Central planning versus spontaneous order: bicycle version
07 Jan 2015 1 Comment
in comparative institutional analysis, economics, economics of regulation, liberalism, Marxist economics
via Neil Wilson and https://twitter.com/juliawolfe/status/551580469910073345?s=09
Richard Epstein, George Soros, and Bruce Caldwell Discuss Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty
22 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, F.A. Hayek, liberalism, Richard Epstein Tags: Bruce Caldwell, Constitution of Liberty, FA Hayek, Richard Epstein
Brad de Long on the difference between the Left and Social Democrats
22 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of bureaucracy, Marxist economics, Public Choice Tags: Brad De Long, Leftover Left, Social Democrats
The cognitive biases of regulators by James Cooper
18 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in behavioural economics, comparative institutional analysis, economics of regulation
|
BIAS |
DESCRIPTION |
IMPLICATION FOR REGULATORS |
|
Availability heuristic |
Place undue weight on recent, salient events |
Engage in regulatory overreaction |
|
Hindsight bias |
Overestimate the ex ante probability of an event occurring given that it has occurred |
Are too likely to find that practices causing harm violated a legal standard |
|
Myopia/hyperbolic discounting |
Discount future benefits at too high a rate versus current costs |
Pursue policies that maximize short-run rewards rather than long-run goals |
|
Confirmation bias |
Discount true information contrary to prior beliefs |
Resistant to change regulatory course even in face of contrary evidence |
|
Optimism |
Overestimate the probability of a good outcome |
Overestimate the success of a regulatory initiative |
|
Status quo bias |
Are irrationally wedded to current state |
Cause regulatory inertia and path dependency |
The war on drugs: Drug induced mortality rates compared
18 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, economics of regulation, political change, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: drug decriminalisation, marijuana decriminalisation, Portugal, war on drugs
Armen Alchian on the inconsistent treatment of the concept of cost in economic theory
17 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
How Sociologists Made Themselves Irrelevant – Part 2
07 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, liberalism Tags: sociology
I would like to suggest two “smell tests” for all sociologists, but especially those engaged with the public sphere, when assessing their work.
The first is the Garfinkel rule: Never treat your subjects as cultural dopes.
If you find yourself struggling to explain away your subjects’ own reasoned and widely held account of what they consider important in explaining their condition, you are up to something intellectually fishy.
The second is this: If you end up with findings that have policy implications that you would never dream of advocating for yourself or your loved ones, be wary of them.
A case in point: If you find that neighborhoods have no effects, you should be prepared to do the rational thing and go live in an inner-city neighborhood with its much cheaper real estate, or at least advise your struggling son or daughter searching for an apartment to save by renting there. If the thought offends you, then something stinks.
More on More Efficient Tax Systems Leading to Bigger Government
02 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, liberalism, Public Choice Tags: Casey Mulligan, Gary Becker, growth in government, public choice
…in Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government (NBER Working Paper Number No. 6789) , [Gary Becker and Casey Mulligan] conclude that flatter and broader taxes also tend to encourage bigger government because taxpayers offer less resistance to increases in flat tax rates than in rates of more onerous and less efficient forms of taxation.
Any decline in the resistance of taxpayers leads to larger government budgets since an endless number of groups agitate for greater government support.
Flat tax rates, such as the VAT and Social Security taxes on earnings, usually start at very low levels but invariably increase over time.
The VAT is now 20 percent and higher in some countries. And payroll taxes began at a modest 2 percent in the 1930s in the United States, but have been increased 21 times to the present 15 percent combined rate on employees and employers.
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
Recent Comments