The National Assembly of France today voted against a confidence measure in the cabinet of Premier François Bayrou. As a result, per Art. 50 of the constitution, the premier must resign and the government is ousted. President Emmanuel Macron had appointed Bayrou last December after the previous premier, Michel Barnier, had been ousted in a […]
French cabinet loses confidence vote
French cabinet loses confidence vote
09 Sep 2025 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, politics, Public Choice Tags: France
A Positive Account of Rights with David Friedman
09 Sep 2025 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, constitutional political economy, David Friedman, economic history, economics of crime, Gordon Tullock, history of economic thought, law and economics, liberalism, libertarianism, property rights, Public Choice
Supreme Court Matters: Constitutional Guardians or Constitutional Threat?
08 Sep 2025 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, law and economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: constitutional law
Roger Partridge writes – When a constitutional law professor warns of “dangerous foes” threatening New Zealand’s legal system, you might expect concern about genuinely destabilising forces – political interference with judicial independence, or threats to the rule of law itself. You would be wrong. Professor Dean Knight of Victoria University recently addressed the Institute of Public […]
Supreme Court Matters: Constitutional Guardians or Constitutional Threat?
The by-election without much choice
03 Sep 2025 1 Comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, discrimination, economics of bureaucracy, income redistribution, labour economics, law and economics, liberalism, Marxist economics, politics - New Zealand, property rights, Public Choice, rentseeking
It’s hard to get too much enthusiasm for the Tamaki Makaurau by-election. The Maori roll and seats have become more politicised than ever before, as they are no longer an exercise in ensuring a core level of Maori representation in Parliament, but rather an expression of Maori nationalism. It used to be that the Maori…
The by-election without much choice
Kiwis don’t need a Constitutional Court to crimp our elected law-makers – we already have judges who do that
02 Sep 2025 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, law and economics, politics - New Zealand, property rights Tags: constitutional law, Thailand
Bob Edlin writes – Thailand’s Constitutional Court reminds us of how judges can be politically powerful. It has removed Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra from office, ruling that she “lacks the qualifications and possesses prohibited characteristics” under the Thai constitution. As the ABC reported, her dismissal flings the country into political instability. It also highlights the […]
Kiwis don’t need a Constitutional Court to crimp our elected law-makers – we already have judges who do that
Single-Member Electoral Districts Cannot Be Unconstitutional Because They Form Part of the Constitution of Canada
30 Aug 2025 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, Public Choice Tags: Canada, constitutional law
Introduction The Ontario Court of Appeal issued a ruling in August 2025 which upheld the constitutionality of single-member electoral districts and lambasted so-called “Fair Vote British Columbia” (which for some reason litigated single-member plurality in Ontario) for having “repackage[ed] failed political arguments as constitutional rights violations.”[1] Justice Huscroft declared unambiguously: “The electoral system is not […]
Single-Member Electoral Districts Cannot Be Unconstitutional Because They Form Part of the Constitution of Canada
House of Lords reform: a Victorian perspective
18 Aug 2025 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economic history, Public Choice Tags: British constitutional law, British history, British politics
Unlike the House of Commons, which underwent major ‘democratic’ reform in the 19th century, the Lords remained virtually unchanged during the entire Victorian period. With a new hereditary peers bill now entering its final stages, Dr Philip Salmon explores how and why the House of Lords was able to survive the ‘age of reform’, highlighting […]
House of Lords reform: a Victorian perspective
Sovereignty and Land Ownership: Distinct Legal Domains
11 Aug 2025 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economic history, law and economics, property rights Tags: constitutional law
Introduction Throughout history, territories have frequently changed hands through war, conquest, and annexation. However, the shift in sovereignty—the legal authority to govern and control a territory—should not be conflated with the transfer of private land ownership within that territory. Sovereignty concerns public law and political authority, whereas land ownership is a matter of private law […]
Sovereignty and Land Ownership: Distinct Legal Domains
Peters and Seymour tussle over ‘Maorification’
07 Aug 2025 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economics of regulation, law and economics, politics - New Zealand, property rights, Public Choice Tags: constitutional law
Graham Adams writes – After NZ First leapfrogged Act last month in a Taxpayers’ Union-Curia poll — which led to much media excitement about the party’s rising fortunes — it seemed odd for Winston Peters to be quite so tetchy with journalists seeking his opinion on David Seymour’s views on karakia, traditional Māori prayers or incantations […]
Peters and Seymour tussle over ‘Maorification’
El Salvador lengthens future presidential terms, abolishes term limits
02 Aug 2025 1 Comment
in constitutional political economy, development economics, law and economics Tags: El Salvador
Constitutional changes have been approved in El Salvador that will increase the length of the presidential term from five to six years and remove (any pretense) of presidential term limits (AP news). Incumbent President Nayib Bukele is already serving a second term, despite the existing constitution supposedly prohibiting immediate presidential reelection. He was elected initially […]
El Salvador lengthens future presidential terms, abolishes term limits
Mamdani’s unworkable proposal for NYC-owned grocery stores
31 Jul 2025 1 Comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of regulation, income redistribution, law and economics, Marxist economics, politics - USA, property rights, Public Choice, rentseeking, transport economics, urban economics Tags: economics of socialism, regressive left, rent control, useful idiots
Democrat Zohran Mamdani is likely to be the next mayor of NYC, as he proffered a number of campaign promises that delighted progressives young and old. (This is besides his pro-Palestinian stand on the Gaza war, which is irrelevant to his actions as NYC mayor but still delighted the benighted.) Here are a few of […]
Mamdani’s unworkable proposal for NYC-owned grocery stores
Should Catalonia receive more financial independence?
26 Jul 2025 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, development economics, Federalism, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, Public Choice, public economics Tags: Spain
Jesús details how Spain already operates one of the most decentralized fiscal systems in the world, “more latitude than most U.S. states,” he notes, yet Catalonia now seeks the bespoke privileges long enjoyed by the Basque Country and Navarra. The Regional Authority Index rates how much self‑rule and shared rule each country’s sub‑national governments actually wield. In its last […]
Should Catalonia receive more financial independence?
Tasmania’s unstable electoral system
25 Jul 2025 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, politics - Australia, Public Choice Tags: Tasmania
Tasmania’s electoral system, particularly its implementation of the Hare-Clark proportional representation method, has frequently faced criticism for its tendency to produce unstable governments. This instability largely arises from the system’s inherent design, which promotes a fragmented parliament and necessitates coalition-building and negotiations that may ultimately compromise governmental efficacy and stability. The Hare-Clark system, in theory, […]
Tasmania’s unstable electoral system
Revolution by Judicial Decree: A Review of Professor Peter Watts KC’s “Ellis v R, A Revolution in Aotearoa New Zealand, Welcome or Not”
24 Jul 2025 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, law and economics, politics - New Zealand, property rights, Public Choice Tags: constitutional law
Roger Partridge writes – Revolutions conjure images of violent uprisings, the storming of institutions, and the forcible overthrow of existing orders. But constitutional foundations can be destroyed through more subtle means. When judges discard long-established constitutional principles and remake the law according to their preferences, they engage in a revolution that may be no less […]
Revolution by Judicial Decree: A Review of Professor Peter Watts KC’s “Ellis v R, A Revolution in Aotearoa New Zealand, Welcome or Not”
The Milei Miracle, Part II
23 Jul 2025 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, budget deficits, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, economic growth, fiscal policy, growth disasters, growth miracles, law and economics, liberalism, libertarianism, macroeconomics, property rights Tags: Argentina
I almost feel sorry for the 108 leftist economists who predicted back in 2023 that Argentina would suffer if Javier Milei won the presidential election. Not only were they disappointed when he enjoyed a landslide victory, but the subsequent events in Argentina have shown that they were wildly wrong (all of which is discussed in […]
The Milei Miracle, Part II
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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