In a democracy we resolve our differences by trying to persuade each other and elections
17 Jul 2014 Leave a comment
Justice Antonin Scalia on the popular will and the role of the courts
29 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, law and economics Tags: Antonin Scalia, constitutional law

Who do members of parliament represent?
28 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, Federalism, James Buchanan, Joseph Schumpeter, Public Choice Tags: consititutional design, Edmund Burke, federalism, James Madison, Jospeh Schumpeter, JS Mill, theories of representation

The theoretical literature on political representation focused on whether representatives should act as delegates or as trustees. James Madison articulated a delegate conception of representation. Representatives who are delegates simply follow the expressed preferences of their constituents.
The classical liberals of the 18th century were highly sceptical about the capability and willingness of politics and politicians to further the interests of the ordinary citizen, and thought the political direction of resource allocation retards rather than facilitates economic progress.
Governments were considered to be institutions to be protected from but made necessary by the elementary fact that all persons are not angels. Constitutions were a means to constrain collective authority. The problem of constitutional design was ensuring that government powers would be effectively limited.
- Sovereignty was split among several levels of collective authority; federalism was designed to allow for a deconcentration or decentralization of coercive state power.
- At each level of authority, separate branches of government were deliberately placed in continued tension, one with another.
- The dominant legislative branch was further restricted by the constitutional establishment of two houses bodies, each of which was elected on a separate principle of representation.
These constitutions were designed and put in place by the classical liberals to check or constrain the power of the state over individuals. The motivating force was never one of making government work better or even of insuring that all interests were more fully represented.
Members of parliament as trustees are representatives who follow their own understanding of the best action to pursue in another view. As Edmund Burke wrote:
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.
You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament. …
Our representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
Burke does not seem to be a fan of federalism and vote trading to protect minorities. Madison liked conflict and tension as a constraint of power and the size of government.
Schumpeter disputed that democracy was a process by which the electorate identified the common good, and that politicians carried this out:
• The people’s ignorance and superficiality meant that they were manipulated by politicians who set the agenda.
• Democracy is the mechanism for competition between leaders.
• Although periodic votes legitimise governments and keep them accountable, the policy program is very much seen as their own and not that of the people, and the participatory role for individuals is usually severely limited.
Modern democracy is government subject to electoral checks. John Stuart Mill had sympathy for this view that parliaments are best suited to be places of public debate on the various opinions held by the population and to act as watchdogs of the professionals who create and administer laws and policy:
Their part is to indicate wants, to be an organ for popular demands, and a place of adverse discussion for all opinions relating to public matters, both great and small; and, along with this, to check by criticism, and eventually by withdrawing their support, those high public officers who really conduct the public business, or who appoint those by whom it is conducted
Representative democracy has the advantage of allowing the community to rely in its decision-making on the contributions of individuals with special qualifications of intelligence or character. Representative democracy makes a more effective use of resources within the citizenry to advance the common good.
Jon Elster on the dangers of majority rule
28 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy Tags: democracy, majoritarianism

Firstly, majority government will always be tempted to manipulate political rights to increase its chances of re-election. If it is free to change the timing of the election, for instance, it may choose a moment when economic conjunctures are favourable.
Secondly, a majority may set aside the rule of law under the sway of a standing interest or a momentary passion. This was Madison’s main worry:
In all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger.
Thirdly, here is the case of a popular majority acting (through its representatives) to further its economic interests.
Fourthly, there is the case of a popular majority acting (through its representatives) under a sudden impulse, a momentary passion. There are references by American founders such as Randolph to "the turbulence and follies of " and "the fury of democracy," by Hamilton to "the popular passions [which] spread like wild fire, and become irresistable," and by Madison to "fickleness and passion," and "the turbulency and violence of unruly passion."
Fifthly, there is the case of a popular majority acting (through its representatives) from a standing, permanent passion. This is different from a majority passion that is "sudden," "fickle," "unruly," and the like. The more permanent passions and prejudices that might fashion the will of the majority is in the late twentieth century the outstanding danger of majority rule. But this can be majoritarianism based on religious, ethnic and racial divides that lead to a permanent majority and a permanent minority.
There are four counter-majoritarian, rights-protecting devices: constitutional entrenchment of rights, judicial review, separation of powers and checks and balances.
Same players, different game: how better rules make better politics
25 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy Tags: James Buchanan

Coase and Demsetz on comparative institutional analysis and the fallacy of comparing actual institutions with unrealistic, idealised alternatives
23 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, Ronald Coase, Ronald Coase Tags: Harold Demsetz, Roanald Coase
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It is my belief that the failure of economists to reach correct conclusions about the treatment of harmful effects cannot be ascribed simply to a few slips in analysis. It stems from basic defects in the current approach to problems of welfare economics
Ronal Coase (1960)
The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing ‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement.
This nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach in which the relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements…
the design of institutional arrangements that provide incentives to encourage experimentation (including the development of new products, new knowledge, new reputations, and new ways of organizing activities) without overly insulating these experiments from the ultimate test
of survivalHarold Demsetz (1969)
Neoclassical economists think the economy is freestanding and ignore institutions!
22 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in Adam Smith, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, James Buchanan, Ronald Coase Tags: Adam Smith, Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom, James Buchanan, Robert Fogel, The institutional structure of production
The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991 was awarded to Ronald H. Coase:
for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy
The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences has decided to award The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 2009 to
Elinor Ostrom “for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons” and Oliver E. Williamson “for his analysis of economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm”
The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences has decided to award the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1993 jointly to Robert W. Fogel and Douglass C. North
for having renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change.
The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences has decided to award the1986 Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences to Professor James McGill Buchanan for
his development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory of economic and political decision-making.

James Buchanan and a non-discriminatory democracy?
17 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, F.A. Hayek, James Buchanan, liberalism Tags: non-discriminatory democracy, rule of law, veil of ignorance

Under Buchanan’s generality norm, governments impose uniform regulation and use flat rate taxes on uniform tax bases to fund an equal-per-head demogrant (or a guaranteed minimum income) to replace all existing government cash transfers. Such a government would account for a large share of GDP. That did not bother him:
It seems to me that far too much of our politics is favourable treatment or unfavourable treatment for particularised groups. If we could somehow introduce into politics the requirement that would be analogous to the rule of law, that is, don’t treat one group differently from another group.
That has a lot of implications. That would not necessarily mean we’d have much smaller politics or government. It would mean there’d be a quite different characteristic of government…
The normative thrust of my current work is to try to push the generalization principle to the maximum extent possible, that is, so you don’t have particularised exemptions. One person gets it, everybody gets it. It cuts in favour of something like a flat tax. It cuts against means testing.
Buchanan has said that all successful welfare states (such as Sweden) apply a generality norm in some form or another.
For Buchanan, the very logic of majority rule implies unequal treatment or discrimination. If left unconstrained, majority coalitions will promote the interests of their own members at the expense of others.
Buchanan proposed a non-discriminatory democracy through the principle of generality:
- If extended to any single industry, tariff or quota protection also be extended and on equal terms to all industries.
- Tax structures would necessarily become simple, since the same tax rate would have to apply across-the-board on all sources or uses of tax base. Flat rate or proportional taxes on all incomes would broadly meet the generality norm.
- On the transfer side of the budget account, payments would have to be made in demogrants, equally available to all persons.
This is equivalent to Rawls’ veil of ignorance: choices must be without knowing where you lie in society so you make choices that are to the benefit of all.
Buchanan argued that if politics generates undesirable results, it is better to examine the rules than to argue about different policies or to elect different representatives. He build on Hayek who called a constitutional amendment that should read:
Congress shall make no law authorizing government to take any discriminatory measures of coercion.
Hayek went on say that, with such an amendment, all of the other rights would be unnecessary. In a non-discriminatory democracy, government choices are limited to those that benefit all.








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