Ronald Coase on the emergence of the firm

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Ronald Coase on what economists do!

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Why does government fail?

HT: coordinationproblem

Richard Epstein on getting environmental law right

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Advertising and free speech: the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market

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The separation of ownership from control

Eugene Fama divides firms into two types:  the managerial firm,  and the entrepreneurial firm.

The owners of a managerial firm advance, withdraw, and redeploy capital, carry the residual investment risks of ownership and have the ultimate decision making rights over the fate of the firm (Klein 1999; Foss and Lien 2010; Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b; Jensen and Meckling 1976).

Owners of a managerial firm, by definition, will delegate control to expert managerial employees appointed by boards of directors elected by the shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b). The owners of a managerial firm will incur costs in observing with considerable imprecision the actual efforts, due diligence, true motives and entrepreneurial shrewdness of the managers and directors they hired (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983b).

Owners need to uncover whether a substandard performance is due to mismanagement, high costs, paying the employees too much or paying too little, excessive staff turnover, inferior products, or random factors beyond the control of their managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983b, 1985). Any paucity in knowledge slows the reactions of owners in correcting managerial errors including slip-ups in the recruitment and the retention of experienced older employees.

The entrepreneurial firms are owned and managed by the same people (Fama and Jensen 1983b). Mediocre personnel policies and sub-standard staff retention practices within entrepreneurial firms are disciplined by these errors in judgement by owner-managers feeding straight back into the returns on the capital that these owner-managers themselves invested. Owner-managers can learn quickly and can act faster in response the discovery of errors in judgement. The drawback of entrepreneurial firms is not every investor wants to be hands-on even if they had the skills and nor do they want to risk being undiversified.

Many of the shareholders in managerial firms have too small a stake to gain from monitoring managerial effort, employee performance, capital budgets, the control of costs and the stinginess or generosity of wage and employment policies (Manne 1965; Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b; Williamson 1985; Jensen and Meckling 1976). This lack of interest by small and diversified investors does not undo the status of the firm as a competitive investment.

Large firms are run by managers hired by diversified owners because this outcome is the most profitable form of organisation to raise capital and then find the managerial talent to put this pool of capital to its most profitable uses (Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b, 1985; Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Alchian and Woodward 1987, 1988).

More active investors will hesitate to invest in large managerial firms whose governance structures tolerate excessive corporate waste and do not address managerial slack and error. Financial entrepreneurs will win risk-free profits from being alert and being first to buy or sell shares in the better or worse governed firms that come to their notice.

The risks to dividends and capital because of manifestations of corporate waste, reduced employee effort, and managerial slack and aggrandisement in large managerial firms are risks that are well known to investors (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jenson 1983b). Corporate waste and managerial slack also increase the chances of a decline in sales and even business failure because of product market competition (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983b). Investors will expect an offsetting risk premium before they buy shares in more ill-governed managerial firms. This is because without this top-up on dividends, they can invest in plenty of other options that foretell a higher risk-adjusted rate of return.

The discovery of monitoring or incentive systems that induce managers to act in the best interest of shareholders are entrepreneurial opportunities for pure profit (Fama and Jensen 1983b, 1985; Alchian and Woodward 1987, 1988; Demsetz 1983, 1986; Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). Investors will not entrust their funds to who are virtual strangers unless they expect to profit from a specialisation and a division of labour between asset management and managerial talent and in capital supply and residual risk bearing (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b; Demsetz and Lehn 1985). There are other investment formats that offer more predictable, more certain rate of returns.

Competition from other firms will force the evolution of devices within the firms that survive for the efficient monitoring the performance of the entire team of employees and of individual members of those teams as well as managers (Fama 1980, Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b; Demsetz and Lehn 1985). These management controls must proxy as cost-effectively as they can having an owner-manager on the spot to balance the risks and rewards of innovating.

The reward for forming a well-disciplined managerial firm despite the drawbacks of diffuse ownership is the ability to raise large amounts in equity capital from investors seeking diversification and limited liability (Demsetz 1967; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983b; Demsetz and Lehn 1985).Portfolio investors may know little about each other and only so much about the firm because diversification and limited liability makes this knowledge less important (Demsetz 1967; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Alchian and Woodward 1987, 1988).

It is still unwise to still suppose that portfolio investors will keep relinquishing control over part of their capital to virtual strangers who do not manage the resources entrusted to them in the best interests of the shareholders (Demsetz 1967; Williamson 1985; Fama 1980, 1983b; Alchian and Woodward 1987, 1988).

Managerial firms who are not alert enough to develop cost effective solutions to incentive conflicts and misalignments will not grow to displace rival forms of corporate organisation and methods of raising equity capital and loans, allocating legal liability, diversifying risk, organising production, replacing less able management teams, and monitoring and rewarding employees (Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b; Fama 1980; Alchian 1950).

Entrepreneurs win profits from creating corporate governance structures that can credibly assure current and future investors that their interests are protected and their shares are likely to prosper (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b, 1985; Demsetz 1986; Demsetz and Lehn 1985). Corporate governance is the set of control devices that are developed in response to conflicts of interest in a firm (Fama and Jensen 1983b).

Spans of control and the cost of entrepreneurial time

One constraint on the growth of any firm is entrepreneurs have a limited span of control (Coase 1937; Williamson 1967, Lucas 1978; Oi 1983a, 1983b). A span of control is the number of subordinates that an individual supervisor has to control and lead either directly or through a hierarchical managerial chain (Fox 2009).

There are only so many tasks that even the most able entrepreneurs can carry out in one day. Over-stretched spans of control motivate entrepreneurs to hire professional managers and delegate to them a wide range of decision-making rights over the firms they own (Williamson 1975; Foss, Foss and Klein 2008).

Entrepreneurs and the professional managers they hired to assist them must divide their respective time between monitoring employees, identifying new business opportunities, forecasting buyer demand and running the other aspects of their business (Lucas, 1978; Oi 1983, 1983b, 1988; Foss, Foss, and Klein 2008). The larger is the firm, the more employees there are for the entrepreneur to direct, monitor and reward. These costs of directing and monitoring employees will increase with the size of the firm and larger firms will encounter information problems not present in smaller firms (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Stigler 1962).

The cost of entrepreneurial time spent monitoring employees will increase with the size of the firm (Lucas 1978; Oi 1983b). The time of the more talented entrepreneurs is more valuable because they had the superior managerial skills and entrepreneurial alertness to make their firms large in the first place and remain deft enough to survive in competition. Time spent on the supervision of employees is time that is spent away from other uses of the talents that got these more able entrepreneurs to the top and keeps them there (Williamson 1967; Lucas 1978; Oi 1983b, 1988, 1990; Idson and Oi 1999; Black et al 1999).

Firms in the same industry tend to exhibit systematic differences in their organization of production and the structure of their workforces because entrepreneurial ability is the specific and scarce production input that limits the size of a firm (Lucas, 1978; Oi 1983b). The less able entrepreneurs tend to run the smaller firms while the more able entrepreneurs tend to lead both the currently large firms and the smaller firms that are growing at the expense of market rivals (Lucas 1978, Oi 1983b; Stigler 1958; Alchian 1950).

Reinterpreting market failure as market success

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The best of the online materials by and about Ronald Coase

Ronald Coase

Obituaries

The Telegraph

The Guardian

Financial Times

Independent

New York Times

Economist

University of Chicago on the announcement of his death

University of Chicago Ronald H. Coase, Founding Scholar in Law and Economics, 1910-2013

Steve Medema

Recent interviews and op-eds:

1997 Interview Interview in Reason Magazine

2001 A conversation with Ronald H. Coase

2002 Why Economics Will Change Speech on why economics will and ought to change

2003 Coase Centennial Speech (video) Speech at the University of Chicago Law School

2002 Ronald H. Coase, The Intellectual Portrait Series: A Conversation with Ronald H. Coase 

2010 Interview on 100th Birthday Interview on Ronald Coase’s 100th birthday

2012 Coase on Externalities, the Firm, and the State of Economics

2012 WSJ Opinion Article, with Ning Wang Opinion article by Ronald Coase and Ning Wang concerning the development of modern China, in the Wall Street Journal, April 6, 2012.

2012 Harvard Business Review Article Article by Ronald Coase concerning the need to reengage modern economics with the economy, in the Harvard Business Review, December 2012.

2013 Cato Policy Report Article, with Ning Wang Article by Ronald Coase and Ning Wang summarizing the work of their book on China, in the Cato Policy Report, January/February 2013.

2012 Small Business Economics Interview on 102nd Birthday Interview conducted by Siri Terjesen and Ning Wang.

2013 Interview Interview with Ronald Coase, conducted by Ning Wang. (Some material is in Chinese.)

About Ronald Coase

Nobel award 1991 Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel

Coase’s work in perspective Nobel Foundation, on the 1991 prize in economics

Essay on Coase’s work The Swedes Get It Right, by David Friedman

Richard Posner on Coase and his methodology 

Don Boudreaux on Coase

Ronald H. Coase. Biography. Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.

Ronald Coase—The Nature of Firms and Their Costs by Robert L. Formaini and Thomas F. Siems

Best of his papers

2013 How China Became Capitalist Cato Policy report with Ning Wang

2013 Saving Economics from Economists Havard Business Review

2000 The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 43, No. 1 (April 2000), pp. 15-31. pdf

1996 Law and Economics and A. W. Brian Simpson Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 103-119.

1993 Law and Economics at Chicago Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 36, No. 1, Part 2 (April 1993), pp. 239-254.

1992 The Institutional Structure of Production The American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 4 (September 1992), pp. 713-719. pdf

1988 Blackmail Virginia Law Review, Vol. 74, No. 4 (May 1988), pp. 655-676. pdf

1988 The Nature of the Firm: Origin Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 3-17. pdf

1988 The Nature of the Firm: Meaning Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 19-32.

1988 The Nature of the Firm: Influence Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 33-47.

1979 Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2 (October 1979), pp. 269-328.

1978 Economics and Contiguous Disciplines The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June 1978), pp. 201-211.

1977 Advertising and Free Speech The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 1977), pp. 1-34.

1976 Adam Smith’s View of Man Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 19, No. 3 (October 1976), pp. 529-546. pdf

1975 Marshall on Method Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 18, No. 1 (April 1975), pp. 25-31.

1974 The Lighthouse in Economics Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2 (October 1974), pp. 357-376.

1974 The Choice of the Institutional Framework: A Comment Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2 (October 1974), pp. 493-496.

1974 The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas (in The Economics of the First Amendment) The American Economic Review

1972 The Appointment of Pigou as Marshall’s Successor Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 15, No. 2 (October 1972), pp. 473-485.

1972 Durability and Monopoly Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 15, No. 1 (April 1972), pp. 143-149.

1972 Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect Vol 3: Policy Issues and Research Opportunities in Industrial Organization

1970 The Theory of Public Utility Pricing and Its Application The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1970), pp. 113-128.

1966 The Economics of Broadcasting and Government Policy (in The Economics of Broadcasting and Advertising) The American Economic Review, Vol. 56, No. 1/2 (March 1966), pp.440-447.

1960 The Problem of Social Cost Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 3 (October 1960), pp. 1-44 pdf

 1959 The Federal Communications Commission Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 2 (October 1959), pp. 1-40 pdf

1946 The Marginal Cost Controversy Economica, New Series, Vol. 13, No. 51 (August 1946), pp. 169-182.

1937 The Nature of the Firm Economica, New Series, Vol. 4, No. 16 (November 1937), pp. 386-405 pdf

Reviews of Others’ Work

1977 Reviewed Work: Selected Economic Essays and Addresses by Arnold Plant Journal of Economic Literature, Vo.. 15, No. 1 (Mar. 1977), pp. 86-88.

some via http://www.coase.org/coaseonline.htm

The Chinese capitalist miracle – guest post by Alan Moran

The Chinese economic miracle is the latest and most comprehensive success story since the end of World War II.

Front Cover

Veteran economists Ronald Coase and Ning Wang explain how in the space of three decades one of the world’s poorest countries became the world’s leading manufacturer and investor. They attempt to disentangle the twists and turns of Chinese politics and economics in its voyage to success within a framework which rightly judges that no system other than capitalism (which the book calls the market economy), could ever produce such an outcome.

In retrospect the internal contradictions within Communism (absence of appropriate incentives, attenuated property rights, politicisation of business decisions and prices and so on) made its collapse inevitable. But that was not clear in 1970 or even 1980. Yes, communist economies in both the Soviet bloc and China were stagnating. But there were many believing and hoping that the future was about to emerge to demonstrate that socialism actually does work. Intellectuals in particular thought that socialism, which accorded them the status and perks they considered they richly deserved, with a little more reform would demonstrate that the bourgeoisie were unnecessary.

Though the collapse of Communism took place almost simultaneously across the world, a remarkable contrast is evident between Chinese Communism’s self-control of its demise and the relatively bloodless overthrow of the system in Europe.

The Europeans delegitimised their Communist Parties and ostensibly opted for a western capitalist system that incorporated democracy and liberty-more so in the former satellites than in the USSR successor states. On the other hand, China’s Communist Party continued to maintain its monopoly of political control, vigorously and sometimes brutally suppressing any challenges. Chinese communists adopted capitalism shorn of the democracy and liberty that many considered to be an essential part of its make-up. And in supervising a gradual dismantling of socialism, its raison d’etre, China’s Communist Party watched over the longest and highest rate of economic growth the world has ever seen. One indicator of this is steel production, traditionally a key indicator of industrialisation. Having increased twentyfold in the past 30 years, China’s steel output now accounts for half the world’s supply, up from 7 per cent in 1980.

How did this happen? How did a ruling political party numbering millions of apparently dedicated Marxists-Leninists retain its power in the decades following 1978 while permitting and facilitating an economic development approach totally alien to its proclaimed ideology? And how did that same Party evolve from a proselytising socialist force to one that welcomed diversity? Coase and Wang offer important insights but leave plenty for others to explain. By the late 1950s, Communist China, like underperforming organised societies of yesteryear, was seeking out ways to catch up with the west. Calls for modernisation started to become increasingly insistent on the part of China’s leadership. The first ‘four modernisations’ program was initiated by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964 and was aborted by the Cultural Revolution of 1971; other modernisations were subsequently endorsed, including in 1978 (Mao died in 1976) by Deng Xiaoping, shortly before one of his downfalls. The catch-up program sought to emulate the successes without adopting the institutions of capitalism-free enterprise, personal ownership, and the rule of law. Progress was therefore transient.

As well as promising a fairer society, socialism had been the supposed key to a more efficient and richer society. But Coase and Wang note early questionings of socialism. By 1984 when Hu Yaobang, as General Secretary of the Communist Party, had taken this further in asking, ‘Since the October revolution (of 1917) more than 60 years have passed. How is it that many socialist countries have not been able to overtake capitalist ones in terms of development? What is it (in socialism) that does not work?’

Hu Yaobang would not have been the first to voice such concerns even though they questioned the party’s core beliefs. Even so, not many people would have had sufficient information to raise such doubts partly because censorship severely limited information-even to senior party members-about the extent of China’s backwardness and how western economies operate. Overseas trips provided rude awakenings as when in 1978, Vice Premier Wang Zhen visited England and found his salary was only one sixth that of a London garbage collector.

While the European Communist systems pursued catch-up by having state enterprises adopt new western technologies and practices, China from the mid-1980s was looking at grafting capitalism itself onto Communism. The proximity of China to the Asian Tigers of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea provided an object lesson for success, especially since the entrepreneurial leaders of the first three were the children of uneducated emigrants from China itself. Not only therefore did the Chinese have the failures of socialism as an example but they also could see the astonishing successes of these newly enriched capitalist countries.

Deng Xiaoping was a key player throughout the Chinese transformation process, even eventually managing to persuade the Communist Party that Marxism was a pragmatic ideology willing to try new systems of ownership and trade. Notwithstanding this breathtaking apostasy, the conversion of China to a fully-fledged capitalist economy involved several paths which were only loosely connected.

In the late 1970s, foreign trade and foreign direct investment became the first areas where liberalisation was introduced. Vastly important in this was the Shenzhen (Guangdong) free trade zone adjacent to Hong Kong. As a catalyst for the introduction of free enterprise Shenzhen had its genesis, not as a means of introducing free enterprise, but as a means to halting the flow of economic refugees to Hong Kong. The Communist authorities were involved in considerable expenditures in trying to stop this illegal exodus of the tens of thousands of people each year, an exodus which also involved many hundreds drowning. To their utter astonishment, in examining the cases of refugees who made it to Hong Kong, they learned that they earned one hundred fold as much as those who remained behind.

The establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) operated on capitalist lines in Shenzhen and elsewhere to attract foreign investment which blossomed. Eventually Shenzhen’s SEZ transformed a village of 30,000 people into a vast metropolis which now has 14 million residents.

Agriculture led the way to domestic private enterprise. In 1978, private farming was a criminal activity, but 1976 saw its first secret reintroduction by peasants at a Sichuan village called Nine Dragon Hill. The success of that village and a few others in increasing production was compelling. From 1980 the party instituted a progressive lifting of the ban on private farming. Fairly soon virtually all land had been divided into individual plots, though remaining under state ownership. Productivity soared.

The de-collectivisation also extended to previously moribund village industries. The output of these industries was growing at 20 per cent a year by the end of the 1980s and accounted for 26 per cent of GDP 15 years later. Four-fifths of these enterprises were privately owned, and all of them were subject to the dictates of the market and not any level of government. In 1980, a rural producer and hawker of confectionary, based on watermelon seeds, became one of the first millionaires.

This liberalisation in rural villages took place at the same time as changes in major cities, where unemployment was previously solved by sending youth to rural areas. But the youths started returning in vast numbers from the late 1970s. With little for them to do, the party allowed small businesses to be formed. Elements of the rule of law and contracts were introduced from 1978 initiating the path to the full panoply of property rights law, a process which was not, however, completed until 1988.

An essential attribute of a market-based economy is decontrolled prices for goods and services. Tentative steps were taken towards this in the early 1980s, were reversed in 1983, but soon recommenced and in 1984 most manufactured goods were no longer subject to controls. Nonetheless, even by 1995, 78 per cent of producer goods were transacted at controlled prices (though by then many of these had become much better aligned to market prices).

Share markets are important to facilitate capital accumulation and to allow investments to be traded, but the first stock exchange was opened only in 1986. It was not until 1990 that major stock markets could operate in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Soon after, there commenced a gradual sale to employees of state enterprises, especially those (over half of the total) which were technically insolvent. This was accompanied by reforms that allowed surplus workers to be sacked (an unemployment insurance scheme was introduced at the same time).

Coase and Wang claim that socialism was endorsed by Mao only in the mid-1950s but, if so, this would seem to contradict the basis of the Communist Party. Nor are they systematic in describing the astonishing growth of internal savings (which were 53 per cent of national income in 2010) that propelled industrialisation, and how this was underpinned by property rights laws.

Other intriguing questions with incomplete answers are: how were lumbering and inefficient government-owned firms transformed into the privately owned nimble and highly productive businesses that have led China to dominate world manufacturing? And how was it that the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that are still the backbone of heavy industry and infrastructure have, once corporatised, been run at a tolerable level of efficiency without which the private sector propelled growth could not have created the success observed?

Indeed, of the 31 Chinese firms in the Fortune Top 300 in 2011, only one (which is Hong Kong based) did not have majority government ownership. Two of the three biggest were fully government owned.

Though all these firms operate under western type corporate law, according to Coase and Wang, the state firms in monopoly sectors employ 8 per cent of the non-farm workforce but account for 55 per cent of total wages. The inferred high wages in monopoly firms suggests they are less cost-conscious than those facing competition, which, if true, makes the performance of the rest of the economy that much more impressive.

Coase and Wang examine but ultimately dismiss fears of some prominent Chinese about a dearth of entrepreneurs which could stifle growth in the future. They are surely right in this. Similar concerns were voiced by South Koreans when that country’s growth was founded on firms doing the more menial tasks that mature businesses outsourced to them-40 years ago the Samsungs, LGs and Hyundais barely existed. Coase and Wang also note that China is now the largest producer of PhDs in the world, having risen from one of the poorest nations to the second biggest economy.

Chinese Communists, while retaining the name have emasculated and even forgotten the theory on which it rode to power. From Marxist works being virtually the only political books being available in the 1960s, Coase and Wang cite evidence that by 2008 students, even those applying to join the Communist Party, were barely aware of Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto. The party had become one of many different career paths and was completely shorn of ideology.

In this respect Coase and Wang refer to an interview that China’s Premier Wen Jiabao had with western media where he quoted not only Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations but the lesser known Theory of Moral Sentiments. Even though the quotation was recruiting Adam Smith in support of measures to combat income inequality in China (a dubious interpretation of Smith’s own view) it is unlikely that any other world statesman would have been adequately versed in Adam Smith in these two guises.

The roots and durability of China’s success remain contentious. Many see the prominence of the SOEs as indicative of strong state guidance or manipulation of the economy.

This is difficult to square with the evidence of economic failures and successes around the world. Government ownership ipso facto has meant poor outcomes for the businesses themselves and eventually, in the case of Eastern Europe, for the economies in which they were housed. Even strong guidance by governments has been associated with failures as was previously the case in the ‘mixed’ pre-1990s Indian economy when government economic manipulation was considerable. Similar guidance and ‘winner picking’ in the West also failed. Where claims have been made of successes from government guidance, as in the case of Japan and Singapore, they have-under closer scrutiny-been found wanting.

Efficiency in China was unleashed by the opening up of the economy to entrepreneurship, the better incentives for productive work and the high rate of savings that followed from a recognition that these are secure from government seizure or wasteful usage. State industry manipulation and even, beyond a point, favouritism by state agencies, would undermine the phenomenal growth that continues to be witnessed.

Since Mao, China has risen from one of the world’s poorest nations to become the second largest economy. It is difficult to see what will stop a continued rise in incomes to levels that may reach or exceed-as some have forecast-as much as 40 per cent of world GDP twenty years from now

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