The GFC did not bring down the Celtic Tiger; the Irish government did by overreacting in a crisis
07 Mar 2018 2 Comments
in global financial crisis (GFC), macroeconomics, monetary economics, Public Choice
Timothy J. Kehoe and Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordoba wrote this for the Annual Report Essay of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in 2008 on the eve of the financial crisis in Ireland:
Different sorts of shocks can start financial crises. Some shocks are external to the economy. In the cases of Chile and Mexico, the shock was the increase in world interest rates and the decrease in international commodity prices, and in the case of Finland, it was collapse in trade with the former Soviet Union. Some shocks are internal. In the case of Japan, the shock was the fall in the prices of commercial real estate, and, currently in North America and Western Europe, it is the fall in the prices of residential real estate. The analysis of great depressions shows that the type of shock that starts the depression is less important than reaction to the shock by the economy and, in particular, the government.
The screen snapshot below shows that the Irish government did not bail out the depositors of a bank, they bailed out the bondholders. It is only when there is a bank run by depositors of a large bank is a financial system under threat. Bondholders are on their own.
FROM https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/03/michael-lewis-ireland-201103
31% of economists are still confused about the merits of tariffs
05 Mar 2018 3 Comments
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, international economics, Public Choice Tags: protection, tariffs, trade policy
George B. N. Ayittey: The Failure of African Socialism
03 Mar 2018 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, development economics, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, growth disasters, Marxist economics, Public Choice Tags: Africa
BE BOTH THE MAN & THE BEAST | The Prince by Niccolo Machiavelli
26 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, defence economics, economics of bureaucracy, law and economics, managerial economics, organisational economics, Public Choice, war and peace Tags: Machiavelli
Machiavelli’s Advice For Nice Guys
25 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, defence economics, economics of bureaucracy, law and economics, managerial economics, organisational economics, Public Choice, war and peace Tags: Machiavelli
BE PRESENT | The Prince by Niccolo Machiavelli
24 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, defence economics, economics of bureaucracy, law and economics, managerial economics, organisational economics, Public Choice, war and peace Tags: Machiavelli
DO NOT BE NEUTRAL | The Prince by Niccolo Machiavelli
23 Feb 2018 1 Comment
in defence economics, economics of bureaucracy, Public Choice, war and peace
.@linda_polman on aid in war zones @OxfamNZ @TaxpayersUnion
21 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in development economics, economics of bureaucracy, Public Choice, war and peace Tags: ODA
Polman observed the ‘crisis caravan’ of aid organizations in post-war situations. In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide millions of people fled to neighbouring DR Congo. “The entire extremist Hutu government and army settled in those refugee camps … A lot of money went into the Hutu extremist movement who used it to gain strength and continue their genocidal struggle”.
Does @OxfamNZ know of this shakedown? Any in the Pacific? @TaxpayersUnion #oxfamscandal
19 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in development economics, economics of bureaucracy, economics of crime, growth disasters, politics - New Zealand
Japanese ODA agencies budget 10% for donations. Their main interest is making sure that these donations go to the politicians who can actually deliver on removing roadblocks to their aid delivery rather than chancers who try it on and never deliver. Benazir Bhutto’s husband was Mr. 10% when she was first prime minister. He was a net plus to the country according to The Economist Magazine article of say 20 years ago because investors only had to pay him rather than dozens of petty bureaucrats, each wanting a taste. These payments are lawful under the laws of Western countries because they are facilitation payments. They are not bribes because the foreign company is only paying the politician or bureaucrat to do what is his duty to do in the first place rather than stall the process in the hope of a bribe.
From The Dictator’s Handbook.
Bigots, left or right, differ in their targets of opportunity, but deep down all are miserable sods looking for someone to bully, abuse and hate
16 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in discrimination, population economics, Public Choice Tags: moral psychology, personality psychology, political psychology
Have you got all of these?
15 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of bureaucracy, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: Machiavelli
At least James Buchanan cast his Svengali spell from a slightly less crappy website than the Mont Pelerin Society. Koch Brothers must not be social media savvy in their quest for global domination. The secret portal for his cabal of elected supplicants cannot be seen anywhere
13 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, Public Choice
Why did Milton Friedman bother? James Buchanan was supposedly far more influential despite rarely looking up from his desk
13 Feb 2018 2 Comments
in constitutional political economy, history of economic thought, Public Choice
Milton Friedman invested decades of his time in being a public intellectual. Writing Capitalism and Freedom in 1962, newspaper columns from the 1960s, countless television interviews and public speeches, travelled the world, and of course his famous 1970s TV series Free to Choose. Friedman wrote a bestselling autobiography Two Lucky People and many other books for popular audiences.
If Democracy in Chains is to be believed, James Buchanan was far more influential in a dastardly Machiavelli way despite no work as a public intellectual, hardly any online video clips, a difficult writing style, and a dry way of public speaking. His only known public policy position would be his advocacy of ruinous inheritance taxes.
Other than that, Buchanan devoted himself to the technical aspects of public choice economics. As a teacher, I am told that he crammed all his lectures into 2-weeks to get back to his desk as quickly as possible without further interruption from students.
If only Milton had known. You can be immensely influential despite making no effort to publicise your views or participate in public debate or even be all that articulate. As Nancy MacLean herself noticed
There are a few reasons Buchanan has been overlooked. One is that the Koch cause does not advertise his work, preferring to tout the sunnier primers of Hayek, Friedman and even Ayn Rand when recruiting. Buchanan is the advanced course, as it were, for the already committed. Another is that Buchanan did not seek the limelight like Friedman, so few on the left have even heard of him. I myself learned of him only by serendipity, in a footnote about the Virginia schools fight.
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