The trade-off between hiring higher-skilled and less-skilled workers

Firms differ in the skill compositions of their labour forces because higher-skilled labour is not always the most profitable type of labour to hire.

A profit-minded firm seeks low costs per unit of labour. In truth, nothing is expensive or cheap. This is because buyers will keep buying until the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit. The next unit was not purchased because it wasn’t worth the cost. The last unit was bought because its cost just matched its benefit.

The most cost-effective labour is the labour with the lowest ratio of wages to output. Low cost per unit of output is the goal whether it is comes from low wages or high labour productivity (Lazear 1998).


The wage spread between high quality and lower quality workers is large enough such that no employer hiring lower quality workers can profitably switch to hire higher quality recruits and no firms hiring high-quality workers will switch to hire lower quality recruits (Lazear 1998).

Employers will buy more of an under-priced skill until the returns to labour equalise again across different skill levels and the hiring of any more of the hitherto mispriced skill is no longer profitable because of rising wages.

Firms of all sizes will revisit their skills strategies when market conditions change if they hope to survive in their new circumstances.

Comparing sea ice today to Shackleton’s Ill Fated Voyage – 100 years ago this month

I am a great admirer of Ernest Shackleton – his unlimited determination and boundless courage

What is the main driver of a gender wage gap?

Some economics of zero hours contracts – part 4: team production as a constraint on working time flexibility

To continue with my theme in my previous three blogs that zero hours contracts aren’t supposed to exist, a leading explanation for the hesitancy of employers to agree to part-time hours is team production (Hutchens and Grace-Martin 2004, 2006; Hutchens 2010).

Employers may want their employees to work a minimum number of working hours because of rigid production technologies and/or team production. Production technologies vary in the rigidity they impose on the hours worked by employees.

The co-ordination of working times is paramount to effective team production. Once the work time schedule is fixed for team, the worker faces a choice between working at the fixed schedule or working in another team or job.

Two common examples of teams are an assembly line and a football team. Both require a minimum number of workers with rigid starting and finishing times. The absence of a team member could reduce team productivity or safety or even stop production entirely.

When the cost of absence is higher such as for team production, there are more efforts to reduce absences. When a single employee absence is costly to employers, employers take steps to ensure that a minimum number of workers plus a reserve are present. There will be increased spending on monitoring, more cross-training, mutual monitoring by employees and the use of peer pressure. Multiple production lines reduce the risks of absence because spare staff can be hired to fill in across different teams.

Other workers can produce independently of their co-workers. One example is a member of a typing pool. The contribution of each typist depends on their efforts alone. The increment they add to production does not vary with the presence or absence of others, nor is the productivity of others affected by their output. If there is little teamwork, the absence of a worker does not affect other workers.

The Department of Labour (2009) found that about 60 per cent of New Zealand full-time employees did not have flexible hours.

A leading reason for employers hiring part-time workers is to solve scheduling problems that arise when hours of operation and peak periods of daily or weekly production do not easily divide into standard shift lengths.

For example, within the day and within the week variation in customer demand explains the heavy use of part-timers in restaurants, retails stores and many services outlets. Not surprisingly, zero hours contracts arise in industries such as the food services sector where there is already a long history of part-time work.

Different production technologies require their own levels of coordination and supervision. This complicates the use of part-timers. Scheduling problems can arise of workers arrive at different times.

A mix of full and part-time employees could increase supervision costs. There can be repetitions of instructions and different capabilities to perform the same tasks.

Two part-timers could be productive if job is repetitive and does not require much co-ordination. Again, and not surprisingly, zero hours contracts occur in industries where the jobs appear to be relatively simple and the worker can pretty much work out what to do after a little bit of training with little supervision.

A managerial employee is less likely to be allowed to be part-time because they will be absent when employees need direction (Hutchens and Grace-Martin 2004, 2006. Managerial employees have scale effects. Higher level management decisions percolate through the rest of the organisation. The interaction of talent and scale ensures that the impact of any loss of efficiency from having part-time managers compound geometrically into the efforts and productivity of those they lead. Sharing a managerial job has costs because information must be exchanged and a common agenda agreed.

The economics of team production suggests that zero hours contracts will occur in teams with peaks and ebbs in customer demand, where workers are pretty much interchangeable alone can take over with little or no instructional briefing, and the level of task dependency between workers is small.

When extra workers on zero hours contracts are brought on to deal with the spike in demand, they take over the servicing of this demand. There is little need for them to interact with existing workers. For example, in a restaurant situation, they could deal with the extra tables filled by the spike in demand. In a McDonald’s restaurant, for example, they could just take over that the till that was otherwise not in use and serve the extra queues of customers.

To summarise, unless we have a good idea about why firms are moving to zero hours contracts, which we don’t, and why employees sign these contracts rather than work for other employers who offer more regular hours of work, meddling in these still novel arrangements is pretty risky.

Some economics of zero-hours contracts – part 3: the fixed costs of working

The Unite Union, which represents about 7000 workers across New Zealand, has announced a campaign against zero-hours contracts. Zero-hours contracts have no specified hours or times of work so a worker could end up working 40 hours one week and none the next.

Unite national director Mike Treen did not know of the specific numbers of such contracts, but said these contracts were particularly common in the fast food industry, although they also appeared in some other industries.

Unite Union’s national director said that zero hours contracts made workers vulnerable to abuse as they became too nervous to speak out, for fear of having their hours reduced.

There’s no security and it puts enormous power in the hands of managers. People are extremely reluctant to assert their rights for simple things like breaks…

Treen admitted that zero-hours contracts gave employers flexibility, but pretended to know that the amount of flexibility employers actually needed was often exaggerated.


It’s not like they have huge swings or anything. They know how much they are going to sell on any particular day of the week during the year… We don’t expect everybody to have guaranteed hours but 80 per cent of the crew should be able to have it.

Treen said the union was not planning to push for a law change at this stage and would focus on addressing the issue during negotiations with fast food companies early next year.

The new leader of the opposition has promised to outlaw these zero our contracts when he gets into government. I wish him well in drafting a law that outlaws zero-hours contracts without outlawing some part-time and casual jobs as well.

 Zero-hours contracts and the class war

As is to be expected, the Guardian is rather hot and bothered about zero hours contracts. One of its columnists referred to those on zero-hours contracts as the new reserve army of the unemployed:

It is a pity Karl Marx was not around last week to comment on the news that 90% of the workers at Sports Direct are on zero-hours contracts.

The author of the Communist Manifesto would also have had plenty to say about the news that the official estimates of those working in this form of casualised labour had shot up by 25%…

It is safe to say Marx would have cavilled with those who see zero-hour contracts as an expression of Britain’s economic strength, a demonstration of flexible labour markets in action.

He would have thought "reserve army of labour" a better description of conditions in which workers were expected to be permanently on call for an employer.

The Guardian went on to admit that the reserve army of unemployed are not as discontented as they should be:

It’s only fair to say that some employees are content to be on zero-hours contracts.

Some students, for example, want to combine work with study and are willing to turn up when summoned. That’s also true of older workers topping up their pensions with a bit of irregular, part-time work.

Despite this, the class war continues as does the immiseration of the proletariat and the long-term decline in profits that will lead to the crisis in capitalism and, with a bit of luck, the inevitable proletarian revolution:

Marx would have seen zero-hours contracts as the continuation of a long historical trend, stretching back to the mid-1960s when the profitability of western manufacturing firms started to fall.

From that moment, he would say, the search was on for measures to boost profits, and this has manifested itself in a number of ways: by direct attacks on organised labour; by the increased financialisation of the economy; by the search for cheap raw materials whatever the environmental cost; and by asset bubbles.

Accordingly, zero-hours contracts are the response to tougher conditions facing firms as a result of the financial crisis.

Reversing that trend will require more than legislation: it will mean tackling one of the root causes of that crisis: the imbalance of power in the labour market.

A more mellow writer in the Guardian brought up the imagery of the interwar depression:

Of course it is difficult for employers to match the demand to work nine to five and yet also to be served on a 24-hour basis, cheaply and effectively by someone, not them.

But there are other ways to solve this conundrum than indenturing workers or making them wait at the metaphorical factory gate for a tap on the shoulder.

The fixed costs of working

I will start my third blog on the economics of zero-hours by reviewing the economic literature on the fixed costs of working. Helpfully, this literature predicts that zero hours contracts really shouldn’t exist much at all.

The literature on the economics of the fixed costs of work arose out of the economics of retirement and the economics of the labour supply of married women, and in particular of young mothers. This literature was attempting to explain why older workers, or young mothers either worked a minimum number of hours, or not at all.

Fixed costs of working constrain the choices that older employees make about how many hours and days that are worthwhile working part-time. For employees, the fixed costs of going to work limit the numbers of days and number of hours per day that a worker is willing to work part-time. The timing costs of working at scheduled times and a fixed number of days per week can make working fewer full-time days, rather than fewer hours per day less disruptive to the leisure and other uses of personal time.

The fixed costs of working induced older workers to retire completely, and young mothers to withdraw from the workforce for extended periods of time, unless these workers worked either full-time or enough hours part-time each day and through the week to justify the costs of commuting and otherwise disrupting their day and week.

In the case of older workers, there were the fixed costs of commuting and other disruptions to their day. In the case of mothers, there are additional fixed costs of working arising from child care and the commuting and other rather rigid time commitments of picking up and dropping off younger children at school and to day care centres.

The fixed costs of going to work

There is a minimum number of hours of work that will be supplied by different workers that is set by the fixed costs of working. These fixed costs of work arise from commuting time and from dressing and other tasks involved in preparing for the trip to work. These costs are fixed because they do not vary with the number of hours to be worked per day and the amount of effort to be exerted while working (Cogan 1981; Hamermesh and Donald 2007).


 

A worker will not accept a job offer or continue in a particular job unless they work sufficient hours so that these fixed costs of going to work are recovered along with receiving sufficient reward for giving up pursuing other job openings open now and in the future and for forgoing leisure and the option of making other uses of their time (Cogan 1981; Hamermesh and Donald 2007).

Cogan (1981) estimated that the average fixed time and money costs of married women entering the workforce was 28 per cent of their earnings, and also estimated that the minimum number of hours a married woman was willing to supply in the labour market was 1,300 hours per year.


There may be a preference for fewer working days over fewer hours per day to reduce the time and money costs of going to work. Donald and Hamermesh (2009) estimated that fixed costs of going to work are equal to about 8 per cent of income. The fixed costs of working provide an incentive to workers to bunch activities.

The fixed timing costs of labour market entry

A surprisingly large part of the fixed costs of working comes from disruption in the ability to use spare time effectively (Donald and Hamermesh 2009, 2007). Entering or remaining in the workforce for any time at all significantly affects the effective allocation and enjoyment of time outside of working hours. This disruption to the effective use of the time that is left outside of working hours is the fixed timing cost of labour market entry.

One way to reduce this disruption from entering the labour force at all is to seek to reduce the number of days worked per week rather than the number of hours per day.

Leisure and other private uses of time are displaced if the individual takes or stays in even a small part-time job. Workers must use their reduced amount of remaining free time to catch-up on tasks, often at the weekend that they could have done if they were not working.

Leisure time may be the first to go because many personal tasks can be rescheduled but must be done eventually. These range from cooking, eating, and cleaning to personal upkeep, sleep and rest. Tasks must be hurried or done to a lower quality (Donald and Hamermesh 2009).

Routine – having the same schedule from day to day – saves time (Hamermesh 2005). Routine enables people to economise on the set-up costs of consumption, leisure and going to work.

Entering the work-force for any time at all to work even a small number of hours per day or per week calls for new daily and weekly routines and disrupts many existing routines that make better use of leisure, family and other uses of time (Hamermesh 2005).

Entering the workforce constrains the unfettered use of spare time. Working increases the fixed costs of coordinating family and leisure times. Workers must surround working times with buffers to ensure they are not late for work.

One reality of rising incomes is time become more valuable. A rise in wages raises the value of time because time is a finite and irreplaceable resource. Time cannot be stored or bought and sold but people can try and make better use of it.

With only 24 hours still in every day, the cost of time-intensive activities including working will rise as incomes increase. People shift away from time intensive activities and buy more of those products that are time saving or which are less time intensive to consume. Time is money and this maxim applies with greater resonance as incomes and wealth increase.

Another important fixed time costs of labour market entry is its impact on the efficiency of the remaining time devoted to leisure, household production and other activities when even a small amount of market work is undertaken. Spare time is of much less value if part of every day is to be spent at work.

Fixed timing costs arise because of a need to hurry to get to work on time and forego other activities to be rested for work the next morning. The requirement to attend work blocks out certain days from major other uses of that day and reduces the time available in any day of part-day work for leisure, family time and household production.

Household production refers to the goods and services made at home which could be purchased in the market from a third-party. These include food preparation, cooking, carer obligations, and household cleaning. There are also various other household tasks that must perform for one-self which are essentially personal maintenance and leisure.

Working even a few hours can reduce the worker’s efficiency in household production and other non-market activities and may require the worker to buy goods and services that were previously produced at home. This reduces the net financial rewards of working. Fewer full days of work, rather than fewer hours per day is less disruptive to leisure and the other uses of personal time.

The fixed time costs of market work might induce workers to engage in different mixes of other activities. The additional hours of work during the week affect the allocation of time on a non-working weekend day. They reduce leisure time on weekends and increase weekend time devoted to household production by those who do market work on week days. Workers catch up at the weekend on the household production that the rigidities of their market work prevented them from doing during the week.

Stress is an important fixed cost of working. Workers spend non-market time worrying or thinking about work-problems. Even a few hours of market work will place a worker at risk of some stress.

Floors and ceilings on the structure of the working week

The fixed costs of going to work and the fixed time cost of labour market entry both place constraints on the willingness of workers to accept a job offer involving a zero-hours contract. These contracts must offer something extra over competing job options.

The employer must offer something extra to prospective recruits to induce them to sign a zero-hours contract. There must be something substantial to overcome both the fixed costs of work, such as commuting, and the less obvious but still substantial fixed costs of labour market entry.

Any commitment to work, such as working on a zero hours contract, carries with it significant costs in terms of disruption to the rest of the day, the rest of the working week and the amount of the weekend that is spent on leisure versus resting from work and catching up on tasks that otherwise could have been done during the week but for work commitments.

A zero-hours contract must pay enough over the expected life time of the job to make up for the costs of going to work as well as the disruption and loss of leisure time and also the pure disutility of working before the worker breaks even on working.

As the Unite Union official noted, zero hours contracts appear to be most prevalent in the fast food sector. Job turnover rates in the sector can be several hundred per cent per year.

Many of the workers in the fast food sector, as the Unite union official himself noted, are young. Teenagers and young workers changed jobs frequently, particularly those who are studying part-time or full-time work, injuring the summer.

As such, zero-hours contracts in any particular job will have a short expected life over which the teenager or young worker would have to recoup for the fixed cost of working and the fixed cost of any labour market entry. Employers would have to offer some sort of premium or other implicit guarantee of regular work to induce prospective young recruits to sign a zero hours contract.

The type of workers who will profit from signing a zero hours contracts of those workers with few other demands on their time and flexible days. The workers who might find zero hours contract appealing will be those who do have much routine in their day. Workers who have a considerable amount of routine in their day such as because of family commitments will not find the wage offers in zero hours contracts appealing.

There will be job sorting: workers who have low fixed costs of working and low fixed costs of labour market entry will be attracted to zero-hours contracts.

Employers profit from offering zero hours contracts to workers who don’t want to make a regular commitment to come into work every day. Teenagers and students fall into this category, which makes it less surprising that zero hours contracts appear to be most common in the fast food sector.

There are mutual gains in the fast food sector to both employers and workers from zero hours contracts when there are peaks and troughs in product demand, and some teenagers and young workers have a low cost of coming into work at short notice.

Some economics of zero hours contracts – part 1: concepts, definitions and initial puzzles

Unions say New Zealand employers are following trends overseas and adopting zero hour contracts: workers have to be available for work, but have no hours guaranteed. Unite Union national director Mike Treen said:

McDonald’s, KFC, Pizza Hut, Starbucks, Burger King, Wendy’s – all of the contracts have no minimum hours, and so people can be – and are – rostered anywhere from three to 40 hours a week, or sometimes 60 hours a week, and it depends a lot on how you get on with your manager.

No official figures are available on the number of people on zero hour contracts in New Zealand, but they are are available in the UK in the chart below. About 250,000 workers in the UK work on zero hours contracts.

These workers agree not to work for anyone else, but are not promised regular work at all with their new employer.

The question that must always be asked is why do people who are deemed competent to vote and drive cars sign zero hours contract? What is in it for them? David Friedman asked this question about the economics of restraint of trade agreements for employees:

…the employer who insists on an employee signing a non- competition agreement will find that he must pay, in additional wages or other terms of employment, the cost that the agreement imposes upon the employee, as measured by the employee and revealed in his actions.

It follows that the employer will insist on such an agreement only if he believes that its value to him is greater than its cost to the employee…

The contract is designed, after all, with the objective of getting the other party to sign it.

If I am designing the contract and offering it to many other parties, that may put me in a position to commit myself to insisting on terms that give me a large fraction of the benefit that the contract produces.

But it is still in my interest to maximize the size of that net benefit-which I do by only insisting on terms that are worth at least as much to me as they cost the other party.

The inherent inequality of bargaining power between employers and workers and the reserve army of the unemployed must not be all that they are cracked up to be these days if low paid workers have to sign legally enforceable restraint of trade agreements.

Obviously, the few members of the reserve army of the unemployed lucky enough to have a low pay, insecure job that offers no regular hours today have so many other job options that their employers must get them to agree not to quit and job-hop at will. Jobs must be readily available  to low paid workers for otherwise why do employers insist on this restraint of trade in employment agreements.

Why do workers sign these contracts, which can include a promise of exclusive services – not working for other employers? Several subsequent blog posts will attempt to answer this question

The inherent inequality of bargaining power between employers and workers doesn’t work too well here because  the worker is accepting this job as compared to these other options , which may include employment in an existing job.

Once a worker is on-the-job and has accumulated job specific human capital, issues of post-contractual opportunism come up on both sides.

An important function of the employment contract is to prevent attempts to renegotiate terms and conditions once one side of the other has committed to the relationship and will find it costly to go elsewhere.

Zero hours contracts are negotiated upfront, which makes them unappealing to anyone already has a job, unless the terms and conditions of a zero hour contract, including the wages paid are much more appealing than officious observers make out.

Richard Epstein made this point about the general operation of the labour market, which is of relevance to our search to the answers to the questions posed by this blog post:

Labour markets are not characterized by tricky externalities. They do not pollute streams or require the creation of public goods. They are not characterized by genuine breakdowns in information, as workers are in a position to observe the conditions of their employment on a day-to-day basis.

Left to their own devices, without explicit support from union activities, they will be highly competitive, and thus work hard to allocate scarce human capital to its most productive use.

Workers have the option to quit for higher wages, and employers can always seek out low cost techniques to reduce their labour costs.

Any short-term dislocation for firms or individuals is more than offset by the overall increase in the system productivity, spurred in part by clear signals that should increase investments in human capital.

Zero hours contracts are a new labour market phenomena . That is no reason to automatically default to monopoly explanations for their emergence, including their emergence in a highly competitive industries and highly competitive labour markets where  employees change jobs regularly.

As Coase said in the context of industrial organisation as a whole and novel business practices in particular:

One important result of this preoccupation with the monopoly problem is that if an economist finds something—a business practice of one sort or other—that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of ununderstandable practices tends to be rather large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation, frequent.

The next blog post arises out of my first exposure to the labour economics of working arrangements. Specifically, how the fixed costs of employment and the fixed cost of going to work  both lead to minimum hours constraints in most employment contracts.

Most of what I know about the  labour, personnel and organisational economics of working arrangements  was about explaining  why employers would expect an employee to work as a minimum number of hours if they were to employ them at all. Always good to start with explanations as to why zero hours should not exist, but they clearly do.

Subsequent blog posts will discuss zero hours contracts in the context of the team production and organisational architecture; and zero hours contracts, equalising differentials and job sorting.

The Effective Decision – Peter Drucker

1. Classifying the problem. Is it generic? Is it exceptional and unique? Or is it the first manifestation of a new genus for which a rule has yet to be developed?

2. Defining the problem. What are we dealing with?

3. Specifying the answer to the problem. What are the “boundary conditions”?

4. Deciding what is “right,” rather than what is acceptable, in order to meet the boundary conditions.. What will fully satisfy the specifications before attention is given to the compromises, adaptations, and concessions needed to make the decision acceptable?

5. Building into the decision the action to carry it out. What does the action commitment have to be? Who has to know about it?

6. Testing the validity and effectiveness of the decision against the actual course of events. How is the decision being carried out? Are the assumptions on which it is based appropriate or obsolete?

via The Effective Decision.

Claudia Goldin on the main cause of the gender wage gap

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Academic jargon decoded

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Sloan on the key to good decisions

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Who rules Japan? A public choice analysis of the courts and the bureaucracy

Gullible gaijin (外人), especially those in the foreign media, foreign ministries and academia think that the bureaucrats rule Japan. Nothing could be further from the truth.

I’ll illustrate this first with the way in which the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan exercises a tight control over the courts.

Judges in Japan are career judges starting straight out of a specialised Law School for trainee judges in their late 20s as an assistant judge with various promotions all the way to the top to various courts with different jurisdictions in different places in Japan.

Control over transfers between courts in different parts of Japan as well as over promotions is the key to making sure judges know what is required of them and punishing those judges who step out of line.

Japanese lower court judges are reassigned every three years to different courts in different parts of the country.  Most Japanese judges find administrative duties prestigious and branch office assignments embarrassing.

The judicial secretariat supervised by the Supreme Court can moves judges up and down the hierarchy from the High Courts (the courts of appeals) to the District Courts (the trial courts) to the Family Courts and to the branch offices of the District and Family Courts. It routinely sends judges to less prestigious postings. Supreme Court judges are appointed directly by the government in their 60s and must retire at the age of 70.

  • Like the vast majority of other professionals, Japanese judges want to live in Tokyo if possible, and in Osaka if not.
  • If a difficult judges is posted to the north of Japan, which is next to Siberia, they must leave their family behind because of the need to go to good schools and universities.

Every Japanese judge knows that when they are reassigned, the next reassignment is not necessarily as prestigious as the last, depending on how they rule in contentious cases.

J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen have written several very good papers and a book on this topic of judicial independence, or more correctly, the lack of judicial independence in Japan.

Lower court judges defer to the wishes of the LDP on sensitive political questions because they will do better in their careers. Japan has a judicial career structure that rewards and punishes judges according to their work product, including their rulings in sensitive political cases.

Ramseyer and Rasmusen reviewed the quality of the assignments of 400 judges after deciding politically charged cases, holding constant proxies for effort, intelligence, seniority, and political bias.  These political sensitive cases involve judges:

  • who held the Self-Defence Force or U.S. bases unconstitutional;
  • rejected national electoral apportionment schemes advantageous to the LDP; and
  • enjoined the national government in administrative law suits.

Ramseyer and Rasmusen found that judges who defer to the LDP in politically disputes do better in their career assignments than those who do not. Similarly, judges who grant injunctions against the national (but not local) government have less successful careers.

This distinction is important because the national government wants to keep local governments in line with the laws they pass. This differentiation between issuing injunctions against local governments, but not the national government, shows the detail at which judicial decisions are controlled by the ruling party through favourable assignments and promotions.

Ramseyer and Rasmusen also found that:

  • judges who joined a communist-leaning bar organization in the 1960s had fewer administrative postings than those who did not join;
  • judges who  consistently convicted criminal defendants spent less time in branch offices than those who occasionally acquitted;
  • judges who found their tax opinions reversed on appeal had fewer administrative assignments and more branch office postings than those without such reversals; and
  • judges who held a ban on door-to-door canvassing unconstitutional suffered in their careers.

If the national government, the ruling LDP, exercises such close control over the courts, it would be surprising that they let the bureaucracy tell them what to do.

The LDP controls the bureaucracy, even though it isn’t apparent, as explained by Mark Ramseyer.

The most reliable agent for your interests is the agent who thinks he in charge because the face has grown to fit the mask. Ramseyer as pointed out that a bureaucracy would act the same whether

  1. it were completely independent or
  2. it were doing only what the LDP wants (i.e. observational equivalence).

Ramseyer and Rosenbluth argue that the institutional framework of government – the rules of the game among political players – decisively shapes the character of political competition and incentives in Japan.

The ruling LDP works within Japanese electoral rules to maximize its success with voters, and within constitutional constraints to enforce its policies on bureaucrats and judges.

The LDP has several ways of keeping the bureaucracy under control:

  • They can easily veto any bureaucratic actions;
  • They have control over promotion;
  • They encourage dissatisfied constituents to report complaints to the LDP;
  • Would-be politicians work in the bureaucracy and have to please the party if they want to run;
  • Ministries compete for policy influence;
  • The LDP requires “large portions of [bureaucrats’] lifetime earnings as bonds contingent on faithful performance” through their control of post-retirement jobs.

The LDP keeps bureaucratic action closely in line with its preferences through the control of promotions and three yearly  transfers and by encouraging intense rivalry between ministries.

Bureaucrats who do as they are told  and anticipate the needs  of their political masters in the LDP get the best transfers and are promoted to the top and then win the best post-retirement positions.

Japanese bureaucrats start retiring in their mid 40s so having a favourable post retirement job is vital. The Japanese system is based on back loading of pay. This is a well-known system for ensuring fidelity of agents where effort and performance is more difficult to monitor.

The main payoff been a bureaucrat in Japan is the prize at the end of the road. This prize will be denied for you if you step out of line, don’t do as you’re told and don’t know what is required of you.

My political science professor in Japan at the National Graduate Institute of Policy Studies (GRIPS) introduced me to the work of Mark Ramseyer in 1996. Ramseyer is completely fluent in Japanese and writes in Japanese as well as English on law and economics.

Some economics of co-authorship

liebowitztable1

The bad explanation of the proliferation of co-authorship is academic rent seeking and CV padding. We do live in a world, publish or perish and academic productivity does decline quite markedly when tenure is secured.

The good explanation is more co-authors is an efficient response to the rising burden of knowledge where teams of authors need to get across much larger fields than in the past.  In  empirical economics, one co-author might specialise in the econometrics, while the other author tells them what to do.

Ben Jones in ‘The Burden of Knowledge and the Death of the Renaissance Man: Is Innovation Getting Harder? found that as knowledge accumulates as technology advances, successive generations of innovators may face an increasing educational burden.

Innovators can compensate through lengthening their time in education and narrowing expertise, but these responses come at the cost of reducing individual innovative capacities. This has implications for the organization of innovative activity – a greater reliance on teamwork – and has negative implications for economic growth.

HT: Stan Liebowitz via andrew gelman

Danny Devito explains both creative destruction and the social responsibility of business

The incentives of a firm and its customers aren’t always properly aligned

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Timeless Tips for ‘Simple Sabotage’ — Central Intelligence Agency

via Timeless Tips for ‘Simple Sabotage’ — Central Intelligence Agency.

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Tim Harding's writings on rationality, informal logic and skepticism

Doc's Books

A window into Doc Freiberger's library

The Risk-Monger

Let's examine hard decisions!

Uneasy Money

Commentary on monetary policy in the spirit of R. G. Hawtrey

Barrie Saunders

Thoughts on public policy and the media

Liberty Scott

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Point of Order

Politics and the economy

James Bowden's Blog

A blog (primarily) on Canadian and Commonwealth political history and institutions

Science Matters

Reading between the lines, and underneath the hype.

Peter Winsley

Economics, and such stuff as dreams are made on

A Venerable Puzzle

"The British constitution has always been puzzling, and always will be." --Queen Elizabeth II

The Antiplanner

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Bet On It

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

History of Sorts

WORLD WAR II, MUSIC, HISTORY, HOLOCAUST

Roger Pielke Jr.

Undisciplined scholar, recovering academic

Offsetting Behaviour

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

JONATHAN TURLEY

Res ipsa loquitur - The thing itself speaks

Conversable Economist

In Hume’s spirit, I will attempt to serve as an ambassador from my world of economics, and help in “finding topics of conversation fit for the entertainment of rational creatures.”

The Victorian Commons

Researching the House of Commons, 1832-1868

The History of Parliament

Articles and research from the History of Parliament Trust

Books & Boots

Reflections on books and art

Legal History Miscellany

Posts on the History of Law, Crime, and Justice

Sex, Drugs and Economics

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

European Royal History

Exploring the Monarchs of Europe

Tallbloke's Talkshop

Cutting edge science you can dice with

Marginal REVOLUTION

Small Steps Toward A Much Better World

NOT A LOT OF PEOPLE KNOW THAT

“We do not believe any group of men adequate enough or wise enough to operate without scrutiny or without criticism. We know that the only way to avoid error is to detect it, that the only way to detect it is to be free to inquire. We know that in secrecy error undetected will flourish and subvert”. - J Robert Oppenheimer.

STOP THESE THINGS

The truth about the great wind power fraud - we're not here to debate the wind industry, we're here to destroy it.

Lindsay Mitchell

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Alt-M

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

croaking cassandra

Economics, public policy, monetary policy, financial regulation, with a New Zealand perspective

The Grumpy Economist

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law