How toxic is it?
15 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of information, economics of regulation, health economics Tags: Anti-Science left
The sharing economy in a nutshell
15 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of information, economics of media and culture, entrepreneurship Tags: entrepreneurial alertness, Facebook, sharing economy, Uber
@FlipChartRick spotted this earlier http://t.co/q6FoyIGJFL—
(@MervynDinnen) March 20, 2015
The three lags on monetary policy
31 Mar 2015 1 Comment
in business cycles, economics of information, inflation targeting, macroeconomics, Milton Friedman, monetarism, monetary economics Tags: lags on monetary policy, monetary policy
There are large uncertainties about the size and timing of responses to changes in monetary policy. There is a close and regular relationship between the quantity of money and nominal income and prices over the years. However, the same relation is much looser from month to month, quarter to quarter and even year to year. Monetary changes take time to affect the economy and this time delay is itself highly variable. The lags on monetary policy are three in all:
- The lag between the need for action and the recognition of this need (the recognition lag)
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The lag between recognition and the taking of action (the legislation lag)
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the lag between action and its effects (the implementation lag)
These delays mean that is it difficult to ascertain whether the effects of monetary policy changes in the recent past have finished taking effect.

Secondly, it is difficult to ascertain when proposed changes in monetary policy will take effect. Thirdly, feedbacks must be assessed. The magnitude of the monetary adjustment necessary to deal with the problem at hand is never obvious.
It is common for a central bank to act incrementally. The central bank makes small adjustments to monetary conditions over time as more information is available on the state of the economy and forecasts are updated.
Most discussions on monetary policy focus on the implementation lag. This lag depends on the fundamental characteristics of the economy.
A long and variable implementation lag means that it is difficult for central banks to ascertain what is happening now or forecast what will happen. Central banks may stimulate the economy after it is well on the way to recovery and tighten monetary policy when the economy is already going into a recession.
In his classic A Program for Monetary Stability, published in 1959, Milton Friedman summarised his empirical findings on length and variability of the lags on monetary policy:
on the average of 18 cycles, peaks in the rate of change in the stock of money tend to preceded peaks in general business by about 16 months and troughs in the rate of change in the stock of money to precede troughs in general business by about 12 months. For individual cycles, the recorded lead has varied between 6 and 29 months at peaks and between 4 and 22 months at troughs.
With lags as variable as those estimated by Friedman, it is difficult to see how any policy maker could know which direction to adjust his policy, much less the precise magnitude needed. Long lags greatly complicate good forecasting. A forecaster cannot know what the state of the economy will be when his policy takes effect.
Many Keynesians, Friedman notes, advocate “leaning against the wind.” By this they mean, in some sense, that the monetary (and fiscal) authorities should try to balance out the private sector’s excesses rather than passively hope that it adjusts on its own.
Friedman tested the Fed’s success at leaning “against the wind” by checking whether the rate of money growth has truly been lower during expansions and higher during contractions. He admits that this method of grading he Fed’s performance is open to criticism, but decides to go ahead and see what turns up. He finds that Fed has – for the periods surveyed – been unsuccessful.
By this criterion, for eight peacetime reference cycles from March 1919 to April 1958. Actual policy was in the ‘right’ direction in 155 months, in the ‘wrong’ direction in 226 months; so actual policy was ‘better’ than the [constant 4% rate of money growth] rule in 41% of the months.
Nor is the objection that the inter-war period biased his study is good since Friedman found that:
For the period after World War II alone, the results were only slightly more favourable to actual policy according to this criterion: policy was in the ‘right’ direction in 71 months, in the ‘wrong’ direct in 79 months, so actual policy was better than the rule in 47% of the months. [2]
One of the best ways to parry a metaphor is with another metaphor. Keynesians have a host of metaphors in their rhetorical arsenal; one frequently voiced is that a wise government should “lean against the wind” when choosing policy. Friedman counters:
We seldom know which way the economic wind is blowing until several months after the event, yet to be effective, we need to know which way the wind is going to be blowing when the measures we take now will be effective, itself a variable date that may be a half year or a year or two from now. Leaning today against next year’s wind is hardly an easy task in the present state of meteorology.
By scrutinising the practice of monetary policy over the decades, Friedman manages to produce objections that both Keynesians and non-Keynesians must take seriously. A key part of any response to Friedman rests on the ability of forecasters to do their jobs with tolerable accuracy.
The importance of defining Internet trolls properly
30 Mar 2015 1 Comment
in economics of information, economics of media and culture, health economics, industrial organisation Tags: information cocoons, infotopia, Internet trolls
The most important aspect of monetary strategy is timing
28 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, economic growth, economics of information, macroeconomics, Milton Friedman, monetarism, monetary economics, Robert E. Lucas Tags: Keynesian macroeconomics, lags on monetary policy, monetary policy
The simplest statement to make about the lags in monetary policy is they are long and variable. This simple statement is also the key insight to understanding the actual implementation of monetary policy. Hence, how many months or years in advance must a central bank forecast to achieve its monetary goals? In 1994, the Economist said:
But [central banks] cannot afford to wait until inflation is actually rising before they act. Monetary policy does not change the speed of the economy instantly: it can take 18 months or more for a rise in interest rates to have its full impact on inflation. The target of policy ought therefore to be future not current inflation, in order to prevent a surge in 1996. The earlier interest rates are raised, the better the chances of engineering a smooth slowdown to a sustainable rate of growth before slack in the economy is exhausted.
Economists differ about the length of those lags. Uncertainty about the average length of those lags and the variability of those lags makes discretion most difficult. Activist policy can improve welfare only if the information about economic structure and economists’ ability to forecast is sufficiently accurate.

Friedman is the most famous and persuasive critic of Keynesianism on the grounds of lags. He has two main arguments: first, that there are “long and variable lags” between the identification of a problem and the effects of the designed remedy; second, that activist policy often itself becomes a source of instability since policy itself becomes a variable that the market must guess.
Friedman’s critique does not depend on the quantity theory of money. Keynesian policies do not necessarily follow even if the Keynesian theory of the business cycle were conclusively proved.
It must also be demonstrated that the government has the ability and willingness of the government to act as the theory prescribes. We are therefore further assuming that central banks have the incentive to stabilise the economy. If the government lacks the information required to stabilise the economy, issues of public choice incentives become fully redundant. Incentives to pursue an objective do not matter if the objective itself is unattainable.
Haven’t blogged on the anti-vaccination movement for a few days
26 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of information, economics of media and culture, health economics Tags: anti-vaccination movement, conspiracy theories, modernity, vaccination, vaccines
Killer green activists – Greenpeace and golden rice
24 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, development economics, economics of information, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, growth miracles Tags: golden rice, Greenpeace, killer green activists
In Defence of Negativity in Politics – John G. Geer
24 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of information, economics of media and culture, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: Attack Ads, expressive voting, John G. Geer, political psychology, rational ignorance, rational irrationality
John G. Geer, author of In Defense of Negativity: Attack Ads in Presidential Campaigns, argues that negative ads are positive. They focus on important political issues and give voters critical information about differences between candidates. Attack ads do not degrade, but rather enrich the democratic process. When political candidates attack each other, they raise doubts about each other’s views and qualifications. Voters—and the democratic process—benefit from this clash of opinions.
The Green Left versus world hunger
20 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in development economics, economics of information, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, environmental economics, growth disasters, growth miracles, health economics Tags: extreme poverty, global poverty, GMOs, Green Left, Leftover Left, world poverty
Further evidence from the legacy media that climate alarmism is on the way out?
16 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of information, economics of media and culture, environmental economics, global warming Tags: climate alarmism, expressive voting, global warming, rational ignorance, rational irrationality
RT if you think this summarises the Anti-Science Left
15 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of information, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, environmental economics, global warming, health economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: Anti-Science left, conjecture and refutation, expressive voting, Green Left, progressive left, rational ignorance, rational irrationality
What is in the homoeopathic flu pills
15 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of information, economics of media and culture, health economics Tags: homoeopathy, quackery
RT if you agree with this warning sign
14 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of information, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation Tags: Anti-Science left, GMOs, organic farming
Is this sign for real?
09 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of information Tags: nanny state, warning signs
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