Dr Mark Pennington – ‘Robust Political Economy’
20 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, entrepreneurship, environmental economics, industrial organisation, liberalism Tags: offsetting behaviour, The fatal conceit, The pretence to knowledge
Saving Ocean Fisheries with Property Rights
17 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, economics of regulation, environmental economics, fisheries economics, industrial organisation, international economics, law and economics, privatisation, property rights Tags: common property, economics of fisheries, individual transferable quotas, tragedy of the commons
Brexit: the Movie
15 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economic history, economics of regulation, industrial organisation, international economics Tags: Brexit, Common market
Some prime numbers are illegal in the United States
13 May 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of media and culture, economics of regulation
The wealthy are more likely to support stricter environmental regulation
13 May 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, environmental economics, Public Choice Tags: expressive voting, rational irrationality, voter demographics
Buying 9 more houses than the Australians = dominating housing market says @nzherald
10 May 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: antiforeign bias, housing affordability, land supplied, rational irrationality
Chinese tax residents bought 321 Auckland properties (29.5 per cent of the total); Australian tax residents purchased 312 Auckland properties (28.6 per cent).
Trekonomics: The Final Frontier (w/ Manu Saadia)
09 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, Austrian economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, economics of regulation, environmental economics, history of economic thought, industrial organisation, international economics, law and economics, property rights Tags: star trek
The dual concepts of Businesses Cannot Discriminate and Her Body, Her Choice have intersected
08 May 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, health economics, politics - USA Tags: alcohol regulation, meddlesome preferences, nanny state
New York drinking establishments must post warnings against pregnant women drinking but still must serve them.
The Coase Theorem
08 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, Austrian economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of regulation, environmental economics, history of economic thought, industrial organisation, law and economics, property rights, Ronald Coase Tags: Coase theorem
@AndrewLittleMP all but admits rents to go up after Healthy Homes Bill?
08 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, economics of regulation, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: economics of housing, economics of mandates, expressive voting, fatal conceit, rent controls, The pretense to knowledge
Opposition Leader Andrew Little accepts that mandating insulation and heat pumps into rental properties will increase their value. But he denies that this will affect rents!
Source: Healthy Homes Bill won’t up rents Little | Politics | Newshub.
An upgrade increases the value of a rental property if the improvements that increase its rental value. You cannot have the increase in the value of the asset without the increase in rent.
I will contract out the rest of my answer to David Friedman’s superb book Laws Order:
For an application of economics to a different part of the law, consider the nonwaivable warranty of habitability, a legal doctrine under which some courts hold that apartments must meet court-defined standards with regard to features such as heating, hot water, sometimes even air conditioning, whether or not such terms are provided in the lease—indeed, even if the lease specifically denies that it includes them.
The immediate effect is that certain tenants get services that their landlords might not otherwise have provided. Some landlords are worse off as a result; some tenants are better off. It seems as though supporting or opposing the rule should depend mainly on whose side you are on.
In the longer run, the effect is quite different. Every lease now automatically includes a quality guarantee. This makes rentals more attractive to tenants and more costly to landlords. The supply curve, the demand curve, and the price, the rent on an apartment, all shift up. The question, from the standpoint of a tenant, is not whether the features mandated by the court are worth anything but whether they are worth what they will cost.
The answer may well be no. If those features were worth more to the tenants than they cost landlords to provide, landlords should already be including them in their leases—and charging for them. If they cost the landlord more than they are worth to the tenant, then requiring them and letting rents adjust accordingly is likely to make both landlord and tenant worse off. It is particularly likely to make poorer tenants worse off, since they are the ones least likely to value the additional features at more than their cost.
A cynical observer might conclude that the real function of the doctrine is to squeeze poor people out of jurisdictions that adopt it by making it illegal, in those jurisdictions, to provide housing of the quality they can afford to rent.
If my analysis of the effect of this legal doctrine seems implausible, consider the analogous case of a law requiring that all cars be equipped with sunroofs and CD changers. Some customers—those who would have purchased those features anyway—are unaffected. Others find that they are getting features worth less to them than they cost and paying for them in the increased price of the car.
Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation
06 May 2016 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of bureaucracy, economics of regulation, financial economics, Public Choice Tags: behavioural public choice, rational irrationality
“Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation,” David Hirshleifer, European Financial Management, 14(5), November, (2008):856-874.

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