Real business cycles, the declining clarity of information and learning by waiting

Willems and van Wijnbergen (2013) identified reduced clarity in information about business cycle fluctuations as a factor that is the lengthening the lag in the response of employment to output changes in recent US recessions.

Willems and van Wijnbergen (2013) – ungated – found that the trough in employment in the 1991 and 2001 recessions was much later than the troughs for earlier US recessions.

  • There was a stronger immediate reduction in employment in pre-1990 US recessions and a faster recovery, so the 1991 and 2001 recessions were initially job-preserving – the rate at which workers were laid off was less than in prior recessions.
  • Employment in the 1991 and 2001 recessions continued to fall for another year after the trough in output.
  • The job-preserving recessions in 1991 and 2001 were then followed by this delayed recovery in employment growth.
  • There is a lengthening labour adjustment lag that slows the loss of jobs at the start of recessions and delays the renewal of recruitment at the end of recessions.

Willems and van Wijnbergen (2013) attributed this combination of job-preserving recessions and delayed employment recoveries in 1991 and 2001 to the interaction of rising labour adjustment costs and a reduction in the clarity of entrepreneurial information about the business cycle.

The rising labour adjustment costs arose from the capital losses to employers of laying off employees who are increasingly rich in firm-specific human capital. The risks of laying off and investing precipitously have increased in recent decades because output growth subsequent to the great moderation in real output growth volatility is less predictable.

The US economy experienced a 50% reduction in volatility for many leading macroeconomic variables as well as low inflation since the early to mid-1980s. Similar declines in the real volatility and inflation rates occurred at about the same time in other industrial countries.

Prior to the mid-1980s, US real output growth was more variable, but this variation was more predictable. Frequent recessions were soon followed by recoveries. Since the early to mid-1980s in the US, major variations in real GDP growth have come increasingly as genuine surprises – 1983–2007 was one long boom punctuated by two mild recessions in 1991 and 2001.

The delay in the official dating of the peaks and troughs in business cycles in the US has increased from an average of 7½ months before 1990 to about 15 months in the post-1990 period (Willems and van Wijnbergen 2013).

With recessions more of a surprise – and the scope and depth of the panic of 2008 is an example of such a surprise in New Zealand and abroad – the value of waiting for better market information has increased.

Less certain information makes it more profitable than before for entrepreneurs to invest in waiting before laying off increasingly human capital-rich employees, making new investments and undertaking fresh recruitment. The impact of the business cycle on employment will be more muted.

Modern recessions can be initially job-preserving – layoffs are postponed for longer because the rising cost of laying off experienced labour is higher and because of the increased value of waiting to see. Recoveries in employment can be more sluggish as investors wait to be sure about the latest trends. These employers can use the employees they hoarded in larger numbers in the downswing to fill orders in the early days of the upswing in business:

We have presented evidence that the lag with which labour input reacts to structural economic shocks went up in the 1980s, thereby bringing jobless recoveries and recessions that were relatively job preserving to the US economy.

Using a real option model, this lagged response is shown to be optimal in a setting where labour input is costly to adjust and where employers are uncertain about the persistence of shocks that drive the business cycle

Economists are terrible at forecasts

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What’s the difference between inflation and counterfeiting? The Portuguese banknote caper

Robert Barro recounts in his macroeconomics textbook a marvellous example where swindlers induced a British manufacturer of bank notes to print and deliver to them 3 million pounds’ worth of Portuguese escudos, which was equivalent to about 1% of Portugal’s nominal GDP in 1926.

This company, Waterlow and Sons Ltd. of London, also printed the legitimate notes for the Bank of Portugal. These bogus notes were,at first pass, indistinguishable from the real thing (except that the serial numbers were duplicates of those from a previous series of legitimate notes).

 

It was impossible to differentiate between the original and most of the duplicate banknotes because they were printed by the same printer using the same plates. 135,318 of the duplicate notes could be identified as part of the swindle because they were printed on plates not used for any other Portuguese banknotes. These bogus notes printed with the new plates could be differentiated from older legitimate banknotes because of a few marks that could be identified by an expert using a magnifying glass.

Central to the scam was taking advantage of the practice of the privately owned Bank of Portugal of secretly printing banknotes and neither recorded such transactions in the books, nor informing the government of the increase in the number of circulating banknotes.

(At the time, the Bank of England was also privately owned and only in 1921 had it obtained a monopoly on the issue banknotes in England and Wales. The Bank of Scotland still prints Scottish banknotes that are not legal tender in England. Three northern Irish banks still print banknotes that are legal tender in Northern Ireland. The entire northern Irish currency was withdrawn from circulation after a major bank robbery by the IRA a few years ago and replaced with new notes).

After the scheme unravelled, the Bank of Portugal made good on the fraudulent notes by exchanging them for newly printed, valid notes. The fraud may have contributed to the military coup, some six months later.

In the interim, by illegally increasing the monetary base and investing heavily in currency, land, building, and businesses, the swindlers created a boom in the Portuguese economy.

From the standpoint of monetary economics, I cannot think of a more unanticipated monetary shock. Of a surprise burst of monetary inflation and price inflation  and led to the writing of books with titles such as The Man who Stole Portugal.

The final part of the swindle was to actually buy a controlling interest in the Bank of Portugal to validate the fraud by erasing all records that might inconvenience the swindlers.

The chief swindler with accomplices set up a bank of his own to facilitate fast distribution of the forged currency. A bank of their own was necessary because they had the modern equivalent of $150 billion to launder.

This Bank of Angola & Metropole set up to launder the bogus notes was also the initial place of suspicion of something fishy going on because it grew so quickly, while taking no deposits. Germans are also involved with this bank. Germany was suspected by the Portuguese government to have ambitions to take over Portuguese Angola, so this attracted additional attention from the authorities.

The chief swindler, Alves Reis, was depicted in a 50-episode TV series in 2000 as well as several books about the fraud over the decades.

At the time of the swindle, Reis was 28 years old engineering dropout from an undistinguished middle-class Lisbon family. He already had a conviction for cheque fraud. As such, one of the greatest swindles of all time was pulled off by a petty conman.

The swindle unravelled because of the duplicate banknote serial numbers, which was an error the swindler made himself. But for that, the swindle would have been immensely difficult to uncover. The swindlers duplicated the existing serial numbers and hoped they were able to successfully release all the banknotes before they were caught.

Reis, the architect of the swindle, work out the sequence of bank governor names and serial numbers used by the Portuguese central bank, but had neglected to eliminate numbers already ordered.

When the British printer realised this, Reis convinced the London firm that the reuse of existing serial numbers for their purported place of circulation in the Portuguese colony of Angola was not a cause for alarm. Fortunately for the swindlers, a letter from the British printers to the Banco de Portugal, in that he spoke about the agreements to print the banknotes for distribution in Angola went missing in the post.

The Bank of Portugal was not supposed to issue its currency in Angola, but often did circulate its currency in Angola.

This was a clever part of the swindle. By pretending that the Bank of Portugal was doing something slightly dodgy but still standard practice, and thus had to do so in secrecy, the swindlers could induce a whole range of other more legitimate people than them to cooperate quietly with what they were doing.

The shady nature of these dealings to surreptitious circulate Bank of Portugal banknotes in Angola stamped with “Angola” was passed over by the British dupes to the swindle as another example of the corruption of Portuguese officials. The stamp “Angola” was so they wouldn’t be confused with notes from the mother country.

In addition, bank notes for the Portuguese colonies were printed at the time by a competitor. The British printer saw this on the quiet contract as an opportunity to take away some of their trade.

The swindlers said that they would take care of stamping “Angola” on the banknotes once they were delivered to them. The swindlers had accomplices in the Portuguese diplomatic service, who issued them with fake diplomatic passports, which was helpful in persuading the British printers to deliver the bogus banknotes personally to them. Consignments were delivered to the swindlers in February, March and November 1925.

the basis of the scam was forging a contract in the name of Banco de Portugal authorising Reis to print banknotes in return for an alleged loan from a consortium to develop Angola. The whole affair had to be kept secret lest Angola fall into further financial difficulties due to rumours of a pending economic ruin.

The London based specialty printer worked, for among other clients, for the English court system and printed the transcripts of its own trial! This printer tried to have the trial postponed for a year while its chief executive completed his one-year term as Lord Mayor of London to save embarrassment.

The British printing company was found liable in subsequent four years of litigation, but the key question for the court was the amount of damages.

  • The Bank argued that the damages were £1 million (less funds collected from the swindlers).
  • The British printer duped by the swindlers argued was that the only true costs to the Bank were the expenses for paper and printing of the replacement notes.

The House of Lords determined in 1932 that £610,000 was the correct measure. This award of damages was the £1 million less the funds recovered from the swindlers

The proper measure of damages, in the view of the majority of the Law Lords, was the face value expressed in sterling of the genuine currency given in exchange for the spurious notes.

As these damages would be paid initially in British pounds, this damages award was a real windfall for the Bank of Portugal. Worthless Portuguese banknotes exchanged for good British pounds that could buy imports.

The majority decision of the Law Lords was the correct measure of damages because that is what the bank had to outlay to make itself whole again after the breach of contract. The chief swindler got 20 years.

One of the two Law Lords in dissent had another view of the proper measure of damages:

The judgment of Wright J. should be set aside and judgment entered for the Bank for the sum of £8,922

This law lord and an appeal court justice held this view because the swindle cost the Bank of Portugal nothing bar printing costs to replace the spurious banknotes, which were widely accepted as valid currency in a cash economy.

The Bank of Portugal could issue banknotes in any number at little cost to itself up to the limit provided by Portuguese law. Ropke wrote that:

The English courts presently discovered that the case involved issues of unusual subtlety and complexity, adjudication of which necessitated the admission of testimony by leading monetary theorists.

The question before the courts was: how great were the actual losses incurred by the Bank of Portugal?

If it had been postage stamps instead of bank notes in which the swindlers had trafficked, it is perfectly clear that the loss of the Portuguese government would have equalled the total value of the stamps.

With respect to the bank notes, however, no such simple calculation could be made.

Among the many questions which troubled the experts the following stand out as particularly relevant to our study: would the Bank of Portugal have issued the same amount of notes even if the swindlers had not done so?

If not, was the increase in the supply of money resulting from the introduction of the fraudulent notes good or bad for Portugal?

No one disputes,  as several of the Law Lords noted, that the theft of a postage stamp must be made good at face value. People hesitate in this case involving swindling access to banknote plates and printing currency for yourself because what exactly was stolen?

When Reis died in 1955 , The Economist said of the counterfeiting scheme:

The perpetrators, however reprehensible their motives, did Portugal a very good turn according to the best Keynesian principles.

The House of Lords case is a major British legal precedent regarding the duty of the wronged party to mitigate damages in the case of breach of contract.

The House of Lords held that this duty did not apply if it would give your business a bad name in the trade. The Bank of Portugal could have repudiated the duplicate banknotes rather than exchange them for genuine new notes, but chose not to do so because this repudiation of banknotes would have ruined what little reputation it had.

The House of Lords also upheld the right of the wronged party to choose between different methods to mitigate damages from the breach of contract.

Deirdre McCloskey on the competition for rents

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Some people don’t understand why organic farming isn’t more popular than it is

The flight to charter schools

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The rise of the working rich among the top 0.1% in the USA

 

Source: “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998” with Thomas Piketty, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 2003, 1-39 
(Tables and Figures Updated to 2012 in Excel format, September 2013)  via Chad Jones

Before 1940, most of the income of the top 0.1% of income earners in the USA was income from investments.

By the end of the 20th century, the top 0.1% were earning their incomes as wages and salaries, business incomes and capital gains. Very little of that income of the top 0.1% was in the form of passive income from capital. The top 0.1% of the USA are now working rich – entrepreneurs.

The slow diffusion of modern human resource management

Modern human resource management gained ground in the 1980s, slowly replaced the centralising of people management in personnel departments that was widespread by the 1960s.

Modern human resource management stressed rigorous selection and recruitment, more training at induction and on-the-job, more teamwork and multi-skilling, better management-worker communication, the use of quality circles, and encouraging employee suggestions and innovation.

The aim is a highly committed and capable workforce that pulls toward common goals. This drive for employer-employee unity is in contrast to the old days of detachment and formality with managers directing and controlling workers.

Modern human resource management replaced compliance with rules with genuine employee commitment and a unified corporate culture.

Modern human resource management is a technology and there is a long lag on the widespread adoption of any new technology.

The lag on the intra-industry diffusion of new technologies from 10% to 90% of users is 15 to 30 years long (Hall 2003; Grubler 1991). The literature on technology transfer is full of examples of the slow and costly diffusion of new technologies even with the on-site help of the original innovator and experienced consultants (Boldrin and Levine 2008).

New management practices are often complex and they are often slow and costly to introduce successfully without the assistance of consultants with prior experience with the new practices (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007, 2010).

Managerial innovations such as Taylor’s scientific management, Ford’s mass production, Sloan’s M-form corporations, Deming’s quality movement and Toyota’s lean manufacturing diffused slowly over decades. These technologies required large investments in learning, retraining, reorganisation, trial and error and adaptation and there were many failures (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010).

Bryson, Gomez, Kretschmer and Willman (2007) found that workplace voice and modern, high-commitment human resource management practices diffused unevenly across British workplaces. More employees, larger multi-establishment networks, public or for-profit ownership and network effects all increased the rates of diffusion of the new practices.

Large firms may invest more in skills because they are the early adopters of new management practices. Large firms are organisationally complex and they require more structured, explicit management practices to survive. Higher levels of worker skills have been linked with firms having better management practices (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007, 2010).

Employers who pay higher wages lose more if they mismanage or under-utilise well-paid workers. Large firms pay more, on average, so they lose more if they do not adopt good management practices in a timely fashion.

There are fixed costs to adopting new technologies and management practices, so large firms may be the first to find them profitable (Hall 2003). Later adopters may follow this lead when the new practices are more proven and, through experience and adaptation, cheaper to adopt.

The organisational disruption from switching to any new technology can reduce production and profits for several years and the new way of doing business may fail perhaps at a great cost (Holmes, Levine, and Schmitz 2012; Atkeson and Kehoe 2007; Roberts 2004).

These costs and uncertainties slow technology diffusion and explain why smaller firms use seemly out-of-date management practices. The new ways are not yet profitable for them. The pace of adoption of new technologies is driven by changes in the profitability of using the new technology as compared to the old (Karshenas and Stoneman 1993).

Firms of different sizes will invest in skills development and new management practices to the extent that is profitable to their circumstances.

On some occasions, large firms will find it profitable to invest in more skills development because this is part of the costs of investing in more capital per worker. On other occasions, skills development is necessary to reduce the costs of a growing corporate hierarchy.

No firm cannot invest in more skills development unless this growth is buoyed by market demand. Precipitate investments in skills development are fraught with risks.

The competition between social networks all in one infographic

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The role of news in real business cycles

Revisions in investor beliefs about productivity prospects can partly account for business expansions and contractions. If favourable news about future technological opportunities can seed a boom today in consumption and investment before the actual technological improvement arrives and is realised, news that future productivity growth may not be as good as was previously expected can induce a recession without any actual change in productivity ever occurring.

Investors build in anticipation, starting new projects and recruiting more staff. Their forecasts can turn out to be too optimistic. When entrepreneurial expectations of future productivity are revised, investment demand can fall because of an excess in capital accumulation – recent investments were made under more optimistic beliefs about productivity (Beaudry and Portier 2004).

Investment demand must be muted for a time until the excess capital accumulation is brought into use, refitted or scraped. There also will be layoffs and a lull in recruitment. Job search strategies must also change as job seekers redirect their careers in light of the news about their revised prospects in different firms, industries and competing occupations.

The optimism and pessimism of investors are rational profit-seeking responses to new entrepreneurial knowledge. Profit expectations reflect consumer preferences, resource constraints and technological factors as they exist and are forecast to change and actual and forecasted opportunities and constraints in the investment sector. Entrepreneurs are dynamic risk takers who profit from anticipating shifts in consumer demand, input costs and technology.

Recessions and booms can arise due to the challenges facing entrepreneurs in forecasting the uncertain and ever-changing future demand for new capital that is implied by their forecasts of consumer demand and technological opportunities as Beaudry and Portier (2004) explain:

The view that recession and booms may arise as the result of investment swings generated by agents’ difficulties to properly forecast the economy’s need in terms of capital has a long tradition in economics.

For example, this difficulty was seen by Pigou as being an inherent feature of any economy with technological progress.

As  emphasized in Pigou (1926), when agents are optimistic about the future and decide to build up capital in expectation of future demand then, in the case where their expectations are not met, there will be a period of retrenched investment which is likely to cause a recession.

Revisions in entrepreneurial beliefs and investment plans can be required when new information is uncovered (Beaudry and Portier 2004; Sill 2009). There can be lulls in investment demand following these revisions to entrepreneurial forecasts leading to recessions. As Pigou noted in 1927:

The varying expectations of business men … constitute the immediate cause and direct causes or antecedents of industrial fluctuations

The Wealth of Grumpy Cat – In defense of the monetisation of uncommon cuteness.

 

via The Wealth of Grumpy Cat – The Atlantic.

Robert Lucas and where have all the small entrepreneurs gone?

 

Robert Lucas predicted the decline in the number of small business people and small firms in 1978. The number of small firms will fall and the number of large firms will rise with increases in real wages (Lucas 1978; Poschke 2013; Gollin 2008; Eeckhout and Jovanovic 2012).

Lucas closed his 1978 discussion of the size distribution of firms, and how firms are getting larger an average over the course of the 20th century, with a discussion of a lovely restaurant he visited on the Canadian border. He predicted that in couple of decades time, these type of restaurants will be fewer.

Nations that are more productive  over time and have higher wages because they have accumulated more capital per worker.

One consequence of more capital per worker is real wages increase at a faster rate than profits (Gollin 2008; Eeckhout and Jovanovic 2012). For example, the rate of return on capital was stable over the 20th century while real wages increased many fold (Jones and Romer 2010). This relationship turns out  to be crucial in terms of occupational choice and the decision to become an entrepreneur – a small business owner

Higher wages reduces the supply of entrepreneurs and increases the average size of firms because entrepreneurship becomes a less attractive occupational choice (Lucas 1978; Gollin 2008; Eeckhout and Jovanovic 2012).

For example, in the mid-20th century, many graduates who were not teachers were self-employed professionals. With an expanding division of labour because of economic growth, many well-paid jobs and new occupations emerged for talented people in white-collar employment.

OECD countries richer than New Zealand should have less self-employment and more firms that are large because paid employment is an increasingly better-rewarded career option for their high skilled workers.

The U.S. had the second lowest share of self-employed workers (7 per cent) in the OECD in 2010 – the latest data – which is less than half the rate of New Zealand self-employment (16.5 per cent) in 2011 (OECD 2013). The Australian self-employment rate was 11.6 per cent in 2010 (OECD 2013).

A companion reason for larger average firm sizes in countries richer than New Zealand is more capital-intensive production can prosper in larger corporate hierarchies than can labour-intensive production (Lucas 1978; Becker and Murphy 1992; Poschke 2011; Eeckhout and Jovanovic 2012).

The more able entrepreneurs can run larger firms with bigger spans of control in richer countries because their employees can profitably use more capital per worker with less supervision. The diseconomies of scale to management and entrepreneurship should rise at a faster rate in less technological advanced countries such as New Zealand because they are more labour intensive economies (Lucas 1978; Becker and Murphy 1992; Poschke 2011; Eeckhout and Jovanovic 2012).

Importantly, the more able entrepreneurs benefit most from introducing frontier technologies because they can deal more easily with their increased complexity and more uncertain prospects (Poschke 2011; Lazear 2005; Shultz 1975; 1980). Growing technological complexity reduces the supply of entrepreneurs because it takes longer to acquire the necessary balance of skills and experience needed to lead a firm (Lazear 2005; Otani 1996).

The more marginal entrepreneurs will switch to be employees as technology advances so the average size of firms will increase. The entrepreneurs that remain in business will be the most able, more skilled and more experienced entrepreneurs and will be more capable of running larger firms that pioneer complex, frontier technologies (Poschke 2011; Lazear 2005, Otani 1996; Lucas 1978).

Countries more technologically advanced than New Zealand will have both larger firms and less self-employment because of growing technological complexity.

The greater is the exposure to foreign competition, the smaller is the fraction of self-employed and small firms in a country (Melitz 2003; Díez and Ozdagli 2012). More foreign competition increases wages because of lower prices, which makes self-employment less lucrative. More exporting favours larger firms both because of the fixed costs of entering export markets and because the stiffer competition will weed-out the lower ability entrepreneurs who run the smaller firms (Melitz 2003; Díez and Ozdagli 2012).

Other factors can countermand the effects that occupational choice, frontier technologies, exporting and capital intensity have to increase the average size of firms as real wages rise.

For example, tax and regulatory policies reduce the average size of firms in many EU member states to levels that are similar to New Zealand. The EU is less likely to have large firms in its labour intensive sectors. Employment protection laws, product market and land use regulation and in particular, high taxes stifled the growth of labour intensive services sectors in the continental EU (Bertrand and Kramatz 2002; Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn 2009; Rogerson 2008).

EU firms are are more capital intensive with fewer employees than otherwise because labour is so expensive to hire in the EU. Small and medium sized firms can struggle to grow in much of the EU because of regulatory burdens that phase in with firm size (Garicano, Lelarge and Van Reenen 2012; Hobijn and Sahin 2013; Rubini, Desmet, Piguillem and Crespo 2012). Average firm sizes are 40% smaller in Spain and Italy than in Germany. Obstacles to firm growth originate in product, labour, technology and financial and the binding constraints differ from one EU member state to another (Rubini, Desmet, Piguillem and Crespo 2012).

Average firm sizes in the USA and UK may be larger because of fewer tax and regulatory policies that limit business growth. Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi (2005) found that new entrants in the U.S. started on a smaller scale than in Europe but grew at a much higher rate. This willingness to experiment on a smaller scale was worth the risk because the payoff was much larger in terms of growth in the more flexible U.S. markets.

In summary, many factors drive the size distribution of firms countries including taxation and regulation. Underlying this, nonetheless, is Lucas’s point from 1978 that rising real wages makes starting a small business a less inviting occupation choice.

Was Aaron Sorkin right? Hollywood discriminates? Sacrifices profit to indulge sexism?

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Real business cycles and learning the value of major technological changes

The true value of any technological improvement is uncertain. Investors adopt a new technology after forecasting the likely productivity of the new technology. Investor learning in the face of imperfect information about the true value of major new technologies can also lead to business cycle fluctuations (Li 2007).

As a new technology slowly diffuses, entrepreneurs learn more about the true potential of the new technology and re-evaluate in hindsight whether they have invested beyond the optimal amount. If entrepreneurs have not over-invested, they revise their beliefs about the magnitude of the innovation and invest more.

Because the agents have to learn the magnitude of the technology shock, they are cautious in making investment decisions before they have learned much about the underlying technology. Consequently, GDP growth is gradual, which stretches out the length of booms.

When entrepreneurs later find that investment has over-shot the optimal amount, they reduce investment demand perhaps sharply and start a recession (Li 2007). This eventuality may seed a recession within many major technology advances such as the IT boom in the 1990s and the computer revolution in the 1970s.

The true value of the major technological improvement is  often discovered only after investment over-shoots the optimal level (Li 2007). A general technological innovation affecting many industries is required for the cluster of entrepreneurial errors about the true magnitude of the productivity increase to seed a recession (Li 2007).

The 2001 US recession followed a long boom involving major new information and communication technologies that raised the productivity of many existing technologies. The information, communications and software boom lasted over a decade in the US (Li 2007).

Entrepreneurs invested gradually in new information and communication capital to learn more about the underlying technologies that they embodied. These new information and communication technologies were productivity improvements of a major but uncertain scope (Li 2007).

The eventual productivity gains come from two complex sources – both from adopting the new technology itself and from its interface with existing capital and expertise. Because both productivity gains must be forecasted and because both are discovered only by experimentation and learning by doing, it is entirely possible that entrepreneurs can invest ahead of consumer demand.

This surplus capacity will emerge despite the best efforts of investors to mitigate this risk by staggering investments to learn more about the true value of the new technology. This investor caution and staggering to allow for more learning is an important factor that stretches out the length of investment booms in major new technologies (Li 2007).

There was a sharp decline in US investment in 2001, with large accumulations of unused capital in some sectors. For example, 90% of the optical fibre laid in the US in the 1990s was unused in the years that followed. Entrepreneurs discovered the optimum investment level in, for example, optical cable fibre by investing past it and revised plans for further investments in light of this over-shooting (Li 2007).

Real business cycles of a significant magnitude can emerge simply from technological learning.

Li (2007) argued that many investment booms start with the advent of a revolutionary technology and ended with overinvestment. For example, canal building boomed after the invention of the steamboat, and by the year 1860 more than 4,000 miles of canal had been completed. However, many of these canals did  not live up to the expectations of their promoters. Many of these projects eventually turned out to be financial failures.

Later in the same century, the railroad expansion shared a similar fate. Thousands of miles of railroad were built and left unused or under used, a phenomenon described by Schumpeter (1949) as construction “ahead of demand.”

That real business cycle theory required technological regress for there to be recessions is one of its oldest criticisms. That criticism that standard equilibrium business cycle models have difficulties in predicting the investment boom and overshooting grows weaker by the day.

Li presents a strong internal propagation mechanism with respect to technology shocks and endogenous recessions without invoking technological regress:

…firms invest in new capital to take advantage of the IT revolution, without knowing the limit to which this new technology can increase productivity.

The belief of this limit becomes increasingly optimistic over time as investors repeatedly realize that they have not invested enough to exhaust the potential of the new technology.  Such belief revisions lead to increasingly aggressive investment and a capital overhang, followed by a recession.

Why are we always restructuring the workplace? The economics of organisational fickleness

Ok, whatever is, is efficient, but I always had my doubts when we are always restructuring wherever I worked. This continual organisational upheaval and restructuring was also a phenomena in the private sector.

What was the survival value of this continual disruption of organisational form and organisational capital in competition with rival firms with more stable internal organisational forms?

Internal reorganisations divert management time away from more profitable pursuits such as facilitating production. Managerial resources are scarce, like any other resource, and must be allocated to their highest value uses.

But as a firm grows, waste accumulates through the duplication of employee effort and the assignment of unnecessary tasks within the organisation.

Jack Nickerson and Todd Zenger wrote a great paper in 2002 on the efficiency of being fickle – of repeated reorganisations of the workplace. Their point was simple: times change and they change a lot faster than we think so organisations have to adapt to their rapidly unfolding new market conditions.

They illustrated their point about the need for regular reorganisation inside a short period of time with a case study of the alternating waves of centralisation and decentralisation in Hewlett-Packard.

Throughout the 1970s, Hewlett-Packard was a thoroughly decentralised organisation and was successful in the market. It had a remarkable record of innovation in the 1970s.

In the early 1980s, Hewlett-Packard hard found this decentralisation was starting to work against it in the rapidly evolving computer market. The Independent divisions developed computers, peripherals and components that will both incompatible with each other and competed with each other.

This redundancy between the independent divisions was costly and was confusing to consumers because they had a hodgepodge of products that really won’t related to each other. The computer industry in the early 1980s was involving very rapidly with many incompatible computers and programs, but the few that turned out to be the best became immensely profitable.

In 1984 and 1985, Hewlett-Packard hard centralise product development in headquarters and put all marketing and sales into one unit. Financial performance recovered after this reorganisation.

By 1990, Hewlett-Packard was on again in a steep financial decline. The centralisation of decision-making has slowed product development and there was a significant drop in innovation.

In 1990, computers was separated into competing products and computing systems. Individual product lines were decentralised and treated a separate business units.

In 1994, Hewlett-Packard again decentralised customer support of all computer activities. Three years later, it decentralised the same activities into three organisations. In 1999 it spun off its instruments and medical business.

Over 16 years, Hewlett-Packard, experience five fundamental ships alternating between decentralisation and centralisation. Each one of these reorganisations was greeted with the share price increase.

The reason why this fickleness in organisational form was efficient was the market changes rapidly. Organisational forms and organisational capital become obsolete rather quickly.

The form of organisation that survives in competition with actual and potential market rivals is that specific form of organisation which allows the firm to deliver the products that customers want at the lowest price while covering costs (Alchian 1950; Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b).

Each time Hewlett-Packard decentralised was a time in the product life cycle of their industry where there was rapid innovation. Hewlett-Packard tended to centralise in the consolidation phase of product life cycles.

New technologies are unproven and they come with much less information and prior experience to guide the top of a hierarchy in directing their successful adoption from a distance (Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen and Zilibotti 2007). In any hierarchy, the top faces two problems with their subordinates: communicating their desires and seeing that they are carried out (Tullock 2005).

When a large firm directs major changes from the top of a hierarchy, failures of communication in the chain of command are a growing risk. More employees require more supervisors. More supervisors require more supervisors of supervisors at every tier of the hierarchy – the layers of supervision multiply (Posner 2010; Williamson 1975, 1985).

There are delay in executing orders, a loss of information and feedback on the way up, and the truncation of the directions from the top: there is a general weakening of control and coherence (Posner 2010; Williamson 1975, 1985). The daily implementation problems of new technologies cannot go up and down a hierarchy for resolution.

Firms must decentralise (rather than grow in hierarchy) to profit most from a line manager’s superior local knowledge about the implementation of the latest, more complex technologies. Delegating initiative to managers downstream is vital when a large firm introduces frontier technologies about which information flows upstream are slow and considerable learning by doing and rapid adaptation are required (Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen and Zilibotti 2007; Jensen and Meckling 1995).

New technologies usually bug-ridden and require considerable refinement, adaptation and consumer feedback on their use before the mature product emerges (Greenwood 1999; Greenwood and Yorukoglu 1997). This costly process of learning, improvisation and product and process re-design explains the multi-decade long 10-90 lag in technology diffusion across firms in the same industry and the slow rate of consumer acceptance of new products.

Larger firms may struggle with striking the most profitable balance between greater local managerial discretion and effective corporate governance of a large diverse organisation with professional managers and diffuse ownership structures.

A risk of greater local managerial discretion in a large firm is less effective governance (Williamson 1975, 1985; Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b). The risks of separating of ownership from control and the distortions to knowledge flows in hierarchies drives the internal organisation of large firms and the division of decision control and decision management rights between the board and management (Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b; Williamson 1985).

The separation of decision management rights, vested in hired managers, from decision control rights, vested in the board of directors, is a common governance safeguard against conflicts of interest in business, professional and non-profit organisations, large and small (Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b).

Decision management rights cover the initiation and the implementation of decisions. Decision control rights involve the ratification and the monitoring of decisions. Managers and division heads carry out the production decisions, budgets and policies on wages, hours, staffing and job designs developed by head office and which are ratified by the board of directors (Fama and Jensen 1983b, 1985).

Competition between different sizes, shapes and internal organisational forms of firms all vying for sales, cheaper sources of supply and investor support sifts out the keener priced, lower cost, and more innovative enterprises (Alchian 1950; Stigler 1958). These lower-cost firms will be able to under-sell their higher cost rivals.

The winning firm size and internal organisational shape is that configuration which meets any and all problems the firm is actually facing and seizes more of the entrepreneurial opportunities that are within its grasp (Stigler 1958; Alchian 1950).

Large firms invest heavily in mimicking the nimbleness of small firms. Some firms re-create some of the advantages of being small by organising into M-form hierarchies made up of product divisions to improve performance monitoring, identify managerial slack, encourage mutual monitoring, promote competition within the firm for top-level management positions and facilitate comparisons of compliance with the policies of head office (Klein 1999; Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b; Williamson 1975, 1985).

Large firms must develop organisational architectures to assign decision rights, reward employees, and evaluate the performance of employees and business units. The aim is to empower subordinates with the requisite local knowledge with the power to act swiftly and the incentive to make good decisions. The organisational architecture of a firm encompasses the assignment of decision rights within the firm, the methods of rewarding individual employees, and the structure of the systems that evaluate the performance of individual employees and business units.

Poor cost control, budgetary excess and any lack of innovation and initiative over products designs and pricing, input mixes and wage and employment policies will reflect in relative divisional performances and overall corporate profits.

Any news of less promising current and future net cash flows will feed into share prices and into the labour market prospects of both career managers and the members of boards of directors (Manne 1965; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b; Demsetz 1983; Demsetz and Lehn 1985). To survive, managerial firms must balance delegation with more centralised control (Fama and Jensen 1983a; McKenzie and Lee 1998).

One way of balancing delegation with centralised control is simply to reorganise the firm on a regular basis as market circumstances change and entrepreneurial judgements about the future are updated. This regular reorganisation of the firm may seem fickle, but the firm must adapt or die. Firms must be efficiently fickle in their organisational forms.

Not only is whatever is, is efficient, any attempt to change whatever is, is efficient, because otherwise it wouldn’t be attempted. Of course, these reorganisations are entrepreneurial ventures that are never guaranteed success.

 

 

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