Friedman on middle-class welfare

Video

I loath bipartisanship

Firstly, the other side is wrong in their approach and often in their objectives. The voters finally put them on the opposition benches for the next 3, 6 or 9 years and that is where they belong: powerless and irrelevant and whose job it is to snipe.

Secondly, written constitutional arrangements dictate the proper extent of power sharing: two-houses of parliament elected differently, proportional and other methods of election, the length of terms, federalism, and parliamentary versus presidential executives.

Thirdly, knowledge grows through critical discussion, not by consensus and agreement

Fourthly, in a democracy, we resolve our differences by trying to persuade each other and voting at elections. The winners then form the government.

The role of equality in subsequently increasing the size of government

Sam Peltzman

Sam Peltzman argues that:

governments grow where groups which share a common interest in that growth and can perceive and articulate that interest become more numerous.

Growth in the size of governmental is driven by the evolving demands of voters. Peltzman maintains that:

the levelling of income differences across a large part of the population . . . has in fact been a major source of the growth of government in the developed world over the last fifty years [because this levelling created] a broadening of the political base that stood to gain from redistribution generally and thus provided a fertile source of political support for expansion of specific programs. At the same time, these groups became more able to perceive and articulate that interest . . this simultaneous growth of “ability” served to catalyse politically the spreading economic interest in redistribution

Growing income equality, which was a result of the Industrial Revolution and modern economic growth, caused the size of government to then grow. The reduction in inequality preceded the rise of the welfare state in the mid-20th century.

The merits of federalism

  • A divided government is a weak government.
  • One great feature of the federal system is that we can try different policies in different states and see what works and what doesn’t.
  • The laws of each state can more closely reflect local public opinion.
  • The will of the people is constantly tested and re-measured in a federal system: elections at one level or another every year contested on local and national issues.
  • People vote more often for different policy packages, rather than occasionally for a few up and down choices.
  • The will of the people is constantly tested and re-measured in a federal system: elections at one level or another every year contested on local and national issues.

After 15 years of Maggie Thatcher, good and hard, British Labor reconsidered devolution because a federal state slows the impassioned majority down.

Who do members of parliament represent?

Delegate - selected for perfect obedience

The theoretical literature on political representation focused on whether representatives should act as delegates or as trustees. James Madison articulated a delegate conception of representation. Representatives who are delegates simply follow the expressed preferences of their constituents.

The classical liberals of the 18th century were highly sceptical about the capability and willingness of politics and politicians to further the interests of the ordinary citizen, and thought the political direction of resource allocation retards rather than facilitates economic progress.

Governments were considered to be institutions to be protected from but made necessary by the elementary fact that all persons are not angels. Constitutions were a means to constrain collective authority. The problem of constitutional design was ensuring that government powers would be effectively limited.

  • Sovereignty was split among several levels of collective authority; federalism was designed to allow for a deconcentration or decentralization of coercive state power.
  • At each level of authority, separate branches of government were deliberately placed in continued tension, one with another.
  • The dominant legislative branch was further restricted by the constitutional establishment of two houses bodies, each of which was elected on a separate principle of representation.

These constitutions were designed and put in place by the classical liberals to check or constrain the power of the state over individuals. The motivating force was never one of making government work better or even of insuring that all interests were more fully represented.

Members of parliament as trustees are representatives who follow their own understanding of the best action to pursue in another view. As Edmund Burke wrote:

Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.

You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament. …

Our representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion.

Burke does not seem to be a fan of federalism and vote trading to protect minorities. Madison liked conflict and tension as a constraint of power and the size of government.

Schumpeter disputed that democracy was a process by which the electorate identified the common good, and that politicians carried this out:

• The people’s ignorance and superficiality meant that they were manipulated by politicians who set the agenda.

• Democracy is the mechanism for competition between leaders.

• Although periodic votes legitimise governments and keep them accountable, the policy program is very much seen as their own and not that of the people, and the participatory role for individuals is usually severely limited.

Modern democracy is government subject to electoral checks. John Stuart Mill had sympathy for this view that parliaments are best suited to be places of public debate on the various opinions held by the population and to act as watchdogs of the professionals who create and administer laws and policy:

Their part is to indicate wants, to be an organ for popular demands, and a place of adverse discussion for all opinions relating to public matters, both great and small; and, along with this, to check by criticism, and eventually by withdrawing their support, those high public officers who really conduct the public business, or who appoint those by whom it is conducted

Representative democracy has the advantage of allowing the community to rely in its decision-making on the contributions of individuals with special qualifications of intelligence or character. Representative democracy makes a more effective use of resources within the citizenry to advance the common good.

P.T. Bauer on what Third World governments do

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Politics without romance

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Growing polarisation of American politics

Items in the Ideological Consistency Scale

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How Did the Prediction Markets Do?

Below is a map showing the results of the 2012 US presidental elections and the map of prediction market forecasts on October 1st.

Florida had not been called to Obama when the map was made.

via  Thinking on the Margin: How Did the Prediction Markets Do?.

the beauty of proportional voting is that even if they don’t vote for you, you’ll probably still get in.

HT: Kiwiblog

Video

Neoclassical economists think the economy is freestanding and ignore institutions!

The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991 was awarded to Ronald H. Coase:

for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy

The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences has decided to award The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 2009 to

Elinor Ostrom “for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons” and Oliver E. Williamson “for his analysis of economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm”

The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences has decided to award the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1993 jointly to Robert W. Fogel and Douglass C. North

for having renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change.

The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences has decided to award the1986 Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences to Professor James McGill Buchanan for

his development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory of economic and political decision-making.

Democratic socialism is pointless

Democratic socialism is pointless because electoral power is fleeting: sooner or later, the left wing parties representing the socialist alternative lose power, and capitalism is resorted.

How can democratic socialism work without entertaining the certain prospects of the right-wing parties winning office in 6,9, 12 years time and undoing everything?

Under pension fund socialism, with the majority of the share market owned by superannuation funds, any call for wide-spread nationalisations is political suicide. The same for re-nationalisation later when the left-parties get another turn in office.

The rotation of power is common in democracies, and the worst rise to the top. So it is wise to design constitutional safeguards to minimise the damage done when those crazies to the right or left of you get their chance in office, as they will.

Socialists must choose between supporting democracy and supporting socialism. The only way to stop the return for capitalism would be to undermine elections and the rule of law and ignore constitutional rights.

Unfettered power loses its shine when it must be shared with your political opponents at least once a decade.

Too many policies and ideas of the Left assumed that they are the face of the future, rather than just another political party that will hold power as often as not.

As James Buchanan pointed out in 1954, the great strength of democracies is majorities are temporary so the exploitation by the majority of the minority is never permanent. If electoral majorities are other than temporary, the minority would have no choice but to fight.

Machiavelli, Mises, Milton Friedman, W.H. Hutt and Walsingham’s Manual on practical public policy advising

File:Santi di Tito - Niccolo Machiavelli's portrait headcrop.jpg

Ludwig Von Mises worked as an economic-policy advisor to the Vienna Chamber of Commerce from 1909 to 1934. As Richard Ebeling notes:

What comes out from reading Mises’s policy writings from this period of his European career is that if you had asked him a fiscal, or monetary, or regulatory-policy question in the context of his role as analyst at the Chamber of Commerce, he would not have said, and did not simply say, "laissez-faire" — abolish the central bank, deregulate the economy, and eliminate taxes.

Mises accepted the context of which his policy options must be worked out. Ebeling went on to note that Mises seemed to think in three policy horizons:

  1. The most optimal institutional and policy arrangements in society for the fostering of the classical-liberal ideal of freedom and prosperity, based on the knowledge that he thought sound economic theory could provide;
  2. the actual circumstances of the present, but focused on the intermediary goals that would be leading in the direction of that more distant, "optimal" horizon; and
  3. current situation and the immediate future

In the 1970s, Rothbard criticised Milton Friedman for advocating indexation of prices and wages as a method to reduce some of the negative effects from an on-going inflation. Rothbard regarded this as a sell-out.

Richard Nixon’s responses to Milton Friedman were rather more flattering in terms of his policy purity:

I don’t care what Milton Friedman says, he’s not running for re-election.

In 1922, during the worsening Great Austrian Inflation, Mises proposed indexation of wages and prices. Ebeling explained Mises as follows:

  • what was inefficient and unnecessary in the three-tiered Austrian bureaucratic system of federal, provincial, and municipal regulators and taxing authorities;
  • what specific reforms should be introduced, how they could be experimented with in smaller regions of Austria; and
  • how best to overcome the resistance of those in the bureaucracy fearful of losing their jobs

Milton Friedman was purer than this – always the first best advice:

The role of the economist in discussions of public policy seems to me to be to prescribe what should be done in the light of what can be done, politics aside, and not to predict what is ‘politically feasible’ and then recommend it.

Little wonder that Friedman had little time for those economists who promised more than they could deliver and warned less than they should of the hazards and difficulties that may lie ahead the particular policies that were being considered:

A major problem of our time is that people have come to expect policies to produce results that they are incapable of producing. …

we economists in recent years have done vast harm—to society at large and to our profession in particular—by claiming more than we can deliver.

We have thereby encouraged politicians to make extravagant promises, inculcate unrealistic expectations in the public at large, and promote discontent with reasonably satisfactory results because they fall short of the economists’ promised land.

W.H. Hutt steered the middle course that I favour:

In our judgment, the best you will be able to get away with is programme A along the following lines; but if you could find a convincing way of really explaining the issue to the electorate, our advice would have to be quite different.

We should have to recommend programme B, along the following lines.

James Buchanan emphases political realities in a similar way:

We start from here, from where we are, and not from some idealized world peopled by beings with a different history and with utopian institutions. Some appreciation of the status quo is essential before discussion can begin about prospects for improvement.

Ebeling ends by saying:

Even as that uncompromising and principled proponent of individual liberty and the free market, Mises was called upon in his role as policy analyst and advocate to sometimes devise "second-" and "third-best" policy proposals in an imperfect world dominated by collectivist and interventionist ideas and practices.

for those who have sometimes asked, "Well, but how do you apply Austrian Economics to the ‘real world’ of public policy?" here is the answer by the economist who has been considered the most original, thoroughgoing, and uncompromising member of the Austrian School over the last one hundred years! His policy analyses provide us with warning signs and guideposts to assist us in thinking about and designing better policies for our own time.

In The Prince, Machiavelli said in a chapter on how to choose wise advisors and avoid flatterers.

Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions.

With these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt…

A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be felt.

I think Mises read less of Machiavelli and more of the now 400 year old book written by an French courter called  not to A Practical Guide for Ambitious Politicians, or Walsingham’s Manual which Gordon Tullock republished in 1961.

I have a copy of this rare book republished in 1961 which was translated again in 2007 under the title Treatise on the Court. The Early Modern Management Classic on Organizational Behaviour.

For Mises to survive and prosper as a policy advisor as he struggled for position within a small elite group amidst fierce competition, he had to know how organisations worked, how to find the levers of power and press them. That is why is pitched his advice in light of the immediate,medium term or long term policy horizon horizon as set out in the dot points above.

Walsingham’s Manual has a whole chapter on when the courtier should warn of the hazards and difficulties that may lay ahead and when he should humour the prince in his inclinations that mesh well with what Mises did. There is another chapter on how to deal with rival courtiers that made Sir Humphrey proud:

Those who feel compelled to compete with you will not be won over by shows of respect or veneration. You can, however, coax them onto a different path by

  • encouraging them to aim for a goal more ambitious than yours,
  • helping them achieve this goal,
  • offering to help advance their ambitions, and
  • playing down your own goal as being too insignificant for them to aspire to.

Imply that you have no choice but to pursue your goal because you aren’t capable of competing (as they are) for any­thing better. By way of contrast, praise your competitors’ reputation, power, abilities and merit: suggest that they can do far better than you and should set their sights higher.

If ever you come to fear that a competitor may get ahead of you, raise doubts and insecurities in his mind about what he wants to do. Discuss the pros and cons of the matter, but always in a way that reinforces why he should give up and look elsewhere.

Your best and quickest course, though, is to disguise or hide your objective until it’s too late for anyone to compete with you or block you.

Pushing an ambitious plan too openly may repel the very people who would have helped you if you’d been more discreet, making your task more difficult and damaging your chances of success.

Then, if you do prevail, you’ll attract more envy than you would have otherwise, and if you fail, you’ll look that much more foolish. Your safest course is to do as rowers do, turning your back on your objective and showing every sign of having some other destination.

Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations

Gary D. Libecap, “Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations.” Journal of Economic Literature (2014).

libecap

Abstract

Is there a way to understand why some global environmental externalities are addressed effectively, whereas others are not?

The transaction costs of defining the property rights to mitigation benefits and costs is a useful framework for such analysis. This approach views international cooperation as a contractual process among country leaders to assign those property rights.

Leaders cooperate when it serves domestic interests to do so. The demand for property rights comes from those who value and stand to gain from multilateral action.

Property rights are supplied by international agreements that specify resource access and use, assign costs and benefits including outlining the size and duration of compensating transfer payments, and determining who will pay and who will receive them.

Four factors raise the transaction costs of assigning property rights:

(i) scientific uncertainty regarding mitigation benefits and costs;

(ii) varying preferences and perceptions across heterogeneous populations;

(iii) asymmetric information; and

(iv) the extent of compliance and new entry.

These factors are used to examine the role of transaction costs in the establishment and allocation of property rights to provide globally valued national parks, implement the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, execute the Montreal Protocol to manage emissions that damage the stratospheric ozone layer, set limits on harvest of highly-migratory ocean fish stocks, and control greenhouse gas emissions.

via Environmental Economics: JEL (52,2) p. 424 – Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations.

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NOT A LOT OF PEOPLE KNOW THAT

“We do not believe any group of men adequate enough or wise enough to operate without scrutiny or without criticism. We know that the only way to avoid error is to detect it, that the only way to detect it is to be free to inquire. We know that in secrecy error undetected will flourish and subvert”. - J Robert Oppenheimer.