
What’s the difference between inflation and counterfeiting? The Portuguese banknote caper
21 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, entrepreneurship, monetary economics Tags: Counterfeiting, fraud, swindles

Robert Barro recounts in his macroeconomics textbook a marvellous example where swindlers induced a British manufacturer of bank notes to print and deliver to them 3 million pounds’ worth of Portuguese escudos, which was equivalent to about 1% of Portugal’s nominal GDP in 1926.
This company, Waterlow and Sons Ltd. of London, also printed the legitimate notes for the Bank of Portugal. These bogus notes were,at first pass, indistinguishable from the real thing (except that the serial numbers were duplicates of those from a previous series of legitimate notes).

It was impossible to differentiate between the original and most of the duplicate banknotes because they were printed by the same printer using the same plates. 135,318 of the duplicate notes could be identified as part of the swindle because they were printed on plates not used for any other Portuguese banknotes. These bogus notes printed with the new plates could be differentiated from older legitimate banknotes because of a few marks that could be identified by an expert using a magnifying glass.
Central to the scam was taking advantage of the practice of the privately owned Bank of Portugal of secretly printing banknotes and neither recorded such transactions in the books, nor informing the government of the increase in the number of circulating banknotes.
(At the time, the Bank of England was also privately owned and only in 1921 had it obtained a monopoly on the issue banknotes in England and Wales. The Bank of Scotland still prints Scottish banknotes that are not legal tender in England. Three northern Irish banks still print banknotes that are legal tender in Northern Ireland. The entire northern Irish currency was withdrawn from circulation after a major bank robbery by the IRA a few years ago and replaced with new notes).
After the scheme unravelled, the Bank of Portugal made good on the fraudulent notes by exchanging them for newly printed, valid notes. The fraud may have contributed to the military coup, some six months later.
In the interim, by illegally increasing the monetary base and investing heavily in currency, land, building, and businesses, the swindlers created a boom in the Portuguese economy.

From the standpoint of monetary economics, I cannot think of a more unanticipated monetary shock. Of a surprise burst of monetary inflation and price inflation and led to the writing of books with titles such as The Man who Stole Portugal.
The final part of the swindle was to actually buy a controlling interest in the Bank of Portugal to validate the fraud by erasing all records that might inconvenience the swindlers.
The chief swindler with accomplices set up a bank of his own to facilitate fast distribution of the forged currency. A bank of their own was necessary because they had the modern equivalent of $150 billion to launder.
This Bank of Angola & Metropole set up to launder the bogus notes was also the initial place of suspicion of something fishy going on because it grew so quickly, while taking no deposits. Germans are also involved with this bank. Germany was suspected by the Portuguese government to have ambitions to take over Portuguese Angola, so this attracted additional attention from the authorities.
The chief swindler, Alves Reis, was depicted in a 50-episode TV series in 2000 as well as several books about the fraud over the decades.

At the time of the swindle, Reis was 28 years old engineering dropout from an undistinguished middle-class Lisbon family. He already had a conviction for cheque fraud. As such, one of the greatest swindles of all time was pulled off by a petty conman.
The swindle unravelled because of the duplicate banknote serial numbers, which was an error the swindler made himself. But for that, the swindle would have been immensely difficult to uncover. The swindlers duplicated the existing serial numbers and hoped they were able to successfully release all the banknotes before they were caught.
Reis, the architect of the swindle, work out the sequence of bank governor names and serial numbers used by the Portuguese central bank, but had neglected to eliminate numbers already ordered.
When the British printer realised this, Reis convinced the London firm that the reuse of existing serial numbers for their purported place of circulation in the Portuguese colony of Angola was not a cause for alarm. Fortunately for the swindlers, a letter from the British printers to the Banco de Portugal, in that he spoke about the agreements to print the banknotes for distribution in Angola went missing in the post.
The Bank of Portugal was not supposed to issue its currency in Angola, but often did circulate its currency in Angola.
This was a clever part of the swindle. By pretending that the Bank of Portugal was doing something slightly dodgy but still standard practice, and thus had to do so in secrecy, the swindlers could induce a whole range of other more legitimate people than them to cooperate quietly with what they were doing.
The shady nature of these dealings to surreptitious circulate Bank of Portugal banknotes in Angola stamped with “Angola” was passed over by the British dupes to the swindle as another example of the corruption of Portuguese officials. The stamp “Angola” was so they wouldn’t be confused with notes from the mother country.
In addition, bank notes for the Portuguese colonies were printed at the time by a competitor. The British printer saw this on the quiet contract as an opportunity to take away some of their trade.
The swindlers said that they would take care of stamping “Angola” on the banknotes once they were delivered to them. The swindlers had accomplices in the Portuguese diplomatic service, who issued them with fake diplomatic passports, which was helpful in persuading the British printers to deliver the bogus banknotes personally to them. Consignments were delivered to the swindlers in February, March and November 1925.
the basis of the scam was forging a contract in the name of Banco de Portugal authorising Reis to print banknotes in return for an alleged loan from a consortium to develop Angola. The whole affair had to be kept secret lest Angola fall into further financial difficulties due to rumours of a pending economic ruin.
The London based specialty printer worked, for among other clients, for the English court system and printed the transcripts of its own trial! This printer tried to have the trial postponed for a year while its chief executive completed his one-year term as Lord Mayor of London to save embarrassment.
The British printing company was found liable in subsequent four years of litigation, but the key question for the court was the amount of damages.
- The Bank argued that the damages were £1 million (less funds collected from the swindlers).
- The British printer duped by the swindlers argued was that the only true costs to the Bank were the expenses for paper and printing of the replacement notes.
The House of Lords determined in 1932 that £610,000 was the correct measure. This award of damages was the £1 million less the funds recovered from the swindlers
The proper measure of damages, in the view of the majority of the Law Lords, was the face value expressed in sterling of the genuine currency given in exchange for the spurious notes.
As these damages would be paid initially in British pounds, this damages award was a real windfall for the Bank of Portugal. Worthless Portuguese banknotes exchanged for good British pounds that could buy imports.
The majority decision of the Law Lords was the correct measure of damages because that is what the bank had to outlay to make itself whole again after the breach of contract. The chief swindler got 20 years.
One of the two Law Lords in dissent had another view of the proper measure of damages:
The judgment of Wright J. should be set aside and judgment entered for the Bank for the sum of £8,922
This law lord and an appeal court justice held this view because the swindle cost the Bank of Portugal nothing bar printing costs to replace the spurious banknotes, which were widely accepted as valid currency in a cash economy.
The Bank of Portugal could issue banknotes in any number at little cost to itself up to the limit provided by Portuguese law. Ropke wrote that:
The English courts presently discovered that the case involved issues of unusual subtlety and complexity, adjudication of which necessitated the admission of testimony by leading monetary theorists.
The question before the courts was: how great were the actual losses incurred by the Bank of Portugal?
If it had been postage stamps instead of bank notes in which the swindlers had trafficked, it is perfectly clear that the loss of the Portuguese government would have equalled the total value of the stamps.
With respect to the bank notes, however, no such simple calculation could be made.
Among the many questions which troubled the experts the following stand out as particularly relevant to our study: would the Bank of Portugal have issued the same amount of notes even if the swindlers had not done so?
If not, was the increase in the supply of money resulting from the introduction of the fraudulent notes good or bad for Portugal?
No one disputes, as several of the Law Lords noted, that the theft of a postage stamp must be made good at face value. People hesitate in this case involving swindling access to banknote plates and printing currency for yourself because what exactly was stolen?
When Reis died in 1955 , The Economist said of the counterfeiting scheme:
The perpetrators, however reprehensible their motives, did Portugal a very good turn according to the best Keynesian principles.
The House of Lords case is a major British legal precedent regarding the duty of the wronged party to mitigate damages in the case of breach of contract.

The House of Lords held that this duty did not apply if it would give your business a bad name in the trade. The Bank of Portugal could have repudiated the duplicate banknotes rather than exchange them for genuine new notes, but chose not to do so because this repudiation of banknotes would have ruined what little reputation it had.
The House of Lords also upheld the right of the wronged party to choose between different methods to mitigate damages from the breach of contract.
Judge Richard Posner on judging civil liberties challenges to national security laws
18 Dec 2014 Leave a comment

For Whatshisname, the Dustbin of History | National Review Online
17 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, law and economics, liberalism Tags: economics of oppositional, war on terror

a third element in policy must be the promotion of a democratic, inclusive Australian identity.
That is made easier by the fact that the existing Aussie identity is already inclusive and democratic, and — under Tony Abbott as under John Howard — self-confident and unapologetic, too.
As in other countries, however, national pride has been hobbled by the exaggerated nervousness of multiculturalism and political correctness.
Media, educational institutions, government agencies, and local government must now set aside political correctness and point out forcefully that this democratic identity is incompatible with radical Islamism.
If young and new Australians are proud of a bold national identity, them they will be that much less tempted by the violent sophistries of extremism.
Above all, however, radical Islamism needs to lose and be seen to lose…
Its adherents today will weep no tears over the two innocent lives lost.
But they will register nervously that Australia refused to give in to blackmail and that Whatsisname ended up dead on the floor.
If every hostage-taking and siege ends in more or less the same way, the ideologically tempted will gradually lose heart, look for other methods to advance their ideology, and eventually drift off into a disappointed and ashamed middle age.
via For Whatshisname, the Dustbin of History | National Review Online.
Let freedom reign
15 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, law and economics, liberalism, politics - Australia Tags: war on terror
This is shot that captures the #sydneysiege: sheer terror/relief of escaped hostages, incredible work of @nswpolice http://t.co/iCffJZ9NuZ—
Caroline Marcus (@carolinemarcus) December 15, 2014
Does going to prison deter crime – evidence from prison overcrowding litigation
13 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, law and economics, occupational choice Tags: crime and punishment, Steven Levitt
Steve Levitt is known for the clever use of data to test hypothesis, for present purposes, of the deterrent effect of prison.
The econometrics of deterrence are complicated by the fact that increases in the number of prisoners are likely to reduce crime, but rising crime rates also translate into larger prison populations. Which came first?
Levitt found a clever way of testing whether the imprisonment had a deterrent effect by looking at what happened after successful litigation against overcrowded prisons.

When prisons became less crowded, were more people willing to risk prison because it was a less unpleasant experience?
Overcrowding litigation reduces the number of people in prison, but this change in the size of the prison population is unlikely to be related to fluctuations in the crime rate.
These lawsuits affect prison populations, but may be otherwise unrelated to crime rates especially because they take a decade or more to resolve. The prison population is falling because of the successful litigation and nothing else.

In 13 states, lawsuits affected a state’s entire prison system. In the three years after a final judgement was handed down, prison populations fell by 14.3% compared to the population of the nation as a whole; violent and property crime rates increased 10.2% and 5.5% respectively.
Levitt found that the responsiveness of crime to prison populations was two to three times greater than previous studies:
For each one-prisoner reduction induced by prison overcrowding litigation, the total number of crimes committed increases by approximately 15 per year.
The social benefit from eliminating those 15 crimes is approximately $45,000; the annual per prisoner costs of incarceration are roughly $30,000.
In another study, Levitt found the quality of life in prison has a greater impact on crime than the death penalty. He showed the death rate among prisoners (the best proxy for prison conditions) is negatively correlated with crime rates, consistent with deterrence. Criminals do not like to be sent to unpleasant, dangerous prisons.
This Greenpeace Stunt May Have Irreparably Damaged Peru’s Nazca Site
12 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, environmental economics, global warming Tags: climate alarmism, eco-vandals, ecotourism, Greenpeace, vandalism



no one, not even presidents and cabinet ministers, was allowed where the activists had gone without authorisation and anyone who received permission must wear special shoes.
The Nazca lines are huge figures depicting living creatures, stylised plants and imaginary figures scratched on the surface of the ground between 1,500 and 2,000 years ago. They are believed to have had ritual functions related to astronomy.
via This Greenpeace Stunt May Have Irreparably Damaged Peru’s Nazca Site
Let’s not kid ourselves: Most Americans are fine with torture, even when you call it “torture” – The Washington Post
10 Dec 2014 1 Comment
in economics of crime, law and economics, laws of war, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, war and peace Tags: interrogation techniques, torture, tourism, war on terror
Jihad for Dummies buyers get 12 years
07 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, war and peace Tags: economics of oppositional identities, Jihad, terrorism, war on terror
Speeding fines are rather steep in Victoria
06 Dec 2014 1 Comment
in economics of crime, law and economics Tags: crime and punishment, speeding tickets
Can crime be deterred: hijackings as a case study of the increase in the probability of apprehension
05 Dec 2014 1 Comment
in economics of crime, law and economics, transport economics Tags: crime and punishment, deterrence, economics of crime, hijacking, law and economics
In 1977, William Landes published a classic study of crime and punishment. He investigated what happened to the number of hijackings in the USA after mandatory screening of passengers and their carry-on luggage was introduced in 1973.
During the peak period of hijackings, 1968 to 1972, the probability of apprehension the hijacker was 15%. For those hijackers that were caught, their average prison sentence was 30 years in 1972 to 1974. One quarter of hijackers were committed to mental institutions. Hijackings became so common that:
[a]irliners carried approach plans for the Havana airport and crews were instructed not to resist hijackers. There were also standard diplomatic procedures for obtaining the return of planes and passengers
No hijackers were killed during the course of their crimes until 1971. After that, there is about a 10% chance of the hijacker being shot dead. Air marshals started riding on US planes in 1970; there were about 1200 of these air marshals, who had to be about the most boring job in the world.
The primary purpose of hijackings in the USA in the late 60s and early 70s in the USA initially was to obtain free transport to Cuba for the political purposes or to avoid prosecution for crimes. However, in the early 1970s, this demand for air transport started to decline as news filtered back about how poorly these hijackers were treated in Cuba. A few of these hijackers chose to return to the United States.
Interestingly, the substitute for flying to Cuba was para-hijackers. They demanded a ransom of an average of $300,000 and then parachuted out of the plane. One out of 18 succeeded. Their average prison sentence for the 11 that survived was 43 years.

As the table above shows, the number of hijackings in the USA immediately fell from over 20 per year, with a maximum of 38 in 1969, to one or two per year after the introduction of mandatory screening of passengers and their carry-on luggage In 1973.
All hijackers were apprehended between 1973 and 1976. Apparently, hijackers of all breeds and political complexions do not enjoy the prison experience. Criminals don’t like to be caught.
Interestingly, lunatics could be deterred. They retained sufficient capacity for planning to abandon their plans to hijack a plane because of the inevitability of arrest at the boarding gate after the metal detector sounded off from 1973 onwards. Only to the 12 offenders that were apprehended for attempted hijacking between 1973 and 1976 were committed to mental institutions. The remaining 10 were just plain stupid.
If lunatics cannot be deterred, do not respond incentives, they should have continued to hijack planes at the same rate as prior to the introduction of mandatory screening in 1973.
That said, mandatory screening was not cheap, which may explain why airlines and their passengers were putting up with up to 40 hijackings per year, as Landes explained using 1977 dollar, which was back when a dollar actually bought something:
Although the mandatory screening program is highly effective in terms of the number of hijackings prevented, its costs appear enormous.
The estimated net increase in security costs due to the screening program (which does not include the time and inconvenience costs to persons searched) is $194.24 million over the 1973 to 1976 period.
This, in turn, translates into a $3.24 to $9.25 million expenditure to deter a single hijacking. Put differently, if the dollar equivalent of the loss to an individual hijacked passenger were in the range of $76,718 to $219,221, then the costs of screening would just offset the expected hijacking losses.
I should add, however,that air travel was much more expensive and much less frequent in 1973. The jumbo jet had only been introduced two years previous. Air travel is much more frequent these days so would the contemporary travelling public be willing to put up with the equivalent of hundreds of hijackings per year?

Caption: A Northwest Orient Airlines plane that was hijacked on July 1, 1968, is pictured at the Miami International Airport after returning from Cuba.
What did happen after the crackdown on hijacking was the terrorists change tactics. Embassy takeovers another type of sieges surged. Prior to the crackdown on hijacking, these were rare.
When embassies became fortified, the terrorists instead started kidnapping or murdering diplomats after they left the Embassy compound. As Walter Enders and Todd Sandler found
The existence of complements and substitutes means that policies designed to reduce one type of attack may affect other attack modes.
For example, the installation of metal detectors in airports reduced skyjackings and diplomatic incidents but increased other kinds of hostage attacks (barricade missions, kidnappings) and assassinations.
In the long run, embassy fortification decreased barricade missions but increased assassinations.





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