
The balance of payments always balances
11 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in international economics Tags: balance of payments, capital account surpluses, current account deficits, economic fallacies
How do trade imbalances affect the #economy? buff.ly/1e32Dg9 http://t.co/8TsPbxXlvf—
MRUniversity (@MRevUniversity) June 10, 2015
The current-account deficit is a false problem
01 Jul 2014 1 Comment
in applied welfare economics, international economics Tags: capital account surpluses, current account deficits, foreign investment, international trade in savings, John Cowperthwaite
The current account balance equals net foreign investment. When net foreign investment is positive, the current account is in deficit. The current account balance is the result of the international trade in savings and the relative rewards and incentives of investing at home or abroad:
- The current account is in surplus when national saving is greater than net domestic investment; and
- The current account is in deficit when national saving is less than net domestic investment.
New Zealand can import more than it exports courtesy of this foreign investment.
- The difference between exports and imports, or net exports, is the trade balance.
- But for net foreign investment, the trade balance would have to always balance.
For most of the last 20-years, exports have been the same as imports, more or less, so the New Zealand current account deficit has little to do with the level of exports or imports.

A current account could be called a capital account surplus, but this label lacks that certain demonic ring the media laps up. Deficits are bad, surpluses are good. How can a surplus be bad? Who wants to cut a surplus?
John Cowperthwaite solved Hong Kong’s current account problems by not collecting trade statistics. His concern was:
If I let them compute those statistics, they’ll want to use them for planning.
Cowperthwaite refused to collect economic statistics
for fear that I might be forced to do something about them
If New Zealand did not collect trade statistics, would anyone be the worse off? How would we notice?
People knew that unemployment and inflation were a problem long before statistics agencies descended upon us.
The better solutions to unemployment and inflation are rules-based and were developed again long before statistics were collected.
Rules based policy regimes that attempt to stabilise unemployment and inflation often reject discretionary responses to the latest statistical releases.
Indeed, the main focus of rules based policy regimes is to prevent monetary and fiscal policy from becoming an independent source of instability. The secret of inflation targeting is to do as little as possible and not make things worse by doing much more that keeping monetary supply growth in check.
What is the welfare cost of a current account deficit and how does it compare?
- Welfare cost of inflation of 10% is maybe 1-2% of national income; and
- The annual welfare cost of the post-war business cycle is about 1% of national income.
People apparently fear the current account because it may lead to recessions and inflation. But the current account must be a small component of the factors contributing to the welfare cost of inflation and the annual welfare cost of the post-war business cycle.
There are a large number of other factors that cause recessions and and one factor that causes inflation. These must get their share of the 1-2% of national income that is the welfare cost of post-war business cycles and inflation of 10%. Adding up constraints mean that the welfare cost of the current account deficit, if there is such a welfare cost, must be small.
Scobie, Zhang and Makin (2008) found average income gains of $2,600 per New Zealand worker on a cumulative basis from capital inflows over the period 1996 – 2006. International capital mobility allows New Zealand to fund additional investment from external sources which raises wages in New Zealand because there is more technology and capital per worker in New Zealand. To the extent that foreign investment occurs, it raises the amount of capital in a country, driving wages up and profits down.
The current account reflects the relative returns of investing at home and abroad and any consumption smoothing. People save and borrow to smooth out consumption during any temporary ups and downs in their annual incomes.
The current-account balance typically gets worse—moves into deficit—in good times. Reason for this is in good times, people anticipate higher permanent incomes in the future and start spending now before the higher income actually arrives.
New Zealand and Australia based their prosperity on borrowing in anticipation of future increases in production based on exploiting the ample land and natural resources in New Zealand and Australia. This increase of wealth could be spread out over many periods including before it actually arrived because of the ability to borrow in the international credit markets in anticipation of permanently higher future incomes.
The end of the great inflation in Australia in 1990 was a policy accident
02 May 2014 Leave a comment
in macroeconomics, Milton Friedman, politics - Australia Tags: current account deficits, inflation, monetary policy
No one under 40 has an adult memory of inflation in Australia. They have forgotten what high inflation was like.

Those older than 40 have forgotten how inflation was tamed.
Edward Nelson’s paper ‘Monetary policy neglect and the Great Inflation in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand‘ is good on this. His paper trawls through the press reports of the 1970s onwards to document exactly what the views of the day were of the causes of inflation:
- Policy-makers at least from 1971 viewed inflation as resulting from factors beyond their control, not as a consequence of their monetary policy decisions;
- Policy-makers embraced non-monetary approaches against inflation in a manner that defied political classification; and
- Highly interventionist strategies of compulsory wage and price controls was adopted by the traditionally more anti-interventionist of the major political parties;
The Governments and Reserve Bank of the 1970s and 1980s attributed the double-digit inflation of that time to a range of causes other than loose monetary policy.
1988 witnessed a major monetary policy tightening in Australia.
The tightening itself was motivated by balance-of-payments rather than inflation considerations. It was that old bogey, the current account deficit. The current account is the most pernicious statistic published.
The fall in inflation to 3% in 1991 transformed the views of policymakers and observers about the role of monetary policy in inflation control.
As late as 1990, the Governor of the Reserve Bank rejected central-bank inflation targeting as infeasible in Australia, and cited the need to use other tools such as wages policy.
When inflation fell below 3% in early 1991—clearly a response to the period of monetary restraint – I can assure you that none of the briefings to ministers at that time forecasted inflation to fall so rapidly.
Policy attitudes changed all through brute experience; no neo-liberal conspiracies here. Milton Friedman was still a swear word back then and the idea that inflation was a monetary phenomenon was still career limiting.
Gruen and Stevens (2000) record that in the 1990s, “the main insight of two centuries of monetary economics… that monetary policy ultimately determined inflation” convinced the authorities that non-monetary approaches to inflation control should be abandoned in favour of central-bank inflation targeting.
The current account did not change much as a result of the deep recession designed to bring it under control. The current account deficit as a major policy problem was quietly forgotten.
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