Why didn’t Greece get Constantinople after World War One?
15 Feb 2023 Leave a comment
in defence economics, economic history, International law, war and peace Tags: Greece, Turkey, World War I
General government net financial liabilities as % Portuguese, Italian, Greek, Spanish and Irish GDPs
03 Jun 2016 Leave a comment
in budget deficits, business cycles, economic growth, economic history, Euro crisis, financial economics, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), macroeconomics Tags: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, public debt management, sovereign debt crises, sovereign defaults, Spain
I had borrowed a lot of money from scratch after 2007. Greece borrowed a lot of money of its own accord from 2010. Italy always owed a lot of money. Spanish do not know all that much money considering their dire financial circumstances.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook June 2016 Data extracted on 01 Jun 2016 12:57 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat
General government expenditure as % of Portuguese, Italian, Greek and Spanish GDP since 1960
24 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in economic growth, economic history, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, public economics Tags: Greece, growth of government, Italy, Portugal, size of government, Spain
I do not think any of these countries have governments who can really handle managing half of national income on a regular basis. The Italian, and I assume Greek GDPs at least are topped up quite considerably to take account of their underground economies. The top up for Italy is 20%.
Data extracted on 23 Feb 2016 07:45 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat.
Greece should have defaulted several years ago rather than have raised taxes
24 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, macroeconomics Tags: Greece, sovereign debt, sovereign defaults
John Cochrane is the latest to join the list of economists who pointed out that Greece should have defaulted several years ago rather than put up taxes. Tax rises just made everything worse and put off the day when Greece had to reform through deregulation and privatisation.
Source: Renowned U.S. Economist Says High Taxes Squash Greece’s Prospects for Recovery | GreekReporter.com.
As early as 2011 , Jeffrey Miron was arguing the best way forward for Greece was to default and leave the Euro:
If Greece defaults, the country gets immediate relief from the crushing interest payments on its debt, leaving it with a relatively modest primary deficit which excludes the big interest payments Greece is faced with now.
In such a scenario, the pressure for austerity would therefore diminish. This would allow Greece to choose policies that encourage growth, rather than ones that shrink the deficit but retard growth by imposing higher taxes.
By abandoning the euro and adopting a properly valued currency, Greece can restore its international competitiveness. This means greater employment demand from both domestic and foreign sources.
The potential negative of default is that Greece will likely lose access, for a while, to international credit markets (although it will be a much safer investment after default than it is now).
But being cut off from foreign lending for a few years is not a disaster; if anything, it might encourage cuts in the wasteful components of government spending.
A bigger risk of default is that ending the crisis might reduce pressure for Greece to address the economy’s fundamental problems: crony capitalism, a Byzantine tax code, excessive regulation, and a bloated government sector.
If Greece fails to reform, it will suffer slow growth and a new crisis soon, regardless of what it does now.
Arellano, Conesa, and Kehoe explained in Chronic Sovereign Debt Crises in the Eurozone, 2010–2012 that the post-GFC recession in many Eurozone countries created an incentive to gamble for redemption. This gamble for redemption is betting that the post-2008 recession will soon end:
- If Greece sold more bonds to smooth government spending in the interim, and if the Greek and EU economies recover, the stronger revenue growth will pay off the enlarged Greek government debt.
- Under some circumstances, this policy is the best that a government can do for its country, but it carries a risk!
- If the recession goes on for too long (and it did in southern Eurozone), a government will either have to stop increasing its debt or default on its bonds.
The global bond markets will anticipate this prospect of default as a country’s government debt accumulates and will seek higher and higher interest for new bonds, and importantly, to roll over existing Greek Government bonds.
EU policies that result in lower interest rates and lower the cost of a sovereign default provide incentives for a government to gamble for redemption. The interventions taken to date by the EU and the IMF – lowering the cost of borrowing and reducing default penalties, the bailouts and the 50% write-off of the existing Greek government debts – encourage southern Eurozone governments to gamble for redemption.
Through history, sovereign defaults come in clusters. Is Greece the start of one? on.wsj.com/1V3XkxR via @WSJ http://t.co/Oy9aMPoHrt—
Greg Ip (@greg_ip) July 15, 2015
Greece and a few others are gambling for redemption by betting that the recession will end soon, selling more bonds to smooth government spending in the interim, and reducing the enlarged debt if their economies recover. The Greeks initially did a fine job in squeezing huge subsidies and debt write-offs!
If the recession continues for too long, the government will have to stop increasing debt or default on its bonds. Greece has been in default in more than 50% of the time since it became independent in 1822.
Greece’s problem is that it is 119th in the 2014 index of economic freedom, just ahead of India. The World Bank ranks Greece 161st in the world for ease of registering property and 91st for enforcing contracts; it takes an average of 1,300 days to enforce a contract through the Greek courts. This low base says something about how Greek politics works and will work for some time to come.
Cristina Arellano in a recent paper pointed out that if default is inevitable, raising taxes just makes everything worse:
Fiscal defaults occur because of the government’s inability to raise tax revenues. Aggregate defaults occur even if the government could raise tax revenues; debt is simply too high to be sustainable.
In a quantitative exercise calibrated to Greece, we find that our model can predict the recent default, but that increasing taxes would not have prevented it. In fact, increasing taxes would have made the recession deeper because of the distortionary effects of taxation.
Tax revenue as % of Portuguese, Italian, Greek and Spanish GDP
23 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in economic history, public economics Tags: Greece, growth of government, Italy, Portugal, size of government, Spain
Portuguese, Italian, Greek and Spanish all-in average personal income tax rates at average wage by family type, 2014
29 Jan 2016 Leave a comment
in public economics Tags: family tax credit, Greece, in work tax credit, Italy, Portugal, Spain
The Left is back in power in Greece
21 Sep 2015 Leave a comment
in currency unions, Euro crisis, macroeconomics, Marxist economics Tags: Euroland, Greece, Leftover Left
Tsipiras remains Greece’s PM, following the country’s third national vote this year econ.st/1Wd3POq http://t.co/F3x08Gyrab—
The Economist (@ECONdailycharts) September 21, 2015
The ups and downs of the Greek economy
25 Aug 2015 1 Comment
in budget deficits, business cycles, currency unions, economic history, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: Eurosclerosis, Greece, sovereign debt crisis, sovereign defaults
@ObsoleteDogma @rodrikdani http://t.co/xKx43wjWHy—
David Andolfatto (@dandolfa) June 30, 2015
Vanishing effect of #religion on the labour market participation of European women
19 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of religion, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, poverty and inequality, welfare reform Tags: female labour force participation, female labour supply, France, gender gap, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey
Vanishing effect of #religion on the labor market participation of European women newsroom.iza.org/en/2015/08/10/… http://t.co/25nx8NiEfk—
IZA (@iza_bonn) August 10, 2015
Incidence of long-term unemployment in the PIGS since 1983
17 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, economic history, Euro crisis, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, occupational choice, unemployment, unions, welfare reform Tags: employment law, equilibrium unemployment, Greece, Italy, labour market regulation, natural unemployment rate, Portugal, Spain, unemployment duration
The boom that preceded the bust in the Greek economy did nothing for the rate of long-term unemployment among Greeks. Long-term unemployment had been pretty stable prior to the economic boom after joining the euro currency union.
Source: OECD StatExtract.
Nothing much happened to long-term unemployment in Italy or Portugal in recent decades. Spanish long-term unemployment fell in line with the economic boom in Spain over the 1980s and 1990s up until the global financial crisis.
Explanation of the Greece Bailout in 90 Seconds
13 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in budget deficits, business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, fiscal policy, international economic law, international economics, International law, macroeconomics Tags: credible commitments, Eurosclerosis, game theory, Greece, sovereign bailouts, sovereign defaults
Greece’s GDP collapse is among the worst advanced economy falls since 1870
07 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in currency unions, economic growth, economic history, Euro crisis, macroeconomics Tags: Eurosclerosis, Greece, prosperity and depression
Greece's GDP collapse is among the worst advanced economy falls since 1870. And most of those were war-related. http://t.co/QLp6fYN83u—
RBS Economics (@RBS_Economics) July 04, 2015
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