing the votes in Parliament, there is a voluntary euthanasia bill currently before the Scottish Parliament. It has been stuck in committee for two years because it not only promises end of life choice, it also grants a right of euthanasia to those with progressive degenerative diseases.
By overreaching to progressive degenerative diseases, the Bill in the Scottish Parliament was bogged down because euthanasia as distinct from a death with dignity is a step too far from many members of Parliament willing to support end of life choice for the terminally ill such as provided for in the House of Lords Private Member’s Bill on end of life choice which later failed in the Commons.
Parliament can make finely judged compromises
Any private member’s bill that does pass the New Zealand Parliament on end of life choice will be riddled with compromises and will have a genuine concern to prevent abuse and guard against questionable decisions made when judgements of the terminally ill is clouded in some way. No court in a single judgement can provide all those details and compromises.
The great strength of democracy is a small group of concerned and thoughtful citizens can band together and change things by mounting single issue campaigns or joining a political party and running for office and winning elections or influencing who wins.
Indeed, it is that very strength of democracy – small groups of concerned citizens banding together – is what is holding up legislating on an end of life choice. It is not that minorities are powerless and individuals are voiceless. Exactly the opposite.
Many people have passionate opinions for and against an End of Life Choice Bill. These opinions are taken into account by members of Parliament in fine detail depending on how voters will vote at the next election. What can be undemocratic about members of Parliament paying attention to how a wide range of ordinary members of the community might vote if they disappoint them.
The key safeguard of minorities against the majority is their ability to block vote. Yes, those in the majority will be annoyed at the power of the minority to slow down the passage of a End of Life Choices Bill. Yet on some other matter passionate to them those currently in the majority will one day or another end up in a minority. The rotation of power is common in democracies, and the worst rise to the top.
It is wise to design constitutional safeguards to minimise the damage done when those crazies to the right or left of you get their chance in office, as they will sooner or later rather than focus on the powers you and those that currently agree with you should have in your few days in which you fleetingly have a majority. Too many policies and ideas of the one political party or another assume that they are the face of the future, rather than just another political party that will hold power as often as not and always for an uncertain time.
New Zealand Parliamentary elections are always close because of proportional representation. This makes reality of ending up in the minority again very quickly in a few years very real.
Yesterday’s majority of the vote sooner or later and often sooner than they expect will break off into different minorities on the next big issue of the day.
These newly formed minorities will use that same ability to band together as a minority to block vote to protect what they think is important and advance agendas they think are to be wider benefit despite the opinion of the current majority to the contrary. All reforms start as a minority viewpoint.
You can’t complain about democracy not working because it’s working precisely as it should: parliamentarians paying close attention to how a great number of people from all walks of life vote in light of how they as members of Parliament voted on specific issues important to them.
Do not underrate the terrors of death
The democratic process must strike a proper balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally competent individuals who would seek to end their suffering and the State’s interests in protecting those who might seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure. The pros and cons of euthanasia as a practical matter is ably summarised by Richard Posner:
Countries and states that authorize physician-assisted suicide impose strict requirements that minimize the danger of involuntary euthanasia—too strict, some believe (such as the requirement in Dutch law that the patient’s suffering be “unbearable” before he can invoke physician assistance to end his life).
These requirements (which further reduce the stigma of physician-assisted suicide by confining the practice to cases of genuine desperation) are not airtight, or uniformly observed.
Any system will be abused. The question is whether the incidence of abuses, combined with the other costs of the system, outweigh the benefits.
Gary Becker has written frequently on the issue of euthanasia and suicide. Indeed, he wrote the Economic Theory of Suicide, not long after his wife took her own life in the early 1970s. He argues well about people’s ability to weigh the considerations:
Rational forward–looking persons with good information about their future circumstances would commit suicide only when convinced that they would be worse off by continuing to live.
David Hume said (in his Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul) “That suicide may often be consistent with interest and with our duty to ourselves no one can question, who allows that age, sickness, or misfortune may render life a burden, and make it worse than annihilation.”
Schopenhauer was also confident about the rationality of suicide, “It will generally be found that, as soon as the terrors of life outweigh the terrors of death, a man will put an end to his life” (Parerga and Paralipomena).
Becker also wrote insightfully of the terrors of death:
Hume adds “I believe no man ever threw away life, while it was worth keeping. For such is our natural horror of death”, and Schopenhauer makes the same observation “But the terrors of death offer considerable resistance…”
The reason why Death with Dignity Bills fail in Parliament is those in the community who are against it are passionately against that it and will change their vote if it passed. Those that are for it are not swinging or single issue voters.
Let the people decide through parliament
The way in which a bill on assisted dying is to be passed is by normal democratic means: by trying to persuade each other and elections. As United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia said
The virtue of a democratic system [with a constitutionally guaranteed right to free speech] is that it readily enables the people, over time, to be persuaded that what they took for granted is not so and to change their laws accordingly.
Yes, assisted dying years a passionate issue and some people are impatient and wanted to use the courts, but again I believe Justice Scalia is right when he said:
We might have let the People decide. But that the majority will not do. Some will rejoice in today’s decision, and some will despair at it; that is the nature of a controversy that matters so much to so many. But the Court has cheated both sides, robbing the winners of an honest victory, and the losers of the peace that comes from a fair defeat. We owed both of them better. I dissent.
That importance of a fair defeat at the ballot box and in Parliament is important both to when and if a bill on end of life choice is passed, and to how quickly support opposition to that bill will be mobilised before such a bill even is put into the Parliamentary ballot of private member’s bills.
Nothing stirs up the impassioned (and most other people as well) more than depriving them of their right to support or oppose what is important to them through political campaigns and at an election. The losing side, we all end up on the losing side at one time or another, are much more likely to accept an outcome if they had their say and simply lost the vote at the election or in Parliament.
We live in a representative democracy
The advocates of a referendum want to remake democracy with the faculty workshop as their model. Such deliberation has demanding requirements for popular participation in the democratic process, including a high level of knowledge and analytical sophistication and an absence, or at least severe curtailment, of self-interested motive.
Representative democracy is a division of labour in the face of information overload. John Stuart Mill had sympathy for parliaments as best suited to be places of public debate on the various opinions held by the population and as a watchdog of the professionals who create and administer laws and policy:
Their part is to indicate wants, to be an organ for popular demands, and a place of adverse discussion for all opinions relating to public matters, both great and small; and, along with this, to check by criticism, and eventually by withdrawing their support, those high public officers who really conduct the public business, or who appoint those by whom it is conducted.
Representative democracy has the advantage of allowing the community to rely in its decision-making on the contributions of individuals with special qualifications of intelligence or character. Representative democracy makes a more effective use of resources within the citizenry to advance the common good.
Members of parliament are trustees who follow their own understanding of the best action to pursue in another view. As Edmund Burke wrote:
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.
You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament. … Our representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
Modern democracy is government subject to electoral checks. Citizens do have sufficient knowledge and sophistication to vote out leaders who are performing poorly or contrary to their wishes. Modern democracy is the power to replace governments at periodic elections.
Richard Posner argued that a representative democracy enables the adult population, at very little cost in time, money or distraction from private pursuits commercial or otherwise:
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to punish at least the flagrant mistakes and misfeasance of officialdom,
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to assure an orderly succession of at least minimally competent officials,
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to generate feedback to the officials concerning the consequences of their policies,
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to prevent officials from (or punish them for) entirely ignoring the interests of the governed, and
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to prevent serious misalignments between government action and public opinion.
The power of the electorate to turn elected officials out of office at the next election gives elected officials an incentive to adopt policies that do not outrage public opinion and administer the policies with some minimum honesty and competence.
A referendum is too blunt an instrument for a matter requiring finely judged compromises
A referendum is an all or nothing choice that does not allow an iterative process where people can converge on better and better drafts of the proposed law. Only Parliament can do that.
Bills have 3 readings on the floor of the house and a select committee process for a reason. There is plenty of time for the parliament to deliberate consider options and alternatives and change its mind in light of further revisions to a bill. None of those possibilities for reflection and reconsideration are available in a referendum. That is why we live in a representative democracy.
We choose people and parties who we see to be of sound judgement and leave the details to them. If they keep getting it wrong, those members of parliament will pay at the ballot box.

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