Saving Ocean Fisheries with Property Rights
17 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, economics of regulation, environmental economics, fisheries economics, industrial organisation, international economics, law and economics, privatisation, property rights Tags: common property, economics of fisheries, individual transferable quotas, tragedy of the commons
@350nz fossil fuel protesters admit plan was to intimidate ANZ, not peaceful protest
16 May 2016 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of crime, energy economics, environmental economics, global warming, law and economics, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, Rawls and Nozick, rentseeking Tags: climate activists, climate alarmism, law and order, non-violent direct action, peaceful protest, reactionary left
In a letter to the editor today in the Dominion Post defending a climate change protest that closed a branch of the ANZ bank, one of the participants Jimmy Green said
Of course our intention wasn’t to intimidate individuals – our intention was to intimidate ANZ into shifting its investments after the bank ignored us asking.
This honesty about the willingness to intimidate to advance a political agenda shows that climate protesters are engaging in plain thuggery. Peaceful protest has its role in any democracy.
What these thuggish protesters forgot about is how we resolve our differences in a democracy. That is by trying to persuade each other and elections. Let the people decide.
These protesters are keen to pass laws to save the environment but they’re more than happy to break laws they disagree with. I wonder if they extend that same courtesy to others they regard as less enlightened than them? They expect others to obey the laws for which they successfully lobbied.
Why do these climate action protesters think they can break laws that others secured through lawful, peaceful democratic action? Is some direct action more equal than others? Why do these climate action protesters think their vote counts more than mine?
John Rawls makes the point that the purpose of civil disobedience is not to impose your will upon others but through your protest to implore others to reconsider their position and change the law or policy you are disputing.
Rawls argues that civil disobedience is never covert or secretive; it is only ever committed in public, openly, and with fair notice to legal authorities. Openness and publicity, even at the cost of having one’s protest frustrated, offers ways for the protesters to show their willingness to deal fairly with authorities.
Rawls argues: for a public, non-violent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law being done (usually) with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government; that appeals to the sense of justice of the majority; which may be direct or indirect; within the bounds of fidelity to the law; whose protesters are willing to accept punishment; and although civil disobedience involves breaking the law, it is for moral rather than selfish reasons, and the willingness to accept arrest is proof of the integrity of the act of peaceful protest.
Rawls argues, and too many forget, that civil disobedience and dissent more generally contribute to the democratic exchange of ideas by forcing the dominant opinion to defend their views.
The civil disobedient is attempting to appeal to the “sense of justice” of the majority and their willingness to accept arrest is proof of the integrity of the act as a contribution to democratic persuasion not intimidation says Rawls:
…any interference with the civil liberties of others tends to obscure the civilly disobedient quality of one’s act.
Rawls argues that the use or threat of violence is incompatible with a reasoned appeal to fellow citizens to move them to change a law. The protest actions are not a means of coercing or frightening others into conforming to one’s wishes.
The intimidation by the protesters at the ANZ bank and their promise to do it again as shown in the adjacent tweet is a breach of the principles of a just society. These climate change protesters blockading an ANZ bank branch were attempting to coerce and frighten others into conforming with their political views. That ‘might does not make right’ is fundamental to democracy and the rule of law. As United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia said
The virtue of a democratic system [with a constitutionally guaranteed right to free speech] is that it readily enables the people, over time, to be persuaded that what they took for granted is not so and to change their laws accordingly.
When the climate protesters lose at the ballot box, they always claim it is rigged by the corporate interests. This is just sore losers.
How the left-wing and liberal visions of democracy are different nymag.com/daily/intellig… http://t.co/Qk5vS9SaV4—
Jonathan Chait (@jonathanchait) August 13, 2015
The great strength of democracy is a small group of concerned and thoughtful citizens can band together and change things by mounting single issue campaigns or joining a political party and running for office and winning elections or influencing who wins.
Yesterday’s majority of the vote sooner or later and often sooner than they expect will break off into different minorities on the next big issue of the day. These newly formed minorities will use that same ability to band together as a minority to block vote to protect what they think is important and advance agendas they think are to be wider benefit despite the opinion of the current majority to the contrary. All reforms start as a minority viewpoint.
Indeed, it is a strength of democracy – small groups of concerned citizens banding together – is what is holding up legislating in many areas. It is not that minorities are powerless and individuals are voiceless. It is exactly the opposite.
Parliaments elected by proportional representation such as in New Zealand, and in Australian upper houses reinforces the ability of small groups of citizens to band together to win a seat.
Nothing stirs up the impassioned (and most other people as well) more than depriving them of their right to support or oppose what is important to them through political campaigns and at an election. The losing side, we all end up on the losing side at one time or another, are much more likely to accept an outcome if they had their say and simply lost the vote at the election or in Parliament. Scalia warned of, for example, the risks of the courts moving in advance of the popular will, and thereby poisoning the democratic process
We might have let the People decide. But that the majority will not do. Some will rejoice in today’s decision, and some will despair at it; that is the nature of a controversy that matters so much to so many. But the Court has cheated both sides, robbing the winners of an honest victory, and the losers of the peace that comes from a fair defeat. We owed both of them better. I dissent.
These climate change protesters want to rob the winners of their honest democratic victory over the balance between oil and coal exploration and other energy options. They are also robbing themselves of a fair defeat.
A fair defeat flows from laws and policies secured through normal democratic means knowing that one day you may be in a majority. Only by respecting the will of the majority when you are in the minority do you have any right to expect future minorities to respect your honest democratic victories as the majority of some future day. Democratic majorities of patched together through give-and-take and the reality that even the most important policies may be reversed in the future.

Climate change protesters should respect the political process because democracy alone can produce compromises satisfying a sufficient mass of the electorate on deeply felt issues so as to not poison the remainder of the democratic process. The losing side, we all end up on the losing side at one time or another, are much more likely to accept an outcome if they had their say and simply lost the vote at the election or in Parliament.
Brexit: the Movie
15 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economic history, economics of regulation, industrial organisation, international economics Tags: Brexit, Common market
What If There Were No Prices? Railroad Thought Experiment
15 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, Austrian economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, entrepreneurship Tags: market process
Trekonomics: The Final Frontier (w/ Manu Saadia)
09 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, Austrian economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, economics of regulation, environmental economics, history of economic thought, industrial organisation, international economics, law and economics, property rights Tags: star trek
The Coase Theorem
08 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, Austrian economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of regulation, environmental economics, history of economic thought, industrial organisation, law and economics, property rights, Ronald Coase Tags: Coase theorem
Johan Norberg on Tax Havens
07 May 2016 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, entrepreneurship, public economics Tags: bribery and corruption, tax havens
Be careful for what you wish for when using irrationality as a rationale for the scope of government
07 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of information, Public Choice Tags: behavioural public choice, growth of government, rational irrationality, size of government
Source: Gary Lucas and Slavisa Tasic‘s "Behavioral Public Choice and the Law" (West Virginia Law Review, 2015) via Bryan Caplan
Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation
06 May 2016 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of bureaucracy, economics of regulation, financial economics, Public Choice Tags: behavioural public choice, rational irrationality
“Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation,” David Hirshleifer, European Financial Management, 14(5), November, (2008):856-874.
How much do you get paid if you can pick winners? @JulieAnneGenter @simonjbridges
05 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, entrepreneurship, fisheries economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: entrepreneurial alertness, hedge fund managers, industry policy, picking winners, superstar wages, superstars
Electric cars have joined the long list of mendicant mendicant businesses that have been backed by the New Zealand government of late. Picking winners again.
The payrolls of entire government departments in New Zealand are not enough to hire a single successful hedge fund manager to pick winners for their political masters. To get on the list of the top 25 hedge fund managers, you need to earn at least $300 million a year.
The 25 highest-earning hedge fund managers and traders made a combined $12 billion in 2015, slightly less than the $12.5 billion the 25 top-earning hedge fund managers together made in 2014.
Why do investment advisors sell and often give away their sage advice? If their insights were any good, they could trade on the share market before others caught on and make a killing!
I will give a personal example based on the skills of bureaucracies in picking winners. The test of my hypothesis is based on the transferability of human capital across jobs.
My graduate school professors in Japan included many retired bureaucrats from the Ministry of Finance and MITI. These agencies were heralded by Joe Stiglitz and others for picking winners and guiding Japanese companies to choose the right technologies and what to export.
The skills that my graduate school professors learned at picking winners over their careers with the Ministry of Finance and MITI in the high-growth years in the 1970s would now be available to them in their retirements to trade on their own account.
Page 32 of "An Illustrated Guide to Income" more economic #dataviz at: bit.ly/12SEI9p http://t.co/HYm0II2UNI—
Catherine Mulbrandon (@VisualEcon) May 08, 2013
My graduate school professors should quickly become very rich after retiring because of the skills they learned in picking winners while at the Ministry of Finance and MITI, which should cross over into their private share portfolios. The rich lists world-wide should be full of retired industry and finance ministry bureaucrats.
Instead, my graduate school professors took the train and bus to work and their families lived off their salaries in standard sized Japanese government apartments. All looked forward to their annual bonus of 5.15 months salary.
If governments are any good at picking winners, people should be willing to pay big time to get jobs at ministries of finance and ministries of international trade and industry to get access to their unique and highly secret skills they learn therein on how to pick winners.
I am still waiting for that tell-all book by an insider on these skills. Why is there no Picking Winners for Dummies on Amazon kindle as yet?
Deirdre McCloskey and George Will discuss bourgeois inquality
05 May 2016 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, economic history Tags: Deirdre McCloskey
How Do You Deal With Painful Truths? Left vs. Right
02 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of media and culture Tags: expressive voting, rational irrationality
The renewable energy curse – does corruption turn clean energy into dirty? @GarethMP
30 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, energy economics, environmental economics, global warming, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: European Union, expressive voting, green rent seeking, Italy, renewable energy, solar power, wind power
Massimo Tavoni and Caterina Gennaioli published a nice paper showing that corruption and violence was higher in the high wind provinces of Italy after the installation of wind generators. They built on earlier work about countries with abundant renewable resources and weak institutions. The main question in their paper
… is whether an increase in the expected returns of investments in wind energy, following the introduction of the new policy regime based on a green certificate system, has driven economic agents, namely bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, to engage more in rent seeking activities.
As they studied Italy, there is no surprise about the answer which was yes. High winds ensure high returns of the wind farm investment, but whether this translates into more bribery depends on institutional quality. There was more corruption, and so especially in high-wind provinces of Italy.
Source: Green policy and corruption | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal.
The construction of an average wind park is associated with an increase of criminal association activity of 6%. Italy will have more corruption than elsewhere in the old European Union.
The wider problem is renewable energy is a celebrity technology. In the context of expressive politics, so many cheer for solar and wind power that standards drop in terms of who qualifies for subsidies and who should lose support when their investments do not turn out as promised.
https://twitter.com/CountCarbon/status/715136022414299138
Wind power is not new, it is intermittent, is unsuitable for modern work, and is land constrained but it is still subsidised. Green rent seeking is a real risk even in countries with the best political institutions.
Two myths about multinationals by Tyler Cowen
30 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, development economics, economics, economics of media and culture, entrepreneurship, growth disasters, growth miracles, industrial organisation, survivor principle Tags: multinational corporations

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