The war on alcohol and the war on drugs were symbiotic campaigns
14 Sep 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, economics, economics of regulation, law and economics, politics - USA Tags: economics of prohibition, war on drugs
The iron law of prohibition
03 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, health economics Tags: alcohol regulation, black markets, economics of prohibition, economics of smoking, marijuana decriminalisation, offsetting behaviour, The fatal conceit, The pretense the knowledge
Repugnant markets and the demand and supply for counterfeit legal ivory
17 Jun 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economics of crime, entrepreneurship, law and economics, property rights Tags: black markets, counterfeit goods, economics of prohibition, endangered species, offsetting the, unintended consequences
A huge legal sale of ivory in 2008 backfired. Instead of crashing the price of ivory and undermining poaching, poaching exploded in East Africa. It increased by 65%.
The international trade in ivory was banned in 1989. In 2008, China and Japan were allowed to pay $15m for 107 tonnes of ivory from elephants that died naturally in four African nations.
Source: Study finds global legalization trial escalates elephant poaching | Berkeley News.
Hsiang and Sekar this week found that this legal sale of ivory was followed by “an abrupt, significant, permanent, robust and geographically widespread increase” in ivory poaching. They were right to conclude that the legal sale provided a cover for poached ivory.
The economic intuition was that if we allow the sale of some legal ivory in Japan and China, then there would be fewer people left to purchase it illegally. We found that that intuition was incorrect. The black market for ivory responded to the announcement of a legal sale as an opportunity to smuggle even more ivory.
The legal sale of ivory created new demand for ivory in China, where it no longer had the stigma of an illicit product. The presence of legal ivory provided cover for smugglers trying to peddle illegal ivory sourced from poachers.
As illegal ivory can now masquerade as legal ivory in China, transporting and selling illicit ivory has gotten easier and cheaper, which can boost illegal production even though prices are falling.
Ivory is a repugnant market. Many friends will be revolted by you having ivory products.
The presence of legal ivory made it possible for counterfeit legal ivory to be passed off as legal ivory and therefore your friends will not reject you. This is a real and striking example of a unintended consequence. The solution to poaching is property rights.
How #drugs travel the world
13 Jun 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, industrial organisation, international economics, law and economics Tags: black markets, drug decriminalisation, economics of prohibition, marijuana decriminalisation, smuggling
Why Do Black Markets for Marijuana Still Exist in Colorado? @PeterDunneMP
24 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economics of regulation, health economics, politics - USA Tags: black markets, economics of prohibition, marijuana decriminalisation, tax evasion
#MorganFoundation errors about @nzinitiative’s Health of the State – part 1
22 Apr 2016 3 Comments
in economics of information, economics of regulation, health economics, law and economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: Aaron Director, alcohol regulation, economics of obesity, economics of prohibition, economics of smoking, meddlesome preferences, Morgan Foundation, nanny state
The Greens have joined that Morgan Foundation in playing the man rather than the ball on the recently published report of the New Zealand Initiative on sin taxes. Green Party health spokesperson Kevin Hague said:
The New Zealand Initiative cares more about junk-food barons’ bottom lines than it cares about Kiwis who are getting sick and dying because of obesity-related illnesses
The Morgan Foundation was just as keen to argue that their opponents on sin taxes are both ignorant and steeped in moral turpitude as a way of avoiding substantive argument:
The New Zealand Initiative are not interested in reducing obesity, or preventing the looming diabetes crisis where 1 in 3 Kiwis will have the disease. They make no attempt to understand the causes, and don’t propose any way to deal with these issues…
Is there no room for honest disagreement and different views on the ability of further government intervention to be a net benefit? As Aaron Director said:
Laissez-faire is no more than a slogan in defence of the proposition that every extension of state activity should be examined under the presumption of error.
One of the specific claims by the Morgan Foundation that seems to be in error is:
In fact, the report seems devoid of any research outside a narrow economic focus. The food industry has funded an enormous amount of psychological research on how to influence people to eat more junk food through packaging, advertising, product placement etc, much of which is publicly available, but which the New Zealand Institute has roundly ignored. Ironic, given that they funded by the same organisations that funded this psychological research.
The Food industry’s own research shows our choices are hugely influenced by the environment that surrounds us, but the New Zealand Institute conveniently prefers to cling to the oversimplification that we are all rational economic units – known as homo economicus.
The report of the New Zealand Initiative has a nice discussion of the limitations of rationality which did not weigh as heavily as it should in the critique by the Morgan Foundation part of which is in the snapshot below:
Source: Jenesa Jeram, The Health of the State, The New Zealand Initiative ( April 2016, p.10).
The international drug trade mapped
11 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, economics of regulation, international economics, law and economics Tags: drug trafficking, economics of prohibition, smuggling
Teenage alcohol consumption across countries
06 Sep 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, health economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: alcohol regulation, economics of prohibition, meddlesome preferences, nanny state
Cannabis is pretty harmless by comparison
06 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, health economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: alcohol regulation, economics of prohibition, marijuana decriminalisation, medical marijuana decriminalisation
US deaths (2013)
Tobacco 437k
Alcohol 29k
Opoids 16k
Heroin 8k
Cocaine 5k
Marijuana 0vox.com/2014/5/19/5727… http://t.co/o8yMDf7oE0—
Conrad Hackett (@conradhackett) August 04, 2015
Kids Create Cafeteria Black Market To Bypass Food Nannies
30 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, economics of education, economics of regulation, entrepreneurship, health economics, industrial organisation, law and economics, survivor principle Tags: black markets, economics of prohibition, entrepreneurial alertness, food, nanny state, police, The fatal conceit, unintended consequences
How drugs move all around the world.
27 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, industrial organisation Tags: black markets, drug trade, economics of prohibition, maps
These three maps show how drugs move all around the world. bloomberg.com/news/articles/… via @sangwonyoon http://t.co/wIjUBEXyt7—
Bloomberg Markets (@markets) June 26, 2015
Prohibition lives! Counties where alcohol cannot be sold
12 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, health economics Tags: economics of prohibition, our goal regulation
US counties where alcohol is not allowed to be sold AKA dry counties (red) http://t.co/MC6iR6G9KE—
Charts and Maps (@ChartsandMaps) June 05, 2015
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
Recent Comments