Source: OECD employment database.
Why do we men, bastards all, have a stronger unconscious bias against well-paid women?
09 Mar 2017 Leave a comment
in discrimination, gender, labour economics, labour supply, politics - USA Tags: employer discrimination, gender wage gap, unconscious bias
@women_nz gender didn’t use Claudia Goldin’s research
08 Mar 2017 2 Comments
in applied price theory, economic history, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, politics - New Zealand Tags: Claudia Goldin, gender wage gap
Dear Deputy Prime Minister,
Earlier this week in your capacity as Minister of Women’s Affairs you sponsored research on the causes of the gender wage gap in New Zealand.
That just published research was seriously incomplete. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs advised today that they were aware of the work of Claudia Goldin but did not reference it.
MWA ignored the research of the world’s top female labour economist Claudia Goldin. Her research shows that the causes of the gender wage gap are completely different to what you have suggested in the research you launched earlier this week and calls for novel policy solutions that are in a completely different ballpark to those that you have raised this week.
When education and accumulated job experience faded away as the statistical explanation of the causes of the gender wage gap, which the research you launched confirmed, Goldin explored how the organisation of work drove what remains. She called this the last chapter of the gender wage gap.
She found that jobs where the willingness to work very long hours, very specific hours and/or maintain continuous contact with co-workers or clients are highly prized and disproportionately rewarded was central to explaining the gender wage gap for well-paid workers.
Both her research and that you sponsored this week shows that the gender wage gap is close to zero for the bottom half of the wage distribution but the wage gap is 20% or more for professionals in the top 10% of wage earners.
Rather than hypothesise that employers suddenly develop an unconscious bias against successful career professionals because they are female, Goldin looked deeply into how the organisation of work and design of jobs affected how workers were paid and how women made choices about their careers and what they majored in at university in anticipation of these demanding or rat race jobs.
Goldin referred to pharmacy as the most family friendly occupation in America because pharmacists are completely interchangeable and in America the great majority of them are employed by Walmart and other big companies. Few are self-employed. The only advantage of working long hours in the pharmacy profession is you are very tired at the end of the week.
Goldin contrasted that with law or finance sector jobs which are rat race jobs.
Rat race jobs such as these disproportionately reward people who are willing to work very long hours, work very rigid hours and/or show up whenever the client wants them anywhere in the world. These jobs also severely penalise even the shortest interruption in your career track. You come back reporting to the people you hired 12-24 months ago!
After starting on the same pay, large gender wage gaps in high-powered professional occupations emerge after 5-10 years into a career as successful professionals power up to become partners or highflyers.
Importantly, Goldin found one counterfactual to this large wage gap for high-powered professionals. If your husband earns less, there is no wage gap with your MBA classmates at Harvard but you do work fewer hours per week.
Goldin’s study of the Harvard and Beyond longitudinal study was corroborated by a study she did of the top 100 occupations in the American Community Survey. The gender wage gap is limited to rat race jobs.
Goldin argued that the last chapter of the gender wage gap dependents on changing the way in which we organise work.
That is a profoundly ambitious agenda because much of the way in which high-powered professionals must work long hours and be always on call for clients is from the demands of their clients. For example, you want your lawyer to show up in court on time every time and always be available to you when you are in trouble. The legal system does not work in any other way because of the possibility of urgent applications to court etc.
Women anticipate this because, as an example, female surgeons tend to specialise in areas where they can schedule operations in advance rather than having to rush in to perform emergency surgery.
I suggest to you that you should think more deeply about the quality of advice you have just received from the causes of the gender wage gap in New Zealand.
That advice to you is profoundly at odds with the latest thinking in modern labour economics on what the causes are and what the solutions must now be for the last chapter of the gender wage gap.
A postscript has the key publications of Claudia Goldin to show why she is the world’s leading female labour economist without a doubt. You were not advised of her findings.
Cheers,
Jim Rose
Selected publications of Claudia Goldin on the labour economics of gender
- 2016 “The Most Egalitarian of All Professions: Pharmacy and the Evolution of a Family Friendly Occupation,” (with L. Katz), Journal of Labor Economics (forthcoming).
- 2014 “A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter,” American Economic Review 104 (April), Presidential Address, pp. 1091-119.
- 2014 “A Pollution Theory of Discrimination: Male and Female Differences in Occupations and Earnings.” In L. Boustan, C. Frydman, and R. Margo, Human Capital and History: The American Record (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 313-48.
- 2011 “The Cost of Workplace Flexibility for High-Powered Professionals” (with L. Katz), The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 638 (November), pp. 45-67.
- 2010 “Dynamics of the Gender Gap among Young Professionals in the Corporate and Financial Sectors” (with M. Bertrand and L. Katz), American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2 (July 2010), pp. 228-55.
- 2008 “Transitions: Career and Family Life Cycles of the Educational Elite,” American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings 98 (May), pp. 363-69.
- 2006 “The ‘Quiet Revolution’ That Transformed Women’s Employment, Education, and Family,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, (Ely Lecture), 96 (May), pp. 1-21.
- 2006 “The Homecoming of American College Women: The Reversal of the Gender Gap in College” (with L. Katz and I. Kuziemko), Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (Fall), pp. 133-56.
- 2006 “The Rising (and then Declining) Significance of Gender.” In F. D. Blau, M. C. Brinton, and D. B. Grusky, eds., The Declining Significance of Gender? New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 67-101.
- 2004 “From the Valley to the Summit: A Brief History of the Quiet Revolution that Transformed Women’s Work,” Regional Review, Q1 vol. 14 (2004), pp. 5-12.
- 2004 “Making a Name: Surnames of College Women at Marriage and Beyond” (with M. Shim), Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18 (Spring 2004): 143-60.
- 2002 “The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions” (with L. Katz), Journal of Political Economy 110 (August): 730-70.
- 2000 “Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of Blind Auditions on the Sex Composition of Orchestras” (with C. Rouse), American Economic Review (September): 715-41.
- 1997 “Career and Family: College Women Look to the Past.” In F. Blau and R. Ehrenberg, eds., Gender and Family Issues in the Workplace. New York: Russell Sage Press, pp. 20-58.
- 1995 “The U-Shaped Female Labor Force Function in Economic Development and Economic History.” In T. P. Schultz, ed., Investment in Women’s Human Capital and Economic Development. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 61-90.
- 1991 “Marriage Bars: Discrimination Against Married Women Workers from the 1920s to the 1950s.” In Henry Rosovsky, David Landes, and Patrice Higonnet, eds., Favorites of Fortune: Technology, Growth, and Economic Development since the Industrial Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 511-36.
No progress at the top in 20 years or compensating differences not measured in data on cash wages?
08 Mar 2017 2 Comments
in discrimination, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, politics - New Zealand Tags: compensating differences, gender wage gap, glass ceiling, work life balance
The new era of segregation
07 Mar 2017 Leave a comment
in economics, economics of love and marriage, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice Tags: assortative mating
The nuances of the gender pay gap
07 Mar 2017 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics, gender, human capital, labour economics, managerial economics, occupational choice, organisational economics, personnel economics
Supervisory and monitoring costs and occupational segregation by sex
06 Mar 2017 Leave a comment
Published: Goldin, Claudia. “Monitoring Costs and Occupational Segregation by Sex: An Historical Analysis,” Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 4, (January 1986), pp. 1-27.
Gender wage gap places NZ 4th
06 Mar 2017 Leave a comment
in discrimination, gender, labour economics Tags: gender wage gap
The Racist Origin of the Minimum Wage — Deirdre McCloskey
03 Mar 2017 Leave a comment
in economics, labour economics, minimum wage, politics - USA
Charles Waldegrave concedes @TaxpayersUnion critique of @LivingWageNZ
02 Mar 2017 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, labour economics, personnel economics, politics - New Zealand
The godfather of the NZ living wage, Charles Waldegrave, conceded that different people are hired after a living wage policy is adopted. That is precisely my critique of the living wage in my recent report for the Taxpayers’ Union.
I summarised that report at public hearings on the living wage at the Hutt City Council last night where the living wage movement also made submissions.

My critique is that higher calibre people will crowd out minimum wage workers from vacancies for which they were previously hired because they are paid the living wage of $20.20 per hour rather than the minimum wage of $15.75 per hour. Employers expect better recruits if they pay more.
The living wage movement and the Taxpayers’ Union are in complete agreement on the minimum wage being crowded out of living wage vacancies in the future by high-calibre applicants attracted by the $20.20 pay. My submission to the Hutt City Council last night is below:
Remarks to the Hutt City Council Finance Committee
The Achilles heel of a living wage at councils is they still must hire on merit. Employees at the time of the living wage rise to $20.20 per hour gain, but their replacements will come from jobs on a similar pay rate to merit short-listing.
Ratepayers pay above-market wages forever for a one-time poverty reduction for existing council employees. A living wage will not lift recruits from poverty because they will be earning a similar pay in their last job to merit shortlisting.
The practical upshot of a living wage is a council is raising its hiring standards. The lower-paid breadwinners currently hired for council jobs are shut out by a living wage policy. Seventeen out of 33 Wellington City parking wardens were not rehired when their service was brought in house as living wage jobs.
The experience with large minimum wage increases in service jobs in American malls and restaurants is employers respond to the wage increase by being choosier in their hiring. Employers expect recruits to be more experienced and arrive with the necessary skills rather than be trained on the-job.
Living wage advocates happily concede that the quality of recruitment pools improves after a living wage policy is adopted. They call this professionalisation of entry-level jobs. They do not ask what happens to the workers who are no longer shortlisted for living wage jobs. They should.
A living wage is linked to the sum of money needed to raise a family. Yet 40% of a living wage increase for workers with families will be lost to income tax and reductions in Working for Families.
The cruel reality is low income families are worse off, not better off, after the introduction of a living wage. Their breadwinners are no longer shortlisted for council jobs because of the raised hiring standard. While advocates have the best of intentions, they hurt the very families they earnestly want to help.
Jim Rose
Research Fellow
Taxpayers Union
1 March 2017
Sectoral shifts in labour demand and the business cycle
01 Mar 2017 Leave a comment
in business cycles, labour economics, macroeconomics Tags: real business cycles, sectoral shifts
Random sector-specific technology shocks
New technologies unfold daily, and consumer tastes change with rising incomes and the arrival of new products. Jobs will open in the expanding industries and disappear in the shrinking sectors. This chapter is about how these sectoral reallocations of labour can cause a recession or prolong existing recessions.
A quarter or more of unemployment rate fluctuations over the business cycle could be due to variations in the rate that labour demand shifts across sectors. These sectoral reallocations in labour demand do not arise from mismatches between entrepreneurial forecasts and actual consumer demand. The higher unemployment rate is not due to a bunching of technological upgrades in a recession. The above average number of sectoral shifts in labour demand is an independent cause of a temporarily higher natural rate of unemployment.
To a significant extent, observed fluctuations in the unemployment rate can be fluctuations in the natural rate of unemployment rather than deviations from that natural rate due, for example, to aggregate demand shocks. There will always be some unemployment. There will be new labour force entrants looking for jobs and workers who are between jobs.
The natural rate of unemployment is a long-run level of unemployment that cannot be altered by monetary policy. The natural rate of unemployment depends on the flexibility of wage contracts and labour market institutions, variations in labour demand and supply in individual markets, demographic change, the mobility of workers, unemployment benefits, the cost of gathering information about vacancies and available labour, labour market regulation and random variations in the rate of reallocation of jobs across industries and regions as technology advances and consumer tastes change.
Sectoral shifts and delayed recoveries in employment
Some years can see relatively uniform growth in labour demand across sectors. Other times can see more dramatic sectoral shifts in labour demand arise out of technological progress and changes in consumer demand.
Instead of significant but steady amounts of unemployment because of labour reallocations across sectors, these job reallocations can vary significantly from one year to the next. The natural rate of unemployment can be higher in these intervals because more job seekers are undertaking the more time-consuming process of searching for jobs in new industries and/or occupations, are relocating or are undertaking retraining.
Sectoral shifts in labour demand has a randomness about them because the size, pace and diffusion of technological advances across firms and industries is uneven (Andolfatto and MacDonald 1998, 2004). The implications of technological progress for jobs has a further randomness because new technologies can displace existing jobs and create new jobs or renovate and update current equipment and employee skills (Mortensen and Pissarides 1998).
As a new technology diffuses, productivity will grow faster in the sectors that are adopting the new technology. During this implementation phase, which is slow, costly and may require considerable learning, there will be reorganisations to capitalise on the impending productivity gains.
New technologies differ in the size of the improvement over existing methods and designs and in the difficulty of adopting the new methods. There will be lower growth in years where new technologies offer comparatively minor or less broadly applicable improvements on existing methods.
Learning consumes resources, and attempts to learn a new technology through innovation or imitation diverts the resources of firms and workers away from production (Andolfatto and MacDonald 1998, 2004). This unevenness in the pace and sectoral diffusion of technological progress will introduce unevenness in the rate of labour reallocation across sectors.
With both growing and shrinking sectors, employment may stagnate or fall for a time because the unemployed are searching for new jobs in different industries and perhaps in new occupations or are retraining. A revival in growth in output and productivity in conjunction with initially poor employment growth is possible and has the attributes of a delayed recovery in employment (Andolfatto and MacDonald 2004). Cross-sector job searches and the redirection of careers is a longer process than job search in the same industries and occupations. Job migration is more time consuming than the more traditional process of layoffs and rehiring by the same employer or in the same industry and occupation.
Labour reallocation and mismatch unemployment
During periods of more intensive or above-average sectoral reallocation of labour demand, a mismatch can arise between the skills and experience of the workers who have exited the shrinking sectors and the immediate requirements of the expanding sectors. More workers than average can be moving into new sectors. Some of these job seekers may not be immediately viable candidates for the available jobs and may exert little downward pressure on wages.
There can be mismatch unemployment because the skills and locations of job seekers can be poorly matched with the locations of vacancies. Some local labour markets will have more workers than jobs. Others will have shortages. Job finding can depend on the rate at which the unemployed can retrain or move to locations with unfilled jobs, the rate at which jobs open in different locations and the rate at which workers vacate jobs in places with ready replacements (Shimer 2007).
A New Zealand candidate for frequent sectoral shifts in labour demand is terms of trade shocks. Grimes (2006) found that half the variance in GDP growth rate over a 45-year period is explained by the level and volatility of the terms of trade. He found that the terms of trade have been high and remarkably stable since the early 1990s, and since the early 1990s, New Zealand has also experienced an unusually long period with high GDP growth and low GDP volatility.
Responding to aggregate versus sectoral shocks
Recessions mix cyclical and structural changes in labour demand. The aggregate demand and sectoral shift explanations have different implications for the role of monetary and fiscal policy in moderating cyclical unemployment fluctuations.
Cyclical unemployment is a reversible response to lulls in aggregate demand. At the start of a recession, there is a general decline in demand, with few industries creating jobs to replace those that are lost. As a recession ends, the unemployed are recalled by old employers or find new jobs in those industries as demand renews. Monetary and fiscal policy can aim to smooth these temporary job losses.
Job losses from structural changes in employment and technology are permanent. The sectoral location of jobs has changed. Workers must switch to new industries, sectors and locations or learn new skills. A role for public policy is to facilitate this process of reallocation to new jobs and retraining.
Much of the higher unemployment during the 1970s stagflation could have been due to a burst in sectoral shifts in labour demand. The 1973 and 1979 oil price shocks are common examples of real shocks that required lasting changes in the sectoral distribution of consumer demand, production and employment. The more energy-intensive industries had to adapt to the suddenly much higher oil prices.
Adding to this 1970s global restructuring in labour demand was the widespread introduction and adaptation of computer technologies. Bessen (2003) and Samaniego (2006) link the 1970s productivity slowdown to the widespread adoption of information technology.
Major economy-wide reorganisations were required because of the incompatibility of substantial accumulations of plant level expertise with many existing technologies with the incoming technologies. A major new technology can initially reduce measured productivity because of plant-level learning costs, the obsolescence of old technologies and skills, the time and resources diverted to develop and introduce the many complimentary innovations that implement a major new technology and the reallocation of labour to new industries.
These technological upheavals of a grand scale can cause a temporary spike in the natural rate of unemployment. Bessen (2003) estimated that, from 1974 to 1983, annual technology adoption costs spiked from 3% to 7% of output, explaining most of the 1970s productivity slowdown. It was decades later before the initially contractionary effects of major new technologies were well understood.
Summary
There is no reason to believe that the distribution of employment across sectors and industries will change at an even pace through time. If there are an above average number of sectoral shifts in labour demand, such as in the 1970s, there can be a significant increase in the natural unemployment rate while workers find new jobs, retrain and relocate. An above average number of sectoral shifts in labour demand during the current recession could delay the recovery. These sectoral shifts are difficult to forecast.
This dress would have been OK with @NZGreens if it was a burqa
28 Feb 2017 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of education, economics of religion, gender, liberalism, politics - New Zealand

As Catherine Delahunty MP said after visiting a fundamentalist religious community in New Zealand:
I looked at the gorgeous, yet regimented girls in their identical clothing and wondered how a physicist, an international lawyer or a plumber might blossom if the only role models she was exposed to were those in her own community. We agreed to disagree, because you can’t argue with religious certainty and a literal interpretation of a religious text. This community feels they are under attack by people like me and throughout the day the women and men I met did their best to share their vision of a safe, structured and practical world led entirely by men who consult with women.


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