Journey Across a Century of Women
23 Nov 2020 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economic history, economics of education, gender, health and safety, health economics, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, poverty and inequality Tags: female labour force participation, female labour supply, gender wage gap
Still more on economists ignoring home production @waring_marilyn @women_nz
01 Nov 2020 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, discrimination, economic growth, economic history, economics of education, gender, history of economic thought, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, occupational choice Tags: female labour supply, marriage and divorce
Still more on #marilynwaring and economists ignoring home production @waring_marilyn @women_nz
17 Apr 2020 Leave a comment
in business cycles, development economics, discrimination, econometerics, economic growth, economics of love and marriage, fiscal policy, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, occupational choice, poverty and inequality Tags: female labour force participation, female labour supply, gender wage gap, marital division of labour, marital labour supply
No gender gap in self-employment in New Zealand
26 May 2017 Leave a comment
in discrimination, entrepreneurship, gender, industrial organisation, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, Robert E. Lucas, survivor principle Tags: female labour supply
Changing labour supply composition and the supply of work-life balance by employers
27 Apr 2017 Leave a comment
in discrimination, gender, labour economics, labour supply Tags: compensating differentials, female labour force participation, female labour supply, gender wage gap, part-time work, worklife balance
The growing number of women in the workforce and the domination of women of the graduate labour supply will increase the incentive of employers to make the workplace more family-friendly. Those that do not will lose access to the majority of graduate and other talent.
Various work place amenities can be traded-off in salary packages. In industries and occupations where this is cheap to do, the wage offset will be least. These industries and occupations will attract a large number of women because the net returns to them in cash wages plus amenities is higher than for men who value the greater work life balance less.
Occupational segregation around the clock illustrates the delicate trade-off between cash wages and the costs of flexible hours. Men and women work in much the same occupations between 8 and 6. There are big gaps if you are an early starter or work over dinner time.
Changing the production processes of these industries to induce more women to work unsocial hours would require large reduction in production and pay. Fewer women will not enter occupations with more unsocial hours unless they are paid more than in other jobs where it is cheaper to provide work-life balance and still pay higher cash wages.
Occupations and industries where family friendliness is more costly will be male dominated because women qualified enough to enter these occupations will go elsewhere where the cash wages sacrifice is less for work-life balance. Influxes of women will occur in industries where technological trends lower the cost of work-life amenities and the growing number of female skilled workers forces employers’ hands. They must adapt or lose out in competition for talent. The large influx of women into male dominated higher skilled occupations and professions suggests that some occupations can provide work-life balance at a lower cost than others.
The traditional drivers of occupational segregation
23 Apr 2017 Leave a comment
in discrimination, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice Tags: economics of fertility, female labour force participation, female labour supply, gender wage gap, marriage and divorce, occupational segregation
The main drivers of female occupational choice are supply-side (Chiswick 2006, 2007). This self-selection of females into occupations with more durable human capital, and into more general educations and more mobile training that allows women to change jobs more often and move in and out of the workforce at less cost to earning power and skills sets.
Chiswick (2006) and Becker (1985, 1993) then suggest that these supply side choices about education and careers are made against a background of a gendered division of labour and effort in the home, and in particular, in housework and the raising of children. These choices in turn reflect how individual preferences and social roles are formed and evolve in society.
These adaptations of women to the operation of the labour market, in turn, reflect a gendered division of labour and household effort in raising families and the accidents of birth as to who has these roles (Chiswick 2006, 2007; Becker 1981, 1985, 1993).
The market is operating fairly well in terms of rewarding what skills and talents people bring to it in light of a gendered division of labour and household effort and the accidents of birth. The issue is one of distributive justice about how these skills and family commitments are allocated and should be allocated outside the market between men and women when raising children. As in related areas such as racial and ethnic wage and employment gaps, these gaps are driven by differences in the skills and talents that people acquired prior to entering the labour market. …
The changing nature and scale of the gender gap
22 Apr 2017 Leave a comment
in discrimination, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice Tags: female labour supply, gender wage gap, occupational segregation, worklife balance
Developments in recent decades greatly increased the options for women to combine careers and family. The unadjusted gender wage gap is narrow while the gender education gap has reversed. The progress with closing the gender gaps in employment and education in recent decades makes the crafting of further gender-based policy interventions more challenging.
The remaining gender gaps reflect much more thorny issues such as work-life balance rather than mid and late 20th century concerns such as large gender differences in education participation and attainment, sex discrimination and full-time motherhood raising much larger families.
Parental leave, early childhood education and child care subsidies have increased in New Zealand in recent years. Early childhood education spending is high in New Zealand by international standards but spending on child care subsidies is less generous (OECD 2012).
The main drivers of greater female labour force participation and greater investment in long-duration professional educations were access to reliable contraception, the rise of service sector and other jobs that depend on brains instead of brawn, the automation of housework with white goods, and rising incomes increasing the opportunity cost of having a large number of children.
This is a first in a series of blogs on occupational segregation and gender.
Women and WW II – Rosie the Riveter
10 Sep 2016 Leave a comment
in economics, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, politics - USA, population economics, war and peace Tags: female labour force participation, female labour supply, World War II
% women age 25 to 54 working full-time in USA, UK, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark
11 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in gender, labour economics, labour supply Tags: female labour force participation, female labour supply, part-time work, social insurance, taxation and labour supply
To account for full-time work being 35 hours per week in some countries but 40 hours others I have included both in the chart below. Not many Dutch women work full-time.
Data extracted on 11 Mar 2016 14:08 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat.
Vanishing effect of #religion on the labour market participation of European women
19 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of religion, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, poverty and inequality, welfare reform Tags: female labour force participation, female labour supply, France, gender gap, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey
Vanishing effect of #religion on the labor market participation of European women newsroom.iza.org/en/2015/08/10/… http://t.co/25nx8NiEfk—
IZA (@iza_bonn) August 10, 2015
Average effective retirement ages by gender in the USA, UK, Germany and France, 1970 – 2012
25 Jul 2015 1 Comment
in economic history, gender, labour economics, labour supply, politics - USA Tags: ageing society, British economy, demographic crisis, economics of retirement, effective retirement ages, female labour force participation, female labour supply, France, Germany, male labour force participation, male labour supply, old age pensions, older workers, retirement ages, social insurance, Social Security, welfare state
Figure 1 shows a divergence from a common starting point in 1974 effective retirement ages. The French in particular were the first to put their feet up and start retiring by the age of 60 by the early 1990. There was also a sharp increase in the average effective retirement age for men in the UK over a short decade. After that, British retirement ages for men started to climb again in the late 1990s. Figure 1 also shows that the gentle taper in the effective retirement age for American men stopped at the 1980s and started to climb again in the 2000s. The German data is too short to be of much use because of German unification. France only recently stopped seeing its effective retirement age fall and it is slightly increased recently – see figure 1
Figure 1: average effective retirement age for men, USA, UK, France and Germany, 1970 – 2012, (five-year average)
Source: OECD Pensions at a Glance.
Figure 2 shows similar results for British and American women as for men in the same country shown in figure 1 . That is, falling effective retirement ages for both British and American women in the 1970s and 1980s followed by a slow climb again towards the end of 1990s. French effective retirement ages for women followed the same pattern as for French retirement ages for men – a long fall to below the age of 60 with a slight increase recently. The German retirement data suggest that effective retirement ages for German women is increasing.
Figure 2: average effective retirement age for women, USA, UK, France and Germany 1970 – 2012, (five-year average)
Source: OECD Pensions at a Glance.
Average effective retirement ages by gender, Australia and New Zealand, 1970 – 2012
24 Jul 2015 1 Comment
in economic history, labour economics, labour supply, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand Tags: ageing society, Australia, demographic crisis, economics of retirement, effective retirement ages, female labour force participation, female labour supply, male labour force participation, male labour supply, old age pensions, older workers, retirement ages, social insurance, Social Security, welfare state
Figures 1 and 2 shows a sharp increase in the average effective retirement age for men and women in both Australia and New Zealand between 1970 and 1990. After that, retirement ages for men in both countries stabilised for about a decade. effective retirement age than Australia.
Figure 1: average effective retirement age for men, Australia and New Zealand, 1970 – 2012, (five-year average)
Source: OECD Pensions at a Glance.
Interestingly, in the 1970s and 1980s, New Zealand had an old-age pension scheme, known as New Zealand Superannuation, whose eligibility age was lowered from 65 to 60 in one shot in 1975. This old-age pension in New Zealand had no income test or assets test, but there was for a time a small surcharge on any income of pensioners. Nonetheless, New Zealand had a higher effective retirement age than in Australia where the old-age pension eligibility age is 65 with strict income and assets tests.
Figure 2: average effective retirement age for women, Australia and New Zealand, 1970 – 2012, (five-year average)
Source: OECD Pensions at a Glance.
Figure 1 and figure 2 also shows that the sharp increase in effective retirement ages in New Zealand for both men and women after the eligibility age for New Zealand’s old-age pension was increased from 60 to 65 over 10 years.
Figures 1 and 2 also show the gradual increase in effective retirement ages for Australian men and women from the end of the 1990s.
Average effective retirement ages by gender, USA and UK, 1970 – 2012
23 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, gender, labour economics, labour supply Tags: ageing society, British economy, demographic crisis, economics of retirement, effective retirement ages, female labour force participation, female labour supply, male labour force participation, male labour supply, old age pensions, older workers, retirement ages, social insurance, Social Security, welfare state
Figure 1 shows a divergence in the 1970s where there is a sharp increase in the average effective retirement age for men in the UK over a short decade. After that, British retirement ages for men started to climb again in the late 1990s. Figure 1 also shows that the gentle taper in the effective retirement age for American men stopped at the 1980s and started to climb again in the 2000s.
Figure 1: average effective retirement age for men, USA and UK, 1970 – 2012, (five-year average)
Source: OECD Pensions at a Glance.
Figure 2 shows similar results to figure 1 for British and American women. That is, falling effective retirement ages for both British and American women in the 1970s and 1980s followed by a slow climb again during the 1990s.
Figure 2: average effective retirement age for women, USA and UK, 1970 – 2012, (five-year average)
Source: OECD Pensions at a Glance.
The rise and rise of mothers as breadwinners
05 May 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of love and marriage, gender, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice Tags: female labour supply, gender wage gap, household division of labour, maternal labour supply
How to argue for welfare reform when sincerely arguing against the 1996 US Federal welfare reforms
28 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, poverty and inequality, welfare reform Tags: 1996 US welfare reforms, female labour supply, labour demographics, welfare state
The share of single mothers without a high school degree with earnings rose from 49 percent to 64 percent between 1995 and 2000 but has since fallen or remained constant almost every year since then. At 55 percent, it’s now just slightly above its level in 1997, the first full year of welfare reform (see first graph).
TANF now serves only 25 of every 100 families with children that live below the poverty line, down from AFDC’s 68 of every 100 such families before the welfare law
Over the last 18 years, the national TANF average monthly caseload has fallen by almost two-thirds — from 4.7 million families in 1996 to 1.7 million families in 2013 — even as poverty and deep poverty have worsened.
The number of families with children in poverty hit a low of 5.2 million in 2000, but has since increased to more than 7 million. Similarly, the number of families with children in deep poverty (with incomes below half of the poverty line) hit a low of about 2 million in 2000, but is now above 3 million.
The employment situation for never-married mothers with a high school or less education — the group of mothers most affected by welfare reform — has changed dramatically over the last several decades.
In the early 1990’s, when states first made major changes to their cash welfare programs, only about half of these mothers worked.
Importantly, there was a very large employment gap between the share of these never-married mothers and single women without children with similar levels of education, suggesting that there was substantial room for these never-married mothers to increase their participation in the labour force.
By 2000, the employment gap between these two groups of women closed, and it has remained so. But in the years since, the employment rate for both groups has fallen considerably.
The employment rate for never-married mothers is now about the same as when welfare reform was enacted 18 years ago. This suggests that the economy and low education levels are now the causes of limited employment among never-married mothers — not the availability of public benefits or anything particular to never-married mothers.
The Centre on Budget and Policy Priorities, who hail clearly from the Left of American politics, scrupulously documented the following:
- Big gains in the employment of single mothers until a setback in the Great Recession but is still much better than in 1996;
- Welfare dependency dropped by two thirds;
- Despite this two third drop in welfare dependency, and earnest predictions of acute poverty and deprivation made in 1996, the number of families in deep poverty has not changed, and the number of families in poverty fell significantly and only rose again with the Great Recession; and
- There was a dramatic increase in the percentage of never married mothers in employment, so much so that there is no difference in the employment rate of single women with no children and never married mothers!
Welfare dependency down by two thirds, employment of never married mothers up to levels no one thought possible, family poverty down, and economic independence is much more widespread and all because of the 1996 US Federal welfare reforms. That sounds like success to me – a great success.
via Chart Book: TANF at 18 | Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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