Source: Rodney Hide, “Pursuit culture skews police priorities”, National Business Review, 19 February 2016, p.28.
Charges following fatal and serious injury New Zealand police crashes, 2003 – 2008
23 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, law and economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: criminal deterrence, law and order, police chases, police killings, road safety
If New Zealand were your home instead of The US you would
22 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, politics - New Zealand
Deaths and serious injuries in New Zealand police chases, 2003 – 2008
22 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, law and economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: criminal deterrence, law and order, police chases, police killings
Rodney Hide found that one in four New Zealand police chases ends in a crash. Of the 137 police pursuits that ended in death or serious injury between 2003 and 2008 there are 9 violence charges. Six were for manslaughter – all caused by crashes that ended the chase. There was also one charge of murder relating to the crash at the end of the chase. No violence charges arose from information known at the time of the start of the police chase. There was ambiguous information about a charge of kidnapping after a police chase. I could not determine if this kidnapping was known at the time the police chase started and therefore was its motive.
Source: Rodney Hide, “Pursuit culture skews police priorities”, National Business Review, 19 February 2016, p.28.
In all, 13 of the 137 police chases were motivated by the fleeing driver having committed a crime. The most serious of these was burglary. Rodney Hide also found that between 2005 and 2008 there are an average of 182 police chases a month.
I am all for police chasing kidnappers and armed criminals brandishing their weapons. As for the rest, they are not serious offenders. Chasing them puts the public at risk. Most of the fleeing drivers and their passengers are enthusiastic applicants for the Darwin awards.
Trade policy parallels @BernieSanders @realdonaldtrump @NZGreens? @nzlabour?
20 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in international economics, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice

Source: Trade Policy Parallels | Econbrowser.
Note: PNTR is Permanent Normal Trade Relations, formerly “Most Favored Nation” status.
Gary Becker on the weak case for junk food taxes @JordNZ @dpfdpf
20 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, health economics, liberalism, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: do gooders, food police, junk food taxes, meddlesome preferences, nanny state, sugar taxes
Source: Gary Becker Fat Taxes, or Just Fat? | Hoover Institution (2010).
Most healthcare expenditures are in the last 3 to 6 months of life. Smokers and overeaters live shorter lives. This can save more than it costs to the health budget. That finding is sufficiently frequent as to put the fiscal case for junk food taxes and sugar taxes on the canvas but still with a chance of getting back up to fight on.
At a minimum, it makes junk food and sugar taxes a legitimate topic for honest disagreement. That is before you consider that people have the right to live their lives according to their own lights and make a few sometimes big mistakes along the way as part of finding their way.
Commercial evaluation of KiwiRail, Solid Energy and total SOE portfolio in New Zealand since 2007
20 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in fiscal policy, industrial organisation, politics - New Zealand, public economics Tags: government ownership, privatisation, state owned enterprises
Two dogs of an investment propped up a $20 billion portfolio that a few years later was worth less than 1/5 of that. Both of these stalwarts are now worth not even one dollar.
Source:New Zealand Treasury – information released under the Official Information Act, January 2016.
Expected years in retirement by gender in the G7 countries, Australia and New Zealand
19 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in labour economics, labour supply, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: ageing society, demographic crisis, old age pensions, older workers
Smoking – where are the externalities?
19 Feb 2016 2 Comments
in applied welfare economics, economics of regulation, health economics, politics - New Zealand, public economics
It will be a slow train coming before the Morgan Foundation calls for a cut in the tobacco tax because the optimal Pigovian tax on it is already too high from the perspective of externalities or the burden on the public health budget.

Source: Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking | Heartland Institute.
I think smoking is disgusting and unhealthy but that does not give me the right to regulate the disgusting habits of others. Where would I start in regulating risk-taking? I would have to start with swimming, tramping and biking. They are all high-risk activities of the self-righteous? Not everything others do that I do not like causes an externality.
Few economists work on the economics of smoking other from the starting point that it should be reduced. Those that do not share that starting point such as Robert Tollison, Gary Anderson and William Shughart are subject to relentless personal abuse. They are immediately denounced as the paid whores of the tobacco industry.

That was one of the reasons I got interested in the economics of smoking. There must be something in the case made by Robert Tollison and others questioning tobacco taxes if the first line of argument against them is you are saying that because someone paid, you low down dog.
NZ state-owned enterprise dividends & cash injections since 2007 – updated
18 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in economic history, industrial organisation, politics - New Zealand, public economics Tags: government ownership, KiwiRail, New Zealand Greens, New Zealand Labor Party, privatisation, rational irrationality, state owned enterprises
With a straight face, the Labour Party and the Greens claim that state-owned enterprises should not be sold because taxpayers give up the future dividend stream.
Source: New Zealand Treasury – data released under the Official Information Act.
Leaving to one side what the sale price is the net present value of, for as far back as I could obtain data from the Treasury, it is a rare year in which the taxpayers does not pour more money into state-owned enterprises than they get back in dividends.
Transpower is carrying the entire state-owned enterprise portfolio. Earlier on, Solid Energy – a now bankrupt coal mining company– was carrying the portfolio in terms of cash flow to the taxpayer.
Does @nztreasury understand company tax incidence?
18 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, politics - New Zealand, public economics
The New Zealand Treasury understands neither who pays company taxes when capital is internationally mobile nor why Ireland was relentlessly bullied over its 12.5% company tax rate.

The Treasury makes the surprising claim that the benefits of company tax cuts will leak overseas to non-residents because of the high level of foreign capital ownership.
Now if New Zealand were to substantially cut its company tax rate, hell will freeze over before the Australian Treasurer rings up and say thanks mate. The Australian worry will be the loss of investment and corporate headquarters to New Zealand.
Who pays company tax when capital is internationally mobile is one of the easiest questions you can get in an economics quiz. Just trace out how investors will react to a lower company tax in New Zealand.
If company taxes are lower in New Zealand, more investment will flow into New Zealand, increasing the size of the capital stock in New Zealand and with it wages in New Zealand because New Zealand workers have more capital to work with.
When will these international capital inflows stop? It is obvious! When risk-adjusted after-tax returns equalise for internationally mobile investors. They will adjust their portfolios so that after-tax returns equalise across tax jurisdictions.
The after-tax returns are equalised by the competing tax jurisdictions having different before-tax rates of return on capital and therefore costs of capital.
Jurisdictions with high company taxes have to offer larger before-tax returns so that internationally mobile investors receive the same risk-adjusted after-tax return everywhere. High tax jurisdictions boost before tax return by wages being lower in the high tax jurisdiction.
High company taxes are paid for by the workers of the jurisdiction concerned through having to accept lower wages to work with the same amount of capital. They must compensate foreign investors by boosting before-tax returns so that their after-tax rates of return equalise across competing tax jurisdictions.
The New Zealand Treasury missed this most basic point about who pays a company tax in a globalised world. The Australian Treasury is right on top of this basic piece of economics:
The mobility of capital refers to how easily financial capital (debt and equity) flows into and out of a country. Greater capital mobility will shift more of the burden of taxation from capital to labour through larger changes in the domestic capital stock, and hence in domestic labour productivity and wages (Grubert and Mutti 1985; Gravelle 2010).
In this situation, a reduction in the company tax rate will result in large inflows of foreign capital to ensure that there is no material difference between the after tax (risk adjusted) rate of return on investment in Australia and the rate available abroad.
The many attempts at company tax harmonisation by the European Union and G20 are motivated by the fear of large capital flows into the lower tax jurisdictions.
No high-tax country views the low company taxes in Ireland, Singapore and Hong Kong as a windfall where they can raise more tax revenue on the additional dividends repatriated from lower tax jurisdictions.
Very large economies such the USA can get away with a slightly above average rates of company tax because the number of other places to go are fewer.
A small open economy such as New Zealand should safely assume that most to all of burden of the company tax is on New Zealand workers through lower wages.
Capital migrates from high-tax to low-tax locations, reducing capital-to-labour ratios in high-tax countries. The low-tax countries experience higher capital-to-labour ratios, a higher marginal product of labour, and higher wages.
I will be putting in an Official Information Act request seeking to find out whether the work of Arnold Harberger influences their company tax briefings to ministers. I will also add any work they are done on corporate inversions and the company tax rate in Ireland.
@ChrisHipkins @jacindaardern @dbseymour student loan balances
17 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of education, politics - New Zealand
Most students do not owe that much compared to the $1/2 million graduate premium over their life plus marrying someone who is also a graduate. 60% owe less than $20,000 and 80% owe less than $30,000. People not smart enough to go to university or Polytech can manage to save that to buy a car

Source: Student Loan Scheme Annual Report 2014 | Education Counts, table 29.
That student loan defaulter arrested at the airport owed $90,000. That is more than 99% of all student loan borrowers.
@ChrisHipkins @jacindaardern @dbseymour when do graduates break even on their investment?
17 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of education, politics - New Zealand
The poor possums: New Zealand graduates have to wait until their early 30s to break even on their educational investments.

Source: A Degree is a smart investment | Universities New Zealand – Te Pōkai Tara.

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