
The quickening in creative destruction and CEO turnover
03 Jul 2014 Leave a comment
in financial economics, labour economics, managerial economics, market efficiency Tags: CEO turnover, creative destruction
Peter Drucker hated meetings too
13 May 2014 Leave a comment
in entrepreneurship, managerial economics Tags: meetings, Peter Drucker
Meetings are by definition a concession to a deficient organization.
For one either meets or one works. One can not do both at the same time…
There will always be more than enough meetings…Every meeting generates a host of little follow-up meetings—some formal, some informal, but both stretching out for hours.
Meetings, therefore, need to be purposefully directed.
An undirected meeting is not just a nuisance; it is a danger.
But above all, meetings have to be the exception rather than the rule.
An organization where everybody meets all the time is an organization in which no one gets anything done.
Wherever a time log shows the fatty degeneration of meetings—whenever, for instance people in an organization find themselves in meetings a quarter of their time or more—there is time-wasting malorganization.

Drucker also said:
The senior financial executive of a large organization knew perfectly well that the meetings in his office wasted a lot of time.
This man asked all of his direct subordinates to every meeting, whatever the topic.
As a result, the meetings were far too large.
And because every participant felt that he had to show interest, everybody asked at least one question—most of them irrelevant. As a result, the meetings stretched on endlessly.
But the senior executive had not known, until he asked, that his subordinates too considered the meetings a waste of their time.
Aware of the great importance everyone in the organization placed on status and on being "in the know", he feared that the uninvited men would feel slighted and left out.
Now, however, he satisfies the status needs of his subordinates in a different manner.
He sends out a printed form which reads:
"I have asked [Messrs Smith, Jones and Robinson] to meet with me [Wednesday at 3] in [the fourth floor conference room] to discuss [next year’s capital appropriations budget].
Please come if you think that you need the information or want to take part in the discussion.
But you will in any event receive right away a full summary of the discussion and of any decisions reached, together with a request for your comments".
Where formerly a dozen people came and stayed all afternoon, three men and a secretary to take the notes now get the matter over within an hour or so. And no one feels left out.
Why are there so few workers’ co-ops?
19 Mar 2014 6 Comments
in Austrian economics, industrial organisation, labour economics, managerial economics, organisational economics, theory of the firm Tags: adverse selection, cooperative ownership, Jon Elster, kibbutzim, moral hazard, Ran Abramitzky, Robert Nozick, worker ownership
If workers’ cooperatives are so efficient, why are there so few cooperatives? Workers’ cooperatives should be able to slowly undercut other firms on price because they do not have to pay a profit to the capitalists.
Building societies, credit unions and some life insurance companies were mutually owned by their customers for a long time, but recently fell out of favour because of a growing lack of competitiveness and under-capitalisation.
Cooperatives are not economically viable because of intrinsic difficulties of entrepreneurship and management. And most workers prefer to work in firms for a wage rather than wait for the co-op to start up and hopefully break even before they get their first pay cheque. That could be a slow train coming.
The kibbutzim are Israeli agricultural communities initially organized on socialist lines, mostly between the 1910s and 1950s. The kibbutz is an example of voluntary socialism. The founders of kibbutzim were socialist idealists wanting to create a new human being.
Robert Nozick pointed out that few people actually join a kibbutz. Six per cent is the maximum proportion of any population who would voluntarily choose to live in these socialist communities. More recently, 2.6% of the Israeli population live on a kibbutz.
Originally, most kibbutzim followed strict socialist policies forbidding private property; they also required near-total equality of income regardless of differences in productivity, and in some cases, even abandoned the specialisation of labour. Kibbutzim are communities whose aim is equal sharing.
Kibbutzim were expected to fail because of moral hazard and adverse selection. Other organisations subject to adverse selection and moral hazard are professional partnerships, co-operatives, and labour-managed firms because they are all based on revenue sharing.
Kibbutzim have persisted for most of the twentieth century and are one of the largest communal movements in history. About 40% are still run on communist principles. Why is this so?
The kibbutz movement was founded by individuals who can be regarded as ex-ante homogeneous in their ability and potential income, and who came to a new land full of uncertainties. They were young unattached individuals who share a comparatively long period of social, ideological, and vocational training.
An even more durable example of voluntary collectivist living is Catholic monasteries and convents, but notice that these too were founded on a realization that close family ties are inimical to communal order.
Kibbutz founders wanted insurance, but their founders realised that members who would turn out to have high abilities might leave the Kibbutz.
- The founders of the kibbutzim decided to abolish all private property and to own all wealth commonly, which served as a lock-in device.
- Like monasteries and convents, kibbutzim deter members from fleeing through this communal ownership of property. You leave with the shirt on your back!
Kibbutzim also put prospective members through lengthy trial periods to make sure they are made of the right stuff. Those raised on a kibbutz tend to have learned kibbutz-specific skills, such as agronomy, which also makes exit to the outside world even more difficult.
Kibbutzim are similar to law firms, medical and business partnerships that pool income for risk sharing purposes.
Mutual monitoring and peer pressure replace direct monetary incentives in mitigating moral hazard in a kibbutz (and in monasteries and convents) in the same way as in professional partnerships, cooperatives, and labour-managed firms with pooled assets and the option of exit.
The trade-off between insurance and adverse selection determines the level of equality within a kibbutz and its size, as with any other professional partnership:
- Kibbutz vary in size from less than a hundred to over a thousand, but most have between 400 and 600 members, with an average of 441 members.
- Kibbutz size is limited by the savings on income insurance no longer offsetting the costs of moral hazard and other transaction costs as the Coasian firm grows in size.
Ran Abramitzky writes with great insight on the economics of the kibbutzim. He is writing a book The Mystery of the Kibbutz: How Socialism Succeeded. He found that high-ability individuals are more likely to leave a kibbutz. The brain drain would be worse if kibbutzim didn’t make it so costly to exit. Is this a familiar theme of socialism?
Many hybrid organisations exist in the market, ranging from joint ventures and agricultural seller and supermarket buyer co-ops to labour-owned firms such as in most of the professions.
But rarely do we find real life existing cooperatives with all workers and only workers having equal ownership rights. As Jon Elster noted, there are often non-working owners, non-owning workers and unequal distribution of shares in real life workers’ co-ops. All other types of co-ops and professional partnership share this feature.
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