1. My JPAM 2000 paper documents that suburbanites drive more and consume more electricity than urban residents.
2. My 2011 JUE paper documents that center city liberal resident NIMBY zoning regulation has deflected more development to the suburbs where people live a high carbon life (see paper #1 above) and then oppose carbon pricing.
3. My co-authored 2013 JPUBE paper documents that energy intensive manufacturing industries seek out cheap electricity price areas. Whether U.S carbon pricing and the resulting higher electricity prices would nudge them to move oversees remains an open question.
4. My co-authored 2012 EER paper documents that more educated people are more likely to have installed solar panels and to go off the grid and thus not pay higher electricity prices.
5. My 2013 EI paper documents that Congress Representatives oppose carbon mitigation regulation when they are conservative, their district is poorer and their district is high carbon. Nancy Pelosi and Tom Steyer are in liberal, rich, low carbon San Francisco. There, it is easy to comply with carbon regulation. They will pay few new costs for such low carbon regulation.
6. My co-authored 2015 JAERE paper documents that even in California and within counties that suburbanites vote against low carbon regulation relative to center city residents. Since we control for the fact that liberals live in center cities, this 3rd variable does not explain the urban form/voting correlation.
7. In my co-authored 2015 JUE paper we document that U.S protectionism through the Buy America Act has hindered the improvement of our bus fleet as a green technology.
The current controversy over payment of dividends by Housing New Zealand is misplaced because of the subtle connections between payment of dividends and greater value for money.
By paying dividends, the investment priorities of Housing New Zealand are subject to additional ministerial scrutiny. Its capital program is scrutinised in greater detail by the Cabinet because ministers must fund it against competing bids across the entire budget and parliamentary scrutiny process.
Each budget bid is championed by a minister, each of whom must make their case every year against all-comers. This annual competition for a central pool of capital filters out lower value investment bids.
If dividends were not paid but were instead retained as free cash flows in the agency, there would be less ministerial scrutiny of Housing New Zealand because it would have a smaller role in annual budget rounds. Ministers and the Parliament sit up and pay attention when money is to be spent, as they should, and the larger is the sum in the budget, the more attention is paid to value for the money sought. Funding projects with retained dividends may reduce ministerial and parliamentary scrutiny.
Payment of dividends does not reduce the ability of Housing New Zealand to engage in new capital spending. If the dividends were not paid, the amount of new capital spending from budget appropriations would be reduced dollar for dollar.
So many American states have smaller populations are New Zealand, half in all, that is difficult to present them on a chart. All managed to be richer the New Zealand despite the horrors of federalism or because of it. These small state populations are before considering how much local government legislative power there is, including taxing and spending powers, city income taxes and city sales taxes, and county and local police forces.
The median national population size of countries is not much more than New Zealand’s current population.
Controlling for location, Easterly and Kraay (2002) found that smaller states were richer than other states in per capita real GDP.
Rose (2006) reviewed the impact of size on the level of income, inflation, material well-being, health, education, and the quality of a country’s institutions and found that small countries are more open to trade than large countries, but are not systematically different otherwise.
As I argued in my previous post on distance, New Zealand were prosperous from the time of European settlement despite a small population and their great distance from the main markets of the world on each side of the Atlantic.
Of the ten richest countries in terms of GDP per capita, only four have populations above one million people (Alesina 2003). These countries are the USA (290 million people), Switzerland (7 million people), Norway (4 million people) and Singapore (3 million people). Of these four nations, two are below the global national population median of six million (Alesina 2003).
It is not usual to measure the gender wage gap against average earnings. Median earnings preferably on an hourly basis is the normal measure. Moreover, more long-term data is readily available on the Internet about median earnings rather than average earnings.
For example, as the chart below shows the unadjusted gender wage gap in New Zealand is a little bit less than the 14% claimed by Auckland YMCA when measured against median earnings and has been slowly tapering down for 15 years.
Source: Statistics New Zealand New Zealand Income Survey.
My larger claim is the gender pay gap has been in a long-term decline for generations. More importantly, the gender will pay gap is disappeared at the bottom of the labour market. For the past 5 to 10 years, the unadjusted gender wage gap rounds down to zero at the bottom of the pay structure for full-time employees.
The gender wage gap remains stubbornly high at the high end of the wage market at 15-20% because of compensating differentials. Women are balancing families and careers in choosing the occupations that best suits each individual woman.
Studies of top earning professionals show that they make quite deliberate choices between family and career. The better explanation of why so many women are in a particular occupation is job sorting: that particular job has flexible hours and the skills do not depreciate as fast for workers who take time off, working part-time or returning from time out of the workforce. Low job turnover workers will be employed by firms that invest more in training and job specific human capital.
Higher job turnover workers, such as women with children, will tend to move into jobs that have less investment in specialised human capital, and where their human capital depreciates at a slower pace.
Women, including low paid women, select careers in jobs that match best in terms of work life balance and allows them to enter and leave the workforce with minimum penalty and loss of skills through depreciation and obsolescence.
This is the choice hypothesis of the gender wage gap. Women choose to educate for occupations where human capital depreciates at a slower pace. This gender wage gap for professionals can be explained by the marriage market combined with assortative mating:
Graduates are likely to marry each other and form power couples; and
There tends to be an age gap between men and women in long-term relationships and marriages of two years.
This two-year age gap means that the husband has two additional years of work experience and career advancement. This is likely to translate into higher pay and more immediate promotional prospects. Maximising household income would imply that the member of the household with a higher income, and greater immediate promotional prospects stay in the workforce. This is entirely consistent with the choice hypothesis and equalising differentials as the explanation for the gender wage gap. As Solomon Polachek explains:
At least in the past, getting married and having children meant one thing for men and another thing for women. Because women typically bear the brunt of child-rearing, married men with children work more over their lives than married women. This division of labour is exacerbated by the extent to which married women are, on average, younger and less educated than their husbands.
This pattern of earnings behaviour and human capital and career investment will persist until women start pairing off with men who are the same age or younger than them.
Claudia Goldin did a great study of Harvard MBAs using online surveys of their careers. She found that three proximate factors accounted for the large and rising gender gap in earnings:
differences in training prior to MBA graduation,
differences in career interruptions, and
differences in weekly hours.
The greater career discontinuity and shorter work hours for female MBAs are largely associated with motherhood. There are some jobs that are severely penalise any time out of the workforce. A 2014 Harvard Business School study found that 28 percent of recent female alumni took off more than six months to care for children; only 2 percent of men did.
Claudia Goldin has described pharmacy is the most family friendly occupation. She compares it to law. In law, if you work long hours, you are on partnership track and win the top clients. In pharmacy, the only advantage of working longer hours as you earn more money that week. Also, pharmacists are completely interchangeable. Do you care which pharmacist fills out your prescription at your local pharmacy or even know which one fills it out? Lawyers are not interchangeable: they cannot just handover a case. Detailed briefings would be required. You expect your lawyer to show up in court or at meetings on time anywhere without fail.
Claudia Goldin found one counterfactual that cancels out the gender wage gap amongst MBA professionals: hubby earns less! Female MBAs who’ve have a partner who earn less than them earn as much as the average MBA professional on an hourly basis but work a few less hours per week.
The gender wage gap is persisted in high-paying jobs because career women have so many options. They can mix and match career and motherhood in fine detail.
In low-paying jobs, there is little in the way of trade-offs other than full-time or part-time work. Low-paid jobs do not involve choosing majors at university, choosing careers, industries and employers that call for long hours and uninterrupted careers or not so long hours, fewer human capital and promotional penalties for time off and more work-life balance.
The choice hypothesis is the far better explanation for the persistence of the unadjusted gender wage gap in New Zealand, which is small by international standards. As Polachek explains:
The gender wage gap for never marrieds is a mere 2.8%, compared with over 20% for marrieds. The gender wage gap for young workers is less than 5%, but about 25% for 55–64-year-old men and women.
If gender discrimination were the issue, one would need to explain why businesses pay single men and single women comparable salaries. The same applies to young men and young women. One would need to explain why businesses discriminate against older women, but not against younger women. If corporations discriminate by gender, why are these employers paying any groups of men and women roughly equal pay?
Why is there no discrimination against young single women, but large amounts of discrimination against older married women? … Each type of possible discrimination is inconsistent with negligible wage differences among single and younger employees compared with the large gap among married men and women (especially those with children, and even more so for those who space children widely apart)
The main drivers of the gender wage gap are unknown to employers such as whether the would-be recruit or employer is married, their partner is present, how many children they have, how many of these children are under 12, and how many years are there between the births of their children.
In countries such as Sweden, the gender wage gap is no better than the OECD average, despite generous maternity and paternity leave. The reason is obvious. You do not close the gender wage gap for professional women by paying them to stay out of the workforce for a year or more perhaps several times over at critical junctures early in their careers.
Long parental leave in Sweden is responsible for a thick Swedish glass ceiling because of lower levels of human capital investment among women and employers’ responses by placing fewer women in fast-track career. Extensive parental leave makes holding a job easier and more family-friendly, it may not be as effective as some might think in eradicating the gender gap for professional women.
There are large differences in the education premium between English speaking countries and also by gender. The tertiary premium in New Zealand is pretty poor compared to the USA, UK or Ireland and is still mediocre when compared to Australia and Canada.
Revenue is a percentage of GDP has always been higher in New Zealand as compared to Australia for as far back as data is available. Tax revenue grew by a third as a percentage of GDP between 1965 and 1989 in New Zealand with a sharp spike from 1984 onwards. The growth in tax revenues as percentage of Australian GDP was smoother rather than spikes such as in the mid-1980s in New Zealand.
Interestingly, this faster growth in the New Zealand tax revenues as a percentage of GDP coincided with the two lost decades of New Zealand growth between 1974 and 1992. Furthermore, the chart below shows that an emerging recovery in labour productivity in the early 1980s stalled when tax revenues started growing again as a percentage of New Zealand GDP.
Between 1974 and 1992, New Zealand lost 34% and productivity against trend of 1.9%. In the chart below, a flat line is growth at a rate equal to the trend rate of growth for the USA in the 20th century which is 1.9%. A falling line indicates growth at less than 1.9% for the year. A rising line means growth in excess of 1.9% for the year. The chart below confirms what the chart above says. Productivity stopped falling in the early 1980s then started falling rapidly at the same time that tax revenues spiked as percentage of GDP in the early 1980s.
in the above chart, Australia had pretty steady growth since about 1970. There is a productivity slowdown in the 1970s and above-average growth as the economy recovered from the Keating recession in the early 1990s. The so-called mining boom is hardly noticeable in Australia’s trend growth rate.
It is time for the environmental movement to face up to the fact that there never will be an international treaty to restrain carbon emissions. The practical way to respond to global warming is healthier is wealthier, richer is safer. Faster economic growth creates more resources for resilience and adaptation to a changing environment.
New Zealand housing prices were pretty stable until the passage of the Resource Management Act in 1993. After that, prices took off New Zealand and didn’t slow that much for the recession subsequent to the Global Financial Crisis.
American prices just had a bubble because of loose monetary policy by the Fed and loose lending criteria by banks at the behest of regulators. Real housing prices in the USA started to rise again last year after a dramatic fall.
Australian prices were rising steadily until about 2000 but then took off with a strong economy and the usual restrictions on land supply by local governments at the behest of the existing homeowners.
The Labour Party and the Greens both plan to build 100,000 affordable houses as a way of offsetting soaring housing prices in Auckland and other New Zealand cities. These plans were announced in the 2014 Election in New Zealand.
A trite but insurmountable objection to the proposal to build 100,000 affordable houses is there are no plans to increase the supply of land. That would require RMA reform which both Labour and the Greens oppose. They oppose RMA reform partly for ideological reasons and partly to cultivate middle-class home owner votes.
Unless there is an increase in the supply of land in Auckland and the other New Zealand cities, the government under the plans of the Labour Party and the Greens are building houses the private sector would have built anyway but for the government bought from the same new supply of land released every year by local councils.
The proposals of Labour and the Green to build affordable houses simply changes the identity of who builds the same number of new houses in New Zealand. There is no net increase in this supply of houses so there will not be any improvement in housing affordability.
If the supply of land were to be increased through RMA reforms, there be no need to for the government to build the houses. This is because the market will take care of building the houses on the additional land released by local councils if there is a demand for them and they’re obviously is.
Attempts by a Labour and Green Government to build affordable houses is no more than displace the efforts of private developers to supply houses but in configurations more closely aligned with market demand in terms of the quality and size of the house.
Another insurmountable but still minor objection to supplying 100,000 affordable houses is Friedman’s second law of economics: you can’t give anything away for free because people will queue up for access.
If the government is selling cheap houses to ordinary families, people change that circumstances to make themselves more eligible for the house, which presumably will be targeted by income. Easiest way to do that is to fund a low income family member such as a student to buy the house and sell it to you. Alternatively, you could make an advanced of them against their inheritances as a way of them buying a house.
The classic New Zealand example of the inability to give anything away for free was the introduction of school zoning. People now pay hundreds of thousands of dollars more for a house if it is in a favourable school zone.
A more serious objection that can never be overcome is as soon as the lucky ordinary family buys the affordable house, they will renovate it to the proper standing reflecting the underlying value of the land. Affordable houses under the plans of the New Zealand Labour Party and the Greens is to build a cheap house on expensive land in Auckland. Land in Auckland is 60% of the price of a house. Land use to be 40% of the value of the house in Auckland.
Plenty of people are in the game of home renovation; some do it as a full-time occupation. They buy an old rundown house on good land and a good location and renovate the house to match the value of the underlying land and location.
The possibility of subsequent renovation to the cheap house on the good land is the death knell of any attempt to sell affordable housing in Auckland or the other New Zealand cities where house prices are spiralling upwards because of restrictions on the supply of land.
Building 100,000 affordable houses were simply present 100,000 renovation opportunities to entrepreneurs. The families who are lucky enough to be first to buy the affordable house will get a marvellous windfall. There will be no long-term impact on the price of land in Auckland because you can’t give anything away for free. Any undervalued good as quickly resold at a profit by budding entrepreneurs after renovating the house to bring it up to market standard given the value of the underlying land.
If the Labour Party and the Greens want more affordable housing, they must support RMA reforms that will increase the supply of land. They won’t do out of sheer political expediency. Labour and the Greens want to win the votes of disgruntled National party voters who already own homes.
Action speaks louder than words in the eyes of the voters who might vote for Labour in the 2017 New Zealand General Election. Kelvin Davis clearly is leadership material.
Why Evolution is True is a blog written by Jerry Coyne, centered on evolution and biology but also dealing with diverse topics like politics, culture, and cats.
In Hume’s spirit, I will attempt to serve as an ambassador from my world of economics, and help in “finding topics of conversation fit for the entertainment of rational creatures.”
“We do not believe any group of men adequate enough or wise enough to operate without scrutiny or without criticism. We know that the only way to avoid error is to detect it, that the only way to detect it is to be free to inquire. We know that in secrecy error undetected will flourish and subvert”. - J Robert Oppenheimer.
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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