I loath bipartisanship
30 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in political change, politics, Public Choice Tags: bipartisanship

Firstly, the other side is wrong in their approach and often in their objectives. The voters finally put them on the opposition benches for the next 3, 6 or 9 years and that is where they belong: powerless and irrelevant and whose job it is to snipe.
Secondly, written constitutional arrangements dictate the proper extent of power sharing: two-houses of parliament elected differently, proportional and other methods of election, the length of terms, federalism, and parliamentary versus presidential executives.
Thirdly, knowledge grows through critical discussion, not by consensus and agreement
Fourthly, in a democracy, we resolve our differences by trying to persuade each other and voting at elections. The winners then form the government.
The role of equality in subsequently increasing the size of government
30 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in income redistribution, Public Choice, Sam Peltzman Tags: growth in government

Sam Peltzman argues that:
governments grow where groups which share a common interest in that growth and can perceive and articulate that interest become more numerous.
Growth in the size of governmental is driven by the evolving demands of voters. Peltzman maintains that:
the levelling of income differences across a large part of the population . . . has in fact been a major source of the growth of government in the developed world over the last fifty years [because this levelling created] a broadening of the political base that stood to gain from redistribution generally and thus provided a fertile source of political support for expansion of specific programs. At the same time, these groups became more able to perceive and articulate that interest . . this simultaneous growth of “ability” served to catalyse politically the spreading economic interest in redistribution
Growing income equality, which was a result of the Industrial Revolution and modern economic growth, caused the size of government to then grow. The reduction in inequality preceded the rise of the welfare state in the mid-20th century.
The merits of federalism
29 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in Federalism, Public Choice Tags: federalism
- A divided government is a weak government.
- One great feature of the federal system is that we can try different policies in different states and see what works and what doesn’t.
- The laws of each state can more closely reflect local public opinion.
- The will of the people is constantly tested and re-measured in a federal system: elections at one level or another every year contested on local and national issues.
- People vote more often for different policy packages, rather than occasionally for a few up and down choices.
- The will of the people is constantly tested and re-measured in a federal system: elections at one level or another every year contested on local and national issues.
After 15 years of Maggie Thatcher, good and hard, British Labor reconsidered devolution because a federal state slows the impassioned majority down.
Who do members of parliament represent?
28 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, Federalism, James Buchanan, Joseph Schumpeter, Public Choice Tags: consititutional design, Edmund Burke, federalism, James Madison, Jospeh Schumpeter, JS Mill, theories of representation

The theoretical literature on political representation focused on whether representatives should act as delegates or as trustees. James Madison articulated a delegate conception of representation. Representatives who are delegates simply follow the expressed preferences of their constituents.
The classical liberals of the 18th century were highly sceptical about the capability and willingness of politics and politicians to further the interests of the ordinary citizen, and thought the political direction of resource allocation retards rather than facilitates economic progress.
Governments were considered to be institutions to be protected from but made necessary by the elementary fact that all persons are not angels. Constitutions were a means to constrain collective authority. The problem of constitutional design was ensuring that government powers would be effectively limited.
- Sovereignty was split among several levels of collective authority; federalism was designed to allow for a deconcentration or decentralization of coercive state power.
- At each level of authority, separate branches of government were deliberately placed in continued tension, one with another.
- The dominant legislative branch was further restricted by the constitutional establishment of two houses bodies, each of which was elected on a separate principle of representation.
These constitutions were designed and put in place by the classical liberals to check or constrain the power of the state over individuals. The motivating force was never one of making government work better or even of insuring that all interests were more fully represented.
Members of parliament as trustees are representatives who follow their own understanding of the best action to pursue in another view. As Edmund Burke wrote:
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.
You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament. …
Our representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
Burke does not seem to be a fan of federalism and vote trading to protect minorities. Madison liked conflict and tension as a constraint of power and the size of government.
Schumpeter disputed that democracy was a process by which the electorate identified the common good, and that politicians carried this out:
• The people’s ignorance and superficiality meant that they were manipulated by politicians who set the agenda.
• Democracy is the mechanism for competition between leaders.
• Although periodic votes legitimise governments and keep them accountable, the policy program is very much seen as their own and not that of the people, and the participatory role for individuals is usually severely limited.
Modern democracy is government subject to electoral checks. John Stuart Mill had sympathy for this view that parliaments are best suited to be places of public debate on the various opinions held by the population and to act as watchdogs of the professionals who create and administer laws and policy:
Their part is to indicate wants, to be an organ for popular demands, and a place of adverse discussion for all opinions relating to public matters, both great and small; and, along with this, to check by criticism, and eventually by withdrawing their support, those high public officers who really conduct the public business, or who appoint those by whom it is conducted
Representative democracy has the advantage of allowing the community to rely in its decision-making on the contributions of individuals with special qualifications of intelligence or character. Representative democracy makes a more effective use of resources within the citizenry to advance the common good.
How Did the Prediction Markets Do?
26 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in market efficiency, politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: prediction markets
Below is a map showing the results of the 2012 US presidental elections and the map of prediction market forecasts on October 1st.


Florida had not been called to Obama when the map was made.
via Thinking on the Margin: How Did the Prediction Markets Do?.
the beauty of proportional voting is that even if they don’t vote for you, you’ll probably still get in.
26 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
HT: Kiwiblog
Neoclassical economists think the economy is freestanding and ignore institutions!
22 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in Adam Smith, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, James Buchanan, Ronald Coase Tags: Adam Smith, Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom, James Buchanan, Robert Fogel, The institutional structure of production
The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991 was awarded to Ronald H. Coase:
for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy
The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences has decided to award The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 2009 to
Elinor Ostrom “for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons” and Oliver E. Williamson “for his analysis of economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm”
The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences has decided to award the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1993 jointly to Robert W. Fogel and Douglass C. North
for having renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change.
The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences has decided to award the1986 Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences to Professor James McGill Buchanan for
his development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory of economic and political decision-making.

Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations
20 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, economics of climate change, Public Choice Tags: Gary Libecap, global commons, global environmental externalities, global warming, property rights, transaction costs
Gary D. Libecap, “Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations.” Journal of Economic Literature (2014).

Abstract
Is there a way to understand why some global environmental externalities are addressed effectively, whereas others are not?
The transaction costs of defining the property rights to mitigation benefits and costs is a useful framework for such analysis. This approach views international cooperation as a contractual process among country leaders to assign those property rights.
Leaders cooperate when it serves domestic interests to do so. The demand for property rights comes from those who value and stand to gain from multilateral action.
Property rights are supplied by international agreements that specify resource access and use, assign costs and benefits including outlining the size and duration of compensating transfer payments, and determining who will pay and who will receive them.
Four factors raise the transaction costs of assigning property rights:
(i) scientific uncertainty regarding mitigation benefits and costs;
(ii) varying preferences and perceptions across heterogeneous populations;
(iii) asymmetric information; and
(iv) the extent of compliance and new entry.
These factors are used to examine the role of transaction costs in the establishment and allocation of property rights to provide globally valued national parks, implement the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, execute the Montreal Protocol to manage emissions that damage the stratospheric ozone layer, set limits on harvest of highly-migratory ocean fish stocks, and control greenhouse gas emissions.








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