
Churchill on capitalism
14 Sep 2014 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, constitutional political economy, market efficiency, Public Choice, public economics, technological progress Tags: capitalism, Winston Churchill

The Putin Effect on transitional economies in the former Soviet union
14 Sep 2014 Leave a comment
in development economics, growth disasters, growth miracles, income redistribution, Marxist economics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: development, development miracles, disasters, former Soviet Union, Poland, The Great Enrichment, transitional economies, Ukraine

Poland was in the same position as Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet empire, but it followed better policy and is now several times richer.
Gerrymandering explained
12 Sep 2014 Leave a comment
in Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: democratic elections, gerrymandering, malapportionment, political accountability, political corruption



Politicians redraw the electoral boundaries to maximize their support in the newly created district. The obvious outcome is that you can get more seats for less votes.
The gerrymander is named after 19th-century Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry. After Gerry took office in 1810, his Democratic-Republican party redrew the map of the state’s Senate districts in a particularly dramatic and unusual manner to weaken the opposing Federalist Party.

Gerry is less famous for signing the Declaration of Independence and refusing to sign the Constitution because it initially didn’t include a Bill of Rights.
Managerial Econ: Make the rules or your rivals will: use anti-growth activists to erect entry barriers
08 Sep 2014 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of regulation, environmental economics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: bootleggers and baptists, rent seeking
The courts have sanctioned the right to organize community opposition that urges government officials and agencies to deny land use permits to applicants, even when the underlying motive of the opposition is protecting market share and eliminating competition.
What’s more, the courts are protecting third-party funding sources, in many cases anonymous funding sources, which support the opposition efforts in order to block potential competition.
Ideas: When Mao died, The Economist wrote
06 Sep 2014 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, growth disasters, liberalism, Public Choice Tags: China, communism, How China Became Capitalist, mao, useful idiots
In the final reckoning, Mao must be accepted as one of history’s great achievers: for devising a peasant-centered revolutionary strategy which enabled China’s Communist Party to seize power, against Marx’s prescriptions, from bases in the countryside; for directing the transformation of China from a feudal society, wracked by war and bled by corruption, into a unified, egalitarian state where nobody starves; and for reviving national pride and confidence so that China could, in Mao’s words, ‘stand up’ among the great powers.



via Ideas and http://www.scottmanning.com/content/visualizing-the-great-leap-forward/








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