Why a messy desk can make you more productive at work
12 Sep 2017 Leave a comment
in managerial economics, organisational economics, personnel economics
I didn’t bring business cards to Japan. Big mistake.
02 Jun 2017 Leave a comment
in managerial economics Tags: Japan
The nuances of the gender pay gap
07 Mar 2017 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics, gender, human capital, labour economics, managerial economics, occupational choice, organisational economics, personnel economics
Supervisory and monitoring costs and occupational segregation by sex
06 Mar 2017 Leave a comment
Published: Goldin, Claudia. “Monitoring Costs and Occupational Segregation by Sex: An Historical Analysis,” Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 4, (January 1986), pp. 1-27.
Dead Wrong™ with Johan Norberg – Nordic Gender Equality
20 Feb 2017 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, discrimination, entrepreneurship, gender, industrial organisation, labour economics, labour supply, managerial economics, occupational choice, organisational economics, personnel economics Tags: gender wage gap
How Budget Airlines Work – YouTube
14 Jan 2017 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, managerial economics, market efficiency, organisational economics, personnel economics, survivor principle, transport economics Tags: entrepreneurial alertness
Prize lecture: Bengt Holmström, Laureate in Economic Sciences 2016
07 Jan 2017 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, industrial organisation, managerial economics, organisational economics Tags: game theory
Happiness research explained
05 Jan 2017 Leave a comment
in labour economics, labour supply, managerial economics, occupational choice, organisational economics, personnel economics Tags: compensating differentials
How did the State Department’s secure email server communicate with @HillaryClinton’s?
02 Jun 2016 Leave a comment
in managerial economics, organisational economics, politics - USA Tags: 2016 presidential election, email privacy, information security, Internet privacy, privacy
My only experience with secure email networks is pretty pesky filters stopping you from sending confidential material outside the network. The emails bounced.
I do not understand how a secure email server could communicate with one that is not such as Hillary Clinton’s private email server thin the secure network without a special dispensation.
With hundreds of thousands use secure email servers in the US government, the network administrator would have to have filters that bounce emails with keywords and classifications.
More sensible agencies that handle classified materials do not allowstaff to take work home. If they do, it must be on a secure laptop with no capacity to print or download.
What happened when a restaurant chain abolished tipping?
16 May 2016 Leave a comment
in labour economics, labour supply, managerial economics, minimum wage, occupational regulation, organisational economics, personnel economics, politics - USA, theory of the firm Tags: Edward Lazear, performance pay, tipping

Joe’s Crab Shack tested a no-tip model in 18 of its 130 restaurants. A 12-15% service charge replaced tips. Joe’s Crab capture is the first major restaurant chain to experiment with a tipping policy to experiment with abolishing it. The tipping minimum wage is far less than the federal, state and local minimum wages.

Joe’s Crab Shack had high hopes. The aims were customers would pay less, get a greater value experience, reduce labour costs and increase profits. The reactionary left represented by Salon and Huffington Post have quite strong views on tipping. Salon says
Tipping is a repugnant custom. It’s bad for consumers and terrible for workers. It perpetuates racism. Tipping isn’t even good for restaurants, because the legal morass surrounding gratuities results in scores of expensive lawsuits.
Tipping does not incentivize hard work. The factors that correlate most strongly to tip size have virtually nothing to do with the quality of service. Credit card tips are larger than cash tips. Large parties with sizable bills leave disproportionately small tips.
We tip servers more if they tell us their names, touch us on the arm, or draw smiley faces on our checks. Quality of service has a laughably small impact on tip size.
According to a 2000 study, a customer’s assessment of the server’s work only accounts for between 1 and 5 percent of the variation in tips at a restaurant.
Salon adds that federal and state law requires restaurants to ensure that tips bring employees up to minimum wage, but few diners know that.
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Huffington Post managed to marshal 9 reasons why tipping should be abolished arguing that it was in no one’s interests either employers, employees or customers. The old efficiency at wage argument was rolled out arguing that employers gain in terms of diligent motivate employees by paying a straight wage rather than leaving it up to customer judgements of the services tended.
Not surprisingly this sounded like a business opportunity to Joe’s Crab Shack. Better customer service, better motivated employees and lower labour costs were promised by abolishing tips. You wonder why tipping survived in competition against alternative forms of restaurant service formats for all these decades?

Well, Joe’s Crab Shack got more than it bargained for when it abolished tipping. The pilot restaurants lost an average of 8-10% of customers during the test run.
The restaurant’s research showed that around 60% of customers disliked the policy because it took away an incentive for good service and that they don’t necessarily trust that management is passing along the money to workers.
The no tipping structure worked at four restaurants and will continue to work out why it succeeded there but failed at 14 other places.
What is even more interesting that the abolition of tipping lead to some workers quitting. This outcome at Joe’s Crab Shack is inconsistent with the notion that tipping is a by-product of the inequality of bargaining power between workers and employees. Turnover is supposed to reduce when tipping is abolished rather than increase with the employer losing their best workers.

Lazear found in data for Safelite Glass that average productivity will rise and the firm will attract a more able workforce will rise when it shifts to piece rates. The 44% increase in output per worker suggested the firm previously had a suboptimal compensation system. Half of the increase in labour productivity came from workers quitting when piece rates are introduced and being replaced by workers motivated to apply by the lure of piece rates. The average worker received a 10% increase in pay as a result of the switch to piece rates.
The only economic analysis of any value on tipping was written in 1985 by David Sisk at the Federal Trade Commission. He wrote a paper about both tipping and commissions. Sisk approached tipping not as a motivational device but a form of contracting.
Sisk points out that tipping takes the place of reputation as a way of guaranteeing good services are at a restaurant. Many do not plan to return to a restaurant so an alternative form of contracting emerges to ensure good service because the threat of taking future custom elsewhere does not work.
In the case of a tip, the buyer (or customer) is provided with a final means of automatic redress which serves to prevent unsatisfactory performance on the part of the seller.
The possibility of unsatisfactory performance arises when the brand-name, repeat purchase mechanism is not effective or because employees of the seller are too costly to monitor.
An example is tourists. They are protected from inferior service relative to the locals because they pay tips too and are well able to judge good and bad service.

Sisk argues that once a customer sits down at a restaurant, the customer commits ever increasing amounts of time and the restaurant commits ever increasing amounts of physical resources. As one commits more irrevocable resources, the greater is the incentive of the other to renege on the contract.
A tip allows the customer to withhold a portion of the price without further negotiation. The tip serves to protect the customer from bad service and to protect the restaurant from bad service by an errant employee
The system of tipping provides the motivation for the waiter to properly identify and accommodate the individual desires of customers subject to the profit maximizing constraint of the restaurant owner…
The tip protects the buyer from exploitation by a seller (when the brand-name mechanism is insufficient) or from exploitation by the shirking employees of the seller
The worst tippers are single males; the best are couples and groups. The biggest tippers are single males on a date.
Source: OkCupid, A woman’s advantage.
Micro-aggressions give way to micro-treasons
12 May 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of education, managerial economics, organisational economics, personnel economics Tags: academic bias, microaggressions, political correctness
Submission to Porirua City Council on proposed #livingwage
28 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in labour economics, managerial economics, minimum wage, organisational economics, personnel economics Tags: expressive voting, living wage, local government, rational irrationality, The fatal conceit
A living wage at a local council will act as a hiring standard that stops low paid workers from being shortlisted for vacancies in the 129 council jobs affected by the proposed living wage increase.
The Council must hire on merit so only those who currently earn about $19 in other jobs will be shortlisted. That is the law. The Council must hire the best available applicant. The minimum wage workers who currently fill these minimum wage jobs simply could not cannot be lawfully shortlisted.
It is explicit in the living wage literature that a living wage improves the quality of applicants for future vacancies.
When a living wage job is advertised, more qualified applicants will apply. This will crowd-out the existing workers had who shortlisted for these Council jobs. They will have to apply for other minimum wage jobs but pay rates to fund council jobs they can never win.
There is no way around this because of the duty of the Council to hire on merit.
All future vacancies covered by the living wage increase will be filled by workers who are currently better paid than the existing applicants who won those jobs in the past.
Any employer who unilaterally introduces a living wage is simply raising their hiring standards saying they will not hire applicants who do not currently earn the equivalent of the living wage in their previous job.
A living wage will exclude low paid worker from council jobs in the future. I have attached a more detailed analysis of the economics of a living wage as proposed by the Wellington City Council.
@Economicpolicy shows that top CEO pay has been a miserable rollercoaster for 15 years
25 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
What a $15 Minimum Wage Would Do
20 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economics of media and culture, entrepreneurship, job search and matching, labour economics, managerial economics, minimum wage, organisational economics, personnel economics, theory of the firm Tags: living wage, offsetting behavior, The fatal conceit

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