Why do taxpayers pay billions for football stadiums? @TaxpayersUnion @EricCrampton
05 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, industrial organisation, Public Choice, rentseeking, sports economics Tags: corporate welfare
Veniality haunts the state sector @TaxpayersUnion
04 Feb 2018 1 Comment
in economics of bureaucracy, economics of crime, politics - New Zealand
One of the first things I noticed after coming to New Zealand from Australia in 1998 was the petty veniality in government departments.

In my first week, I discovered employers pay for farewells. No chance in Canberra. We take our colleague out for lunch and have a whip-round to pay for their lunch. If it was a retirement function, such as for a long serving employee, the senior staff would pay for it out of their own pocket. The taxpayer never ever paid.
Then I noticed that public servants would charge lunches with each other to their government credit card. They would buy wine! By chance, I discovered when working at the Productivity Commission that the chairman was authorised to send out for sandwiches if a meeting ran over lunch time. He never did. The last time I remember a meeting running over lunch, the deputy chairman, who later went on to be the chairman, bought the sandwiches out of his own pocket.
It got worse when I noticed who went on overseas trips. When it was a more exotic location, a much more senior manager felt the need to represent his country. Enthusiasm in a minister’s office for going to a rather boring international meeting picked up no end when they discovered it was in Istanbul.
I thought most overseas travel was a waste of time in 1999 even with that so primitive an Internet back then so I actively avoided it and never proposed a trip. This became crystal clear when we were receiving cables from the embassy in Washington and London telling me what I had already read in the Washington Post and the London Times while they were sleeping. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs a couple years later installed desktop Internet access.
Then to my astonishment, I found that government employees would take holidays at the end of their business travel. If you tried that in Australia, you would be fired and hopefully your manager too for not setting the right tone. It would never be considered.
If you were on an interstate secondment, as some friends once were from Adelaide to Canberra for the Tax Office, they were entitled to take leave equal to the amount of time accrued while on that secondment. If they were away for one month, they were entitled to take one and a half days leave and receive travelling allowances and so forth for those one and a half days.
Clearly, it would give an appearance of bias when you are writing the business case if you could get it business class air ticket to the other side of the world and then take a long holiday on the way back. Appearances count, especially when you are thinking about taxpayers’ money.
New Zealand government departments seem to employ a lot of contractors as policy analysts. I have never heard of such things in Canberra when working at the Department of Finance, the Prime Minister’s Department and the Productivity Commission.
If a manager could not recruit and retain enough analysts to work through peaks and troughs in the workload, you were not a very good manager. If it was a real crisis, you found someone who was not busy from within the organisation and had them seconded to your team.
In more than a few places, these contractors seemed to be good friends of the manager. These contractors can be hired so quickly and in such number that a new manager can find no time to talk to his existing staff about what they do now, what they might do in the coming months or what skill sets they might have. Is always a bit odd that new managers can hire a couple of contractors but not have time to sign a performance agreement with any of his staff in that year.
I was talking to a colleague, also a migrant to this country from another state sector about how he would always refuse attempts by people to buy him lunch or a beer. Like me, he would be up the back eating his own sandwiches while the senior executives tucked into 3 course lunches plus wine provided by various lobby groups.
Until I came to New Zealand, the taxpayer had never bought me lunch or a beer. I was careful to refusal offers of hospitality. If an offer was made, I thought they were up to something.
But worst of all, worse than any of this veniality, the worst culture shock of all was until I came to Wellington, I had never been to a team meeting. When I was asked to go to my first team meeting, the 2nd day on the job, I just had to wing it.
In Australia, managers are expected to keep staff in the loop and staff are expected to talk to each other about what they are working on in case they can help each other. Managers and staff are expected to be frugal with their time as well as the taxpayers’ money paying their salaries.
Didn’t realise how regressive the first 100 days of @nzlabour were! 2/8 at best for decent public policy
03 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, rentseeking
This has a disturbingly wide application
01 Feb 2018 1 Comment
in applied price theory, Public Choice Tags: anti-capitalist mentality, anti-foreign bias, anti-market bias

.@amnestynz is no longer about freeing prisoners of conscience, fair trials for political prisoners and opposition to torture and the death penalty. Its mission creep even extends to supporting abortion rights.
01 Feb 2018 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, International law, law and economics

Jordan B Peterson on “But That Wasn’t Real Communism, Socialism, or Marxism!”
31 Jan 2018 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, economics of crime, history of economic thought, law and economics, Marxist economics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: fall of communism, The fatal conceit
The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping the Electorate
30 Jan 2018 2 Comments
in constitutional political economy, politics - USA, Public Choice
Boston Mayor Curley had the rare distinction of winning his first election from prison and his last while under federal indictment for corruption which he was soon convicted of while in office.
Curley won his first election in 1904 as an alderman on the slogan “he did it for a friend”. He sat a civil service exam for a friend to get him a job. He quickly then handed out 700 patronage jobs once he once he got out of prison to serve as an alderman.
In 1945, he was re-elected mayor. Truman commuted his 6 to 18 month sentence after 5 months in 1948 at the behest of the Massachusetts congressional delegation and later (1950) granted him a full pardon.
Curley was then defeated by the acting mayor during his prison term in the subsequent Democratic party primary in part because of the high taxes under the Curley regime. Naturally, during his lame-duck period, Curley granted many tax abatements to sabotage the public finances of his successor.
Jordan Peterson: Why is Marxism so Attractive?
29 Jan 2018 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economic history, economics of crime, environmental economics, history of economic thought, law and economics, Marxist economics, Public Choice, war and peace Tags: fall of communism, Nazi Germany
How to shut up a marxist (Jordan Peterson speech)
28 Jan 2018 2 Comments
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economic history, economics of crime, history of economic thought, income redistribution, law and economics, Marxist economics, poverty and inequality, Public Choice Tags: fall of communism, Twitter left
The Vision of Jeffrey Sachs
28 Jan 2018 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, development economics, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, entrepreneurship, growth disasters, growth miracles, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: overseas aid, The fatal conceit
Alan Dershowitz to Democrats “Face it We Lost!”
27 Jan 2018 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economics of crime, law and economics, politics - USA, Public Choice
Our house too big for ultrafast broadband hook-up @stevenljoyce @TaxpayersUnion @EricCrampton
26 Jan 2018 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice
Your picking loses detector is at maximum when governments are retrofitting infrastructure in the suburbs. We just had Chorus in to retrofit ultrafast broadband to our house. Our house is too big and complicated to rewire.

In addition to stringing a wire from the road to a ATC box, as with everybody, we need to rewire from that box to my office for another ultrafast broadband box next to my computer on the other side of the house 2 floors up. I was told I would need an electrician to do that as the house is already built, most of the wires will probably be external, ugly and I would have to pay for it and the drilling through my floors.
Seems like the political genius behind government paying for ultra fast broadband including fitting it into my house assumed everybody had a nice simple one story house where the office was near the ACT box so there would be minimal rewiring. That would involve minimal internal wiring.
If I want to proceed, I need to bring in an electrician and as the house is already been built, he will need to drill holes, string wires and then the chorus team will come back. The alternative was to have my modem just above the ATC box in the spare bedroom and the rest of the house operate including my desktop in my office on Wi-Fi which seems to very must defeat point of ultrafast broadband indeed.
Slippery @jamespeshaw admits he does not know the cost of #globalwarming. Had to go to ombudsman to get him to admit that. Maybe he should ask for those projections and considered ministerial advice on the same
25 Jan 2018 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, global warming, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice

Did banning alcohol in 1837 fit in with deliberate genocide?
25 Jan 2018 Leave a comment
in discrimination, health economics, politics - Australia, Public Choice
Laws banning the sale of alcohol to aboriginals were first passed in 1837. Later that century the ban was extended to opium. In time, all states and territories banned the sale of alcohol to aboriginals.
Australia figures prominently in the Journal of Genocide Research. The black armband theory of Australian history alleges genocidal intent towards Australian aboriginals by the state and territory protectors of aboriginals and their accomplices. Then why the ban on alcohol and the opium?
There were strong temperance movements in Australia in the first half of the 20th century. They achieved considerable political success. Their intention was to save their fellow Australians from the demon drink.

Why then was a policy of alcohol prohibition extended to aboriginals when the state protectors aboriginals were apparently according to the black armband theory of history practising genocide?
A credible theory must make risky predictions and strictly forbid certain things if its fundamental thesis is valid. Temperance movements were well-intentioned attempts to save their fellow man and, in particular, husbands and sons. The pubs closed at 6 for white Australians and were not open at all for aboriginals.
Why was this well-intentioned policy to save people from the demon drink extended to aboriginals in an era of genocide against aboriginals? Certainly, genocidal governments of that time would have known that binge drinking would have helped kill off the aboriginal people. Did they just miss a step? Keep missing that step from 1837 until 1972?
Something does not add up here? Drinking was seen as a serious social evil. The supposedly otherwise genocidal state and territory protectors of aboriginals sought to protect aboriginals from this serious social evil.
Genocidal state and territory protectors of aboriginals, if it is true they were intent on a genocide, must be expected to do little or nothing to promote aboriginal welfare. Yet they sought bans on alcohol and opium.

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