Posner and Epstein Debate Patent System
29 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in law and economics, Richard Epstein, Richard Posner Tags: patents, Richard Epstein, Richard Posner
Richard Posner on constructive criticism in public policy
09 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in organisational economics, Richard Posner Tags: Richard Posner

What is evidence of price collusion?
16 May 2014 Leave a comment
in industrial organisation, law and economics, Richard Posner Tags: cartels
Posner and Easterbrook suggest that these industry behaviours together are suspicious.
- Fixed relative market shares among top firms over time.
- Declining absolute market shares of the industry leaders.
- Persistent price discrimination.
- Certain types of exchanges of price information.
- Regional price variations.
- Identical sealed bids for tenders.
- Price, output, and capacity changes at the time of the suspected initiation of collusion.
- Industry-wide resale price maintenance or non-price vertical restraints.
- Relatively infrequent price changes; smaller price reactions as a result of known cost changes.
- Demand is highly responsive to price changes at market price.
- Level and pattern of profits relatively favourable to smaller firms.
- Particular pricing and marketing strategies.

Aaron Director’s most creative suggestion of evidence of price collusion is disputes between the marketing and finance departments of a large company. The market department wants to cut prices because there would be a large increase in sales. The finance department says no because this would take the price below the monopoly or agreed cartel price.
The next time you make an allegation of price fixing
15 May 2014 Leave a comment
in entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, law and economics, Richard Posner Tags: cartels
Remember this, firms are only likely to collude in certain market environments.

Brozen and Posner suggest the following pre-conditions to collusion
- market concentration on the supply side;
- no fringe of small sellers;
- high transport costs from neighbouring markets;
- small variations in production costs between firms;
- readily available information on prices;
- inelastic demand at the competitive price;
- low pre-collusion industry profits;
- long lags on new entry;
- many buyers (otherwise selective discounting to big buyers will be too tempting while monitoring adherence to the agreement will be difficult);
- no significant product differentiation;
- large suppliers selling at the same level in the distribution chain;
- a simple price, credit and distribution structure;
- price competition is more important than other forms of competition;
- demand is static or declining over time; and
- stagnant technological innovation and product redesign.
Stable collusive arrangements are thus likely to be rare; the absence of any of the conditions will tend to undermine the potential for successful collusion.
Chicago Unbound | 60+ years of University of Chicago Law Online, mostly ungated
02 May 2014 Leave a comment
in law and economics, Richard Posner, Ronald Coase Tags: University of Chicago
Chicago Unbound contains 60+ years of scholarship, most of it ungated online, of the members of University of Chicago Law School
via Chicago Unbound | University of Chicago Law School Research.
On throwing the rascals out
18 Mar 2014 Leave a comment
in Joseph Schumpeter, Public Choice, Richard Posner Tags: elections, electoral cycles, Joseph Schumpeter, political mandates, retrospective voting, Richard Posner
“American democracy,” writes Richard Posner, “enables the adult population, at very little cost in time, money or distraction from private pursuits commercial or otherwise, to punish at least the flagrant mistakes and misfeasances of officialdom, to assure an orderly succession of at least minimally competent officials, to generate feedback to the officials concerning the consequences of their policies, to prevent officials from (or punish them for) entirely ignoring the interests of the governed, and to prevent serious misalignments between government action and public opinion.”

Too many, in Richard Posner’s view, want to remake democracy with the faculty workshop as their model. Such deliberation has demanding requirements for popular participation in the democratic process, including a high level of knowledge and analytical sophistication and an absence, or at least severe curtailment, of self-interested motives.
Much empirical research demonstrates that citizens have astonishingly low levels of political knowledge. Most lack very basic knowledge of political parties, candidates and issues, much less the sophisticated knowledge necessary to meet the demands of a deliberative democracy.
Posner champions Joseph Schumpeter’s view of democracy as a superior alternative to the unrealistic visions of deliberative democracy.

Schumpeter disputed the widely held view that democracy was a process by which the electorate identified the common good, and that politicians carried this out:
- The people’s ignorance and superficiality meant that they were manipulated by politicians who set the agenda.
- Although periodic votes legitimise governments and keep them accountable, their policy programmes are very much seen as their own and not that of the people, and the participatory role for individuals is limited.
Schumpeter’s theory of democratic participation is that voters have the ability to replace political leaders through periodic elections. Citizens do have sufficient knowledge and sophistication to vote out leaders who are performing poorly or contrary to their wishes. The power of the electorate to turn elected officials out of office at the next election gives elected officials an incentive to adopt policies that do not outrage public opinion and administer the policies with some minimum honesty and competence.
The outcome of Schumpeterian democracy in the 20th century, where governments are voted out rather than voted in, is that most of modern public spending is income transfers that grew to the levels they are because of support from the average voter.

Political parties on the Left and Right that delivered efficient increments and streamlinings in the size and shape of government were elected, and then thrown out from time to time, in turn, because they became tired and flabby or just plain out of touch.
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