#Seinfeld economics: market power for soup
12 Sep 2016 Leave a comment
in economics, economics of media and culture, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation Tags: Seinfeld, trade secrets
Why politicians and bureaucrats can never pick winners?
12 Aug 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, politics - New Zealand
If politicians and bureaucrats were any good at picking winners, they will be on a fabulously well paid package at a hedge fund.
The Economist Crony Capitalism Index
08 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, economics of bureaucracy, entrepreneurship, financial economics, growth disasters, growth miracles, industrial organisation, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking, survivor principle Tags: crony capitalism, superstar wages, superstars, top 1%
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In the hours after planes hit WTC, largest maritime evacuation in history took place
05 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, economics, entrepreneurship Tags: 9/11, spontaneous order
HT: Pete Boettke
#Corporatewelfare since 2008 @JordNZ @MatthewHootonNZ @GrantRobertson1 @stevenljoyce
02 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economics of bureaucracy, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, rentseeking, survivor principle Tags: corporate welfare, industry policy, picking losers, picking winners, The pretense to knowledge
My latest corporate welfare report is out at the Taxpayers Union website. The company tax could be 6 percentage points lower but for this generosity of politicians picking winners.
Source: New Zealand Budget Papers, various years.
It is not as bad as you think under the last Labour government budget. $700 million of those hand-outs to business was seed capital for agricultural research institute. That institute to be run out of the investment income on that $700 million one-off injection which the incoming National Party-led government cancelled.
Another $675 million in that last Labour budget was to KiwiRail and OnTrack. Other than that, the Labour Party ran a pretty tight ship on business subsidies. There are no particular record of picking winners. Labour did buy a real loser in KiwiRail. You heard it here first.
Deirdre McCloskey: What are the biggest misunderstandings about capitalism?
30 Jun 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, economic history, entrepreneurship Tags: capitalism and freedom
10 Inventors Who Made Modern Life Possible
29 Jun 2016 Leave a comment
in economic history, entrepreneurship
Robots Are Really Bad At Folding Towels
25 Jun 2016 Leave a comment
in economics, economics of media and culture, entrepreneurship, human capital, labour economics, labour supply Tags: creative destruction, robots
Source: Robots Are Really Bad At Folding Towels : Planet Money : NPR.
Repugnant markets and the demand and supply for counterfeit legal ivory
17 Jun 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economics of crime, entrepreneurship, law and economics, property rights Tags: black markets, counterfeit goods, economics of prohibition, endangered species, offsetting the, unintended consequences
A huge legal sale of ivory in 2008 backfired. Instead of crashing the price of ivory and undermining poaching, poaching exploded in East Africa. It increased by 65%.
The international trade in ivory was banned in 1989. In 2008, China and Japan were allowed to pay $15m for 107 tonnes of ivory from elephants that died naturally in four African nations.
Source: Study finds global legalization trial escalates elephant poaching | Berkeley News.
Hsiang and Sekar this week found that this legal sale of ivory was followed by “an abrupt, significant, permanent, robust and geographically widespread increase” in ivory poaching. They were right to conclude that the legal sale provided a cover for poached ivory.
The economic intuition was that if we allow the sale of some legal ivory in Japan and China, then there would be fewer people left to purchase it illegally. We found that that intuition was incorrect. The black market for ivory responded to the announcement of a legal sale as an opportunity to smuggle even more ivory.
The legal sale of ivory created new demand for ivory in China, where it no longer had the stigma of an illicit product. The presence of legal ivory provided cover for smugglers trying to peddle illegal ivory sourced from poachers.
As illegal ivory can now masquerade as legal ivory in China, transporting and selling illicit ivory has gotten easier and cheaper, which can boost illegal production even though prices are falling.
Ivory is a repugnant market. Many friends will be revolted by you having ivory products.
The presence of legal ivory made it possible for counterfeit legal ivory to be passed off as legal ivory and therefore your friends will not reject you. This is a real and striking example of a unintended consequence. The solution to poaching is property rights.
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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