Freedom as a solution to poverty @Oxfam
24 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in Austrian economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, economic history, economics of media and culture, growth miracles Tags: Bill Easterly, The Great Escape, The pretence to knowledge
Why Is Marijuana Legal in Some States and Not Others?
24 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economics of crime, economics of regulation, health economics, law and economics Tags: federalism, war on drugs
Poverty in #India under the Permit Raj and then the dead hand of #neoliberalism
24 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, constitutional political economy, development economics, growth disasters, growth miracles, Marxist economics Tags: antiforeign bias, antimarket buyers, economics of socialism, India, permit raj, rational irrationality
But who would be elected president of New Zealand? @PeterDunneMP
22 Apr 2016 2 Comments
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice Tags: head of state, New Zealand republic
The principal argument against the republic is it results in a president as the head of state.
In the last Republican debate in Australia in 1999, the Republican movement split between those who wanted an appointed president and an elected president.
An elected president would quickly get ideas above his station because of their popular mandate.
Imagine Gareth Morgan as president. He is a great New Zealander, but heads of state are supposed to be seen and not heard.
It would be a good pub quiz game to list the people would be wholly unsuited as president but would be likely to be elected. Boring people such as those who currently occupy the position such as judges and retired military would not have much of a chance of being elected. A vote for president would be the ultimate protest vote.
The Irish president, for example, is elected but is completely circumscribed in powers. The only power they have to exercise independently is whether to dissolve parliament after a motion of no confidence.
A president elected by the New Zealand House of Representatives would still have some sort of independent mandate and sooner or later would get ideas above their station, which is to be seen but not heard.
Why environmentalists are adverse to real solutions #earthday
22 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, energy economics, entrepreneurship, environmental economics, environmentalism, global warming, politics - USA Tags: anti-market bias, Earth Day, expressive voting, rational ignorance, rational rationality
Source: Quotation of the day for Earth Day on the ‘science of economics versus the religion of environmentalism’ … – AEI | Carpe Diem Blog » AEIdeas from Steven E. Landsburg’s book “The Armchair Economist: Economics and Everyday Life,” in his chapter titled “Why I Am Not an Environmentalist: The Science of Economics versus the Religion of Ecology“.
A challenge for @GarethMorgannz on disagreement in public policy making
21 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: action bias, conjecture refutation, motivated reasoning, The fatal conceit, The pretense to knowledge
SPECIFIC TYPES OF IRRATIONALITY THAT CAUSE GOVERNMENT FAILURE
21 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of bureaucracy, economics of information, Public Choice Tags: behavioural public choice, growth of government, rational irrationality, size of government
Source: Gary Lucas and Slavisa Tasic‘s "Behavioral Public Choice and the Law" (West Virginia Law Review, 2015) via Bryan Caplan
Forget avoidance outrage: public’s real attitude to tax is revealed by their actions @JordNZ
21 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, constitutional political economy, economic history, economics of media and culture, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice, public economics Tags: British economy, British politics, expressive voting, growth of government, rational irrationality, revealed preference, size of government, voter demographics
P.T. Bauer on @BernieSanders extending #fightfor15 to entire Third World!
19 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, behavioural economics, constitutional political economy, development economics, economic history, growth disasters, growth miracles, P.T. Bauer, politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: 2016 presidential election, antiforeign buyers, George Orwell, living wage, rational irrationality, The fatal conceit, The pretense to knowledge
India tried that in the 1950s as part of its five-year plans. It did not work that well. Bauer said that in development economics there is a “need to restate the obvious.”
Source: Ending the Race to the Bottom – Bernie Sanders.
Source: Indian Economic Policy and Development – P. T. Bauer (1959) – Google Books
<p><img src="http://quotes.lifehack.org/media/quotes/quote-George-Orwell-we-have-now-sunk-to-a-depth-39424.png" /></p> <p>
Americans used to be much more trusting of government
15 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economics of bureaucracy, income redistribution, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: rational ignorance, rational irrationality, special interests, voter demographics
#Illinois politicians have no shame about their gerrymanders
11 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: gerrymanders
@JulieAnneGenter tax havens underwrite The Great Escape from extreme poverty in developing countries
08 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, constitutional political economy, development economics, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, economics of crime, growth disasters, growth miracles, International law, law and economics, property rights, rentseeking
Tax havens and offshore financial centres are vital to the economic development of poor countries. There are plenty of countries, poor countries, where the ability to move funds offshore is fundamental to successful investment. That is missed in the reporting of the Panama Papers:
Consider the big names that have shown up so far on the list. With the notable exception of Iceland, these are not countries I would describe as “capitalist”: Russia, Pakistan, Iraq, Ukraine, Egypt. They’re countries where kleptocratic government officials amass money not through commerce, but through quasi-legal extortion, or siphoning off the till. This is an activity that has gone on long before capitalism, and probably before there was money.
Tax havens and offshore financial centres offer a way in which entrepreneurs can make an honest investment, secure a return and put it aside safely from the reach of the minister’s cousin who wants to muscle in once the business succeeded.
A major problem in poor countries is short time horizons for investment. Entrepreneurs must make their money quickly.
Many years ago there is a survey of entrepreneurs in Russia and Poland. It was in the early 1990s. Each was asked whether an investment project that doubled their money in two years was worth the risk. The Russian entrepreneurs mostly said no, the Polish entrepreneur said yes.
So insecure are the returns from investment in Russia at that time that the phenomenal returns were required before an investment was made. They would only invest if they could double the money in two years.
Many years ago, Mancur Olson wrote an insightful book about prosperity and dictatorships. He introduced the concept of rights intensive production.
As countries become more and more developed, investment horizons lengthen and depends more and more upon the enforcement of contract and property rights in a tolerably honest way.
Instead of being the first entrepreneur to introduce the most basic technologies and profit handsomely, entrepreneurs are introducing a product upgrade or new product that is a minor improvement on current offerings. Such investments will take time to pay off.
In many developing countries, China as an example, property rights are insecure. One way to secure your investment is to take the proceeds offshore to a tax haven. If everything goes wrong, at least you got some nest egg overseas.
As many developing countries have corrupt politicians and dishonest courts, the way to secure gains from honest investments is to move some of the profits offshore. That is why tax havens are essential to poor countries growing richer.
One of the sources of Hong Kong prosperity was investors would deal with a Hong Kong-based company with the requisite political and economic links to China. They could enforce their contracts in China against their Hong Kong assets because the contract was based in Hong Kong under British law.
If the local legal system is inadequate, entrepreneurs well look overseas for mechanisms to force contracts and secure their returns on investments against confiscation.
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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