Watch Buzz Aldrin punches Bart Sibrel after being harassed on moon landing
24 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of media and culture Tags: conspiracy theories, moon landing
Gender gaps by education and age
24 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in economics
I ran these numbers for a colleague, and figured others might find them handy.
Gender wage ratios for full-time year-round workers range from .68 for older advanced-degree holders to .85 for young high school dropouts.
Gary Johnson on Bill Maher
24 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in politics - USA Tags: 2016 presidential election
Cheap Talk Causes Peace: Policy Bargaining and International Conflict
24 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in economics
(Paper here.)
Here are two observations about international diplomacy:
First, crises are often the result of uncertainty about policy preferences. Currently, this is most apparent with the United States, Russia, and Ukraine. It remains unclear exactly how much influence Putin wants over Ukrainian politics. He might have expansionary aims or he may just want moderate control, aware that too much sway over Ukraine will cost Russia too much in subsidies in the long term. In the former case, the United States has reason to worry. In the latter case, the United States can relax.
Second, diplomatic conferences often discuss preferred policies. That is, the parties sit in a room and talk about what they want and what they don’t want. For scholars of crisis bargaining, this is weird. War, after all, is supposed to be the result of uncertainty about power or resolve or credible commitment. These types of…
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Preventive War – Game Theory 101
24 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in economics
Go to lesson #20.
- Once a power shift has occurred, the states will reach a negotiated settlement. (War is costly.)
- But if states are experiencing a great power shift, that peaceful settlement may be highly disadvantageous for the declining state.
- Declining states therefore launch preventive wars if they prefer a costly but advantageous war today to an efficient but disadvantageous peace tomorrow.
- Preventive war is distinct from preemptive war. Do not confuse the two. Preemptive war deals with first strike advantages, which we will cover later on.
- To make life even more complicated, preventive war and preventative war are the same thing.
Source: Preventive War – Game Theory 101
The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Ultimate Prisoner’s Dilemma
24 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in economics
As I was doing some reading in the never-ending effort to increase my knowledge of war and politics, I happened to start analyzing the practical applications of Game Theory to current situations in the Middle-East.(As a warning to anyone interested in exploring Game Theory, it is heavy and tedious stuff.I apologize ahead of time if this writing reflects such.)Specifically, I focused in on the Game Theory problem commonly known as the “Prisoner’s Dilemma.”
For those who are unfamiliar with The Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is best explained like this:Two criminals are apprehended by the police (we’ll call them Criminal X and Criminal Y.)The authorities don’t have enough evidence to convict either man to a long prison sentence.Consequentially, the police isolate and interrogate each criminal separately.In an attempt to achieve a conviction, the police separately offer each criminal a deal.
The deal is this: if…
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Tertiary educational attainment, 2000 and 2014, USA, UK, France, Germany, Canada, Australia
24 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in economic history, economics of education, human capital, labour economics Tags: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, tertiary educational attainment.
The British, Australians, and Italians experienced strong growth in tertiary attainment since the year 2000. In the case of the Italians, it was from a low base. There is still a big difference in tertiary attainment between English-speaking and other countries.
Source: OECD Factbook 2015-2016.
A nuclear free New Zealand delayed the end of the Cold War
24 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in defence economics, politics - New Zealand, war and peace Tags: Cold War, game theory, George Orwell, nuclear free New Zealand, peace movements, war against terror
If the dilettantes at the end of the known world accomplished anything at all by declaring New Zealand nuclear free after 1984, anything at all, it was to prolong the Cold War, embolden Communist Russia and increase the chance of a nuclear exchange. As George Orwell said in 1941
Pacifism is objectively pro-Fascist. This is elementary common sense. If you hamper the war effort of one side you automatically help that of the other. Nor is there any real way of remaining outside such a war as the present one. In practice, ‘he that is not with me is against me’.
The idea that you can somehow remain aloof from and superior to the struggle, while living on food which British sailors have to risk their lives to bring you, is a bourgeois illusion bred of money and security.
Mr Savage remarks that ‘according to this type of reasoning, a German or Japanese pacifist would be “objectively pro-British”.’ But of course he would be! That is why pacifist activities are not permitted in those countries (in both of them the penalty is, or can be, beheading) while both the Germans and the Japanese do all they can to encourage the spread of pacifism in British and American territories. The Germans even run a spurious ‘freedom’ station which serves out pacifist propaganda indistinguishable from that of the P.P.U. They would stimulate pacifism in Russia as well if they could, but in that case they have tougher babies to deal with.
In so far as it takes effect at all, pacifist propaganda can only be effective against those countries where a certain amount of freedom of speech is still permitted; in other words it is helpful to totalitarianism.
There is a strong peace movement in the 1930s that undermined rearmament at every point. Indeed, the then leader of the British Labour Party met with Hitler one afternoon with the aim of persuading him to become a Christian pacifist. He failed.
The slaughterhouse of World War I would certainly rest on the memory but Hitler gave them no choice but to rearm yet some on the Left would not accept this reality. The purpose of British foreign policy in the 1930s was to buy time to rearmament before the inevitable clash.
The pro-fascism of the peace movement continues to this day. To quote Michael Walzer
so many leftists rushed to the defense of civil liberties while refusing to acknowledge that the country faced real dangers–as if there was no need at all to balance security and freedom.
Maybe the right balance will emerge spontaneously from the clash of right-wing authoritarianism and left-wing absolutism, but it would be better practice for the left to figure out the right balance for itself, on its own; the effort would suggest a responsible politics and a real desire to exercise power, some day.
But what really marks the left, or a large part of it, is the bitterness that comes with abandoning any such desire. The alienation is radical.
How else can one understand the unwillingness of people who, after all, live here, and whose children and grandchildren live here, to join in a serious debate about how to protect the country against future terrorist attacks? There is a pathology in this unwillingness, and it has already done us great damage.
With one exception, democracies do not go to war with other democracies. There are plenty of undemocratic countries out there with dictators willing to have it go if they see weakness.
That is before you consider the suspicion that the Communist dictatorships had of other countries. In Tom Schelling’s view, many wars including World War 1 were the products of mutual alarm and unpredictable tests of will.
Robert Aumann argued well that the way to peace is like bargaining in a medieval bazaar. Never look too keen, and bargain long and hard. Aumann argues that:
If you are ready for war, you will not need to fight. If you cry ‘peace, peace,’ you will end up fighting… What brings war is that you signal weakness and concessions.
A nuclear free New Zealand signalled weakness and a willingness to make concessions. The peace movements across all democracies had the same effect.
Disarmament increases the chances of war. Aumann gave the example of the Cold War of how their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fleets of bombers prevented a hot war from starting:
In the long years of the cold war between the US and the Soviet Union, what prevented “hot” war was that bombers carrying nuclear weapons were in the air 24 hours a day, 365 days a year? Disarming would have led to war.
Peace activists are utterly clueless about what is discussed at peace talks. The ability to negotiate a credible peaceful settlement between sovereign states depends on:
- the divisibility of the outcome of the dispute,
- the effectiveness of the fortifications and counterattacks with which an attacker would expect to have to contend, and
- on the permanence of the outcome of a potential war.
Central to any peace talks is that any peace agreement is credible – it will hold and not will not be quickly broken:
A state would think that another state’s promise not to start a war is credible only if the other state would be better off by keeping its promise not to start a war than by breaking its promise.
Peace talks occur only when there something to bargain about. As James Fearon explained, there must be
a set of negotiated settlements that both sides prefer to fighting
That need for a bargaining range is the fundamental flaw of peace activists. When they call for peace talks, peace activists never explain what will be discussed in a world where everybody is not like them terms of good intentions.
What are the possible negotiated settlements that each both side will prefer to continue fighting? Diplomacy is about one side having some control over something the other side wants and this other side have something you want to exchange. In a war, the attacker thinks he can get what it wants to fighting for it.
If peace activists truly want peace, rather than victory for the other side, they must prepare for war including fortified borders so that the other side doesn’t dare cross them and start a war. A peace settlement depends upon the ability to divide the contested territory with or without fortified borders to make a settlement credible:
…despite the costs and risks of war, if a dispute is existential, or, more generally, if the whole of a contested territory is sufficiently more valuable than the sum of its parts, then a peaceful settlement is not possible.
A peaceful settlement of a territorial dispute, and especially a settlement that includes an agreement not to fortify the resulting border, also can be impossible if a state thinks, even if over optimistically, that by starting a war it would be able at a small cost to settle the dispute completely in its favour permanently.
Gary Johnson: He’s Also Running | Full Frontal with Samantha Bee
24 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, libertarianism, politics - USA Tags: 2016 presidential election
HT: Lise Rose
Best defence of Employment Contracts Act is a @FairnessNZ graphic
24 Jul 2016 1 Comment
in economic growth, economic history, labour economics, macroeconomics, politics - New Zealand, unions Tags: economic reform, Employment Contracts Act, employment protection laws, employment regulation, Leftover Left, neoliberalism, pessimism bias
Source: Low Wage Economy | New Zealand Council of Trade Unions – Te Kauae Kaimahi, with extra annotations by this blogger.
Nick Barber: Can Royal Assent Be Refused on the Advice of the Prime Minister?
24 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in economics
UK Constitutional Law Association
There is a very good article in the most recent edition of the Law Quarterly Review. It is by Rodney Brazier, and is concerned with the nature and mechanics of royal assent. It is a fascinating read, and, as with all Brazier’s work, characterised by a dry wit. There is, however, one claim, made almost in passing, that I think is mistaken. Brazier addresses the question of when, if ever, a monarch could properly refuse to give assent to legislation. He rightly concludes that it is almost impossible to imagine situations in which assent should be refused, but leaves open the possibility that it might be appropriate for the Monarch to refuse assent if advised to do so by her Ministers. In suggesting that royal assent could be refused on ministerial advice Brazier is not alone. The assertion has also been made by Geoffrey Marshall in Constitutional Conventions…
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