@JordNZ best way to talk yourself out of #UBI is listen to advocate list new taxes required
01 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in economics, income redistribution, labour economics, labour supply, politics - New Zealand, poverty and inequality, Public Choice, public economics, welfare reform Tags: universal basic income
Questions for @grantrobertson1 on the #UBI @JordNZ
30 Mar 2016 1 Comment
in labour economics, labour supply, politics - New Zealand, poverty and inequality, welfare reform Tags: flat rate tax, New Zealand Labour Party, top tax rate, universal basic income
Labor Party finance spokesman Grant Robertson yesterday ruled out an income rate tax of 50% to fund a Universal Basic Income. Labour is considering a Universal Basic Income. It released a background paper for that purpose as part of its Future of Work Commission.
Source: Taxpayers’ Union rubbishes Universal Basic Income idea | Stuff.co.nz.
Questions arise as to how the Labour Party will fund its Universal Basic Income after ruling out a tax rate of 50%. As Brain Easton said:
Many advocates put the UMI forward without doing the sums. Those who do find that the required tax rates are horrendous or the minimum income is so low that it is not a viable means of eliminating poverty. Among the latter are New Zealanders Douglas, Gareth Morgan and Keith Rankin.
The Labour Party’s background paper already has said that the Universal Basic Income proposed by the Morgan Foundation is insufficient because many beneficiaries and all retirees will be much worse off. They receive much more in income support under the existing welfare state and they would under a Universal Basic Income of $11,000 per adult as proposed by the Morgan Foundation.
The solution proposed by the Labour Party is a supplemental income transfers to ensure no one is worse under a Universal Basic Income. This will greatly increase the cost of a Universal Basic income in comparison to the Morgan Foundation proposals.
https://twitter.com/grantrobertson1/status/711758860659240960
A series of questions come to mind that the Labour Party and its finance spokesman Grant Robinson must answer if they are to go anywhere with a Universal Basic Income;
- Is not the point of a Universal Basic Income to replace the welfare state, not supplement it?
- How will the Labour Party fund its Universal Basic Income plus the supplemental income transfers without introducing a $8 billion tax on capital income (including the family home) as in the Morgan Foundation’s proposals?
- The Universal Basic Income proposed by the Morgan Foundation requires $13 billion in extra taxes ($8 billion from taxing capital and $5 billion from a 30% flat-rate income tax) so how much more to that will Labour need for a Universal Basic Income plus supplemental income transfers?
- What is the maximum top marginal income tax rate that Labour will consider to fund a Universal Basic Income?
- Will the Labour Party’s Universal Basic Income be funded by a flat rate income tax or a progressive income tax system?
Source: How we pay for a universal basic income – Whiteboard Wednesday.It would have been my first point
The brutal utilitarian calculus of @NoahSmith @livingwageNZ @berniesanders
29 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, labour economics, minimum wage Tags: living wage
The bleeding heart concerns of the Left for job losses from economic policy changes such as from trade liberalisation disappears as soon as they discuss the losers from a living wage increase.
Instead of may the heavens may fall but a manufacturing job must not be lost from trade liberalisation, a brutal utilitarian calculus overtakes Noah Smith and the living wage movement about the small number of job losses that result from modest increases in the minimum wage.
Most are those who support the minimum wage shift gears their applied welfare economics in all other social context to emphasise how the losers should be given priority and greater weight when adding up the social gains and social losses of economic change.
The social cost of the minimum wage is not discussed in this way: how many jobs are lost and that these job losses are much more important than any gains to society.
All that is done is the number of jobs lost is compared with some other social metrics such as how much the wages go up for those that still have a job and that is enough to conclude that there is a socially beneficial change from a minimum wage increase.
Any low paid workers affected by the minimum wage increase are just reduced to numbers and added and subtracted with great ease and few moral compunctions about interpersonal comparisons of utility.
A minimum wage increase is not free if one worker loses their job. The Paretian Criterion states that welfare is said to increase or decrease if at least one person is made better off or worse off with no change in the positions of others.
As Rawls pointed out, a general problem that throws utilitarianism into question is some people’s interests, or even lives, can be sacrificed if doing so will maximize total satisfaction. As Rawls says:
[ utilitarianism] adopt[s] for society as a whole the principle of choice for one man… there is a sense in which classical utilitarianism fails to take seriously the distinction between persons.
Minimum wage advocates fail to take seriously that low paid workers who lose their jobs because of minimum wage increases are real living people who suffer when their interests are traded off for the greater good of their fellow low paid workers, some of whom come from much wealthier households.
It's pretty simple: Minimum Wage = Compulsory Unemployment http://t.co/6xiX6YCp9Z—
Mark J. Perry (@Mark_J_Perry) July 25, 2015
As Rawls pointed out, a general problem that throws utilitarianism into question is some people’s interests, or even lives, can be sacrificed if doing so will maximize total satisfaction. As Rawls says:
[ utilitarianism] adopt[s] for society as a whole the principle of choice for one man… there is a sense in which classical utilitarianism fails to take seriously the distinction between persons.
Minimum wage advocates fail to take seriously that low paid workers who lose their jobs because of minimum wage increases are real living people who suffer when their interests are traded off for the greater good of their fellow low paid workers, some of whom come from much wealthier households. Obviously the teenagers and adults thrown onto the scrapheap of society by an increased minimum wage don’t count in the brutal utilitarian calculus Noah Smith and the living wage movement employs.
All part of @BernieSanders’ good old days before the top 1% looted everything
26 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, economic history, economics of media and culture, politics - USA, poverty and inequality, technological progress

@suemoroney the Maori economy is not $39 billion, it is much more @Maori_Party
26 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in economic history, economics of education, human capital, labour economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: Maori economic development
Much of the non-European human capital in New Zealand is Maori and it far exceeded $39 billion 20 years ago or more. Attempts to quantify the Maori economy by counting up the value of Maori institutions and businesses distracts from the main priority for Maori economic development which is education, education, education.
Source: Lˆe Thi. Vˆan Tr`ınh, Estimating the monetary value of the stock of human capital for New Zealand, University of Canterbury PhD thesis (September 2006), Table 4.6: Aggregate human capital stock by ethnicity.
Unemployment rates across the OECD in 2015
26 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in business cycles, economic growth, Euro crisis, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, job search and matching, labour economics, macroeconomics, unemployment
Was Occupy Wall Street based on a measurement error?
26 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, economic history, entrepreneurship, human capital, labour economics, poverty and inequality Tags: entrepreneurial alertness, superstar wages, superstars, top 0.1%, top 1%
Piketty and Saez (2003, updated) estimated the share of income held by the top 1% from 13 percent in 1991 to 23 percent in 2012. The new Bricker et al. research shows only a 7 percentage point increase to 18 percent in 2012. The share held by the super-rich, the top 0.1% has increased much at all.
Source: Measuring income and wealth at the top using administrative and survey data via How super-rich Americans get that way is changing – AEI | Pethokoukis Blog » AEIdeas.
Source: Measuring income and wealth at the top using administrative and survey data via How super-rich Americans get that way is changing – AEI | Pethokoukis Blog » AEIdeas.
The gender pay gap, adjusted and unadjusted, USA, UK, Australia, Germany and France
26 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in discrimination, econometerics, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice Tags: gender wage gap
https://twitter.com/adchamberlain/status/712647716229111808
Source: Demystifying the Gender Pay Gap: Evidence from Glassdoor Salary Data – Glassdoor Economic Research via Wednesday evening links – AEI | Carpe Diem Blog » AEIdeas.
https://twitter.com/adchamberlain/status/713097526878953472
.
Drug testing helps minority job applicants @jacindaardern
25 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of information, entrepreneurship, human capital, labour economics, personnel economics Tags: asymmetric information, counter-signalling, employer discrimination, racial discrimination, screening, signalling, statistical discrimination
Statistical discrimination is a harsh mistress. If reliable measures of the quality of job applicants are unavailable for short-listing, such as credit checks, coarser, less reliable screening devices will be employed. That was the case when credit checks were prohibited in employment recruitment:
Looking at 74 million job listings between 2007 and 2013, Clifford and Shoag found that employers started to become pickier, especially in cities where there were a lot of workers with low credit scores. If a credit-check ban went into effect, job postings were more likely to ask for a bachelor’s degree, and to require additional years of experience.
There are other ways that employers could have also become more discerning, Shoag says. They might have started to rely on referrals or recommendations to make sure that applicants were high-quality. In the absence of credit information to establish trustworthiness, they may even have fallen back on racial stereotypes to screen candidates. The researchers couldn’t measure these tactics, but they’re possibilities.
Drug testing allows employers to dispel less accurate stereotypes about drug use among different ethnic and social groups. They increased hiring of minorities because a reliable measure became available of their drug use:
…after a pro-testing law is passed in a state, African-American employment increases in sectors that have high testing rates (mining, manufacturing, transportation, utilities, and government).
These increases are substantial: African-American employment in these industries increases by 7-30%. Because these industries tend to pay wage premia and to have larger firms offering better benefits, African-American wages and benefits coverage also increase. Real wages increase by 1.4-13% relative to whites. The largest shifts in employment and wages occur for low skilled African-American men.
I also find suggestive evidence that employers substitute white women for African-Americans in the absence of testing. Gains in hiring African-Americans in these sectors may have come at the expense of women, particularly in states with large African-American populations.
Employers test for drug use both for health and safety reasons and as a way of screening out less reliable employees. People who break the rules are not reliable employees and that includes taking drugs. In low skill jobs, what employers seek is a recruit who is friendly and reliable.
Testing of the skills of workers also showed similar results. What happened is that the ratio of black to white hirings do not change. The administration of these skills tests allowed the more productive of both white and black job applicants to be identified and hired.
Employers already had an accurate stereotype of the average skills of different ethnic groups. Administration of tests allow them to identify which members of each group were the most productive.
It is a standard result that statistical discrimination improves the chances of below-average applicants subject to the stereotype but harms those of above average quality. For that reason, applicants look for what methods of counter-signalling to show that they are indeed a quality applicant – make themselves stand out from the crowd.
Employers profit from developing screening devices that go beyond stereotypes to identify above-average applicants. They want screening devices that find those who do not otherwise stand out from the crowd because of difficulties in transferring credible information about their quality. This is a special difficulty with low-skilled vacancies because hiring is made based much more than on character than experience.


Recent Comments