Israeli settlements, explained | Settlements Part I
29 Dec 2016 2 Comments
in constitutional political economy, defence economics, international economics, International law Tags: Gaza Strip, Israel, West Bank
Are We Better Off If We Buy Local?
07 Dec 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, development economics, economic history, industrial organisation, international economics, labour economics Tags: buy local
Fair Trade: Does It Help Poor Workers? Normative sociology alert
02 Dec 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, development economics, international economics, labour economics, labour supply Tags: fair trade
Randall Kroszner’s advice for the next president
02 Dec 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economic growth, entrepreneurship, international economics, macroeconomics, politics - USA, public economics Tags: 2016 presidential election, company tax
.@4corners @amnestynz evidence standards hit new low on #Nauru refugee reporting
18 Oct 2016 Leave a comment
in Economics of international refugee law, international economics, politics - Australia Tags: economics of immigration, Nauru, refugees
The ABCs journalistic standards have dropped so low that they continued to regard as credible a witness who compared Nauru with Syria. Neistat wrote the report for Amnesty which Four Corners then built on.
Syria is a war zone. Nauru is not. This is the Australian Government’s travel advice for Syria
We strongly advise Australians not to travel to Syria because of the extremely dangerous security situation, highlighted by ongoing military conflict including aerial bombardment, kidnappings and terrorist attacks…
Australians are also warned not to travel to the northern Caucasus included Chechnya for any reason because of the threat of terrorism and kidnappings.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade does not issue travel advice for Nauru at this time.
I doubt that the state of law and order in Syria or Chechnya in peacetime is any different from Nauru at its worst. Refugees seek asylum from persecution. That does not guarantee them asylum in a country that is materially wealthier than the one they fled.
Many people engage in considerable hubris to avoid making difficult decisions about immigration and refugees. Tullock talked about how people avoid difficult decisions. They do not want to face up to the fact resources are scarce and they face limits on their powers.
To reduce the personal distress of making these tragic choices, Tullock observed that people often allocate and distribute resources in a different way so as to better conceal from themselves the unhappy choices they had to make. This even if this means the recipients of these choices are worse off and more lives are lost than if more open and honest choices were made up about there only being so much that can be done.
The Australian Greens, for example, call for a doubling of the refugee quota. A drop in the ocean when there is 59 million refugees out there. This allows them to feel righteous when they go to sleep at night
When it is pointed out that their policies will encourage more people to get on a boat, some of whom will drown, the Greens suggest people should be free to fly to Australia without documentation and then be released after a short security check.
#LetThemStay https://t.co/n1hA7W3q3Q—
Sarah Hanson-Young (@sarahinthesen8) February 04, 2016
Naturally, no government will ever adopt this suggestion. It shows that the Greens are not serious participants in managing refugee flows across borders. They prefer to feel righteous rather than actually systematically help people to the maximum available.
Arriving by boat in Australia does not increase the size of the refugee quota. It just changes who gets to the head of the queue and how many died trying to get to the head of the queue.
A.J.P. Taylor said something similar
15 Oct 2016 Leave a comment
in economic history, international economic law, international economics, labour economics, labour supply Tags: age of empires, age of migration, economics of immigration, George Orwell, great migrations
Do trade and investment sanctions against a dictator work?
24 Sep 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, international economics, International law, Public Choice
Sanctions only work at all if there is trade and investment to sanction – think of North Korea. This means the autocrat has already liberalised first for there to be trade and investment to sanction. But if the dictator, be it a tin-pot dictator or a totalitarian, has liberalised, it must build loyalty around that liberalisation quickly or risk a coup. All revolutions are palace coups.
Source: Ronald Wintrobe (2002) Dictatorship.
A dictator who agrees to liberalise puts himself in danger of being deposed, and it is no surprise that dictators like Castro, Hussein and Milosevic were all reluctant to do so. The Austro-Hungarian emperor opposed the introduction of railways because he thought they would bring revolution with them.
Neither trade sanctions nor airstrikes worked against Afghanistan under the Taliban. There is nothing to destroy or degrade.
@Greens @PaulineHansonOz are peas in a pod
15 Sep 2016 1 Comment
in international economics, politics - Australia
This chart from coming on 20 years ago by Lyndon Rowe illustrates that the Australian Greens, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation and a now-defunct Australian political party of self-proclaimed do-gooders have plenty in common and still do.
Pauline Hanson and the Australian Greens will vote the same way many times despite the Greens self-righteously boycotting the maiden speech of a fellow economic nationalist.
A pro-poor bias of trade in every country #TPPANoWay @Oxfamnz
26 Aug 2016 Leave a comment
in international economics Tags: free trade
Poor consumers spend relatively more on sectors that are more traded, while high-income individuals consume relatively more services, which are among the least traded sectors.
Source: Pro-poor bias of trade: New research on the expenditure channel | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal.
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
Recent Comments