Two impossible things alert: supporting both a higher youth minimum wage and a larger youth wage subsidy

The New Zealand Labour Party is one of many parties on the Left and Right that support youth wage subsidies as a way of making it cheaper for employers to hire teenagers. The rationale is if you make it cheaper to hire teenagers, employers will hire more of them.

New Zealand Labour Party is one of many parties on the Left and occasionally on the Right that supports a youth minimum wage

Supporters of youth minimum wages do not believe that making teenagers more expensive to hire will harm their employment prospects.

Indeed, it is even argued that a higher minimum wage will increase the employment of  teenagers and adults.

Minimum wages are supported because the price of labour doesn’t matter that much  to the employment prospects  of teenagers and adults.

Wage subsidies is supported because the price of labour is important to the employment prospects of teenagers and adults.

Capitalism is blinded by one colour – Thomas Sowell

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Milton Friedman on the overstated impact of unions

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Recall and waiting unemployment

Time use surveys in a range of countries show that the unemployed spend maybe a few hours per week looking for a new job. Krueger and Mueller (2008) found that:

…average search time is highest in the U.S.A., at 32.3 minutes per day, closely followed by Canada.

Europeans search much less, but there is considerable variation across countries.

In France the unemployed search around 21 minutes a day compared with 3 minutes in Finland

A small amount of job search per week is rational for many of the unemployed because a major form of job search doesn’t involve any job search any time soon. Instead, they are waiting for a call.

Also, Anglo-Saxon labour market are  much more dynamic with many more vacancies opening every month  as compared with the Eurosclerosis dual labour markets. In the European Union’s dual labour markets, it is not rational to search for vacancies that will never be there.

Job searches is an entrepreneurial venture that can involve a considerable amount of biding your time. Job seekers must choose between wider job search that may involve switching to a new industry or new occupation and investing in availability for suitable vacancies in their local labour markets or a recall to employment by old employers.

A spell of unemployment followed by a rehire by an old employer is known as recall unemployment or a temporary layoff.

Demand is less stable and more seasonal in industries such as construction, manufacturing and agriculture. When demand rebounds, recalling an old employee is a faster and cheaper hiring process than screening unfamiliar applicants of uncertain quality and training recruits.

Recall is not certain. Temporary layoffs will forecast their chances of recall and review these forecasts as they discover more about the length of drop in local labour demand and the general state of the rest of the labour market.  the majority of unemployed who  regard themselves as temporary layoffs are indeed recalled  to their old job by their old employer after most downturns.

Better prospects of recall by old employers will reduce the intensity of job searches of temporary layoffs and increase their asking wages for other jobs. Workers with considerable industry and firm-specific human capital are likely to risk waiting longer for recall. Workers will search more intensively for other jobs as their forecasts of their chances of recall to old jobs become less encouraging.

There are more temporary layoffs in milder recessions because the lull in demand is expected to be short and there are fewer business closures. The higher levels of recall unemployment will reduce downward pressure on asking wages and slow the filling of vacancies because many well qualified job applicants are waiting for recall to their old jobs rather than applying more widely for new jobs.

Dixon and Crichton (2006) found that 58% of New Zealand benefit-to-work transitions involved starting with a new employer, 30% continued with an employer for whom they worked part-time in the benefit spell and 12% returned to an employer they had worked for in the past 2 years. The prospect of a recall by an old employer has been important for unemployed workers in countries such as the US, Canada, Demark, Sweden, Austria and Norway.

In the context of work-for-the-dole schemes and activation programmes that involve intensive monitoring of job search by the unemployed on unemployment benefits, requiring  workers who are temporarily laid off to search for jobs is in many ways counter-productive.

Developing a screening mechanism to find these temporary layoffs and distinguishing them from permanent layoffs would be quite challenging. Countries which have unemployment insurance premiums spend a lot of try trying to adjust those premiums for temporary layoffs. This is so employers and employees do not take advantage of unemployment insurance to have a week or two off work in slack periods at the expense of the unemployment insurance system and top up their wages in the interim.

A cousin of recall unemployment is  rest unemployment or waiting unemployment – job seekers who are waiting for conditions in a depressed sector to improve (Hamilton 1988; Alvarez and Shimer 2008).

Some job seekers may wait for local labour market conditions to improve, rather than search for jobs in other industries and new occupations. A job seeker’s old industry may offer better wage and job finding prospects than other industries If the  newly unemployed worker waits a while. 

Rest unemployment or waiting unemployment strives to salvage as much of the occupation and industry-specific human capital  of the  newly unemployed worker as possible.

A significant share of job seekers have been found to be waiting for local labour market conditions to improve rather than searching further afield  in different industries or new occupations (Alvarez and Shimer 2008).

Again, rest unemployment or waiting unemployment is a type of job search that cannot be well handled by work-for-the-dole schemes and intensive monitoring of the job search of unemployed workers.

Job finding rates under work for the dole when there is involuntary unemployment

Jeff Borland is a critic of work for the dole. He points out that they do not improve the job finding rates of participants and in fact reduce the amount of job search because work for the Dole participants are busy undertaking work for the dole requirements:

The main reason is that participation in the program diverts participants from job seeking activity towards Work for the Dole activity. Research on similar programs internationally has come up with comparable findings.

This made me wonder. If unemployment is caused by deficient aggregate demand, and otherwise is involuntary, how can work for the dole increase unemployment or reduce the rate at which people exit unemployment?

‘Involuntary’ unemployment occurs when all those willing and able to work at the given real wage but no job is available, i.e. the economy is below full employment. A worker is ‘involuntary’ unemployment if he or she would accept a job at the given real wage. Keynesians believe money wages are slow to adjust (e.g. due to money illusion, fixed contracts or because employers and employees want long run money wage stability), and so the real wage may no adjust to clear the labour market: there can be ‘involuntary’ unemployment.

Under the deficient aggregate demand theory of unemployment, people have no control over why they are unemployed – that’s why their unemployment is involuntary.

Sticky wages are no less sticky when work for the dole is introduced and people search more intensively for jobs. Deficient demand unemployment is no less deficient when there is an increase in job search intensity.

Work for the dole must be carefully defined, of course, to differentiate it from the failed active labour market programs of the past that attempted to improve the employability of the unemployed. By work for the dole, I simply mean mandatory work requirements simply make it more of an ordeal to be on unemployment and thereby encourage people to find a job.

Mandatory work requirements simply tax leisure. By taxing leisure,  mandatory work requirements  change the work leisure trade-off between unemployment and seeking a job with greater zeal and a lower asking wage more attractive option. More applicants asking for lower wages will mean employers can fill jobs faster and at lower wages, which means our create more jobs in the first place.

The probability of finding a job for an unemployed worker depends on how hard this individual searches and how many jobs are available: Chance of Finding Job = Search Effort x Job Availability

Both the search effort of the unemployed and job creation decisions by employers are potentially affected by unemployment benefit generosity and mandatory work for welfare benefits requirements.

Modern theory of the labour market, based on Mortensen and Pissarides provides that more generous unemployment benefits put upward pressure on wages the unemployed seek. If wages go up, holding worker productivity constant, the amount left to cover the cost of job creation by firms declines, leading to a decline in job creation.

Everything else equal under the labour macroeconomics workhorse search and matching model of the labour market, reducing the rewards of being unemployed exerts downward pressure on the equilibrium wage. This fall in asking wages increases the profits employers receive from filled jobs, leading to more vacancy creation. More vacancies imply a higher finding rate for workers, which leads to less unemployment.  The vacancy creation decision is based on comparing the cost of creating a job to the profits the firm expects to obtain from hiring the worker.

When unemployment benefits are less generous or more onerous work requirements are attached, some of the unemployed will become less choosey about the jobs they seek in the wages they will accept.  a number of people at the margin between working or not. An example is commuting distance  to jobs. A number of people turn down a job  because is just that little too far to commute. A small change in the cost of  accepting that job would have resulted in them moving from being unemployed to fully employed.

Unemployment is easy to explain in modern labour macroeconomics: it takes time for a job seeker to find a suitable job with a firm that wishes to hire him or her; it takes time for a firm to fill a vacancy. Search is required on both sides of the labour market  –  there are always would-be workers searching for jobs, and firms searching for workers to fill vacancies.

In a recession, a large number of jobs are destroyed at the same time. It takes time for these unemployed workers to be reallocated new jobs.  It takes time for firms to find where it is profitable to create new jobs and find workers suitable to fill these new jobs.

Recessions are reorganisations. Unemployed workers look for jobs, and firms open vacancies to maximize their profits. Matching  unemployed workers with  new firms firms is a time-consuming and costly process.

The demand for labour is a derived demand

The willingness to pay of buyers is the fundamental constraint on wages, conditions, and job amenities including reduced hours of work. Entrepreneurs will not pay no more for inputs – be it labour, land, machinery, or raw materials – than they expect to recoup later on from the sale of their final product (Hicks 1932; Hamermesh 1996).

Wages reflect the value the employee adds to the sales of the firm. The value of what an employee adds is set by the consumers who buy or abstain from buying the output of the firm.

The prices that the final consumer will pay or refuse to pay for products assigns to each kind of labour used in its production a maximum profitable wage. An employer cannot pay higher wages or provide more generous working conditions if buyers are not willing to pay more to cover the extra cost of this (Hicks 1932; Stigler 1987). A profit minded employer cannot grant favours to employees at the expense of customers.

Employers compete for the services of workers who are seeking a range of jobs in industry and occupational labour markets in the areas in which they live. An employer who offers wages, working hours and conditions below what others are paying for the extra value added by a worker will experience higher staff turnover as employees quit to more rewarded jobs elsewhere (Stigler 1987).

These less alert employers will also struggle to recruit and retain the types of workers that are the most profitable for that firm to employ unless they pay the going rate. Rivalry with other sellers sets the maximum on what an employer can profitably pay in wages and survive.

Competition from other employers sets a minimum in wages, hours, working conditions and job amenities to recruit and retain a profitable workforce. Wages are demarked both by what consumers are willing to pay for what the firm produces and by what wages that rival employers are offering in comparable jobs (Stigler 1987).

H.L. Mencken on poverty as a cause of crime

HT: David Skarbek

Teen employment and the minimum wage: sixty years of U.S. experience

Teenemployment

In every episode, except 1996 (which is the smallest hike relative to average wages), there was a distinct decline in the trend of teen employment in the few months before the initial hike until a few months after the follow-up hike. This led Kevin Erdmann to ask:

Is there any other issue where the data conforms so strongly to basic economic intuition, and yet is widely written off as a coincidence?

HT: idiosyncraticwhisk.blogspot

Down and out in the USA isn’t what it used to be

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P.J. O’Rourke on the new-found obsession of the 60s generation with safety

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P.J. O’Rourke on the safety Nazis

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Calmfor’s Iron Law of Active Labour Market Policy.

Lars Calmfors is a Swedish economist whose main interest is labour makets.

His iron law of Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) refers to a characteristic of make work schemes, like the WPA that operated in the United States in the 1930s.

The characteristic or problem with these schemes is that if people are attracted to these schemes by generous pay or conditions, their motive to search for regular work is necessarily reduced.

Assuming unemployment is anywhere near NAIRU, the effect of this reduced aggregate labour supply will be inflationary, which means that demand will have to be reduced, which in turn means that the jobs created by the make work scheme will be, at least to some extent, at the expense of regular jobs.

Alternatively, if people are coerced into joining make work schemes because of what might be called a “workfare” sanction, their job search efforts are not reduced, thus the jobs created by the make work scheme have a better chance of not being at the expense of normal jobs.

via RALPHONOMICS: Calmfor’s Iron Law of Active Labour Market Policy..

How flexible is the New Zealand labour market

The first chart below shows that NZ is the 4th most deregulated labour market for individual dismissals.

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Source: OECD employment protection index

The next figure below shows that NZ is top of the world for deregulation of lay-offs and redundancies.

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Source: OECD employment protection index

The chart below shows that New Zealand is far more flexible than in Western Europe and is pretty near the USA in terms of people moving in and out of the unemployment pool every month with great ease.

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Source: Elsby, Hobijn  and Şahin (2013).

There are very high outflow rates from unemployment among the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic economies. The economies of Continental Europe stand in stark contrast. Unemployment outflow rates in these economies lie below 10% at a monthly frequency.

A major labour market reform in recent years in New Zealand was introduction of the option of a 90 day trial for new employees, initially in small businesses and then in all businesses.

The UK recently extended its trial period from one-year to two-years. Trial periods are common in OECD member countries.

There is plenty of evidence to back-up the notion that increased job security leads to less employee effort and more absenteeism. Some examples are:

· Sick leave spiking straight after probation periods ended;

· Teacher absenteeism increasing after getting tenure after 5-years; and

· Academic productivity declining after winning tenure.

The MBIE research into the actual operation of 90-day trials was highly favourable in terms of increased employment, the hiring of riskier applicants and lower costs of ending bad job matches (about 15-20% of trials did not work out). These outcomes are the usual importance of a test drive argument for employment trial periods.

Interestingly, the MBIE research also found that some employers hired new employees on 90-day trials for positions about which these employers were uncertain might be profitable. But for the option of the trial period, these jobs never would have existed.

This suggests that in some firms, 90-day trials are a decisively cheaper alternative to hiring an employee and perhaps making them redundant later if the new position does not pay for itself. No one’s fault: the market just did not sustain the expansion in staff as expected.

The MBIE research shows that winners from 90-day trials are new labour force entrants, the unemployed and beneficiaries, migrants and labour force re-entrants such as mothers.

I kept note of an interesting press report adding to this where Hospitality New Zealand Wellington president Jeremy Smith said he had hired dozens of staff he would not otherwise have considered. Because of the transient nature of the hospitality industry, it was often difficult to check references so a trial period “levelled the playing field”.

The politics of ethnicity-based research in New Zealand

When Simon Chapple in 2000 wrote “Māori Socio-Economic Disparity”, which showed that disadvantage in New Zealand is more closely tied to age, marital status, education, skills, and geographic location than it is to ethnicity, broadly conceived, such as Māori ethnicity:

  • He was summoned before the Māori Affairs Committee of parliament to defend his paper! His chief executive at the Ministry of Social Policy went along with him to defend what he wrote while employed as a senior analyst at the Department of Labour. Staff at his new ministry launched a petition to have Simon fired.
  • The head of the Māori Affairs Ministry accused Simon of breaching the public service code of conduct.

Chapple also found that there are important differences in socio economic development by Māori self-identity. Those who identified only as Māori did worse than those that are identified as Māori and another ethnicity. Identifying only as Māori also correlated with living in rural New Zealand.

In terms of employment discrimination, employers would not know whether a Māori job applicant identified as only as Māori or also with another ethnicity, so discrimination is not a good explanation of Māori disadvantage because of this counterfactual. A major driver of Māori disadvantage, which is identifying on the Census form solely as Maori, is simply unknown to discriminating employers as a basis for discrimination in hiring and promotion.

There were editorials in the Dominion Post, which I cannot find online,  and in the New Zealand Herald. The latter said:

The Government is being prodded to recognise that Maori deprivation has more to do with socio-economic factors than ethnicity.

This was the conclusion of a report by the Labour Department’s senior research analyst, Simon Chapple. Helen Clark might well have had that finding partly in mind when she referred to a lot of water having gone under the bridge since the Government first formulated legislation.

Mr Chapple said, in essence, that place of residence, age, education and skills had more to do with poverty than race. In areas such as South Auckland, Northland and the central North Island, there were poor Maori, but there were also poor Pākehā and poor Pasifika.

The Minister attacked him and the paper as well for contradicting the Minister’s claim during the election campaign that everything got worse for Maori in the 1990s.

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Real equivalised median household income rose 47% from 1994 to 2010; for Māori, this rise was 68%; for Pasifika, 77% (Perry July 2014)

See Karen Baehler’s Ethnicity-based research and politics: snapshots from the United States and New Zealand for more information and a comparison with the similar response to Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s The Negro Family: A Case for National Action in 1965.

About a quarter of Negro families are headed by women. The divorce rate is about 2 1/2 times what it is [compared with whites],” Moynihan said. “The number of fatherless children keeps growing. And all these things keep getting worse, not better, over recent years.”

Moynihan, now retired from the United States Senate, was a senior official in LBJ’s Labor Department in 1965. He wrote his report on a typewriter over a few weeks and had the publications office in the basement of the Labor Department print 100 of them, marked “For Official Use Only.”

  • He warned about the breakdown of the African-American family where deprivation and disorganisation had formed their own vicious circle.
  • Many civil rights leaders had labelled Moynihan’s report a subtle form of racism because of its unflattering portrayal of the black family (Wilson 1987).
  • These accusations of racism helped make the breakdown of the family a taboo subject in social policy in the USA

see The Moynihan Report Revisited: Lessons and Reflections after Four Decades for a review by the best and the brightest in American economics and sociology on Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s prophetic warnings. Holzer says, for  example:

Moynihan was extremely insightful and even prescient in arguing that the employment situation of young black men was a “crisis . . . that would only grow worse.”

He understood that these trends involve both limits on labour market opportunities that these young men face as well as skill deficits of and behavioural responses by the young men themselves.

More children are growing-up without a working father living in the home and glean the awareness that work is a central expectation of adult life (Wilson 1987, 1996).

Single-parent households increased from 13 per cent of all Māori households in 1981 to 24.4 per cent in the 2006 Census. In the 2006 Census, 70 per cent of Māori single parent households were on a low income compared to 15 per cent of other Māori one family households (Kiro, Randow and Sporle 2010).

Most of the skill gaps that are present at the age of 18 – skill gaps which substantially explain gaps in adult earnings and employment in all groups – are also present at the age of five (Cunha and Heckman 2007). There is much evidence to show that disadvantaged children have lower levels of soft skills (non-cognitive skills): motivation, persistence, self-discipline, the ability to work with others, the ability to defer gratification and plan ahead, etc. (Heckman 2008). Most of the skills that are acquired at school build on these soft skills that are moulded and reinforced within whānau.

When I started working on labour economics in 2007 I found that the labour economics of Māori was very narrowly written and stayed well clear of the minefield that Simon braved about how ethnicity does not matter that much to Māori social disadvantage.

Lessons from field trials with work mandates

Table1_RANDRevRevised_1202

One of the most controversial aspect of the U.S. program changes are the negative incentives – time limits, sanctions, and diversion – that are built into their structure.

All of these policies limit the entitlement to cash public assistance, by either enforcing behavioural requirements (such as work search) or limiting the availability of assistance.

As Besley and Coate (1992) pointed out, linking such requirements with public assistance payments can help deter welfare participation among those who could find a job on their own.

The majority of evaluations of mandatory welfare-to-work programs show significant increases in labour supply and reduced welfare dependency. The drawback is the increase in wage income is greatly offset by the decline in benefit income. In–work tax credits played a major role in making work pay in 1996 U.S. welfare reform

The Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) was implemented in 1994 and provided a strong earnings threshold, allowing women to receive some cash assistance until their earnings reached about 140 per cent of the U.S. poverty line. It also required participation in mandatory job search programs.

A randomly assigned control group remained in AFDC without work requirements or substantial earnings thresholds. MFIP involved both strong negative and positive work incentives. A subset of the treatment group (also randomly assigned) was provided with the earnings thresholds but not the mandatory work requirements.

The MFIP results allow the separate and joint effects of mandatory job search and earnings thresholds to be explored. When only positive work incentives are provided through an expanded earnings threshold, this has little effect on labour supply, consistent with earlier results. The additional income provided by these higher thresholds had strong income-increasing and poverty-reducing effects. Once mandatory work requirements are added to MFIP, then labour supply increases as well, but there is little further effect on income or poverty.

The evaluations of MFIP suggest that the stick of work requirements increases labour supply, but has little effect on overall income as increases in earnings are offset by reduced benefits.

The carrot of greater earnings thresholds provides an income enhancing effect. When used together, there is increased work and higher earnings, along with reduced poverty.

The relatively strong measures to mandate work participation can be effective. Work mandates with sanctions are more effective at inducing work than are more financial incentives. Strict work requirements by themselves may have little income-enhancing effects if they are not combined with some form of wage support for the low-skilled.

Education and training programs do not seem any more effective in promoting labour force attachment and increased earnings than work experience programs. In various welfare reform experiments in the U.S. during the 1990s, states tested training programs – human capital development programs — against work first programs – labour force attachment programs.

The work-first programs increased earnings and decreased welfare usage faster, while human capital development programs cost more, particularly in the first year when women were training rather than working.

But even three years out, after women from human capital development programs had been in the labour market two years, human capital development participants still did not outperform labour force attachment participants.

This may suggest that the gains to experience among women who have been out of the labour market may be larger than the gains to formal education and training. Employment outcomes did not seem significantly worse among less skilled participants or participants with identifiable barriers to work, such as child care or health problems. Learning by doing and job match and job search capital are major sources of hard-to-measure post-school human capital and wages growth even for less skilled workers. Work-first programmes suggest that the reward from working which is human capital as well as wages are greater than an investment in time away from working to train.

The dual emphasis in the U.S. welfare reforms on positive work incentives and more punitive work mandates seems to have been important.

Work mandates (mandatory welfare-to-work programs, backed by sanctions and time limits) forced more people into work faster than would have naturally left welfare even strong economic environments. With low wages and (often) part-time hours, many welfare leavers would have gained little in income without subsidies to low-wage work. Reduced earnings thresholds, the expanded EITC, and subsidies to assist with child care or other work related expenses, all helped make work pay.

Table4_RANDRevised_1202

Diagrams HT: rand.org Conflicting Benefits Trade-Offs in Welfare Reform by Jeffrey Grogger, Lynn A. Karoly, and Jacob Alex Klerman (2002).

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