People really forget how awesomely powerful IBM was in the 1980s: @evankirstel http://t.co/TkpuU5sAXg—
Marc Andreessen (@pmarca) April 04, 2015
Creative destruction in the US technology sector since 1980
04 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, survivor principle Tags: creative destruction, entrepreneurial alertness, Joseph Schumpeter
More evidence of mass kidnappings of activists
01 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in development economics, entrepreneurship, growth disasters, growth miracles, liberalism Tags: Africa, anticapitalist mentality, capitalism and freedom, do gooders, entrepreneurial alertness, foreign direct investment, Left-wing hypocrisy, ODA
Why aren’t overseas development activists dancing in the streets to celebrate this turnaround in the economic climate of Africa through capitalism and the freedom to invest. The only possible explanation is mass kidnappings.
Customer service was always a priority in Japan
01 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in entrepreneurship, transport economics Tags: entrepreneurial alertness, Japan, Tokyo
Japan Railway's app has live data, sure… including the crowdedness and inside temperature of EACH TRAIN CAR. 😍/😭 http://t.co/ySz1oTuIbF—
Cabel Sasser (@cabel) March 27, 2015
The North–South theory of product life cycles
23 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, law and economics, managerial economics, organisational economics, property rights, survivor principle, theory of the firm Tags: entrepreneurial alertness, foreign direct investment, incomplete contracts, incomplete property rights, North-South product life cycle, product life cycles
Forecasts of the offshoring of service jobs, as an example, can be constituted into a theory of North-South product cycles. The North-South theory of the life cycle of products starts with their research and development and refinement by entrepreneurs in the advanced countries (the North) with some exporting (Grossman and Helpmann 1991a, 1991b). These innovations require resources to be invested with uncertain prospects of success. Entrepreneurs in the North compete to discover new technology-intensive products using the ample supply of R&D workers and human capital-rich workers in the industrialised countries (Grossman and Helpmann 1991a, 1991b).

As a new product matures and its production becomes more standardised, the bulk of its production can migrate to the less developed countries (the South) to take advantage of lower production costs, and these countries will become net exporters. In the South, entrepreneurs focus more on imitation. They invest resources in importing and learning the production processes developed and proven to be a success in the North (Grossman and Helpmann 1991a, 1991b).
The shifting of production of standardised products to lower-wage foreign locations will frequently be within the originating company via a foreign affiliate, because of uncertainties about property rights and contract enforcement institutions in the host countries, and only later to independent foreign firms (Antràs 2005). Within corporate hierarchies, the high-skilled managers in the developed countries will specialise in problem-solving and non-routine tasks. They will interact with middle managers and production workers in developing countries who perform the routine tasks (Antràs et al. 2006, 2008).
Contracts are typically incomplete either because they are difficult to write and/or because the court cannot enforce them. The World Trade Organization (2005, 2008) concluded that, for example, the location of offshored services depends on:
- labour costs,
- trade costs,
- the quality of institutions, particularly the legal framework,
- the tax and investment regime,
- the quality of infrastructure, particularly telecommunications, and
- skills, particularly language and computer skills.
Risks in contract negotiation and enforcement will influence which types of production is outsourced. Roughly one-third of world trade is infra-firm, and this intra-firm trade is concentrated in the capital-intensive industries because of the costs and risks of investing in contracting with arm’s-length suppliers (Antràs 2003). Considerations about R&D incentives, the availability of human capital and the quality of contract enforcement institutions weigh heavily on the development of new products and their initial and later locations of different stages of production.
Products are initially developed in the highly industrialised countries because their sophisticated legal systems allow contracts to be enforced. Even then, in industrialised countries, the difficulties of writing and enforcing complicated contracts over the quality of new products early in the product life cycle encourages firms to make those products internally within the firm. Early in the product life cycle, if sub-contractors were used for key imports, there would have to be continual renegotiation of contracts contracts to incorporate new innovations and learning by doing. As Antras says:
Global production networks necessarily entail intensive contracting between parties located in different countries and thus subject to distinct legal systems0
As the new product standardises, and product quality in consequence becomes easier to measure and contract over, initially the innovating firm will sub-contract within the industrialised country but in time will import from developing countries. In the first instance, these imports may be from affiliates established in the developing country to ensure greater control of product quality through direct ownership of the factory. As Antras says:
Firms contemplating doing business in a country with weak contracting institutions might decide to do so within firm boundaries to have more control.
The size and shape of the firm is a direct response to mitigate the costs of contracting over quality that is hard to measure and which is constantly changing early in the product cycle. By assigning ownership rights to the party undertaking the more important investment in quality early in the product life cycle, entrepreneurs and innovators can minimise the losses caused by lack of enforceable contracts over quality when quality is changing rapidly as the firm moves through the product life cycle.
Boeing blamed the delays on the delivery of the Dreamliner on an unwillingness of sub-contractors to stand by their contractual obligations. In response, Boeing acquired some of the key sub-contractors to ensure that they delivered as promised. This is a classic operation of the theory of the firm where the entrepreneur brings within the firm what is too expensive to transact on the market because of difficulties in measuring quality and defining and enforcing property rights over what has been contracted.
Creative destruction in cell phone battery gripes
22 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of media and culture, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, Joseph Schumpeter
A few months ago, my complaint about my cell phone battery was it ran out after a couple of hours use.

Now my complaint about my new HTC 510 is the battery lasts so long that it takes quite some time to recharge it. My current and previous phones were HTC. The new phone costs the same $299 as I paid for the previous HTC, but is about three times as good as the old one which I bought about 18 months ago.
When researching the purchase of my new phone, I read a few reviews where I discovered they are written by complete snobs who own the latest iPhone and looked down on anything cheaper.
Landlines are certainly on the way out
21 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of media and culture, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, survivor principle Tags: cell phones, creative destruction, mobile phones, network industries
Creative destruction defined
18 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of media and culture, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, survivor principle Tags: creative destruction, entrepreneurial alertness, Iphone, Joseph Schumpeter
The evolution of the entrepreneur
15 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, entrepreneurship, history of economic thought Tags: business history, entrepreneurial alertness
Trends in DNA Sequencing Costs
14 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in entrepreneurship, health economics Tags: creative destruction, innovation, Moore's law, The Great Enrichment, The Great Escape

via DNA Sequencing Costs.
Do Paul Samuelson’s criticisms of behavioural economics make him a double secret Austrian economist?
13 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, Austrian economics, behavioural economics, comparative institutional analysis, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, survivor principle Tags: efficient markets hypothesis, entrepreneurial alertness, Paul Samuelson
via Samuelson vs. Friedman, David Henderson | EconLog | Library of Economics and Liberty and An Interview With Paul Samuelson, Part One — The Atlantic.
Security cameras in prison showers and the case for private prisons
06 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, entrepreneurship, law and economics, organisational economics, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: do gooders, law and order, prisons
I was listening to a radio show the other day on the introduction of close circuit television into New Zealand prisons that were to be monitored by both male and female guards. This is regarded as an indignity by some because these new close circuit cameras would be in showers and toilets.

The initial commentators on the radio programme immediately said they had watched plenty of TV programs where people were shanked in the showers.

The close circuit television was for the safety of prisoners. Close circuit cameras in all parts of prisons made prisons a safer place and that was that. It was the price of safety, especially for prisoners vulnerable to intimidation and sexual assault.

Greg Newbold, a New Zealand criminologist and an ex-prisoner in itself, then came on air to criticise the introduction of close circuit televisions in showers and other intimate areas such as toilets as an indignity on prisoners. Prisoners have a right to intimate privacy in his view. He said only 12 prisoners had been murdered in the New Zealand prisons since 1979.
Only 12 murders is 12 murders too many. Every one of those murders would have been subject of outrage about the failure of the prison administration from the bleeding hearts brigade.
The most interesting thing that Greg Newbold said on the radio was about how these close circuit television systems first emerged in prisons, initially in the USA.
Close circuit television systems will put throughout prisons initially in private prisons to avoid being sued for wrongful death and injury. The private prisons introduced this rather obvious security measure to reduce liability in the civil courts.
Public prisons are supposedly a safer place for prisoners to be if you listen to the bleeding hearts brigade and the Left over Left. Pubic prisons but never got around introducing what seems to me to be a rather basic security measure in confined areas of prisons. Close circuit television systems would protect both inmates and guards.
The different incentives facing public and hybrid prisons, in this case, exposure to litigation, is an illustration of the superior efficiency of private prisons.

Private prisons did something because it affects the bottom line. One way to reduce liability for deaths and injuries is prison security measures that reduce the number of deaths and injuries in prisons.

More importantly, private prisons have unforgiving critics in the form of the bleeding hearts brigade and Left over Left. No one on the Left will defend or protect a prison that is private from closure out of a knee-jerk defence of the public sector, and in particular, public-sector unions.
Oddly enough the only prison that the Left over Left want to close in New Zealand is the highest performing prison, Mt Eden, which happens to be privately run.

The main problem with private prisons is contracting over quality where it is difficult to define quality and measure performance against quality standards specified in a contract as Andrew Shleifer explains:
…critics of privatization often argue that private contractors would cut quality in the process of cutting costs because contracts do not adequately guard against this possibility
Privatisation for many government services is simply an extension of the make-or-buy decision. Every firm faces a make-or-buy decision – should the firm buy a production input from outside suppliers or should it make what it needs itself with existing or additional internal resources?
As any industry grows, there is more room for more specialised producers to supply to firms of all sizes at a lower cost than in-house production (Stigler 1951, 1987; Levy 1984). As an example, all with the largest firms intermittently hire legal, accounting and many other professional skills from specialists.
By contracting-out to these more specialised and niche suppliers, firms can enjoy all available economies of scale in production unless its needs are unique or the firm has some special competency in producing the input in-house (Lindsay and Maloney 1996; Shughart 1997; Roberts 2004). Firms in most industries capture all available economies of scale at relatively small sizes after which they have a long region of production where their marginal cost of further increases in production are constant (Stigler 1958; Lucas 1978; Barzel and Kochin 1992; Shughart 1997).
Put simply, an entrepreneur makes what he or she cannot buy at the quality preferred through contracting in market:
The case for in-house provision is generally stronger when non-contractible cost reductions have large deleterious effects on quality, when quality innovations are unimportant, and when corruption in government procurement is a severe problem. In contrast, the case for privatization is stronger when quality reducing cost reductions can be controlled through contract or competition, when quality innovations are important, and when patronage and powerful unions are a severe problem inside the government.
The way in which the market process dealt with chiselling on quality where quality reducing cost reductions where costly to control through contract or competition was the emergence of non-profit institutions. The competitive edge of these non-profit institutions was they had fewer incentives to dilute hard to measure qualities of the product transacted.

Any additional profits from this dilution of quality were not distributed to the owners because the non-profit organisation was either run by a charity or was owned mutually by the customers. The proceeds from cutting corners on quality could not be paid out to the owners in dividends because there were none.
Examples of non-profits competing successfully in the market are obvious, such as life insurance. Until recent decades, most life insurance companies were mutually owned by the policyholders. Life insurance companies were mutually owned as an assurance that no one could run off with the money by paying high dividends to the owners before policyholders died many years after they have paid their premiums.
Most private universities are run as non-profit institutions even when they are set up by private developers with profits in mind. The private university itself is owned by a charity with esteemed persons on the board to assure quality and probity. The active involvement of alumni is encouraged as a further guard of the future quality of the University from which they graduated. The private developers make their profit on the surrounding land as the university grows and prospers. Land grant universities in the USA may have operated this way.
Other examples of the emergence of non-profit institutions to assure quality in a competitive market are private schools, private hospitals, and private day care centres where concerns about the private provision of a quality service arise, with or without justification. Andrew Shleifer again:
…entrepreneurial not-for-profit firms can be more efficient than either the government or the for-profit private suppliers precisely … where soft incentives are desirable, and competitive and reputational mechanisms do not soften the incentives of private suppliers [to dilute quality].
Of course, any proper analysis must compare like with like and compare the dismal record of public prisons date in terms of prisoner and prison guard safety and preventing escapes with any scandals in the private prison systems. Few do that.

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