Palestinian revanchism is a recipe for endless wars

Why are borders in 1861, 1919, 1945, 1948, 1956 or 1967 or any other time morally superior?

Palestinian revanchism is a recipe for endless wars. Revanchism is the desire to reverse territorial losses.

Revanchism is linked with irredentism, the conception that a part of the cultural and ethnic nation remains “unredeemed” outside the borders of its appropriate nation-state.

• A return of German revanchism would plunge Europe back into war as Germany marched to reclaim Western Poland and the Sudetenland lost after the massive ethic cleansing in 1945 and the moving of Poland 1/3rd to the left after Potsdam.

• The Balkans and Eastern Europe would be plunged into war to revise the 1945 and the 1919 boundaries.

• Irish revanchism and irredentism over protestant Northern Ireland led to war from 1922 onwards.

The just war doctrine of the Catholic Church found in the 1992 Catechism of the Catholic Church, which is a convenient summary as any on what is and is not a just war, lists four strict conditions for legitimate defence by military force:

  • the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain;
  • all other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective;
  • there must be serious prospects of success;
  • the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated (the power of modern means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition).

Hamas does not have any serious prospects of success in its attacks on Israel. Therefore any military action by Hamas is an unjust war

Rothbard on the source of social problems

Image

Murray Rothbard on John Keynes

Image

Every time the Fed tightens the money supply, interest rates rise (or fall); every time the Fed expands the money supply, interest rates rise (or fall).

The problem is that… there are several causal factors operating on interest rates and in different directions.

If the Fed expands the money supply, it does so by generating more bank reserves and thereby expanding the supply of bank credit and bank deposits. The expansion of credit necessarily means an increased supply in the credit market and hence a lowering of the price of credit, or the rate of interest. On the other hand, if the Fed restricts the supply of credit and the growth of the money supply, this means that the supply in the credit market declines, and this should mean a rise in interest rates.

And this is precisely what happens in the first decade or two of chronic inflation. Fed expansion lowers interest rates; Fed tightening raises them.

But after this period, the public and the market begin to catch on to what is happening. They begin to realize that inflation is chronic because of the systemic expansion of the money supply.

When they realize this fact of life, they will also realize that inflation wipes out the creditor for the benefit of the debtor. As creditors begin to catch on, they place an inflation premium on the interest rate, and debtors will be willing to pay it.

Hence, in the long run anything which fuels the expectations of inflation will raise inflation premiums on interest rates; and anything which dampens those expectations will lower those premiums. Therefore, a Fed tightening will now tend to dampen inflationary expectations and lower interest rates; a Fed expansion will whip up those expectations again and raise them.

There are two, opposite causal chains at work. And so Fed expansion or contraction can either raise or lower interest rates, depending on which causal chain is stronger.

Which will be stronger? There is no way to know for sure. Will In the early decades of inflation, there is no inflation premium; in the later decades, such as we are now in, there is. The relative strength and reaction times depend on the subjective expectations of the public, and these cannot be forecast with certainty

Murray Rothbard

Economists, using charts or high-speed computer models, can accurately forecast the future

crystal_ball-551x700

Many studies, formal and informal, have been made of the record of forecasting by economists, and it has been consistently abysmal.

Forecasters often complain that they can do well enough as long as current trends continue; what they have difficulty in doing is catching changes in trend. But of course there is no trick in extrapolating current trends into the near future.

You don’t need sophisticated computer models for that; you can do it better and far more cheaply by using a ruler.

The real trick is precisely to forecast when and how trends will change, and forecasters have been notoriously bad at that. No economist forecast the depth of the 1981–82 depression, and none predicted the strength of the 1983 boom.

The next time you are swayed by the jargon or seeming expertise of the economic forecaster, ask yourself this question: If he can really predict the future so well, why is he wasting his time putting out newsletters or doing consulting when he himself could be making trillions of dollars in the stock and commodity markets?

Murray Rothbard

Murray Penthouse.jpg

Defer to experts except when they are economists putting limits on your utopian thinking

Image

Have you ever heard of a private firm proposing to solve a shortage of the product it sells by telling people to buy less?

Image

Imports from countries where labour is cheap causes our unemployment to rise

One of the many problems with this doctrine is that it ignores the question: why are wages low in a foreign country and high in the United States?…

Basically, they are high in the United States because labour productivity is high – because workers here are aided by large amounts of technologically advanced capital equipment.

Wage rates are low in many foreign countries because capital equipment is small and technologically primitive. Unaided by much capital, worker productivity is far lower than in the United States.

Wage rates in every country are determined by the productivity of the workers in that country. Hence, high wages in the United States are not a standing threat to American prosperity; they are the result of that prosperity…

we must realize that wages in each country are interconnected from one industry and occupation and region to another.

All workers compete with each other, and if wages in industry A are far lower than in other industries, workers – spearheaded by young workers starting their careers – would leave or refuse to enter industry A and move to other firms or industries where the wage rate is higher…

If the steel or textile industries in the United States find it difficult to compete with their counterparts abroad, it is not because foreign firms are paying low wages, but because other American industries have bid up American wage rates to such a high level that steel and textile cannot afford to pay.

In short, what’s really happening is that steel, textile, and other such firms are using labour inefficiently as compared to other American industries.

Tariffs or import quotas to keep inefficient firms or industries in operation hurt everyone, in every country, who is not in that industry. They injure all American consumers by keeping up prices, keeping down quality and competition, and distorting production. Tariffs and import quotas also injure other, efficient American industries by tying up resources that would otherwise move to more efficient uses.

Murray Rothbard

Murray Rothbard on the European Union

The Union will increase pressures  for high taxes and higher inflation.

Machiavelli, Mises, Milton Friedman, W.H. Hutt and Walsingham’s Manual on practical public policy advising

File:Santi di Tito - Niccolo Machiavelli's portrait headcrop.jpg

Ludwig Von Mises worked as an economic-policy advisor to the Vienna Chamber of Commerce from 1909 to 1934. As Richard Ebeling notes:

What comes out from reading Mises’s policy writings from this period of his European career is that if you had asked him a fiscal, or monetary, or regulatory-policy question in the context of his role as analyst at the Chamber of Commerce, he would not have said, and did not simply say, "laissez-faire" — abolish the central bank, deregulate the economy, and eliminate taxes.

Mises accepted the context of which his policy options must be worked out. Ebeling went on to note that Mises seemed to think in three policy horizons:

  1. The most optimal institutional and policy arrangements in society for the fostering of the classical-liberal ideal of freedom and prosperity, based on the knowledge that he thought sound economic theory could provide;
  2. the actual circumstances of the present, but focused on the intermediary goals that would be leading in the direction of that more distant, "optimal" horizon; and
  3. current situation and the immediate future

In the 1970s, Rothbard criticised Milton Friedman for advocating indexation of prices and wages as a method to reduce some of the negative effects from an on-going inflation. Rothbard regarded this as a sell-out.

Richard Nixon’s responses to Milton Friedman were rather more flattering in terms of his policy purity:

I don’t care what Milton Friedman says, he’s not running for re-election.

In 1922, during the worsening Great Austrian Inflation, Mises proposed indexation of wages and prices. Ebeling explained Mises as follows:

  • what was inefficient and unnecessary in the three-tiered Austrian bureaucratic system of federal, provincial, and municipal regulators and taxing authorities;
  • what specific reforms should be introduced, how they could be experimented with in smaller regions of Austria; and
  • how best to overcome the resistance of those in the bureaucracy fearful of losing their jobs

Milton Friedman was purer than this – always the first best advice:

The role of the economist in discussions of public policy seems to me to be to prescribe what should be done in the light of what can be done, politics aside, and not to predict what is ‘politically feasible’ and then recommend it.

Little wonder that Friedman had little time for those economists who promised more than they could deliver and warned less than they should of the hazards and difficulties that may lie ahead the particular policies that were being considered:

A major problem of our time is that people have come to expect policies to produce results that they are incapable of producing. …

we economists in recent years have done vast harm—to society at large and to our profession in particular—by claiming more than we can deliver.

We have thereby encouraged politicians to make extravagant promises, inculcate unrealistic expectations in the public at large, and promote discontent with reasonably satisfactory results because they fall short of the economists’ promised land.

W.H. Hutt steered the middle course that I favour:

In our judgment, the best you will be able to get away with is programme A along the following lines; but if you could find a convincing way of really explaining the issue to the electorate, our advice would have to be quite different.

We should have to recommend programme B, along the following lines.

James Buchanan emphases political realities in a similar way:

We start from here, from where we are, and not from some idealized world peopled by beings with a different history and with utopian institutions. Some appreciation of the status quo is essential before discussion can begin about prospects for improvement.

Ebeling ends by saying:

Even as that uncompromising and principled proponent of individual liberty and the free market, Mises was called upon in his role as policy analyst and advocate to sometimes devise "second-" and "third-best" policy proposals in an imperfect world dominated by collectivist and interventionist ideas and practices.

for those who have sometimes asked, "Well, but how do you apply Austrian Economics to the ‘real world’ of public policy?" here is the answer by the economist who has been considered the most original, thoroughgoing, and uncompromising member of the Austrian School over the last one hundred years! His policy analyses provide us with warning signs and guideposts to assist us in thinking about and designing better policies for our own time.

In The Prince, Machiavelli said in a chapter on how to choose wise advisors and avoid flatterers.

Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions.

With these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt…

A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be felt.

I think Mises read less of Machiavelli and more of the now 400 year old book written by an French courter called  not to A Practical Guide for Ambitious Politicians, or Walsingham’s Manual which Gordon Tullock republished in 1961.

I have a copy of this rare book republished in 1961 which was translated again in 2007 under the title Treatise on the Court. The Early Modern Management Classic on Organizational Behaviour.

For Mises to survive and prosper as a policy advisor as he struggled for position within a small elite group amidst fierce competition, he had to know how organisations worked, how to find the levers of power and press them. That is why is pitched his advice in light of the immediate,medium term or long term policy horizon horizon as set out in the dot points above.

Walsingham’s Manual has a whole chapter on when the courtier should warn of the hazards and difficulties that may lay ahead and when he should humour the prince in his inclinations that mesh well with what Mises did. There is another chapter on how to deal with rival courtiers that made Sir Humphrey proud:

Those who feel compelled to compete with you will not be won over by shows of respect or veneration. You can, however, coax them onto a different path by

  • encouraging them to aim for a goal more ambitious than yours,
  • helping them achieve this goal,
  • offering to help advance their ambitions, and
  • playing down your own goal as being too insignificant for them to aspire to.

Imply that you have no choice but to pursue your goal because you aren’t capable of competing (as they are) for any­thing better. By way of contrast, praise your competitors’ reputation, power, abilities and merit: suggest that they can do far better than you and should set their sights higher.

If ever you come to fear that a competitor may get ahead of you, raise doubts and insecurities in his mind about what he wants to do. Discuss the pros and cons of the matter, but always in a way that reinforces why he should give up and look elsewhere.

Your best and quickest course, though, is to disguise or hide your objective until it’s too late for anyone to compete with you or block you.

Pushing an ambitious plan too openly may repel the very people who would have helped you if you’d been more discreet, making your task more difficult and damaging your chances of success.

Then, if you do prevail, you’ll attract more envy than you would have otherwise, and if you fail, you’ll look that much more foolish. Your safest course is to do as rowers do, turning your back on your objective and showing every sign of having some other destination.

Murray Rothbard on outlawing jobs

 

All demand curves are falling, and the demand for hiring labour is no exception. Hence, laws that prohibit employment at any wage that is relevant to the market (a minimum wage of 10 cents an hour would have little or no impact) must result in outlawing employment and hence causing unemployment…

Since the demand curve for any sort of labour (as for any factor of production) is set by the perceived marginal productivity of that labour, this means that the people who will be disemployed and devastated by this prohibition will be precisely the "marginal" (lowest wage) workers, e.g. blacks and teenagers, the very workers whom the advocates of the minimum wage are claiming to foster and protect.

The advocates of the minimum wage and its periodic boosting reply that all this is scare talk and that minimum wage rates do not and never have caused any unemployment.

The proper riposte is to raise them one better; all right, if the minimum wage is such a wonderful anti-poverty measure, and can have no unemployment-raising effects, why are you such pikers?

Why you are helping the working poor by such piddling amounts? Why stop at $4.55 an hour? Why not $10 an hour? $100? $1,000?…

It is conventional among economists to be polite, to assume that economic fallacy is solely the result of intellectual error.

But there are times when decorousness is seriously misleading, or, as Oscar Wilde once wrote, "when speaking one’s mind becomes more than a duty; it becomes a positive pleasure."

If you’re so smart, show me your bank account

The pretensions of econometricians and other “model-builders” that they can precisely forecast the economy will always flounder on the simple but devastating query: “If you can forecast so well, why are you not doing so on the stock market, where accurate forecasting reaps such rich rewards?”

It is beside the point to dismiss such a query . . . by calling it “anti-intellectual”; for this is precisely the acid test of the would-be economic oracle

Murray Rothbard

Austrian economics, labour economics and the economics of unemployment

Austrian economists seem not to be as thorough as they could be in applying the concepts of dispersed knowledge, tendency to equilibrium and entrepreneurial appraisal, discovery and learning to the labour market.

In a nutshell, the position of Mises and Rothbard is the problem of unemployment is not jobs being fewer than workers. On some terms, a job is always available in an open market. But a wage and the hours of labour required to earn it can be so unrewarding that a person is rational to decline the job offer and remain unemployed. Of course, they acknowledge institutional unemployment that results from are laws and arrangements which inhibit adjustment of prices of labour services.

Kirzner and Rothbard argue that the market is a process that is always in disequilibrium. Does this disequilibrium not imply some unemployment in the labour market? Why should the tendency toward equilibrium be any stronger in the labour market that elsewhere?  Bill Allen explained search unemployment this way:

…many officially counted as unemployed are heavily and rationally investing their resources in looking for work. They are sampling the market, seeking information on employment alternatives. That information is valuable, but it is not obtained either freely or instantaneously, and generally, the faster it is to be acquired, the more costly it will be…

as output falls [because of a demand or supply shock], there will be some rise in unemployment, for the economy’s adjustment to the new circumstances of supply and prices will not be made instantaneously, without frictions and lags.

Rothbard was well aware of search unemployment:

It might be objected that workers often do not know what job opportunities await them. This, however, applies to the owner of any goods up for sale. The very function of marketing is the acquisition and dissemination of information about the goods or services available for sale.

Except to those writers who posit a fantastic world where everyone has “perfect knowledge” of all relevant data, the marketing function is a vital aspect of the pro­duction structure.

The marketing function can be performed in the labour market, as well as in any other, through agencies or other means for the discovery of who or where the potential buyers and sellers of a particular service may be. In the labour market this has been done through “want ads” in the newspa­pers, employment agencies used by both employer and employee, etc.

Mises also spoke of search unemployment:

Unemployment is a phenomenon of a changing economy. The fact that a worker discharged on account of changes occurring in the arrangement of production processes does not instantly take advantage of every opportunity to get another job but waits for a more propitious opportunity is not a consequence of the tardiness of the adjustment to the change in conditions, but is one of the factors slowing down the pace of this adjustment.

It is not an automatic reaction to the changes which have occurred , independent of the will and the choices of the job-seekers concerned, but the effect of their intentional actions. It is speculative, not frictional

These are good discussions of search unemployment. But when discussing mismatch unemployment as identified by Hayek after a shortening of the produc­tion structure on the market where there might be temporary unemployment of workmen in the higher stages, lasting until the workers can be reabsorbed in the shorter proc­esses of the later stages, Rothbard’s repost to this possible case of involuntary unem­ployment on the free market is:

It is also true that the shortening of the structure means that there is a transition period when, at final wage rates, there will be un­employment of the men displaced from the longer processes. How­ever, during this transition period there is no reason why these workers cannot bid down wage rates until they are low enough to enable the employment of all the workers during the transi­tion. This transition wage rate will be lower than the new equilibrium wage rate. But at no time is there a necessity for unem­ployment.

The labour market is a process just as is any other market: it is a communication network that mobilises dispersed knowledge to overcoming ignorance. Why should knowledge unfold in the labour market process through entrepreneurial discovery any faster than elsewhere? There should be disequilibrium wages, entrepreneurial errors, unemployed and mispriced resources, and a process of entrepreneurial learning and error correction. Hayek held that unemployment is always a pricing problem:

The normal cause of recurrent waves of widespread unemployment is … a discrepancy between the way in which demand is distributed between products and services, and the proportions in which resources are devoted to producing them.

Unemployment is the result of divergent changes in the direction of demand and the techniques of production. If labour is not deployed according to demand for products, there is unemployment…

It is the continuous change of relative market prices and particularly wages which can alone bring about that steady adjustment of the proportions of the different efforts to the distribution of demand, and thus a steady flow of the stream of products.

True, but the correction of erroneous wage rates and the reallocation of labour and other resources to new jobs, new firms and new industries is neither instantaneous nor a free process. Kirzner explains:

The entrepreneurial forces acting on the market for any one commodity are thus continually pushing that market toward the market-clearing point—that is, to where (a) the quantity produced is such that (only) all units “worth producing” are indeed produced, and (b) the market price for this commodity is just high enough to make it, as a practical matter, worthwhile for producers to produce this quantity, and is just low enough to make it worthwhile for consumers to buy it…

The process through which the market tends to generate the “right” quantity of a commodity, and the “right” price for it, can be seen as a series of steps during which market participants gradually tend to discover the gaps or errors in the information on which they had previously been basing their erroneous production and/or buying decisions…

The market process is one in which, driven by the entrepreneurial sense for grasping at pure profit opportunities (and for avoiding entrepreneurial losses), market participants, learning more accurate assessments of the attitudes of other market participants, tend toward the market-clearing price-quantity combination.

Alchian, Demsetz and Barzel were on the mark when they pointed out that too frequently the process of change and reaching a new equilibrium is assumed to be a free good, having no resource costs. Hayek also spoke of the time that is takes to reach a new equilibrium because the new constellation of prices and wages must emerge through the free-play of the market:

The primary cause of the appearance of extensive unemployment, however, is a deviation of the actual structure of prices and wages from its equilibrium structure. Remember, please: that is the crucial concept. The point I want to make is that this equilibrium structure of prices is something which we cannot know beforehand because the only way to discover it is to give the market free play; by definition, therefore, the divergence of actual prices from the equilibrium structure is something that can never be statistically measured.

As Kirzner has well argued, entrepreneurs thrive on alertness to disequilibrium prices and they buy and sell to profit from their discoveries, thereby correcting the mispricing, but this takes time. The knowledge and intentions of the different members of society both across all markets and in the labour market about how to match workers to new jobs must come into agreement through a process of discovery and mutual learning that takes time. Phelps (1969) put forward a fine metaphor for how this process of learning and discovery takes place:

I have found it instructive to picture the economy as a group of islands between which information flows are costly: to learn the wage paid on an adjacent island, the worker must spend the day travelling to that island to sample its wage instead of spending the day at work.

Beveridge has similar views of a multiplicity of markets in 1912:

Why should it be the normal condition of the labour market to have more sellers than buyers, two men to every job and at least as often two jobs for every man? The explanation of the paradox is really a very simple one … that there is no one labour market but only an infinite number of separate labour markets.

Gary Becker drew a parallel between the theory of marriage and the theory of job search and matching. In both cases, it takes time to sort among the options and find a suitable pairing. Some are clearly unacceptable.  Good  matches will often take a long time to find unless people are just plain lucky. Involuntary unemployment is like saying you are involuntarily unmarried. You could marry the first person you meet, if they will have you, but few would say that is wise.

Workers must search for and discover each other. Both are entrepreneurs. The information, knowledge and forecasts of future wages and prices each needs to improve co-ordination of supply and demand will not be discovered immediately:

  • The behavioural responses of employers and workers to change are so pronounced because the cost of acquiring new information is profound (Alchian 1969). Many such costs impede wages from instantly fluctuating to rebalance labour supply with demand.
  • A job seeker does not initially know the location of suitable vacancies, the wages for various skills, differences in job security and other factors. Job seekers must search for this information, keep this knowledge current and forecast whether better vacancies may open soon.
  • Employers must search to learn the location, availability and asking wages of applicants.

The time consumed in labour market search is why Rothbard’s views below that wages just adjust to clear the market has been over taken by developments in economic thinking:

To talk of unemployment or employment without reference to a wage rate is as meaningless as talking of “supply” or “de­mand” without reference to a price. And it is precisely analogous. The demand for a commodity makes sense only with reference to a certain price.

In a market for goods, it is obvious that what­ever stock is offered as supply, it will be “cleared,” i.e., sold, at a price determined by the demand of the consumers…

Whatever supply of labour service is brought to market can be sold, but only if wages are set at what­ever rate will clear the market…

We conclude that there can never be, on the free market, an unemployment problem. If a man wishes to be employed, he will be, provided the wage rate is adjusted according.

Mises in the quote below treated unemployment as a investment in prospecting for a better wage offer very much along the lines of W.H. Hutt:

If a job-seeker cannot obtain the position he prefers, he must look for another kind of job. If he cannot find an employer ready to pay him as much as he would like to earn, he must abate his pretensions. If he refuses, he will not get any job. He remains unemployed.

What causes unemployment is the fact that–contrary to the above-mentioned doctrine of the worker’s inability to wait–those eager to earn wages can and do wait. A job-seeker who does not want to wait will always get a job in the unhampered market economy in which there is always unused capacity of natural resources and very often also unused capacity of produced factors of production. It is only necessary for him either to reduce the amount of pay he is asking for or to alter his occupation or his place of work.

Alchian (1969) lists three ways to adjust to unanticipated demand fluctuations:
• output adjustments;
• wage and price adjustments; and
• Inventories and queues (including reservations).

Alchian (1969) suggests that there is no reason for wage and price changes to be used regardless of the relative cost of these other options:
• The cost of output adjustment stems from the fact that marginal costs rise with output;
• The cost of price adjustment arises because uncertain prices and wages induce costly search by buyers and sellers seeking the best offer; and
• The third method of adjustment has holding and queuing costs.

There is a tendency for unpredicted price and wage changes to induce costly additional search. Long-term contracts including implicit contracts arise to share risks and curb opportunism over sunken investments in relationship-specific capital such as firm-specific human capital and specialised machinery. These factors lead to queues, unemployment, spare capacity, layoffs, shortages, inventories and non-price rationing in conjunction with wage stability. Alchian and Woodward in their 1987 paper ‘Reflections on a theory of the firm’ say that :

… the notion of a quickly equilibrating market price is baffling save in a very few markets. Imagine an employer and an employee. Will they renegotiate price every hour, or with every perceived change in circumstances? If the employee is a waiter in a restaurant, would the waiter’s wage be renegotiated with every new customer? Would it be renegotiated to zero when no customers are present, and then back to a high level that would extract the entire customer value when a queue appears?

… But what is the right interval for renegotiation or change in price? The usual answer ‘as soon as demand or supply changes’ is uninformative.

Alchian and Woodward then go on to a long discussion of the role of protecting composite quasi-rents from dependent resources as the decider of the timing of wage and price revisions. Alchian and Woodward explain unemployment to the side effect of the purpose of wage and price rigidity, which is the prevention of hold-ups over dependent assets. They note that unemployment cannot be understood until an adequate theory of the firm that explains the type of contracts the members of a firm contract with one another.

Walter Oi has also written on slack capacity as being productive and he included references back to W.H. Hutt. Oi’s work on retailing and supermarkets spends a lot of time explaining how an empty store is efficient because the owners are waiting for a mass of customers to arrive at unpredictable time. Oi redeveloped the term the economies of massed reserves to describe this. Oi thought that this was a better term than Hutt’s pseudo-idleness. Oi argued that all resource idleness could, in principle, be eliminated, but to accomplish this, the synchronization of the arrival rates of customers, sales clerks, and just-in-time inventories would be prohibitively expensive.

Benjamin Klein’s theory of rigid wages in American Economic Review in 1984 is one of the few that explored rigid wages as an industrial organisation issue. Klein treated rigid wages as a response to opportunism and hold-up problems over specialised assets and are forms of exclusive dealership or take-or-pay contracts.

The labour market is better understood by forgetting it is the labour market and treating it as a market for long-term contracts for relationship-specific services, firm-specific human capital and mutually dependent assets owned by multiple parties.

Labour is more heterogeneous than capital. The notion that buyers and sellers in the labour market can pair up instantly contradicts the Austrian traditions that markets only tend to equilibrium and entrepreneurs are needed to move things along.

Morgan O. Reynolds makes a good point in his labour economics textbook about how labour markets are different from other markets because there are no speculators and no forward markets in labour to quickly clear the market and allow entrepreneurs to drive the market towards equilibrium through arbitrage as quickly as they do elsewhere.

Murray Rothbard and the Bourbon Democrats

The American political system is complicated with the Republicans and Democrats moving around the political spectrum. Remember, Teddy Roosevelt’s Progressive Party, with its rather left wing agenda split from the Republicans, not from the Democrats in 1912.

Murray Rothbard saw a lot of anti-big government sentiments in the pre-1896 Democratic Party under the Third Party System, and especially in the Second Party System prior to the Civil War with Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren. The 19th century Democratic Party tended to be the party of peace, anti-militarism, and anti-imperialism. Rothbard referred to Grover Cleveland

The Third Party System was dominated by the newly created Republican Party, which supported national banks, railroads, high tariffs, homesteading rights and aid to the land-grant colleges.

The Fourth Party System from 1896 to 1932 was made up of a majority centrist Republican Party against a minority Democratic Party from the South together with urban Catholics in the Northern cities – a volatile brew – which soon had an ideology scarcely distinguishable from the Republicans.

Both parties under the Third party System that operated prior to 1896 comprised broad-based voting coalitions divided between the parties on racial, ethnic and religious lines with high voter turnout and strong partisanship.

  • Methodists, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and Scandinavian Lutherans were closely linked to the Republican Party.
  • Catholics, Episcopalians, and German Lutherans, looked to the Democratic Party for protection from moralism and prohibition.
  • The Democrats gained more support from the lower classes than did the Republicans.

Bourbon Democrat was a term used in the US from 1876 to 1904 for members of the Democratic Party, conservative or classical liberal, and especially those who supported President Grover Cleveland in 1884–1888 and 1892–1896. Rothbard referred to Grover Cleveland as “a hard-money laissez-faire Democrat” and

the continuity of quasi-libertarian thought that the Democrat Party brought to the United States throughout the nineteenth century

The Bourbon Democrats represented business interests, generally supporting the goals of banking and railroads but opposed to subsidies for them and were unwilling to protect them from competition.

Bourbon Democrats were promoters of laissez-faire capitalism (which included opposition to the protectionism that the Republicans advocated). The Bourbon Democrats opposed imperialism and U.S. overseas expansion, fought for the gold standard, and opposed bimetallism.

The notion that the Democratic Party was once the home of classical liberals in the USA at one time and the Republican Party was the party of regulation and big government is so foreign to the modern party divides in the USA today. Political parties in the United States certainly are big tents as they say.

Contributions of Mises and Rothbard to Economic Thought | Robert P. Murphy – YouTube

Previous Older Entries Next Newer Entries

Bassett, Brash & Hide

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Truth on the Market

Scholarly commentary on law, economics, and more

The Undercover Historian

Beatrice Cherrier's blog

Matua Kahurangi

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Temple of Sociology

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Velvet Glove, Iron Fist

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Why Evolution Is True

Why Evolution is True is a blog written by Jerry Coyne, centered on evolution and biology but also dealing with diverse topics like politics, culture, and cats.

Down to Earth Kiwi

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

NoTricksZone

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Homepaddock

A rural perspective with a blue tint by Ele Ludemann

Kiwiblog

DPF's Kiwiblog - Fomenting Happy Mischief since 2003

The Dangerous Economist

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Watts Up With That?

The world's most viewed site on global warming and climate change

The Logical Place

Tim Harding's writings on rationality, informal logic and skepticism

Doc's Books

A window into Doc Freiberger's library

The Risk-Monger

Let's examine hard decisions!

Uneasy Money

Commentary on monetary policy in the spirit of R. G. Hawtrey

Barrie Saunders

Thoughts on public policy and the media

Liberty Scott

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Point of Order

Politics and the economy

James Bowden's Blog

A blog (primarily) on Canadian and Commonwealth political history and institutions

Science Matters

Reading between the lines, and underneath the hype.

Peter Winsley

Economics, and such stuff as dreams are made on

A Venerable Puzzle

"The British constitution has always been puzzling, and always will be." --Queen Elizabeth II

The Antiplanner

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Bet On It

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

History of Sorts

WORLD WAR II, MUSIC, HISTORY, HOLOCAUST

Roger Pielke Jr.

Undisciplined scholar, recovering academic

Offsetting Behaviour

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

JONATHAN TURLEY

Res ipsa loquitur - The thing itself speaks

Conversable Economist

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

The Victorian Commons

Researching the House of Commons, 1832-1868

The History of Parliament

Articles and research from the History of Parliament Trust

Books & Boots

Reflections on books and art

Legal History Miscellany

Posts on the History of Law, Crime, and Justice

Sex, Drugs and Economics

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

European Royal History

Exploring the Monarchs of Europe

Tallbloke's Talkshop

Cutting edge science you can dice with

Marginal REVOLUTION

Small Steps Toward A Much Better World

NOT A LOT OF PEOPLE KNOW THAT

“We do not believe any group of men adequate enough or wise enough to operate without scrutiny or without criticism. We know that the only way to avoid error is to detect it, that the only way to detect it is to be free to inquire. We know that in secrecy error undetected will flourish and subvert”. - J Robert Oppenheimer.

STOP THESE THINGS

The truth about the great wind power fraud - we're not here to debate the wind industry, we're here to destroy it.

Lindsay Mitchell

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Alt-M

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

croaking cassandra

Economics, public policy, monetary policy, financial regulation, with a New Zealand perspective

The Grumpy Economist

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

International Liberty

Restraining Government in America and Around the World