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Creative destruction 1946, not
24 Dec 2021 Leave a comment
in economic history, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, entrepreneurship Tags: barriers to entry, creative destruction
Friedman (1951) thought the union wage premium was overstated because it can’t be as big as doctors’ extract from occupational licensing
02 Dec 2019 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, econometerics, economics of regulation, labour economics, labour supply, Milton Friedman, occupational choice, occupational regulation, Public Choice, rentseeking, unions Tags: barriers to entry, occupational licensing, union power, union wage premium
Despite itself, @nzcomcom shows free entry into petrol supply because independents can import as much as they need
21 Aug 2019 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, energy economics, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, law and economics, politics - New Zealand, survivor principle Tags: barriers to entry, competition law
Amazon v. France
23 Jul 2019 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, economics of bureaucracy, economics of regulation, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: barriers to entry, competition law, France
Who said mobile phone networks were not contestable?
31 May 2016 Leave a comment
in industrial organisation, politics - New Zealand, survivor principle, technological progress Tags: anti-trust economics, barriers to entry, competition law, creative destruction, network goods, The meaning of competition
Source: New Zealand Commerce Commission.
Numbers of days needed to start a business in high income countries
11 May 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, industrial organisation, law and economics, property rights Tags: barriers to entry, doing business
Number of procedures required to start a business in high income countries
10 May 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, law and economics, property rights Tags: barriers to entry, doing business
Waiting for the permits to come in: business start-up fees and lost output waiting in Europe and North America
09 May 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, law and economics Tags: barriers to entry, Belgium, British economy, Canada, cost of doing business, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain
Expediting the processing of permits can actually make quite a difference to firm start-up costs even in countries with few barriers to starting up a business.
Source: Markus Poschke (2011) Entry regulation: Still costly | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal.
Note: The value of time is set to a business day’s output per day of waiting time at 22 business days per month.
What % of each occupation needs a license or certificate in the USA?
23 Apr 2016 1 Comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, economics of regulation, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, occupational regulation, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: adverse selection, barriers to entry, moral hazard, occupational licensing, occupational regulation
The 2015 Current Population Survey in the USA added a question about whether you needed a licence or a certificate to practice your occupation. One in 4 Americans say they need a licence or certificate. 22.4% need a license and 3.1% need a certificate among employed over the age of 16 in the USA.
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey (2015), Certification and licensing status of the employed by occupation Table 5.
This estimate of 25% is less than the 30% estimated by Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2015) using a Harris Poll. Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2015) also found that some American states regulate twice as many occupations as others. This diversity in federalism strains any public interest explanation of occupational regulation.
Occupational regulation is more likely to be an issue for those who finished further education. It would have been better if the estimate by the Bureau of Labour Statistics was for adults and not have included teenagers.
The purpose of occupational regulation is to protect buyers from quacks and lemons – to overcome asymmetric information about the quality of the provider of the service.
The main issue with quacks in the labour market is whether there is a large cost of less than average quality service, and is there a sub-market who will buy less than average quality products in the presence of competing sellers competing on the basis of quality assurance. This demand for assurance creates opportunities for entrepreneurs to profit by providing assurance of quality.
Mostly disciplinary investigations and deregistrations under the auspices of occupational regulation are for gross misconduct and criminal convictions rather than the shading of quality.
The cost of starting a business in Europe and North America
18 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, industrial organisation, law and economics, politics - USA, property rights Tags: barriers to entry, Belgium, British economy, Canada, Denmark, doing business, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain
These measures including the full cost of starting a business. Not only are official fees included, the opportunity cost of the waiting times for various permits are issued are added as well.
Source: Markus Poschke, Entry regulation: Still costly | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal (2011).
Note: The value of time is set to a business day’s output per day of waiting time at 22 business days per month.
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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