The courts have sanctioned the right to organize community opposition that urges government officials and agencies to deny land use permits to applicants, even when the underlying motive of the opposition is protecting market share and eliminating competition.
What’s more, the courts are protecting third-party funding sources, in many cases anonymous funding sources, which support the opposition efforts in order to block potential competition.
Managerial Econ: Make the rules or your rivals will: use anti-growth activists to erect entry barriers
08 Sep 2014 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of regulation, environmental economics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: bootleggers and baptists, rent seeking
How Much Should a Landlord Pay a Tenant to Move Out of an Apartment?
30 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economics of regulation Tags: rent control, rent dissipation, rentseeking
Bootleggers and Baptists alert: Mexican cannabis output falls in wake of legalisation
19 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, development economics, economics of regulation Tags: black markets, bootleggers and baptists, decriminalisation of marijuana
Farmers in the storied “Golden Triangle” region of Mexico’s Sinaloa state, which has produced the country’s most notorious gangsters and biggest marijuana harvests, say they are no longer planting the crop.
Its wholesale price has collapsed in the past five years, from $100 per kilogram to less than $25.
“It’s not worth it anymore,” said Rodrigo Silla, 50, a lifelong cannabis farmer who said he couldn’t remember the last time his family and others in their tiny hamlet gave up growing mota. “I wish the Americans would stop with this legalization.”

The people designing your cities don’t care what you want. They’re planning for hipsters. – The Washington Post
19 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economics of regulation, income redistribution, rentseeking, urban economics Tags: do gooders, elitism, land supply, new class, rent seeking, the vision of the annointed, zoning

HT: Michael Warby via The people designing your cities don’t care what you want. They’re planning for hipsters. – The Washington Post .
New Zealand has the highest minimum wage in the world
19 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, labour economics, minimum wage, Uncategorized Tags: minimum wage, offsetting behaviour, Richard McKenzie, unintended consequences


John Schmitt lists 11 margins along which a minimum wage might cause changes:
- Reduction in hours worked (because firms faced with a higher minimum wage trim back on the hours they want)
- Reduction in non-wage benefits (to offset the higher costs of the minimum wage)
- Reduction in money spent on training (again, to offset the higher costs of the minimum wage)
- Change in composition of the workforce (that is, hiring additional workers with middle or higher skill levels, and fewer of those minimum wage workers with lower skill levels)
- Higher prices (passing the cost of the higher minimum wage on to consumers)
- Improvements in efficient use of labour (in a model where employers are not always at the peak level of efficiency, a higher cost of labour might give them a push to be more efficient)
- “Efficiency wage” responses from workers (when workers are paid more, they have a greater incentive to keep their jobs, and thus may work harder and shirk less)
- Wage compression (minimum wage workers get more, but those above them on the wage scale may not get as much as they otherwise would)
- Reduction in profits (higher costs of minimum wage workers reduces profits)
- Increase in demand (a higher minimum wage boosts buying power in overall economy)
- Reduced turnover (a higher minimum wage makes a stronger bond between employer and workers, and gives employers more reason to train and hold on to workers)
Richard McKenzie argues that the biggest impact of a minimum wage increase is reductions to paid and unpaid benefits for minimum wage workers, including health insurance, store discounts, free food, flexible scheduling, and job security resulting from higher-skilled workers drawn to the higher minimum wage jobs:
- Masanori Hashimot found that under the 1967 minimum-wage hike, workers gained 32 cents in money income but lost 41 cents per hour in training—a net loss of 9 cents an hour in full-income compensation. Several other researchers in independently completed studies found more evidence that a hike in the minimum wage undercuts on-the-job training and undermines covered workers’ long-term income growth.
- Walter Wessels found that the minimum wage caused retail establishments in New York to increase work demands by cutting back on the number of workers and giving workers fewer hours to do the same work.
- Belton Fleisher, L. F. Dunn, and William Alpert found that minimum-wage increases lead to large reductions in fringe benefits and to worsening working conditions.
- Mindy Marks found that workers covered by the federal minimum-wage law were also more likely to work part time, given that part-time workers can be excluded from employer-provided health insurance plans.
McKenzie also argued that if the minimum wage does not cause employers to make substantial reductions in fringe benefits and increases in work demands, then an increased minimum should cause
(1) an increase in the labour-force-participation rates of covered workers (because workers would be moving up their supply of labour curves),
(2) a reduction in the rate at which covered workers quit their jobs (because their jobs would then be more attractive), and
(3) a significant increase in prices of production processes heavily dependent on covered minimum-wage workers.
Wessels found that minimum-wage increases had exactly the opposite effect:
(1) participation rates went down,
(2) quit rates went up, and
(3) prices did not rise appreciably—which are findings consistent only with the view that minimum-wage increases make workers worse off.
McKenzie was the first economist to argue that a minimum wage increase may actually reduce the labour supply of menial workers. Employment in menial jobs may go down slightly in the face of minimum-wage increases not so much because the employers don’t want to offer the jobs, but because fewer workers want these menial jobs that are offered.
The repackaging of monetary and non-monetary benefits, greater work intensities and fewer training opportunities make these jobs less attractive relative to their other options. This reduction in labour supply by low skilled workers is why the voluntary quit rate among low-wage workers goes up, not down, after a minimum wage increase. As McKenzie explains
Economists almost uniformly argue that minimum wage laws benefit some workers at the expense of other workers.
This argument is implicitly founded on the assumption that money wages are the only form of labour compensation.
Based on the more realistic assumption that labour is paid in many different ways, the analysis of this paper demonstrates that all labourers within a perfectly competitive labour market are adversely affected by minimum wages.
Although employment opportunities are reduced by such laws, affected labour markets clear. Conventional analysis of the effect of minimum wages on monopsony markets is also upset by the model developed.
McKenzie argues that not accounting for offsetting behaviour led to a fundamental misinterpretation in the empirical literature on the minimum wage. That literature shows that small increases in the minimum wages does not seem to affect employment and unemployment by that much.
…. wage income is not the only form of compensation with which employers pay their workers. Also in the mix are fringe benefits, relaxed work demands, workplace ambiance, respect, schedule flexibility, job security and hours of work.
Employers compete with one another to reduce their labour costs for unskilled workers, while unskilled workers compete for the available unskilled jobs — with an eye on the total value of the compensation package. With a minimum-wage increase, employers will move to cut labour costs by reducing fringe benefits and increasing work demands…
Proponents and opponents of minimum-wage hikes do not seem to realize that the tiny employment effects consistently found across numerous studies provide the strongest evidence available that increases in the minimum wage have been largely neutralized by cost savings on fringe benefits and increased work demands and the cost savings from the more obscure and hard-to-measure cuts in nonmoney compensation.
McKenzie is correct in arguing that the empirical literature on the minimum wage is dewy-eyed. The first assumption about any regulation is the market will offset it significantly. In the course of undoing the direct effects of the regulation, there will be unintended consequences such as the remixing of wage and nonwage components of remuneration packages of low skilled workers covered by the minimum wage.
Zealots cannot countenance trade-offs and diminishing returns – Thomas Sowell
13 Aug 2014 Leave a comment

Killer green technologies alert: safety records of the nuclear and wind industries
10 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, climate change, economics of climate change, economics of regulation, environmental economics, global warming, health economics Tags: killer green technologies; wind power
Christchurch Earthquake | Libertarianz TV
04 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of natural disasters, economics of regulation, liberalism, libertarianism, politics - New Zealand, urban economics Tags: Christchurch earthquake, economics of natural disasters
Devastating effect of government bureaucracy following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. As told by two business owners, an economist and an engineer. Concludes with the Libertarianz policy to make Christchurch a free enterprise zone.
How flexible is the New Zealand labour market
31 Jul 2014 1 Comment
in economics of regulation, labour economics, politics - New Zealand, unemployment, welfare reform Tags: 90 day trials, employment law, employment probation periods, employment protection, labour market regulation
The first chart below shows that NZ is the 4th most deregulated labour market for individual dismissals.
Source: OECD employment protection index
The next figure below shows that NZ is top of the world for deregulation of lay-offs and redundancies.
Source: OECD employment protection index
The chart below shows that New Zealand is far more flexible than in Western Europe and is pretty near the USA in terms of people moving in and out of the unemployment pool every month with great ease.
Source: Elsby, Hobijn and Şahin (2013).
There are very high outflow rates from unemployment among the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic economies. The economies of Continental Europe stand in stark contrast. Unemployment outflow rates in these economies lie below 10% at a monthly frequency.
A major labour market reform in recent years in New Zealand was introduction of the option of a 90 day trial for new employees, initially in small businesses and then in all businesses.
The UK recently extended its trial period from one-year to two-years. Trial periods are common in OECD member countries.
There is plenty of evidence to back-up the notion that increased job security leads to less employee effort and more absenteeism. Some examples are:
· Sick leave spiking straight after probation periods ended;
· Teacher absenteeism increasing after getting tenure after 5-years; and
· Academic productivity declining after winning tenure.
The MBIE research into the actual operation of 90-day trials was highly favourable in terms of increased employment, the hiring of riskier applicants and lower costs of ending bad job matches (about 15-20% of trials did not work out). These outcomes are the usual importance of a test drive argument for employment trial periods.
Interestingly, the MBIE research also found that some employers hired new employees on 90-day trials for positions about which these employers were uncertain might be profitable. But for the option of the trial period, these jobs never would have existed.
This suggests that in some firms, 90-day trials are a decisively cheaper alternative to hiring an employee and perhaps making them redundant later if the new position does not pay for itself. No one’s fault: the market just did not sustain the expansion in staff as expected.
The MBIE research shows that winners from 90-day trials are new labour force entrants, the unemployed and beneficiaries, migrants and labour force re-entrants such as mothers.
I kept note of an interesting press report adding to this where Hospitality New Zealand Wellington president Jeremy Smith said he had hired dozens of staff he would not otherwise have considered. Because of the transient nature of the hospitality industry, it was often difficult to check references so a trial period “levelled the playing field”.








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