Did government pick the Internet as a winner? @stevenljoyce @dpfdpf
31 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, Austrian economics, comparative institutional analysis, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, economics of media and culture, industrial organisation, Public Choice, survivor principle Tags: creative destruction, entrepreneurial alertness, industry policy, Internet, picking losers, picking winners, The fatal conceit, The meaning of competition, The pretense to knowledge
Mises on Nazi socialism
31 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, Austrian economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, defence economics, economics of bureaucracy, economics of regulation, industrial organisation, labour economics, Ludwig von Mises, Public Choice, survivor principle Tags: Nazi Germany
#TBT Ludwig von Mises' 1942 Letter to the Editor in the @nytimes on Nazi socialism. http://t.co/kv7TFekY8J—
Mises Institute (@mises) October 15, 2015
@NaomiAKlein agrees with #MiltonFriedman on Mancur Olson’s theory of how nations escape institutional sclerosis
25 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, income redistribution, Marxist economics, Milton Friedman, Public Choice, rentseeking, technological progress Tags: expressive voting, interest groups, Leftover Left, logic of collective action, Mancur Olson, Naomi Klein, pressure groups, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, rise and decline of nations, Twitter left
Source: quoted by Naomi Klein in “The Shock Doctrine”.
LA premiere tonight @NaomiAKlein @avilewis @mrdannyglover in person Q&A 7.30pm sundancecinemas.com http://t.co/wRkPFbnUHu—
Changes Everything (@thischanges) October 16, 2015
1. There will be no countries that attain symmetrical organization of all groups with a common interest and thereby attain optimal outcomes through comprehensive bargaining.
2. Stable societies with unchanged boundaries tend to accumulate more collusions and organizations for collective action over time.
3. Members of “small” groups have disproportionate organizational power for collective action, and this disproportion diminishes but does not disappear over time in stable societies.
4. On balance, special-interest organizations and collusions reduce efficiency and aggregate income in the societies in which they operate and make political life more divisive.
5. Encompassing organizations have some incentive to make the society in which they operate more prosperous, and an incentive to redistribute income to their members with as little excess burden as possible, and to cease such redistribution unless the amount redistributed is substantial in relation to the social cost of the redistribution.
6. Distributional coalitions make decisions more slowly than the individuals and firms of which they are comprised, tend to have crowded agendas and bargaining tables, and more often fix prices than quantities.
7. Distributional coalitions slow down a society’s capacity to adopt new technologies and to reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and thereby to reduce the rate of economic growth.
8. Distributional coalitions, once big enough to succeed, are exclusive, and seek to limit the diversity of incomes and values of their membership.
9. The accumulation of distributional coalitions increases the complexity of regulation, the role of government, and the complexity of understandings, and changes the direction of social evolution.
Source: Obituary: Professor Mancur Olson | Obituaries | News | The Independent
Why does Housing New Zealand pay dividends? @chrishipkins @metiria
23 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economics of bureaucracy, financial economics, industrial organisation, managerial economics, organisational economics, politics - New Zealand
The current controversy over payment of dividends by Housing New Zealand is misplaced because of the subtle connections between payment of dividends and greater value for money.
By paying dividends, the investment priorities of Housing New Zealand are subject to additional ministerial scrutiny. Its capital program is scrutinised in greater detail by the Cabinet because ministers must fund it against competing bids across the entire budget and parliamentary scrutiny process.
Each budget bid is championed by a minister, each of whom must make their case every year against all-comers. This annual competition for a central pool of capital filters out lower value investment bids.
If dividends were not paid but were instead retained as free cash flows in the agency, there would be less ministerial scrutiny of Housing New Zealand because it would have a smaller role in annual budget rounds. Ministers and the Parliament sit up and pay attention when money is to be spent, as they should, and the larger is the sum in the budget, the more attention is paid to value for the money sought. Funding projects with retained dividends may reduce ministerial and parliamentary scrutiny.
Payment of dividends does not reduce the ability of Housing New Zealand to engage in new capital spending. If the dividends were not paid, the amount of new capital spending from budget appropriations would be reduced dollar for dollar.
@EricCrampton @KhyaatiA should New Zealand divide into Cantons?
22 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of bureaucracy, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice Tags: economics of federalism, Switzerland
Suggestions by the New Zealand Initiative for regions to be able to ask to be exempt from some national policies was against a background that New Zealand is too small to be a federal state. The New Zealand provinces were abolished in 1876. Switzerland seems to still put bread in the shops despite having many tiny Cantons and half-Cantons.
Source: Swiss Statistics – Cantons, communes.
So many American states have smaller populations are New Zealand, half in all, that is difficult to present them on a chart. All managed to be richer the New Zealand despite the horrors of federalism or because of it. These small state populations are before considering how much local government legislative power there is, including taxing and spending powers, city income taxes and city sales taxes, and county and local police forces.
Source: List of U.S. states and territories by population – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
The median national population size of countries is not much more than New Zealand’s current population.
- Controlling for location, Easterly and Kraay (2002) found that smaller states were richer than other states in per capita real GDP.
- Rose (2006) reviewed the impact of size on the level of income, inflation, material well-being, health, education, and the quality of a country’s institutions and found that small countries are more open to trade than large countries, but are not systematically different otherwise.
As I argued in my previous post on distance, New Zealand were prosperous from the time of European settlement despite a small population and their great distance from the main markets of the world on each side of the Atlantic.
Half the world's population lives inside this circle. http://t.co/XlTeEsTZkn—
Weird Science (@weird_sci) October 17, 2015
Of the ten richest countries in terms of GDP per capita, only four have populations above one million people (Alesina 2003). These countries are the USA (290 million people), Switzerland (7 million people), Norway (4 million people) and Singapore (3 million people). Of these four nations, two are below the global national population median of six million (Alesina 2003).
@GreenpeaceNZ @jamespeshaw The Futility and Farce of Global Climate Negotiations @RichardTol
18 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, development economics, economics of bureaucracy, environmental economics, environmentalism, global warming, growth disasters, growth miracles, international economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: bootleggers and baptists, climate alarmism, expressive voting, free-riders, global warming, green tariffs, international public goods, Leftover Left, New Zealand Greens, Twitter left
It is time for the environmental movement to face up to the fact that there never will be an international treaty to restrain carbon emissions. The practical way to respond to global warming is healthier is wealthier, richer is safer. Faster economic growth creates more resources for resilience and adaptation to a changing environment.
NEW REPORT: The Futility and Farce of Global Climate Negotiations bit.ly/1LvFFv3 http://t.co/TwbFUwaPlm—
Manhattan Institute (@ManhattanInst) October 17, 2015
India's target compared to its recent history http://t.co/pIvwhoSTpL—
Richard Tol (@RichardTol) October 02, 2015
Yes Prime Minister on every support short of help
15 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, television Tags: Yes Prime Minister
MFAT’s Hawaian Mansion
03 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice Tags: government waste, Taxpayers'Union
For some reason NZ has a Consul General in Hawaii. Their main job appears to be working with Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, so I wonder why they are not located on one of those island…
Source: MFAT’s Hawaii Mansion | Kiwiblog
@NZGreens @JulieAnneGenter are right! Government cars should go electric!
01 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economics of bureaucracy, politics - New Zealand, transport economics
Ministerial cars going electric is a great idea. The range limitations and range anxiety inherent to electric cars would mean ministers will find it much more difficult to do their jobs and therefore will have less time each day to mess up the economy and regulate unnecessarily.
One of the most productive things I ever saw the Green MPs do in Wellington was taking the bus to and from work.
I could not be happier when I saw Green coleaders Russel Norman and Metiria Turei waiting at a bus stop. They are just waiting, they will not working with a colleague, they were not working on their phones. They were just standing there doing nothing. That was the most productive moments of their times in parliament.
Every second a Green MP spends waiting for a bus and travelling on a bus and arranging to fit in with bus timetables is one second less spent making New Zealand a poorer country and deterring investment from coming to New Zealand through their high tax and heavy regulation policies.
Will the standard policy response to a labour market crisis reduce inequality?
24 Sep 2015 2 Comments
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, economics of education, human capital, labour economics, occupational choice, poverty and inequality, Public Choice Tags: assortative mating, asymmetric marriage premium, College premium, economics of higher education, economics of schooling, economics of universities, graduate premium, marriage and divorce, power couples, university premium
Whenever there is a crisis in the labour market, the standard policy response is send them on a course. That makes you look like you care and by the time they graduate the problem will probably fixed itself. Most problems do. I found this bureaucratic response to labour market crises to repeat itself over and over again while working in the bureaucracy.
Inequality – What can be done?
Stefan Thewissen reviews Tony Atkinson’s book
bit.ly/1h0KDDF http://t.co/KiiGgFQJau—
Max Roser (@MaxCRoser) September 27, 2015
The standard policy response to a normal problem in the labour market is send them on a course. Clever geeks as yourself sitting at your desk as a policy analysis or minister did well at university. You assume others will as well including those who have neither the ability or aptitude to succeed in education. Lowering university tuition fees and easing the terms of student loans simply means that those who do well at university will not have to pay back as much to the government. People who succeed at university already have above average IQs so they already had a good head start in life.
Will more education decrease inequality? A simulation provided an answer. nyti.ms/1xw5m9W http://t.co/paQp19BEWc—
The Upshot (@UpshotNYT) March 31, 2015
The standard solution to growing inequality is to send people on a course. Trouble is that just make smart people wealthier without helping the not so smart and increases the chance of smart men and women marrying off together. This increases the inequality between power couples and the rest.
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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