Anti-prohibition demonstration, 1933 pic.twitter.com/JWBk6y8jOl
— Museum Facts (@museumfacts) December 7, 2014
Anti-prohibition demonstrators were in-your-face about what they wanted
07 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, economics of regulation, law and economics, liberalism Tags: drug decriminalisation, expressive voting, marijuana decriminalisation, prohibition
Jihad for Dummies buyers get 12 years
07 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, war and peace Tags: economics of oppositional identities, Jihad, terrorism, war on terror
Sweden has offered permanent residence to all Syrians fleeing the conflict
06 Dec 2014 1 Comment
in Economics of international refugee law, war and peace Tags: refugees, Sweden, Syria

Asylum applications to Sweden
2012: 44,000
2013: 55,000
2014: 83,000 (projected)
2015: 95,000 (projected)
The population of Sweden is about twice that New Zealand and a million more. The population of Syria is almost 23,000,000.

Nearly half of Syria’s population has been displaced since the start of the civil war in 2011. Half. It’s the equivalent of 135 million Americans being forced to move.
I admire Sweden’s generosity, but not their wisdom. Three million Syrians have become refugees abroad and 6.5 million more have fled their homes for other locations within the country.
Speeding fines are rather steep in Victoria
06 Dec 2014 1 Comment
in economics of crime, law and economics Tags: crime and punishment, speeding tickets
Environmental Law 101 | Richard Epstein
05 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in environmental economics, law and economics, liberalism, property rights, Richard Epstein Tags: environmental law, law of nuisance, Richard Epstein, tort law
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Back in 1999, Richard Epstein wrote a great summary of what should be environmental law from an old common law perspective, from a classical liberal perspective, and a pragmatic economic libertarian perspective:
Stated bluntly, nothing in the theory of property rights says that my property is sacred while everybody else’s property is profane. That single constraint of parity among owners should lead every owner to think hard…
This recognition of the noxious uses of private property is the source of the common law of nuisance.
That law dates from medieval times, certainly by 1215, at the time of the Magna Carta. It is no new socialist or environmentalist creation for the twentieth century.
When the common law of nuisance restricts the noxious use of property, it benefits not only immediate neighbours but the larger community. If I enjoin pollution created by my neighbour, others will share in the reduction of pollution.
Simply by using private actions, we have built a system for environmental protection that goes a long way toward stopping the worst forms of pollution.
Epstein does not stop there. He recognises as he should that the common law of nuisance is not enough to stop all problems of pollution:
Yet before we leap for joy, we must recognize that private actions are not universally effective in curbing nuisances.
Sometimes pollution is widely diffused—waste can come from many tailpipes, not just one—so that no one can tell exactly whose pollution is causing what damage to which individuals.
Under those circumstances, private enforcement of nuisance law can no longer control pollution…
We do not change the substantive standards of right and wrong, but we do use state regulation to fill in the gaps in private enforcement.
Epstein then makes a plea for private covenants to deal with a great deal of the social frictions that arise in the suburbs:
But often when individuals worry about their local environments, they’re not particularly happy to treat the nuisance law, however enforced, as the upper bound of their personal protection.
They want (especially as their wealth increases) more by way of aesthetics and open spaces. Fortunately, our legal system has a way to accommodate these newer demands.
One of our most important land-use control devices is the system of covenants by which all the holders of neighbouring lands agree among themselves and for their successors in title
Covenants might work in Greenfields developments in modern cities. But they really doesn’t work in managing land use conflicts in the inner city where regulation is been used to substitute the covenants for many decades.
Epstein’s ideal for modern environmental law is:
In sum, the system of public and private enforcement of nuisances and public and private purchases of environmentally sensitive sites is the way that sound environmental policy should proceed.
Can crime be deterred: hijackings as a case study of the increase in the probability of apprehension
05 Dec 2014 1 Comment
in economics of crime, law and economics, transport economics Tags: crime and punishment, deterrence, economics of crime, hijacking, law and economics
In 1977, William Landes published a classic study of crime and punishment. He investigated what happened to the number of hijackings in the USA after mandatory screening of passengers and their carry-on luggage was introduced in 1973.
During the peak period of hijackings, 1968 to 1972, the probability of apprehension the hijacker was 15%. For those hijackers that were caught, their average prison sentence was 30 years in 1972 to 1974. One quarter of hijackers were committed to mental institutions. Hijackings became so common that:
[a]irliners carried approach plans for the Havana airport and crews were instructed not to resist hijackers. There were also standard diplomatic procedures for obtaining the return of planes and passengers
No hijackers were killed during the course of their crimes until 1971. After that, there is about a 10% chance of the hijacker being shot dead. Air marshals started riding on US planes in 1970; there were about 1200 of these air marshals, who had to be about the most boring job in the world.
The primary purpose of hijackings in the USA in the late 60s and early 70s in the USA initially was to obtain free transport to Cuba for the political purposes or to avoid prosecution for crimes. However, in the early 1970s, this demand for air transport started to decline as news filtered back about how poorly these hijackers were treated in Cuba. A few of these hijackers chose to return to the United States.
Interestingly, the substitute for flying to Cuba was para-hijackers. They demanded a ransom of an average of $300,000 and then parachuted out of the plane. One out of 18 succeeded. Their average prison sentence for the 11 that survived was 43 years.

As the table above shows, the number of hijackings in the USA immediately fell from over 20 per year, with a maximum of 38 in 1969, to one or two per year after the introduction of mandatory screening of passengers and their carry-on luggage In 1973.
All hijackers were apprehended between 1973 and 1976. Apparently, hijackers of all breeds and political complexions do not enjoy the prison experience. Criminals don’t like to be caught.
Interestingly, lunatics could be deterred. They retained sufficient capacity for planning to abandon their plans to hijack a plane because of the inevitability of arrest at the boarding gate after the metal detector sounded off from 1973 onwards. Only to the 12 offenders that were apprehended for attempted hijacking between 1973 and 1976 were committed to mental institutions. The remaining 10 were just plain stupid.
If lunatics cannot be deterred, do not respond incentives, they should have continued to hijack planes at the same rate as prior to the introduction of mandatory screening in 1973.
That said, mandatory screening was not cheap, which may explain why airlines and their passengers were putting up with up to 40 hijackings per year, as Landes explained using 1977 dollar, which was back when a dollar actually bought something:
Although the mandatory screening program is highly effective in terms of the number of hijackings prevented, its costs appear enormous.
The estimated net increase in security costs due to the screening program (which does not include the time and inconvenience costs to persons searched) is $194.24 million over the 1973 to 1976 period.
This, in turn, translates into a $3.24 to $9.25 million expenditure to deter a single hijacking. Put differently, if the dollar equivalent of the loss to an individual hijacked passenger were in the range of $76,718 to $219,221, then the costs of screening would just offset the expected hijacking losses.
I should add, however,that air travel was much more expensive and much less frequent in 1973. The jumbo jet had only been introduced two years previous. Air travel is much more frequent these days so would the contemporary travelling public be willing to put up with the equivalent of hundreds of hijackings per year?

Caption: A Northwest Orient Airlines plane that was hijacked on July 1, 1968, is pictured at the Miami International Airport after returning from Cuba.
What did happen after the crackdown on hijacking was the terrorists change tactics. Embassy takeovers another type of sieges surged. Prior to the crackdown on hijacking, these were rare.
When embassies became fortified, the terrorists instead started kidnapping or murdering diplomats after they left the Embassy compound. As Walter Enders and Todd Sandler found
The existence of complements and substitutes means that policies designed to reduce one type of attack may affect other attack modes.
For example, the installation of metal detectors in airports reduced skyjackings and diplomatic incidents but increased other kinds of hostage attacks (barricade missions, kidnappings) and assassinations.
In the long run, embassy fortification decreased barricade missions but increased assassinations.
Kokoro Scanner monitors your pulse to tell if you’re telling fibs | Daily Mail Online
05 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, economics of crime, politics
Claudia Goldin and the power of the pill
04 Dec 2014 1 Comment
in economics of education, economics of love and marriage, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply Tags: Claudia Goldin, engines of liberation, gender wage gap, sex discrimination, single parenthood
Claudia Goldin has documented well that the availability of reliable contraception in the late 1960s led to an explosion in female investment in higher education, and in particular, long duration professional educations.
Although rapidly disseminated among married women once it came on the market in 1960, the pill at first was almost inaccessible to single females, due to the prevailing state laws on prescriptions of drugs.
Liberalisation of availability for single females was on a state-by-state basis and was staggered over a few years. This allowed Claudia Goldin to study what happened to investment in professional education by young women in each of those states as they reformed their laws on the dispensing of contraception to single females.

As contraception was made lawful for single women on a state-by-state basis in the USA in the late 60s and 1970s, young women started investing in long duration professional educations at an explosive rate. They stayed in high school the longer, more young women went on to college, and more of these college female students majored in long duration professional degrees.

In the 1960s, it was common to get engaged and even marry while at college in the USA. As Claudia Goldin, and her co-author Larry Katz explain:
It was a stark choice, you could be celibate, get your career started, and potentially face a very thin marriage market once you were done.
Or, you could have fun, get married earlier, and not necessarily have a career.
The availability of the pill allowed college-age women to have certainty in their career investments and therefore the payoff of investing in professional educations was much greater.

By decoupling sex for marriage, women could afford to defer marriage and shop around looking for better partners. Postponing marriage for at least a few years didn’t mean all the “good guys” would be taken. In addition, with higher career incomes for female college graduates, as Goldin explained:
You might think of it as the decline of the trophy wife, as women with careers who might not be as intrinsically good-looking became more highly valued than—or at least as equally valued as—women for whom appearance was a primary asset.
But as Goldin’s co-author Larry Katz explained:
Potential losers in this equation, in addition to trophy wives, are women with poor career prospects.
The clear winners are women with careers and, of course, the men they marry… Guys have more money, more sex, and less responsibility.
One side effect of the availability of contraception to better educated women was that young women with poor career prospects were also left with a pool of more unattractive men to marry.
Many of these young women who wanted to have baby chose just to have the child, and perhaps marry the father later if the responsibilities of fatherhood turned him into marriage material.
This reversal in order of parenthood and marriage among less well educated young women was one of the surprising social developments in the mid to late 20th century.
"The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint" with Judge Richard Posner
03 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in law and economics, Richard Posner Tags: constitutional law, Richard Posner, statutory interpretation
A favourite line from Seinfeld
03 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of love and marriage, gender, human capital, labour economics, TV shows, unemployment Tags: Seinfeld
On the unsustainability of wind power – noise pollution edition
03 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in energy economics, environmental economics, global warming, law and economics Tags: noise pollution, wind power
Jeffrey Miron — “Legalizing Drugs” | Harvard Thinks Big 5 – YouTube
02 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, law and economics, liberalism Tags: drug decriminalisation, marijuana decriminalisation



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