The essence of macroeconomic forecasting by consultants
24 May 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, business cycles, econometerics, economic growth, economic history, economics of media and culture, macroeconomics Tags: consultants, efficient markets hypothesis, forecasting errors
Persuasive power of quoting a number
29 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, behavioural economics, econometerics, economic history, economics of information Tags: cognitive biases, cognitive psychology, data mining, economics of persuasion, evidence-based policy
Politicians & statistics. My proposal in today's @FT : ft.com/cms/s/0/dcf46a… http://t.co/HYbV4V2ps2—
Jonathan Portes (@jdportes) January 26, 2015
US, UK and Japanese inflation adjusted for new good and quality bias, 1994-2014
22 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in econometerics, inflation targeting, macroeconomics, politics - USA Tags: CPI bias
All agree that the consumer price index (CPI) is biased and overstates inflation. In 1996, economists hired by the Senate Finance Committee estimated that the U.S. CPI overstates annual inflation by 1.1% (Boskin et al. 1996). That estimated CPI bias has not gotten smaller with time. It is now up to 1.5%, even 2%.
The main biases in the consumer price index everywhere come from how to handle changes in the quality of goods and services and how to deal with completely new goods and services.
I thought I might see what happened if I took account of this one and a half percentage point annual bias because of new goods, quality variation and other known biases in the CPI estimates for the USA, UK and Japan in the relevant OECD StatExtract database for annual CPI inflation.

Source: OECD StatExtract.
Taking into account new good and quality bias, Japan is been in serious deflation for quite some time now – at least 20 years. Japanese inflation went positive in the last year or two because I believe they increased their consumption tax.
The USA has a low inflation for about 20 years. The UK had no inflation for about seven years from 1997 then it started to rise again until 2012.
People get hot and bothered with deflation. Breathless journalism aside, fears of inflation are just a legacy of the great depression in the 1930s.
The only depression where deflation was accompanied by mass unemployment was the Great Depression. Mild deflation with good growth is a common phenomenon as Atkinson and Kehoe found:
Are deflation and depression empirically linked? No, concludes a broad historical study of inflation and real output growth rates. Deflation and depression do seem to have been linked during the 1930s. But in the rest of the data for 17 countries and more than 100 years, there is virtually no evidence of such a link.
Have real wages stagnated?
16 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, econometerics, labour economics, poverty and inequality Tags: middle class stagnation, wage stagnation
The War on Poverty was won but for a measurement error
27 Mar 2015 2 Comments
in econometerics, economic history, poverty and inequality
Is the gender wage gap in New Zealand 6% or 9.9%?
26 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, econometerics, gender, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, politics - New Zealand
The OECD puts the gender wage gap in New Zealand at about 6% for full-time employees on an hourly basis when measured using median earnings.

The Ministry of Women’s Affairs puts that gender wage gap estimate at 9.9% by measuring median hourly earnings, but the Ministry includes both full-time and part-time employees.
Conflating full-time and part-time earnings when measuring wage gaps is unwise. The level of compensating differentials in full-time and part-time jobs differ. More of the net pay package of a part-time job would be convenience and flexibility. A full-time job tends to indicate greater commitment to the labour force day in day out and less interest in flexibility and time off during the week.
It’s the Trend, Stupid
25 Mar 2015 1 Comment
in econometerics, environmental economics Tags: climate alarmism, conjecture and refutation, double standards, green hypocrisy
If I had a dollar for every time a climate alarmist talked about how hot this summer was or how strong that cyclone was is evidence of global warming, I’d be a rich man.
They can’t then go around saying a sample size of 17 years is too short to assess trends will show evidence of global warming when they routinely use a sample of one for their own global warming alarmism.
Naturally, such is the high stakes of the never admit you’re wrong, never concede anything public political discourse of these days, if a fellow traveller oversteps the mark, you gain nothing from calling him out as someone who overstepped the mark.
Both NASA and NOAA report 2014 as the hottest year on record. Despite the new #1, neither the news itself nor the response to it has surprised me.
View original post 632 more words
Why doesn’t capital flow from the rich countries to supposedly capital shallow New Zealand?
03 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in econometerics, economic growth, industrial organisation, politics - New Zealand Tags: capital mobility, Trans-Tasman income gap
Hall and Scobie (2005) attributed 70 percent of the labour productivity gap with Australia to New Zealand workers using less capital per worker than their Australian counterparts, rather than their using w3capital less efficiently. Figure 1 shows that the capital labour ratio is lower in New Zealand than in Australia and has been lower than Australia for several decades and is getting worse.
Figure 1: Capital intensity in New Zealand relative to Australia: 1978-2002

Source: Hall and Scobie 2005.
In 1978, New Zealand and Australian workers had about the same amount of capital per hour worked. By 2002, capital intensity in Australia was over 50 percent greater than in New Zealand. This lower rate of capital intensity is capital shallowness.
Capital should flow to countries with the highest risk adjusted rates of return. If workers in a country work with less capital than in other countries, the rate of return on providing them with more capital is higher than the global average return to capital. As Stigler (1963) said:
There is no more important proposition in economic theory than that, under competition, the rate of return on investment tends toward equality in all industries.
Entrepreneurs will seek to leave relatively unprofitable industries and enter relatively profitable industries, and with competition there will be neither public nor private barriers to these movements.
This mobility of capital is crucial to the efficiency and growth of the economy: in a world of unending change in types of products that consumers and businesses and governments desire, in methods of producing given products, and in the relative availabilities of various resources—in such a world the immobility of resources would lead to catastrophic inefficiency
Hall and Scobie (2005) acknowledged that lower capital intensities could be entirely a by-product of lower MFP. New Zealand had the third worst MFP growth performance since 1985, one quarter the OECD average (OECD 2009).
Rather than money being left on the table by persistent, known but unexploited entrepreneurial opportunities for pure profit by investing more in under-capitalised New Zealand and providing additional capital and equipment and more advanced technologies for New Zealanders to work with, investors have done the best they could the relative poor investment opportunities here.
Figure 2: Differences in capital intensity: the case of different production functions

Source: Hall and Scobie 2005.
A divergence in labour productivity levels between Australia and New Zealand emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. Kehoe and Ruhl (2003) attributed 96 percent of the fall in labour productivity in New Zealand between 1974 and 1992 to a fall in MFP. Changes in capital intensities played a minor role.
Aghion and Howitt (2007) found that three-quarters of the growth in output per worker in Australia and New Zealand between 1960 and 2000 was due to growth in MFP. New Zealand’s annual MFP growth of 0.45 percent between 1960 and 2000 was simply much lower than Australia’s 1.26 percent per year. Capital deepening was equally lower in New Zealand with 0.16 percent comparing to 0.41 percent in Australia.
Less would be invested in a country if the returns are lower because the capital is poorly employed. There might be a lack of complementary skills and education and, more often, policy distortions that lower MFP (Alfaro et al 2007; Caselli and Feyrer 2007; Lucas 1990).Investment in ICT capital is greatest in the USA because it is the global industrial leader and has very flexible markets. Investment in ICT in the EU is proportionately less because less flexible markets make ICT investments in the EU members less fruitful to investors.
To explore the relative role of lower MFP and the cost of capital in capital shallowness, Hall and Scobie (2005) used national accounts data to estimate the cost of capital and found that New Zealand faced a higher cost of capital than Australia, the USA and the OECD average since the early 1990s. Research that is more recent disputes these concerns about a higher cost of capital in New Zealand.
In Caselli and Feyrer’s (2007) revised cost of capital estimates, the cost of capital is significantly lower in New Zealand than in Australia and elsewhere in the OECD area such as the USA, Japan and UK – see Figure 3. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) correct for an overestimation of the cost of capital that is prevalent for countries such as New Zealand where the value of land and natural resources are high.
Figure 3: Caselli and Feyrer’s Estimates of the Cost of Capital, 1996

Source: Caselli and Feyrer (2007); Hsieh and Klenow (2011).
Notes: The measure of capital income used by Hall and Scobie (2005) to calculate the cost of capital includes payments to reproducible physical capital (equipment, machinery, ICT, buildings and other structures) as well as payments to natural capital (land and natural resources). Dividing the income that flows to all types of capital including land and natural resources by just the value of reproducible physical capital overestimates the cost of capital. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) used World Bank (2006) estimates of natural capital stocks in 1996 to estimate of income flows to reproducible physical capital. Their estimates excluded income flows to land and natural resources to estimate the cost of reproducible capital.
Caselli and Feyrer (2007) revised estimate in Figure 3 is for the cost of capital for investing in equipment, machinery, ICT, buildings and structures. When land and resources are included, shown in light blue as the naive cost of capital, the estimated cost of capital is one-half of percentage point higher in New Zealand than in Australia and two percent higher in New Zealand than the USA and UK in Figure 3. When land and natural resources are excluded, shown in red as the adjusted for natural capital estimate, the cost of capital is much lower in New Zealand than in Australia, the USA, Japan and UK – see Figure 3.
What Caselli and Feyrer (2007) show is the estimation of the cost of capital to New Zealand is fraught with statistical difficulties. A broader data set yields radically different results. That is the broader lesson.
At a minimum, safest thing to say, is there are no reliable estimates of the cost of capital in New Zealand. Depending on how you measure it, the cost of capital in New Zealand is either much higher or much lower than in the leading industrial countries such as the USA and UK. Such a broad range of estimates is no basis for public policy interventions.
When having to choose between arguing for a persistent, known but unexploited entrepreneurial opportunities for risk-free profit left on the table in New Zealand by foreign investors for decades, and measurement error in the case of one of the nastiest measurement jobs – measuring capital and natural resources – measurement error is more likely.
Capital is the most internationally mobile of factors of production. Entrepreneurs have every incentive to move it to new destinations with higher risk-adjusted rates of returns. Returns will not be exactly equal, but there will be a tendency for equalisation subject to these reservations listed by George Stigler in 1963:
- Some dispersion in rates of return exist because of imperfect knowledge of returns on alternative investments.
- Dispersion of returns would arise because of unexpected developments and events which call for movements of resources requiring considerable time to be completed.
- Dispersion in rates of return would arise because of differences among industries in monetary and nonmonetary supplements to the average rate of return.
- In any empirical study, there is also a fourth source of dispersion: the difference between the income concepts used in compiling the data and the income concepts relevant to the allocation of resources.
The last of these reservations listed by George Stigler in 1963 about the statistical concepts used in compiling what data can be collected and the concepts relevant to the entrepreneurial decisions about the allocation of resources appear to be crucial to the debate about capital shallowness in New Zealand. They also echo Hayek’s great reservation in his 1974 lecture The Pretence to Knowledge about focusing on what can be measured rather than what is important in both economic analysis and public policy making:
We know: of course, with regard to the market and similar social structures, a great many facts which we cannot measure and on which indeed we have only some very imprecise and general information. And because the effects of these facts in any particular instance cannot be confirmed by quantitative evidence, they are simply disregarded by those sworn to admit only what they regard as scientific evidence: they thereupon happily proceed on the fiction that the factors which they can measure are the only ones that are relevant.
Hall and Scobie (2005) were careful scholars who noted that possibility that the apparent capital shallowness in New Zealand is merely the result of measurement error because of the problems of measuring land and natural. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) justify their caution and vindicated the view that the marginal product of capital is pretty much the same all round the world. As Caselli and Feyrer (2007) explain:
There is no prima facie support for the view that international credit frictions play a major role in preventing capital flows from rich to poor countries.
Lower capital ratios in these countries are instead attributable to lower endowments of complementary factors and lower efficiency, as well as to lower prices of output goods relative to capital. We also show that properly accounting for the share of income accruing to reproducible capital is critical to reach these conclusions.
There is various debates in policy circles in New Zealand about this lack of capital per worker and a higher cost of capital in New Zealand.
But that debate and any policy measures that were introduced as a result may be misplaced and all due to measurement error, or more correctly the grave difficulties of measuring both the capital stock and the cost of capital, both generally and in New Zealand course of its large bounty of natural resources. The data was always in doubt, so any policy interventions should be very cautious and incremental.
It would have been surprising to find that lower productivity in New Zealand was due to a lack of access to capital. There is growing evidence that capital intensities are not a major contributor to cross-national per capita income gaps.
There is a broad empirical consensus that capital intensity explains about 20 per cent of cross-country income differences; differences in human capital account for 10 to 30 per cent of cross-national differences with MFP accounting for the remaining 50 to 70 percent (Hsieh and Klenow 2011).
The New Zealand capital shallowness hypothesis is too marred in measurement shortcomings to rebut this broad empirical consensus about MFP differences between all other countries. For example, when reviewing the trans-Atlantic productivity and income gap, Edward Prescott said:
The capital factor is not an important factor in accounting for differences in incomes across the OECD countries… [It] contributes at most 8 percent to the differences in income between any of these countries.”
At the broader level, this blind alley about capital shallowness in New Zealand illustrates the pretence to knowledge. The politicians and bureaucrats pretended to know the cost of capital and the size of the capital stock in New Zealand and then work out what to do in response while doing more good than harm. This was despite serious reservations about the quality of data at hand.
This blind alley about the cost of capital and capital shallowness in New Zealand illustrates Josh Lerner’s point about distractions such as these and their many equivalents overseas reinforce the importance of the neglected art of setting the table– of fostering a favourable business environment. The neglected art of setting the table includes:
- investing in a favourable tax regime (low taxes on capital gains relative to income tax are particularly important as studies show people respond to incentives); and
- making the labour market more flexible (again the opposite of what has happened in continental Europe ),
- reducing informal and formal sanctions on involvement in failed ventures;
- easing barriers to technology transfer, and
- providing entrepreneurship education for students and professionals alike.
The success of monetarism and the death of the correlation between monetary growth and inflation
30 Jan 2015 1 Comment
in business cycles, econometerics, economics of bureaucracy, economics of information, inflation targeting, macroeconomics, Milton Friedman, monetarism, monetary economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: lags on monetary policy, Levis Kochin, monetary policy

Monetarists blame fluctuations in inflation on excessively volatile growth in monetary aggregates. In 1982, Friedman defined monetarism in an essay on defining monetarism as follows:
Like many other monetarists, I have concluded that the most important thing is to keep monetary policy from doing harm.
We believe that a steady rate of monetary growth would promote economic stability and that a moderate rate of monetary growth would prevent inflation
The U.S. data supported this hypothesis about the volatility of monetary growth and inflationuntil 1982, but since 1983 monetary aggregates have been essentially uncorrelated with subsequent inflation in the U.S.
Levis Kochin pointed out in 1979 that a well designed monetary policy would lead to zero correlation between any measure of monetary policy and subsequent inflation. The reason for this is the correlation between any variable and a constant is zero.
If monetary growth is stable, say, a constant growth rate of 4% per year, as advocated by Milton Friedman, monetary growth will have no correlations with any variable:
Poole (1993, 1994) and Tanner (1993) also argue that one predictable consequence of optimal monetary policy is that the correlation between monetary policy instruments and policy goals will be driven to zero.
Poole further contends that it is obvious to any careful reader of Theil (1964) that optimally variable policy will give rise to a zero correlation between policy and goal variable…
In 1966 Alan Walters, a U.K. monetarist, observed:
If the [monetary] authority was perfectly successful then we should observe variations in the rate of change of the stock of money but not variations in the rate of change of income… [a]ssuming that the authority’s objective is to stabilize the growth of income.
Milton Friedman in 2003, wrote about how the Fed acquired a good thermostat:
The contrast between the periods before and after the middle of the 1980s is remarkable.
Before, it is like a chart of the temperature in a room without a thermostat in a location with very variable climate; after, it is like the temperature in the same room but with a reasonably good though not perfect thermostat, and one that is set to a gradually declining temperature.
Sometime around 1985, the Fed appears to have acquired the thermostat that it had been seeking the whole of its life…
Prior to the 1980s, the Fed got into trouble because it generated wide fluctuations in monetary growth per unit of output. Far from promoting price stability, it was itself a major source of instability as Chart 1 illustrates.
Yet since the mid ’80s, it has managed to control the money supply in such a way as to offset changes not only in output but also in velocity.
Nick Rowe explained the difficulty of causation and correlation under different policy regimes and Milton Friedman’s thermostat superbly as an econometric problem Nick Rowe:
If a house has a good thermostat, we should observe a strong negative correlation between the amount of oil burned in the furnace (M), and the outside temperature (V).
But we should observe no correlation between the amount of oil burned in the furnace (M) and the inside temperature (P). And we should observe no correlation between the outside temperature (V) and the inside temperature (P).
An econometrician, observing the data, concludes that the amount of oil burned had no effect on the inside temperature. Neither did the outside temperature. The only effect of burning oil seemed to be that it reduced the outside temperature. An increase in M will cause a decline in V, and have no effect on P.
A second econometrician, observing the same data, concludes that causality runs in the opposite direction. The only effect of an increase in outside temperature is to reduce the amount of oil burned. An increase in V will cause a decline in M, and have no effect on P.
But both agree that M and V are irrelevant for P. They switch off the furnace, and stop wasting their money on oil.
Subsequent work of Levis Kochin showed that if the effects of fluctuations in monetary aggregates were not precisely known then the optimal policy would produce negative correlations between monetary aggregates and inflation:
The negative correlation results from coefficient uncertainty because the less certain we are about the size of a multiplier, the more cautious we should be in the application of the associated policy instrument.
Therefore, although optimal policy leads to lack of correlation between the goal and control variables if the coefficient is known, it will lead to a negative relationship if there is coefficient uncertainty. The higher the uncertainty, the more cautious will be the optimal policy response. Also, if the control variable can’t be controlled perfectly then the correlation between the goal and the control variable becomes positive i.e., the control errors are random…
Uncertainty about the impact of a policy will stay the hand of any bureaucrat , much less a central banker, as Kochin and his co-author explain:
Uncertainty should lead to less policy action by the policymakers. The less policymakers are informed about the relevant parameters, the less activist the policy should be. With poor information about the effects of policy, very active policy runs a higher danger of introducing unnecessary fluctuations in the economy.
Some Ground Rules for the Minimum Wage debate
12 Jan 2015 1 Comment
in econometerics, labour economics, minimum wage Tags: methodology of economics, minimum wage
This is the best single paper I’ve seen written on the methodology of the minimum wage debate.
From a great blog I have just discovered, the author gives a good kicking to both sides for empiricial sloppiness, advocacy bias and plain bad economics. He also explains how to lift your game no matter where you are on the political spectrum.
Naturally, the author, Michael Tontchev, is an economics undergraduate.
My latest article for Turning Point USA. I suggest some aspects of the debate that just need to go away. Your thoughts?








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