Uber creative destruction
06 Apr 2018 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation Tags: creative destruction, taxi regulation
Uber: Revolutionary but Controversial – (The Story of Uber)
30 Mar 2018 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, Public Choice, rentseeking, survivor principle, transport economics Tags: creative destruction, taxi regulation, Uber
#Uber and creative destruction in The Knowledge
21 Sep 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, survivor principle Tags: creative destruction, entrepreneurial alertness, taxi regulation, Uber
I used Uber for the first time over the weekend. My car was towed away and a friend had the app on his phone. We used it to go to the tow away yard to pay the $275 release fee.
One of the things I noticed was the the driver could immediately use his GPS because it was pre-programmed by the booking.
When you book a regular cab, they do not know where you are going until they arrive. This is to stop drivers avoiding picking up short trips. It also means that they must know where they are going rather than waste time programming the GPS. Prior to the GPS, they simply had to know where everything was.
The Knowledge, knowledge of London streets necessary to qualify for a black cab License is so difficult that neurologists study the brains of black cabdrivers to see how they are different from others in memory capacity.
Uber destroyed the Knowledge in a wave of creative destruction by linking the app booking request to GPSs. No diver needs to know where anything because the destination and pickup points are both pre-programmed into their GPS.
Uber and taxi medallion prices in Chicago
17 Jan 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation Tags: taxi regulation
Why taxi drivers are suddenly getting nicer?
07 Jan 2016 1 Comment
in applied price theory, economics of regulation, rentseeking, transport economics Tags: creative destruction, taxi regulation, Uber
Where I live, taxis suddenly starting texting to say they are five minutes away or outside.
Source: Why taxi drivers are suddenly getting nicer – The Washington Post
Uber is creative destruction on steroids
23 Nov 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, survivor principle Tags: creative destruction, entrepreneurial alertness, taxi regulation, Uber
Creative destruction in taxi medallion sales
05 Sep 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, economics of regulation, entrepreneurship, politics - USA, property rights, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: taxi regulation, Uber
Uber and the Great Taxicab Collapse
02 Sep 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, economics of regulation, industrial organisation, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: creative destruction, taxi regulation, Uber
How big is Uber
23 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
CHART: How Big is Uber vs. Legacy Taxis? VERY, VERY BIG nationalpost.com/m/wp/blog.html… http://t.co/gz0vXPZDip—
Mark J. Perry (@Mark_J_Perry) August 22, 2015
via Summer of Uber: Everything you need to know about the upstart ride-sharing service.
Is Uber taking British customers for a ride?
14 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, survivor principle Tags: creative destruction, taxi regulation, Uber
Is Uber taking British customers for a ride? i100.io/40kqOqH http://t.co/ok7UJmmgNQ—
i100 (@thei100) June 11, 2015
The Uber effect on taxi medallion prices
17 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: taxi regulation, Uber
https://twitter.com/Mark_J_Perry/status/576460181862801408/photo/1
$TAXI Ruh roh. Big jump in cabbies having trouble paying their loans on time. Aging of medallion loans '13 vs '14. http://t.co/Ayn69u1mgK—
Donut Shorts (@DonutShorts) March 12, 2015
Are Uber drivers twice as likely to be murdered as a cop?
30 Jan 2015 2 Comments
in economics of crime, economics of regulation, health and safety, labour economics, law and economics, occupational choice Tags: compensating differentials, occupational hazards, police, taxi regulation, Uber
Is surge pricing by Uber another name for overtime and weekend pay
28 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, Public Choice, rentseeking, transport economics Tags: barriers to entry, compensating differentials, peakload pricing, taxi regulation, Uber
Uber is in strife of late for charging more at peak times - Uber calls it surge pricing. We don’t object paying more for a meal at a restaurant at dinner time rather than at lunchtime but the same people object to paying more for the taxi late at night where the driver must risk the dangers of solitary night-time work and picking up strangers who might have had a few too many.
Under Uber’s now-national policy, price surging is capped during disasters and states of emergency at the fourth-highest nonemergency surge seen in the previous two months.
We all expect to pay more for air tickets at peak times, such as school holidays and Christmas. Indeed, one reason we are able to delay booking is we know seats will be available because they are selling at a premium for those who booked late. Others who make their plans early quite enjoy getting the cheaper for early bird bookings.
Is surge pricing another name for over time and night and weekend pay? Union contracts provide for overtime pay, if you work more than the specified 8 hours a day.
The Holidays Act in New Zealand provides that if an employee works at the weekends, they are paid at 150% of the normal rate; and double party on public holidays. Not many employees object of this wage premium for work in it inconvenient times. Cafes and restaurants routinely charge of 10-15% price premium on public holidays to cover this overtime pay.
As would be expected under the theory of compensating differentials, there are wage premiums for jobs where the worker must work at inconvenient or unsocial times, in jobs with a greater risk of injury, or otherwise work more unpleasant than the average.
Viscusi estimated the wage premium for hazardous jobs to be rather large in the United States:
The extra pay for job hazards, in effect, establishes the price employers must pay for an unsafe workplace.
Wage premiums paid to U.S. workers for risking injury are huge; they amount to about $245 billion annually (in 2004 dollars), more than 2 percent of the gross domestic product and 5 percent of total wages paid. These wage premiums give firms an incentive to invest in job safety because an employer who makes the workplace safer can reduce the wages he pays.
Those who don’t like Uber’s surge pricing can always hail a cab. As I remember from American TV programmes, at peak times, prospective customers on the side of the road hail cabs at peak times with several fingers raised to indicate how much more than the standard fare, they are willing to pay.
There is nothing new under the sun. Uber’s app allows you to do the price bidding for a taxi on your cellphone rather than out in the cold
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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