The financial performance of Landcorp since 2007

Landcorp is a state-owned enterprise of the New Zealand government. Its core business is pastoral farming including dairy, sheep, beef and deer. In January 2012, Landcorp managed 137 properties carrying 1.5 million stock units on 376,156 hectares of land. Its total return to shareholders, the taxpayers, has been quite up-and-down in recent years.

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Source: The New Zealand Treasury – data released under the Official Information Act.

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Source: The New Zealand Treasury – data released under the Official Information Act.

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Source: The New Zealand Treasury – data released under the Official Information Act.

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The financial performance of Solid Energy (NZ state-owned enterprise) since 2007

Leaving aside the fortunes and vicissitudes of the mining industry, Solid Energy’s numbers have been up and down by so much that if this was in a private company, you would start to wonder.

Source: The New Zealand Treasury – data released under the Official Information Act.

Taxpayers barely saw a cent of those multibillion-dollar valuations of just a few years ago for a company now under receivership. I doubt the ride was worth the price of passage for the taxpayer.

Source: The New Zealand Treasury – data released under the Official Information Act.

Source: The New Zealand Treasury – data released under the Official Information Act.

The financial performance of TVNZ since 2007

The volatile returns to taxpayers from Television New Zealand shows that continuing to own a state-owned enterprise operating a legacy media adds considerable risk to the taxpayers’ portfolio.

Source: The New Zealand Treasury – data released under the Official Information Act.

Source: The New Zealand Treasury – data released under the Official Information Act.

Source: The New Zealand Treasury – data released under the Official Information Act.

The financial performance of New Zealand Post since 2007

New Zealand Post is slowly going out the door with declining dividends to taxpayers, a sustained decline in its commercial valuation and a negative or poor Total Shareholder Return. Letter volumes declined by a one-half in 10 years but the parcels business is growing because of the rise of e-commerce and Internet shopping.

Source: The New Zealand Treasury – data released under the Official Information Act.

Source: The New Zealand Treasury – data released under the Official Information Act.

Source: The New Zealand Treasury – data released under the Official Information Act.

@nzlabour @NZGreens New Zealand state-owned enterprises dividends paid and capital injections since 2007

The New Zealand Labour Party and New Zealand Greens both make much of the fact that when you privatise a state-owned enterprise the taxpayer is no longer entitled to dividends from the privatised business. The fact that the sale price is the net present value of those future dividends is a rating fallacy that is not the subject of this post.

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Source: New Zealand Treasury –  data released under the Official Information Act.

What is the subject of this post is whether there are indeed any dividends paid to taxpayers after capital injections. 2007 was the last year in which dividends to the taxpayer exceeded capital injections. The reason was that dog called KiwiRail.

@nzlabour @NZGreens Adjusted return to equity on the New Zealand state owned enterprises portfolio since 2008

I asked for information from the Treasury for as far back as 2000 but could only get information back to 2008 on the return on equity of the portfolio of state-owned enterprises to the taxpayer.

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Source: New Zealand Treasury – released under Official Information Act.

Apparently, long-term information on the performance of the state-owned enterprise portfolio is not available. Anyone wanting to know the performance of an individual or group of listed companies simply looks at the share price was far back as they want. The prices of individual shares reflect market expectations of future dividends and future price movements, and they go up and down as new information is revealed. The history of a share price indicates the ups and downs of a company in one number far better than any other available indicator.

I also included the adjusted rate of return on equity taking out the two dogs in the portfolio: Solid Energy and KiwiRail.

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Source: New Zealand Treasury – released under Official Information Act.

“Family silver’ looking a bit tarnished

In the editorial today in the Dominion Post on the Solid Energy fiasco, the editorial writer made quite an extraordinary statement:

“Ideologues of the Right will claim that the whole sad fiasco shows the dangers of the state getting into business. This is simple-minded. Not all SOEs have ended up hundreds of millions of dollars in debt. Some SOEs have been well run; some have not.”

It is absurd to claim that making a $20 million net profit on a portfolio of $30 billion in state owned enterprises in 2013 is some sort of reasonable investment for the taxpayer.

Homepaddock

Opponents to the sale of minority shareholdings in a few state owned assets would have us believe that the government is selling the family silver.

Treasury’s annual portfolio return shows that silver isn’t returning much:

Government businesses with assets worth $45 billion made a total net profit of just $20 million in the year to June 30, according to the Treasury’s annual portfolio report.

The assets don’t include Meridian Energy, Air New Zealand and Mighty RiverPower, which were partially privatised, but cover troubled entities like KiwiRail, Solid Energy and New Zealand Post, which are all struggling to make their business models work.

The annual review covers Crown-owned assets valued at $125b.

A return of just $20 million on $125b is lamentably low.
“For the residual commercial priority portfolio, overall performance (with some notable exceptions) was mediocre,” the Treasury’s Crown Ownership Monitoring Unit says in the report. . .

Total shareholder…

View original post 332 more words

The Amtrak and KiwiRail bailouts compared

Figure 1: Amtrak and KiwiRail bailouts, (exchange rate US$1:NZ$1.53), 2008 – 2015

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Sources: Federal Funding Received by Amtrak | Mercatus and New report: Corporate welfare in the 2015 budget – Taxpayers’ Union.

New Zealand with its KiwiRail does a good job of keeping up with the Amtrak bailout especially when you look at figure 2,  which computes the bailouts on a per capita basis.

Figure 2: Amtrak and KiwiRail bailouts per capita (2014 populations), (exchange rate US$1:NZ$1.53), 2008 – 2015

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Sources: Federal Funding Received by Amtrak | Mercatus and New report: Corporate welfare in the 2015 budget – Taxpayers’ Union.

Hopeless KiwiRail bailout reporting by Radio New Zealand

This morning on 9 to noon on Radio New Zealand, Kathryn Ryan, the compere of the program, repeatedly claimed that the government pumped $1 billion into the KiwiRail Turnaround Plan between 2010 and 2014. I was so annoyed by this that I made a broadcasting standards complaint while the program was still being broadcast on my mobile as a one finger typist.

The report on 9 to Noon was in response to the government putting KiwiRail on notice, giving it two years to identify savings and reduce Crown funding required or risk the possibility of closure. Since KiwiRail was acquired in 2008 for $665 million as a commercial investment, Crown investments (taxpayers bailout) totalled $3.4 billion – see Figure 1.

Figure 1: State-owned enterprise welfare, Vote Transport and Vote Finance (KiwiRail), Budgets 08/09 to 15/16

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Source: New Zealand budget papers, various years.

Table 1 shows that the KiwiRail Turnaround plan of $1.272 billion since the 2009-10 Budget is only a small part of the bailout of KiwiRail. 9 to Noon simply ignored the $210 million in the  2015 budget for KiwiRail for no explicable reason and instead talked about a $1 billion Turnaround plan rather than the $1.272 billion Turnaround plan.

Table 1: State-Owned Enterprise welfare, Vote Transport and Vote Finance (KiwiRail), Budgets 2008/09 to 2015/16, $million

  08/09

09/10

10/11

11/12

12/13

13/14

14/15

15/16

New Zealand Railways Corporation Loans

 

405

55

250

108

 

11

 

KiwiRail Turnaround Plan

 

20

250

250

250

94

198

210

KiwiRail Equity Injection

       

323

25

 

29

Rail Network and Rolling Stock Upgrade

 

105

71

10

       

New Zealand Railways Corporation Loans

55

             

New Zealand Railways Corporation Increase in Capital for the Purchase of Crown Rail

376

             

Crown Rail Operator Loans

140

             

Crown Rail Operator Equity Injection

7

             

Total

578

530

376

510

680

119

209

239

Source: New Zealand budget papers, various years.

Other parts of the bailout of KiwiRail include $405 million in loans to the New Zealand Railways Corporation in the 2009-10 budge – see table 1. There was a $323 million equity injection in the 2012-13 Budget – see table 1. KiwiRail has also caused write-downs in the Crown balance sheet of an incredible $9.8 billion since it was repurchased in 2008.

9 to Noon ignored at least two thirds of the cost to the taxpayer of bailing out KiwiRail by only limiting its reporting to part of the KiwiRail Turnaround Plan. It ignored the contribution in the most recent budget to that plan. That does not meet broadcasting standards of accuracy or professional responsibility.

Any reasonable listener will infer, as I did when listening, that the entire cost of the bailout of KiwiRail is represented by the Turnaround Plan of about $1 billion. If listeners were left with that impression, they were misled by 9 to Noon and Radio New Zealand.

It’s Time to Name a Price on KiwiRail – how much more in losses before committing to shutting it down?

In the finest public service traditions of free and frank advice, the New Zealand Treasury in its budget advice this year advised ministers to contemplate shutting down KiwiRail.

Treasury recommended the Government fund KiwiRail for one more year and undertake a comprehensive public study to look into closing the company. The study is public so that people were informed of the costs of running the rail network compared with any benefits it provided. The Government rejected the idea.

Figure 1: State-owned enterprise welfare, Vote Transport and Vote Finance (KiwiRail), Budgets 08/09 to 15/16

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Source: New Zealand budget papers, various years.

KiwiRail has been a constant thorn in the taxpayers’ side. Since this rail business was acquired in 2008 for $665 million as a commercial investment, Crown investments have totalled $3.4 billion – see Figure 1.

Fortunately in the 2015 budget, the Minister of Finance signalled that the government’s patience with the KiwiRail deficits is not unlimited. KiwiRail has a 10-year Turnaround Plan to make its freight business commercially viable. The current network of 4,000 km must be reduced to 2,300 km for the company to even breakeven. The Treasury advised, to no avail, that this massive and painful restructuring was required before KiwiRail was purchased. The purchase went through.

The latest developments where Treasury advised ministers to contemplate shutting the network down is an opportunity for ministers, and the opposition spokesmen on finance and transport both to say how much is too much in accumulated KiwiRail losses.

The Minister of Finance and his Cabinet colleagues must say after the public review that there is only so much more left in the cupboard to bailout KiwiRail losses. After that fiscal cap is reached, KiwiRail is on its own. If that means bankruptcy and network closure, so be it.

In the interim, on the side of every KiwiRail train there should be advertising billboards with the following disclosure statements:

  • KiwiRail losses adds one percentage point to the company tax rate each year;
  • KiwiRail losses takes deny sick taxpayers X number of elective surgeries per year; and
  • X number of doctors, nurses, and teachers could have been hired but for last year’s KiwiRail losses!

The tired Marxism of @chrishipkins MP. Is government provision cheaper because they don’t have to make a profit?

At least one Labour MP must have watched the other channel when the Berlin Wall fell. How else could Chris Hipkins, MP ever think that government provision is cheaper because they don’t have to make a profit? OK, he was a teenager when the Berlin Wall fell, but even teenagers watch the headline news or pick up the gist of the headlines from friends.

The tidiest of all Marxist arguments, the saddest of all Marxist arguments is government operation of businesses is cheaper because they don’t have to make a profit. At least we were spared the cliché “people not profits”.

Leaving to one side that government school buildings are built by private contractors to the Ministry of Education, let’s focus on whether government businesses will be cheaper because they don’t have to make a profit.

No cheap shots about how the portfolio of state owned enterprises are worth $30 billion returned a profit of $20 million to New Zealand taxpayers last year or of the inherent flaws of government ownership:

On the free market, in short, the consumer is king, and any business firm that wants to make profits and avoid losses tries its best to serve the consumer as efficiently and at as low a cost as possible.

In a government operation, in contrast, everything changes. Inherent in all government operation is a grave and fatal split between service and payment, between the providing of a service and the payment for receiving it.

The government bureau does not get its income as does the private firm, from serving the consumer well or from consumer purchases of its products exceeding its costs of operation.

No, the government bureau acquires its income from mulcting the long-suffering taxpayer. Its operations therefore become inefficient, and costs zoom, since government bureaus need not worry about losses or bankruptcy; they can make up their losses by additional extractions from the public till.

The accounting profit or loss of any firm combines two rather different concepts of profit:

  1. normal profit – the interest paid to those who lend capital to the form either as a loan or as equity; and
  2. economic profit – the earnings that result from risk taking and entrepreneurship.

Normal profit is simply at the cost of raising capital from investors. This capital can be borrowed in the form of a loan or can be equity.

Chris Hipkins, MP concedes a need to borrow capital when he talks about government typically having lower costs to access capital in the screenshot above. Both private and public builders of schools will have to pay to access capital.

Economic profit is a far more complicated concept frequently misunderstood, especially by Marxists, the Left over Left and, of course, professional media commentators. As Mises explains:

If all people were to anticipate correctly the future state of the market, the entrepreneurs would neither earn any profits nor suffer any losses. They would have to buy the complementary factors of production at prices which would, already at the instant of the purchase, fully reflect the future prices of the products. No room would be left either for profit or for loss.

What makes profit emerge is the fact that the entrepreneur who judges the future prices of the products more correctly than other people do buys some or all of the factors of production at prices which, seen from the point of view of the future state of the market, are too low. Thus the total costs of production — including interest on the capital invested — lag behind the prices which the entrepreneur receives for the product. This difference is entrepreneurial profit.

Profits arise from the dynamism of the market and the ability of superior entrepreneur’s to anticipate the future better than others for which there is always only a temporary profit:

Profits are never normal. They appear only where there is a maladjustment, a divergence between actual production and production as it should be in order to utilize the available material and mental resources for the best possible satisfaction of the wishes of the public. They are the prize of those who remove this maladjustment; they disappear as soon as the maladjustment is entirely removed.

Frank Knight in Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921) distinguished between interest on capital that is lend as either a loan or equity – long-run normal profits – and the short-run profits and losses earned by superior, or suffered by inferior entrepreneurs , respectively. This entrepreneurial superiority or inferiority flows from the ability to forecast the uncertain future. Those entrepreneurs “with superior knowledge and superior foresight,” wrote Frank Fetter, “are merchants, buying when they can in a cheaper and selling in a dearer capitalisation market, acting as the equalizers of rates and prices.”

Knight argued that entrepreneurs earn profits as a return for putting up with uncertainty and anticipating uncertainty faster than the rest. Many businesses are unprofitable because of rising costs or falling sales that were not anticipated. The Knightian concept is of the profit-seeking entrepreneur investing resources under uncertainty about market demand and costs in the future.

Alchian (1950) illustrated the unreliability of cost estimation with the range of bids made in government tendering processes. When contractors bid for the same project, these entrepreneurs routinely disagree over its likely cost by margins of 20 percent. These tenderers are predicting their own costs, about which they are knowledgeable, and they have an incentive to be truthful to win the initial tender.

Profits and losses, by rewarding and penalising the entrepreneurs who are not the quickest, ensures that only what consumers want is bought to the market as Henry Hazlett explains:

In a free economy, in which wages, costs, and prices are left to the free play of the competitive market, the prospect of profits decides what articles will be made, and in what quantities—and what articles will not be made at all.

If there is no profit in making an article, it is a sign that the labour and capital devoted to its production are misdirected: the value of the resources that must be used up in making the article is greater than the value of the article itself.

Profits arise as the reward for superior foresight into the future and innovation. Both of these concepts are not associated with government run businesses as Alfred Marshall explained:

A government could print a good edition of Shakespeare’s works, but it could not get them written.

As for Hipkins’ argument that governments can borrow at a cheaper rate than private firms, Bailey and Jensen (1972) said:

…we argue that efficient allocation of risk bearing is usually more difficult for government projects than it is for private ones. Therefore, if anything, the allowance for risk should be greater for government projects than it is for otherwise comparable private ones…

We find no support for the arguments in favor of using the government bond rate or any other such universally low rate for discounting costs and benefits of public projects.

We concur in Hirshleifer’s conclusion that a public project with given attributes (in terms of dispersion of possible future outcomes and of the covariance of these outcomes with those for existing portfolios) should he discounted with at least as high a rate as a similar private project.

This “same rate” should include the appropriate allowances for taxes and other distortions in private markets (as outlined by Harberger) as well as the appropriate allowances for risk, which we have outlined above.

Moreover, if private markets in risk are as “imperfect” as many have claimed, that merely tends to increase the rate that should be used, because the government is even less able to distribute risks than are these markets.

NZ taxpayers made a $20 million profit on its $30 billion state owned enterprises portfolio!

KiwiRail is such a dog that the Treasury reports on the rate of return to the taxpayer on the state owned enterprises portfolio by excluding KiwiRail from its calculations of rates of return.

The Treasury doesn’t do similar adjustments for state owned enterprises that are performing unusually well, so total shareholder return figures should be reported without this KiwiRail exception. If you buy a dog, you should own up to the fleas it spreads to the rest of your portfolio.

Trying to pretend that KiwiRail is just not there, or survives on the largess of someone other than the one and only New Zealand taxpayer, does no one any favours. This KiwiRail exception will have to apply for at least 10 years to the annual commercial portfolio report of the Treasury. I want to know the total shareholder return, including KiwiRail every year without exception or special pleading.

That total shareholder return of -8.2% in 2012 is worthy of comment too:

The portfolio generated a net loss after tax of $1.8 billion driven by a restructuring of KiwiRail’s balance sheet and reductions in bottom line results for Meridian and Solid Energy, affected by hydrology and coal market deterioration respectively.

Yet another successful privatisation of the electricity industry

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Déjà vu all over again: Sovereign Funds, a History of Bad Timing Version

Shara funds under active and passive management

Josh Lerner analysed about 2,600 sovereign fund investments over the last 25 years, to find that:

these funds are “trend chasers” rather than good market timers — they are likely to invest at home when domestic equity prices are higher, and invest abroad when foreign prices are higher. This tendency to shun assets when their prices are low has taken its toll on the returns at these funds…

sovereign fund investments made in a fund’s home country tend to do worse than foreign investments, at least in the short term. Industry price-to-earnings ratios of domestic investments tend to drop in the first year, while international investments have a positive change in the first year. Moreover, when politicians are involved in sovereign funds’ decision-making, more money is funnelled to poorly performing domestic deals

What were they thinking? NZ government super fund loses the lot on loan to already failing bank in one of the PIGS.

Portuguese bank

A Portuguese bank on the verge of collapse – what were they thinking?

That would have been the response of many newspaper readers this morning upon learning the New Zealand Superannuation Fund has lost nearly $200 million in taxpayers’ cash on a "risk-free" loan it provided to Lisbon-based Banco Espirito Santo (BES) on July 3.

The loan – part of a US$784 million credit package US investment bank Goldman Sachs put together through its Oak Finance vehicle – was made exactly one month before Portugal’s central bank broke up BES and split the country’s biggest lender into two, with one part holding the good assets and the toxic assets placed in the other.

Unfortunately, the Oak Finance loan is now stranded in the so-called "bad bank" following a retrospective law change by the Bank of Portugal.

Christopher Adams: What were they thinking? – Business – NZ Herald News.

Portuguese junk bonds bank of New Zealand super

This is what the 2015 index of Economic Freedom has to say about Portugal on the rule of law:

In 2013, the OECD expressed concern over Portugal’s reluctance to crack down on foreign bribery, particularly in regard to its former colonies Brazil, Angola, and Mozambique.

Since 2001, Portugal had officially acknowledged only 15 bribery allegations, and there had been no prosecutions. The judiciary is constitutionally independent, but staff shortages and inefficiency contribute to a considerable backlog of pending trials.

2014 index of economic Freedom

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