Firstly, majority government will always be tempted to manipulate political rights to increase its chances of re-election. If it is free to change the timing of the election, for instance, it may choose a moment when economic conjunctures are favourable.
Secondly, a majority may set aside the rule of law under the sway of a standing interest or a momentary passion. This was Madison’s main worry:
In all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger.
Thirdly, here is the case of a popular majority acting (through its representatives) to further its economic interests.
Fourthly, there is the case of a popular majority acting (through its representatives) under a sudden impulse, a momentary passion. There are references by American founders such as Randolph to "the turbulence and follies of " and "the fury of democracy," by Hamilton to "the popular passions [which] spread like wild fire, and become irresistable," and by Madison to "fickleness and passion," and "the turbulency and violence of unruly passion."
Fifthly, there is the case of a popular majority acting (through its representatives) from a standing, permanent passion. This is different from a majority passion that is "sudden," "fickle," "unruly," and the like. The more permanent passions and prejudices that might fashion the will of the majority is in the late twentieth century the outstanding danger of majority rule. But this can be majoritarianism based on religious, ethnic and racial divides that lead to a permanent majority and a permanent minority.
There are four counter-majoritarian, rights-protecting devices: constitutional entrenchment of rights, judicial review, separation of powers and checks and balances.
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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