Who had the most colonies?
05 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in development economics, economic history, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: age of empires, British empire, colonisation
Vast right-wing conspiracy alert: economists must be double secret Republicans!
05 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in labour economics, occupational choice, politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: vast right-wing conspiracy, voted demographics
There were 2,412 donations from Economists, in the last two election cycles. They gave 3 times as often to Democrats. http://t.co/c8tnQ9Vv15—
Justin Wolfers (@JustinWolfers) June 03, 2015
via How Democratic or Republican is your job? This tool tells you. – The Washington Post.
Is there a Republican sociologist in America?
05 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in occupational choice, politics - USA, population economics, Public Choice Tags: campaign finance regulation, voted demographics
Exactly one person identified themselves as a sociologist & gave money to Republicans (in the past 2 election cycles) http://t.co/JP9RAoRgiF—
Justin Wolfers (@JustinWolfers) June 04, 2015
The scramble for Africa 1880 – 1913
05 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, economic history, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: Africa, British empire, colonialism
Africa in 1880 vs. 1913 – brilliantmaps.com/africa-1914/ http://t.co/mLSSZfG0Co—
Brilliant Maps (@BrilliantMaps) May 31, 2015
John Key’s 2017 tax cuts will not be “modest”
04 Jun 2015 3 Comments
in economic growth, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, public economics
Bill English’s 2015 New Zealand Budget foreshadows a $1.5 billion allowance in the 2017 budget for “modest tax cuts”. Any reasonable mock-up of these tax cuts, such as in table 1 using the numbers on the Treasury website for revenue losses for small tax changes show that Prime Minster Key is planning his own fistful of dollars in the lead up to the 2017 election.
Table 1: hypothetical 2017 National Party tax cuts, $1.5 billion
| Current tax rate | New tax rate | Revenue loss, static scoring |
Revenue loss, dynamic scoring |
| 33% | 31.5% | $323m | $274m |
| 30% | 27.5% | $388m | $329.4m |
| 17.5% | 16.5% | $505m | $429.3m |
| Trust tax 33% | Trust tax 31.5% | $135m | $129m |
| Company tax rate 28% | 27.5% | $113m | $90m |
| Total cost | $1.465b | $1251m |
No serious participant in public policy debate could suggest that tax cuts of the size in table 1 will not have incentive effects that will lead to growth in incomes and business profits. There will be offsetting tax revenue increases that make a more ambitious tax package possible in 2017.
The Treasury’s website on revenue losses forecasts that a 1% increase in wages growth will increase tax revenue by $300 million. A 1% increase in the growth rate of taxable business profits will increase tax revenues by $140 million again according to the Treasury. These are big differences.
Any sensible discussion of the 2017 tax cuts should be against a background of what is called dynamic scoring to use the American parlance.
When the NZ Treasury “scores” revenue losses from tax cuts on its website, its estimates of revenue changes assume no changes in behaviour. Dynamic scoring takes behavioural effects into account.
The Congressional Budget Office was recently required to use dynamic scoring when costing major tax policy proposals. New Zealand should follow this path.

Table 2 makes conservative assumptions about the behavioural effects of income tax cuts. I follow Mankiw, N. Gregory and Matthew Weinzierl “Dynamic Scoring: A Back-of-the-Envelope Guide,” Journal of Public Economics (September 2006): 1415-1433. They argue that, in the long run, about 17% of a cut in individual income taxes is recouped through higher economic growth. For a cut in company taxes, their figure is 50%. I assume 15% is recouped in this way for individuals, 20% for companies and 5% for trusts.
Table 2: hypothetical 2017 National Party tax cuts, $1.5 billion, dynamic scoring of revenue effects
| Current tax rate | New tax rate | Revenue loss static Scoring |
Revenue loss dynamic scoring |
| 33% | 31% | $430m | $366m |
| 30% | 27% | $465m | $395m |
| 17.5% | 16.5% | $505m | $429m |
| Trust tax 33% | Trust tax 31% | $180m | $171m |
| Company tax rate 28% | 27% | $225m | $180m |
| Total cost | $1.805b | $1.541b |
The $200-300 million in revenue increases from higher incomes and higher business profits incentivised by lower tax rates is not a trivial sum. It is enough on its own to cut one percentage point of the company tax rate. Spread around as in table 2, there are enough to knock another one-half of a percentage point of the top tax rate, the second top tax rate and the company tax rate. The $1.5 billion in tax cuts planned for 2017 will be neither modest in their size nor in their behavioural effects.
No budget should be published and no party in an election should assert that large changes in the tax system have no behavioural effects. Dynamic scoring makes a big difference to what scale of tax cuts are possible.
There are practical hurdles to dynamic scoring but static scoring has more important ones. The hurdles of dynamic scoring are:
- Economists do not know how to accurately measure the growth effects of most policies
- Dynamic scoring relies on less-than-accurate, theory-based macro models
- The macro models undergirding dynamic scoring have numerous controversial and unproven built-in assumptions
- The assumptions embedded in the macro models are not always carefully empirically based
- Macro models exclude theoretically and empirically supported evidence of supply-side effects of public investment
- Macro models exclude evidence-based effects of economic inequality
- Macro models exclude evidence-based effects of numerous policies
- Macro models provide different estimates of growth impacts of policy depending on guesses of how the policy may be finance
Against that is dynamic scoring removes the bias against pro-growth policies in current budgetary scoring:
[A] theoretical advantage of accurate dynamic scoring is that it is not biased against pro-growth policies compared to the current conventional scoring method. By ignoring macroeconomic effects, the conventional method overstates the true budgetary cost of pro-growth policies, such as infrastructure investments, and understates the cost of anti-growth policies.
To close on some New Zealand politics, Prime Minister Key, who is known as the smiling assassin, overtook the Labour Party and the Greens on their left In the 2015 Budget by increasing welfare benefits for the first time since 1972 in real terms, and by a large amount ($25 a week), and also increasing family tax credits.
Prime Minister Key well then pivot to the right in 2017 with a fistful of dollars to firmly camp himself over both the centre-left in the centre-right to be re-elected for a fourth term against an increasingly hapless and out-manoeuvred opposition.
The surprising divergences in the congressional gender gap by party
04 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in politics - USA, population economics, Public Choice Tags: gender gap
Why the pipeline of GOP female politicians is dry: Too few are highly conservative. nyti.ms/1Fp4JNW http://t.co/kst4so4kyH—
The Upshot (@UpshotNYT) June 01, 2015
A Bootleggers and Baptists alliance against e-cigarettes
03 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: bootleggers and baptists, economics of smoking, meddlesome preferences, pressure groups
Where people are the most and least racially tolerant
02 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of media and culture, gender, labour economics, Public Choice Tags: Age of Enlightenment, maps, racial discrimination, racial tolerance, racism
Was the Battle of Jutland decisive?
31 May 2015 1 Comment
in Gordon Tullock, war and peace Tags: World War I
Many unions have exemptions from local minimum wage laws they helped pass
31 May 2015 Leave a comment
in income redistribution, labour economics, minimum wage, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking, unions Tags: bootleggers and baptists, cartels, rent seeking, union power, union wage premium
The British electorate is almost as right-wing as New Zealand’s
30 May 2015 Leave a comment
People in Britain who bothered to vote: on the whole, as @NickCohen4 points out, fairly Right-wing http://t.co/BFYRBVnray—
Michael Deacon (@MichaelPDeacon) May 30, 2015
The Green vote can only head south under James Shaw or why he must win Wellington Central
30 May 2015 Leave a comment
in politics - New Zealand, Public Choice Tags: expressive voting, James Shaw, New Zealand Greens, New Zealand Labour Party, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, swinging voter, tactical voting, vote parking
The New Zealand Greens have elected a new male co-leader. James Shaw is a first term MP who is supposed to consolidate and build the green vote from 10%. At the last election, the Greens were targeting a 15% party vote. Their vote fell from 11.1% to 10.7%.
I doubt that he can do it because much of the improvement of the Green vote since the 2005 election has been an expense of the Labour Party.
The Green vote was pretty sickly at 5-7% when the Labour Party was popular in government between 1999 and 2005. In the 2005 election, the Greens failed to reach the 5% party vote threshold necessary to win seats in Parliament on election night. It was only saved by absentee and postal votes that pushed its party vote up to 5.3%.
Maybe 30% of the Green vote, perhaps more, is made up of disgruntled Labour Party voters awaiting the call home. These disgruntled Labour voters will vote for the Labour Party again when it is fit for government.
Once there is a Labour–Green government in New Zealand, the Green vote faces the recurring theme that green parties lose a substantial part of their vote whenever they get into government such as happened federally in Australia and in Tasmania.
If the Greens go into government with about 7% of the party vote in the 2017 or 2020 New Zealand general elections, the Greens face the real prospect of of being voted out of Parliament completely in the 2023 New Zealand general election if their vote drops below 5%.
James Shaw happened to run for the Wellington Central electorate in the 2014 general election. He did not ask for the electorate vote in that election. Only the party vote.
Wellington Central has one of the highest green party votes in New Zealand. The Green party vote is 2000 more than Labour’s party vote in Wellington Central although the National Party won the party vote with 14,000 party votes.
Given the fact that the Greens may dropped below 5% by 2020, James Shaw would be wise to try to win Wellington Central in 2017 as a safety margin. If a party wins electorate seat under MMP, their party vote counts towards winning list MPs even if they win less than 5% of the party vote.
To add a twist to the tail, the deputy leader of the Labour Party, Grant Robertson, is the sitting member for Wellington Central with a margin of 8000 votes. If the current leader of the opposition fails at his job, Grant Robertson is his natural replacement.
There’s not much room at the top of the Labour Party list for defeated electoral seat candidates because of the last election Labour’s party vote was so low that it was only eligible for five list MPs. The last of these was the current leader of the opposition prove wasn’t even elected on election night but got back into Parliament on postal and absentee votes.
To complicate Grant Robinson’s golden parachute even further, the Labour Party has a policy that 50% of its caucus should be female by 2017 and the party list should be drawn up with that gender quota in mind. Grant Robertson may be a victim of this policy if he does not win Wellington Central.
More than a few careers hinge on the election of James Shaw as male co-leader of the Greens including the very survival of his party. It would be a tight race, but James Shaw could win Wellington Central.
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