10 Jun 2024
by Jim Rose
in comparative institutional analysis, development economics, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, economics of crime, growth disasters, growth miracles, income redistribution, law and economics, Public Choice, rentseeking
Tags: economics of corruption, India
In India it’s common for politicians to have criminal cases against them. Why do voters vote for criminals? One compelling explanation provided by political scientist Milan Vaishnav is that voters often care less about their represntative’s ability to deliver broad-based development or draft good laws, and more about the effectiveness at helping them access limited […]
Haan, goonda hai, magar hamara goonda hai
09 Jun 2024
by Jim Rose
in applied price theory, econometerics, economics of crime, economics of education, labour economics, law and economics, occupational choice
Tags: cognitive psychology, crime and punishment, criminal deterrence, law and order
Gary Becker’s famous model of rational crime suggests that criminals weigh up the costs and benefits of crime (and engage in a criminal act if the benefits outweigh the costs). Time preferences matter in this model, because the benefits of a criminal act are usually realised immediately, whereas the greatest costs (including the penalties of…
More impatient people are more likely to commit crime
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