Profit maximisation gets no respect

Who would own up to personal greed and selfishness? But who sends a tip in with their taxes?

George Stigler said that if you ask business owners if they maximise profits, they say no, no, no. They are just there to provide employment, a service for their customers, and then they put a small amount aside for the education of their children.

Stigler then said that if you asked them if they lowered their prices, would they increase their profits, the answer is invariably no.

Stigler then said that if you asked them if they raised their prices, would they increase their profits, the answer is invariably no.

Stigler then said that if you asked them if they have in the last 12-months substituted some other objective for profit, they throw you out of their office.

What people do is far more important than what they say and what they say motivated them.

Alchian pointed out the evolutionary struggle for survival in the face of market competition ensured that only the profit maximising firms survived:

  • Realised profits, not maximum profits, are the marks of success and viability in any market. It does not matter through what process of reasoning or motivation that business success is achieved.
  • Realised profit is the criterion by which the market process selects survivors.
  • Positive profits accrue to those who are better than their competitors, even if the participants are ignorant, intelligent, skilful, etc. These lesser rivals will exhaust their retained earnings and fail to attract further investor support.
  • As in a race, the prize goes to the relatively fastest ‘even if all the competitors loaf.’
  • The firms which quickly imitate more successful firms increase their chances of survival. The firms that fail to adapt, or do so slowly, risk a greater likelihood of failure.
  • The relatively fastest in this evolutionary process of learning, adaptation and imitation will, in fact, be the profit maximisers and market selection will lead to the survival only of these profit maximising firms.

These surviving firms may not know why they are successful, but they have survived and will keep surviving until overtaken by a better rival. All business needs to know is a practice is successful. The reason for its success is less important.

Great store is placed in industry economics on how firms in direct competition in the same market producing even rather standard products such as cement can have far greater measured productivity than others. Some firms produce half as much output from the same measured inputs as their market rivals and still survive in competition (Syverson 2011).

As is too common, the conclusion is there is something wrong with the firms in these markets rather than with the analysis that fails to understand these puzzlingly large gaps in measured productivity.

Few ask the obvious question, which is how do these firms survive if they are so inferior to the market leaders. The important fact is they do survive. They must be doing something right for their customers that the productivity statistics miss.

One method of organising production and supplying to the market will supplant another when it can supply at a lower price (Marshall 1920, Stigler 1958). Gary Becker (1962) argued that firms cannot survive for long in the market with inferior product and production methods regardless of what their motives are. They will not cover their costs.

The more efficient sized firms are the firm sizes that are currently expanding their market shares in the face of competition; the less efficient sized firms are those that are currently losing market share (Stigler 1958; Alchian 1950; Demsetz 1973, 1976). Business vitality and capacity for growth and innovation are only weakly related to cost conditions and often depends on many factors that are subtle and difficult to observe (Stigler 1958, 1987).

An example is in Adam Smith’s study of religion. One thing he noticed was that religious sects with strict codes of honesty and intense mutual monitoring by co-congregants for the slightest moral lapses proliferated in cities. Many successful businessmen belonged to these strict religions. These highly religious businessmen were successful in their businesses because they were looked upon by the public as reliable trading partners in a time of weak law enforcement. These businessmen did not know that this was profit maximising but the businessmen with religious backgrounds slowly gained market share over rival firms that had less efficient ways of communicating both their reliability and that their personal honesty was under daily scrutiny.

Ethnic minorities are advantaged in the same way in business. Because of their extensive social interactions with each other because of their language or religious practices and inter-marriage, the costs of bad business behaviours are much higher due to the risk of social ostracism by everyone you know.  This greater trustworthiness gives them a cost advantage in the marketplace even though they may be unaware of its source.

Whatever is, is efficient – part 1

Armen Alchian would ask “If something is so optimal, why don’t we see it then?”

The best way Alchian related this discipline on thinking was to point to something like the question of optimal taxes. If optimal taxes are so optimal, why don’t we see more of these optimal taxes in practice?

There must be other costs left out of your optimal tax analysis. There might be less obvious costs in the political system in organising support or other changes that are required that are overlooked, making optimal taxes such a ‘low-cost’ option. Most objectives look better than they are if you ignore some of the costs of achieving those objectives.

Alchian asserted that “whatever is, is efficient.”

  • If the status quo was not efficient, something else would eventuate;
  • Of course, if you try to change anything that is – that too is efficient because otherwise you would not try to do so.

The key point is why are we weighing only some costs and not others? Why are these costs (involved in minimizing particular dead-weight losses that would be involved in setting a particular optimal tax) less important than other types of costs (those involved in informing people of what the options are or of organizing them to go and try to adopt the alternative option)? Optimal taxes are also decidedly less optimal if they allow governments to raise more revenue, and the extra revenue is not spent wisely.

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Alchian’s analysis of institutions and processes spent a lot of time showing that many often puzzling institutions and practices arose to lower various costs of decision making and transacting in the market and within organisations and groups. Many of these costs are far from obvious and must be teased out through difficult, time-consuming analysis.

Alchian was a great teacher. He taught in the Socratic Method. He posed countless questions to force his students to think harder and deeper.

Behavioural economics is an example of a whole field that expanded not by thinking harder and deeper using standard economic tools. It explains anomalous behaviour and seemingly irrational choices as the result of cognitive quirks or short-sightedness and a range of people’s other shortcomings. That is easier than spending a few more decades getting to the bottom of the matter.

George Stigler in the 1960s made a marvellous critique of what became behavioural economics back in the early 1960s by saying that in every decade for the last 150 years, economists dabbled in psychology.

Stigler said that they missed the point of economics as a method. He argued that the simple hypothesis of rational behaviour is so powerful because it can account for so much of human behaviour. Stigler adds this in his Tanner Lectures in 1981:

Members of  other  social sciences  often  remark, in fact I must say complain, at the peculiar fascination that the logic of rational decision-making exerts upon economists.

It is such an interesting logic: it has answers to so many and varied questions, often answers that are simultaneously reasonable to economists and absurd to others. The paradoxes are not diminished by the delight with which economists present them…

The power of self-interest, and its almost unbelievable delicacy and subtlety in complex decision areas, has led economists to seek a large role for explicit or implicit prices in the solution of many social problems.

Richard Posner went further and argued that behavioural economics may not be a science in Popper’s sense of falsifiability.

Posner referred to Cardinal Bellarmine’s famous description of what he saw in Galileo’s telescope which was pointing to the moons rotating around Saturn. Cardinal Bellarmine explained it as a trick of the devil.

Behavioural economics, in Richard Posner’s view, is close to Cardinal Bellarmine’s trick of the devil methodology because it explains anomalies away either as cognitive quirks or as rational behaviour. Nothing is an anomaly for behavioural economics so nothing can falsify it. Instead of the devil making me do it, a cognitive quirk made me do it.

Posner’s key point was:

Rational-choice economics makes the analyst think hard. Faced with anomalous behaviour, the rational-choice economist, unlike the behavioural economist, doesn’t respond, “Of course, what do you expect?” Troubled, puzzled, challenged; he wracks his brains for some theoretical extension or modification that will accommodate the seeming anomaly to the assumption of rationality.

Rather than attribute odd behaviour to cognitive quirks or short-sightedness, the better explanation is the behaviour is not fully understood.

Privatisation screw-ups are the best case for privatisation

Governments are so bad as business owners and so incapable of running a commercial process free of politics that governments cannot even sell a state-owned enterprise for a good price under the full glare of the media and public.

Anyone can sell an asset. It is the simplest task of ownership. Hire some consultants and go for the best price. Governments lack this ability.

Privatisations are often politicised, with discounts for small buyers from the middle class, for employees and other special interests. These messy privatisations are the best case out there against state ownership of businesses.

 

“No asset sales” was the Labour Party’s most coherent slogan in the 2011 general election in New Zealand. It cannot be claimed that the more recent privatisations in New Zealand were not subject to the maximum amount of public and parliamentary scrutiny possible in a democracy. The 2011 election was said to be a referendum on asset sales.

This inability to sell state-owned enterprises for a profit and free of politics calls into question the ability of governments to make complicated day-to-day business management and entrepreneurial judgements as owners of business enterprises. Imagine the quality of the day-to-day state-owned enterprise decision making that is further away from the glare of an election?

Private asset owners have a strong incentive to sell assets at a profit as it will otherwise hurt their share price and their personal wealth. Inferior entrepreneurs and owners are punished by losses. Any assets that inferior entrepreneurs either mismanaged or sell at a bargain price will, through further buying and selling, end up in the hands of more alert entrepreneurs and owners.

There are no similar feedback and error correction measures disciplining governments as asset owners and in their day-to-day monitoring of their business portfolios. Governments who own business assets have an inherently softer budget constraint.

Is there media bias?

A leading characteristic of media bias is that people agree on its existence, but disagree on its manifestation.

The print media is under dire threats to its existence at the moment. A newspaper that ignores what its readers want does so only at great peril.

Armen Alchian and George Stigler both argued that realised profits are the criterion by which the market process selects survivors: those who realise positive profits survive and will grow their market share; those who suffer losses will eventually disappear unless they improve themselves. The surviving media outlets will be those firms that anticipated or adapted fastest to the current and future demands of their readers and viewers.

Any media bias is likely to be slightly to the centre-left for the following reasons:

  1. Young women tend to be one of the most marginal groups of news consumers (i.e., they are the most willing to switch to activities besides reading or watching the news).
  2. Young women often make more of the consumption decisions for the household so advertisers will pay more to reach this group.
  3. Since young women tend to be more centre-left, on average, a news outlet may want to slant its coverage that way. Media sell space to advertisers and tailor the way they cover politics to gain more readers and viewers.

Puglisi and Snyder found that:

  • Using endorsements of state-level initiatives and referendums, newspapers are located almost exactly with the median voter – the average voter – in their home states.
  • Newspapers are moderate relative to interest groups and political parties.
  • Although newspapers exhibit some variation in their ideological position, they tend to be much closer to the median voter than most interest groups.
  • Newspapers appear to be more liberal than voters on social and cultural issues such as gay marriage, but tend to be more conservative on economic issues such as the minimum wage.
  • On average, the news and editorial sections have almost identical partisan positions.

Positive profits accrue to media outlets that are better at serving their readers and viewers than their competitors. Their lesser rivals will lose money, exhaust their retained earnings and fail to attract further investor support.

There is no best practice on measuring media bias. The literature is too young. Milton Friedman put up robustness as his test. Hit the hypothesis with as many tests as possible with many different data sets.

Most studies using many different data sets and methodologies suggest that the media reflects the politics of the market they serve. Newspapers and TV stations are big businesses, and they increased readership, ratings and revenue by presenting factual and informative news with a dose of ‘infotainment’. 

Competition forces news media outlets, just like any other firm, to cater to their customers’ preferences. Why did anyone think the media industry was any different from any other?

Why are there so few workers’ co-ops?

If workers’ cooperatives are so efficient, why are there so few cooperatives? Workers’ cooperatives should be able to slowly undercut other firms on price because they do not have to pay a profit to the capitalists.

Building societies, credit unions and some life insurance companies were mutually owned by their customers for a long time, but recently fell out of favour because of a growing lack of competitiveness and under-capitalisation.

Cooperatives are not economically viable because of intrinsic difficulties of entrepreneurship and management. And most workers prefer to work in firms for a wage rather than wait for the co-op to start up and hopefully break even before they get their first pay cheque. That could be a slow train coming.

The kibbutzim are Israeli agricultural communities initially organized on socialist lines, mostly between the 1910s and 1950s. The kibbutz is an example of voluntary socialism. The founders of kibbutzim were socialist idealists wanting to create a new human being.

Robert Nozick pointed out that few people actually join a kibbutz. Six per cent is the maximum proportion of any population who would voluntarily choose to live in these socialist communities. More recently, 2.6% of the Israeli population live on a kibbutz.

Originally, most kibbutzim followed strict socialist policies forbidding private property; they also required near-total equality of income regardless of differences in productivity, and in some cases, even abandoned the specialisation of labour. Kibbutzim are communities whose aim is equal sharing.

Kibbutzim were expected to fail because of moral hazard and adverse selection. Other organisations subject to adverse selection and moral hazard are professional partnerships, co-operatives, and labour-managed firms because they are all based on revenue sharing.

Kibbutzim have persisted for most of the twentieth century and are one of the largest communal movements in history. About 40% are still run on communist principles. Why is this so?

The kibbutz movement was founded by individuals who can be regarded as ex-ante homogeneous in their ability and potential income, and who came to a new land full of uncertainties. They were young unattached individuals who share a comparatively long period of social, ideological, and vocational training.

An even more durable example of voluntary collectivist living is Catholic monasteries and convents, but notice that these too were founded on a realization that close family ties are inimical to communal order.

Kibbutz founders wanted insurance, but their founders realised that members who would turn out to have high abilities might leave the Kibbutz.

  • The founders of the kibbutzim decided to abolish all private property and to own all wealth commonly, which served as a lock-in device.
  • Like monasteries and convents, kibbutzim deter members from fleeing through this communal ownership of property. You leave with the shirt on your back!

Kibbutzim also put prospective members through lengthy trial periods to make sure they are made of the right stuff. Those raised on a kibbutz tend to have learned kibbutz-specific skills, such as agronomy, which also makes exit to the outside world even more difficult.

Kibbutzim are similar to law firms, medical and business partnerships that pool income for risk sharing purposes.

Mutual monitoring and peer pressure replace direct monetary incentives in mitigating moral hazard in a kibbutz (and in monasteries and convents) in the same way as in professional partnerships, cooperatives, and labour-managed firms with pooled assets and the option of exit.

The trade-off between insurance and adverse selection determines the level of equality within a kibbutz and its size, as with any other professional partnership:

  • Kibbutz vary in size from less than a hundred to over a thousand, but most have between 400 and 600 members, with an average of 441 members.
  • Kibbutz size is limited by the savings on income insurance no longer offsetting the costs of moral hazard and other transaction costs as the Coasian firm grows in size.

Ran Abramitzky writes with great insight on the economics of the kibbutzim. He is writing a book The Mystery of the Kibbutz: How Socialism Succeeded. He found that high-ability individuals are more likely to leave a kibbutz. The brain drain would be worse if kibbutzim didn’t make it so costly to exit. Is this a familiar theme of socialism?

Many hybrid organisations exist in the market, ranging from joint ventures and agricultural seller and supermarket buyer co-ops to labour-owned firms such as in most of the professions.

But rarely do we find real life existing cooperatives with all workers and only workers having equal ownership rights. As Jon Elster noted, there are often non-working owners, non-owning workers and unequal distribution of shares in real life workers’ co-ops. All other types of co-ops and professional partnership share this feature.

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