George Carlin on Global Warming
22 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in energy economics, environmental economics, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: George Carlin, global warming
The role of unions in prolonging the Great Depression
20 Apr 2015 1 Comment
in business cycles, fiscal policy, great depression, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, politics - USA, unemployment, unions Tags: capital taxation, FDR, Herbert Hoover, Leftover Left, Leo Ohanian, New Deal, union power, union wage premium, unionisation
Our friends on the left at the Economic Policy Institute were good enough to remind us of the link between rapid unionisation of the US labour market in the early and mid-1930s and the petering out of the recovery from the great depression. That recession within a depression is the Roosevelt recession.
New blog on Mind The Gap: on labour #unions and income #inequality
oxfamblogs.org/mindthegap/201… http://t.co/FyrOboCaRk—
Ricardo FuentesNieva (@rivefuentes) April 17, 2015
Harold Cole and Lee Ohanian analysed in depth this double-dip depression in the USA in a paper in the Journal of Political Economy titled “New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis” about 10 years ago:
The recovery from the Great Depression was weak… Real gross domestic product per adult, which was 39 percent below trend at the trough of the Depression in 1933, remained 27 percent below trend in 1939. Similarly, private hours worked were 27 percent below trend in 1933 and remained 21 percent below trend in 1939.
The weak recovery is puzzling because the large negative shocks that some economists believe caused the 1929–33 downturn—including monetary shocks, productivity shocks, and banking shocks—become positive after 1933. These positive shocks should have fostered a rapid recovery, with output and employment returning to trend by the late 1930s.
The focus of the paper by Cole and Ohanian in explaining the weak recovery – the double-dip depression in the 1930s – are the New Deal cartelisation policies designed to limit competition and increase labour bargaining power through extensive unionisation of workforce.
The recovery from the depths of the Great Depression was weak but real wages in several sectors rose significantly above trend despite mass unemployment.
The view that limiting competition in product markets and the labour market was essential for economic prosperity was influential in the 1920s and 1930s. Both FDR and Hoover believed high wages were the key to prosperity.
FDR’s recipe for economic recovery from the great depression when he came to office in 1933 was raising prices and wages and the promotion of unions:
Union membership rose from about 13 percent of employment in 1935 to about 29 percent of employment in 1939, and strike activity doubled from 14 million strike days in 1936 to about 28 million in 1937.
The result of this suppression of market competition and the encouragement of unions was real wages increase despite the weak recovery:
The coincidence of high wages, low consumption, and low hours worked indicates that some factor prevented labour market clearing during the New Deal.
The combination of government interference with competition and strong unions stifled the recovery from the great depression rather than speed it up as was the plan of FDR:
New Deal labour and industrial policies did not lift the economy out of the Depression as President Roosevelt had hoped.
Instead, the joint policies of increasing labour’s bargaining power and linking collusion with paying high wages prevented a normal recovery by creating rents and an inefficient insider-outsider friction that raised wages significantly and restricted employment.
Not only did the adoption of these industrial and trade policies coincide with the persistence of depression through the late 1930s, but the subsequent abandonment of these policies coincided with the strong economic recovery of the 1940s.
U.S. unemployment fell from 22.9% in 1932 to 9.1% in 1937, a reduction of 13.8%, but was back up to 13% by 1938. The Social Security payroll tax debuted in 1937 on top of tax increases in the Revenue Act of 1935. In 1937, the economy fell into recession again. Cooley and Ohanian argue that:
The economy did not tank in 1937 because government spending declined. Increases in tax rates, particularly capital income tax rates, and the expansion of unions, were most likely responsible.
The Great Depression in the USA was unique in the fact that it was so long and the recovery, so weak:
Total hours worked per adult in 1939 remained about 21% below their 1929 level, compared to a decline of 27% in 1933… Per capita consumption did not recover at all, remaining 25% below its trend level throughout the New Deal, and per-capita non-residential investment averaged about 60% below trend.
After 1933, productivity growth was rapid, the banking system was stabilized, deflation was eliminated and there was plenty of demand stimulus as the Fed more than doubled the monetary base between 1933 and 1939. As Lee Ohanian noted:
Depressions are periods of low employment and low living standards. The normal forces of supply and demand should have reduced wages, which would have lowered business costs and increased employment and output. What prevented the normal forces of supply and demand from working?
Central to the faltering of this recovery by 1937 was the regime change when the Supreme Court finally upheld revised laws promoting unionisation:
The downturn of 1937-38 was preceded by large wage hikes that pushed wages well above their NIRA levels, following the Supreme Court’s 1937 decision that upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act. These wage hikes led to further job loss, particularly in manufacturing.
The "recession in a depression" thus was not the result of a reversal of New Deal policies, as argued by some, but rather a deepening of New Deal polices that raised wages even further above their competitive levels, and which further prevented the normal forces of supply and demand from restoring full employment.
Lee Ohanian argues that the defining characteristic of the Great Depression was this failure of real wages to fall in the face of mass unemployment:
The defining characteristic of the Great Depression is a substantial and chronic excess supply of labour, with employment well below normal, and real wages in key industrial sectors well above normal.
Policies of Hoover and of FDR of propping up wages and encouraging unions and work sharing were the most important factors in precipitating and prolonging the Great Depression. The Great Depression was the first time U.S. wages did not fall in that you were administered a period of significant deflation.
The manufacturing sector, where unions and the threat of unionisation was much stronger which was much harder hit initially than the agricultural sector both in terms of loss of jobs and wages not falling. The Great Depression did not start as an ordinary garden variety recession, as argued by Milton Friedman. It was immediately severe and sector specific with industrial production declining by about 35% between late 1929 and the end of 1930.
This decline in industrial production occurs before any banking crises. Despite this sector specific nature of the onset that Great Depression, monetary policy might have some role in explaining the start of the Great Depression but not in its prolongation:
any monetary explanation of the Depression requires a theory of very large and very protracted monetary non-neutrality. Such a theory has been elusive because the Depression is so much larger than any other downturn, and because explaining the persistence of such a large non-neutrality requires in turn a theory for why the normal economic forces that ultimately undo monetary non-neutrality were grossly absent in this episode.
Source: A different view of the Great Depression’s cause | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal.
I roamed all over Devonport on my bike when I was a lad. No more, no longer!?
20 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: child development, good old days, Helicopter parents, moral panic, political correctness
As a soon-to-be parent, I find this fascinating and terrifying. The diminishing range of children visualized: http://t.co/7NiFN9Eaw0—
Austen Allred (@AustenAllred) April 18, 2015
Be careful for what you wish for when you call for moderation and bipartisanship in politics
20 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, income redistribution, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: bipartisanship, expressive voting, growth in government, ideology, median voter theorem, political polarisation, rational irrationality
Computers are taking gerrymandering to a whole new level
19 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: gerrymandering
You know I heart you Chicago, but u killing me tonight. Mayoral race notwithstanding, this is gerrymandered 2nd ward http://t.co/Fnq75tup06—
Caroline Vanderoef (@CAVandy) February 25, 2015
The political ideology of libertarians
19 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in liberalism, libertarianism, politics - USA Tags: voter demographics
What are the revenue effects of capital gains tax cuts?
19 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, public economics Tags: dynamic scoring, laffer curve, optimal taxation, taxation of capital income
Average tax rates on consumption, investment, labour and capital in USA, UK and Canada, 1950-2013
17 Apr 2015 5 Comments
in business cycles, economic growth, economic history, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, macroeconomics, politics - USA, public economics Tags: British economy, Canada, sick man of Europe, tax incidence, tax reform
Income taxes in the USA and UK didn’t change all that much after the mid-70s. Prior to that, income tax rose quite steadily in the UK in the 1950s and 1960s and not surprisingly, Britain was the sick man of Europe in the 1970s. Income taxes rose quite steadily in Canada for most of the post-war period up until 1990 and then levelled out for most of that decade before a small tapered downwards.
Source: Cara McDaniel.
Taxes on consumption expenditure were very different stories across the Atlantic. There has been a tapering down in the average tax rate on American consumption expenditure since 1970 after modest increases before that. Canadian taxes on consumption expenditure rose steadily until the 1970s, then drop steadily in the 1970s and than rose in the 1980s and dropped again after 1992. British taxes on consumption expenditure rose sharply in the late 1960s, dropped sharply and then rose again in the 1970s and was pretty steady after that.
The sleeper tax in all three countries was payroll taxes to fund social security and the welfare state. These rose steadily in the USA, UK and Canada up until the 1990s.
Source: Cara McDaniel.
Despite all that nonsense about neoliberalism from the Left over Left, the average rate of tax on capital income did not appear to change much at all over the last 50 years. There was a modest taper in US capital income taxation from the mid-30s to the mid-20s over the entire post-war period. The average Canadian tax rate on income from capital rose steadily in the 60s, fell steadily in the 70s before rising again in the mid-1980s and fell again after 2000. The average British tax rate on capital income rose steadily in the 60s and 70s, coinciding with the emergence of Britain as a sick man of Europe, and then stabilised in the the 1980s onwards but with a dip in the late 80s before a rise in the early 1990s.. Despite the large cuts in the statutory corporate tax rate in the UK, there was only a mild taper in the average tax rate on capital income in the UK.
Source: Cara McDaniel.
The average tax rate on investment expenditures is pretty stable in the USA for the entire post-war period. The only significant increase in the average tax rate on investment expenditures in the UK coincided with the emergence of the sick man in Europe after a drop in the early 70s. The average tax rate on investment expenditures do not change at all in the UK after the 1970s. The Canadian average tax rate on investment expenditures is higher than elsewhere. It rose steadily in the 50s and 60s, dropped in the 70s and rose again in the 80s before tapering from 1992 onwards.
Source: Cara McDaniel.
These higher on rising taxes and the UK and Canada did nothing for either country in catching up with the USA. The figure 1 below shows real GDP per working age per American, Canadian and British.
Figure 1: Real GDP per Canadian, British and American aged 15-64, converted to 2013 price level, updated 2005 EKS purchasing power parities, 1950-2013
Source: Computed from OECD StatExtract and The Conference Board, Total Database, January 2014, http://www.conference-board.org/economics
The USA is pulling away from Canada and the UK in GDP per working age person. The exception is British economy from about 1990 onwards which caught up with Canada.
Figure 2, which is detrended GDP data, illustrates the British economic boom in the 1990s. Each country’s annual economic growth rate is detrended by 1.9%, the detrending value currently used by Ed Prescott. A flat line is growth at 1.9%, a rising line is above trend growth, a falling line is below trend growth.
Figure 2: Real GDP per Canadian, British and American aged 15-64, converted to 2013 price level, updated 2005 EKS purchasing power parities, detrended 1.9%, 1950-2013
Source: Computed from OECD Stat Extract and The Conference Board, Total Database, January 2014, http://www.conference-board.org/economics
Figure 2 shows that Canada has been in a long-term decline since the mid-1980s with much of this decline coinciding with periods of rising taxes on income from labour.
The British economy boomed in the 1990s, after the tax hikes of the 1970s and early 80s were reversed. This growth dividend was squandered by the Blair government in the 2000.
Figure 2 also shows that US growth was rather stable with some ups and downs up until 2007, expect during the productivity slowdown in the 1970s. The first major departure from trend growth of 1.9% was with the onset of the great recession.
Support over time from marijuana decriminalisation was twin peaked in the USA
17 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, law and economics, politics - USA Tags: marijuana decriminalisation, medical marijuana decriminalisation, voter demographics
The Obamas’ tax return
17 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in politics - USA, public economics Tags: obama
You know you're curious– take a look at Obama's 1040: urbn.is/1JHnxvd #taxday http://t.co/M958cQoLVv—
Urban Institute (@urbaninstitute) April 15, 2015
DNA and death row exonerations
17 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in law and economics, politics - USA Tags: capital punishment, crime and punishment, definitely
Renewable energy to supply same market share in 2040 as in 1949
17 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
CHART: New EIA forecast — Fossil fuels will supply >81% of our energy for at least the next quarter century http://t.co/Oju3njQrfD—
Mark J. Perry (@Mark_J_Perry) April 15, 2015
Think renewables will be important source of future energy? Not so, fossil fuels will provide 81% of energy in 2040 http://t.co/9LOoqC3VRK—
Mark J. Perry (@Mark_J_Perry) March 15, 2015
Becoming president is part of the college premium
16 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of education, politics - USA Tags: 2016 presidential election, College premium, graduate premium
These men lacked college degrees but they ran for president & guess what happened next …
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015… http://t.co/L05DXnSvtz—
Conrad Hackett (@conradhackett) March 29, 2015
Who Pays Taxes in America in 2015?
16 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in politics - USA, public economics Tags: tax incidence
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State and local taxes are rather regressive.
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via Think the poor don’t pay taxes? This chart proves you very wrong. – Vox and How Much Do the Top 1 Percent Pay of All Taxes?
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