Are Uber drivers twice as likely to be murdered as a cop?
30 Jan 2015 2 Comments
in economics of crime, economics of regulation, health and safety, labour economics, law and economics, occupational choice Tags: compensating differentials, occupational hazards, police, taxi regulation, Uber
The Public Has Lightened Up on Weed
27 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
Best mug shot ever
27 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of crime Tags: Darwin awards, dumbest criminals, mug shots
Double standards on terrorism
26 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, war and peace Tags: Gaza Strip, Hamas, Israel, Leftover Left, Osama bin Laden, war on terror
It is only illegal if you get caught?
26 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
These are undercover officers?
25 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, economics of media and culture, law and economics, personnel economics, politics - USA Tags: Undercover police
A simple model of crime waves, riots and revolution
23 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economics of crime, labour economics, law and economics, occupational choice Tags: Alexander Tabarrok, crime waves, revolutions, riots
In ‘A simple model of crime waves, riots, and revolutions’, Alexander Tabarrok puts forward a model of crime waves that applies not only to crime but also to phenomena like riots, strikes, and revolutions.
- In each of these cases, the probability of being punished is a decreasing function of the total amount of the activity.
- The probability that a rioter is apprehended falls the more rioters there are.
- The probability that a striker or a revolutionary is punished is less the greater the number of strikers and revolutionaries. This is true even if the revolution or strike fails.
The standard model of crime analyses a criminal’s decisions as if they were unrelated to the decisions of other criminals.
The game-theoretic approach examines the entire system of criminal decisions exploring the implications of interdependence.
As crime increases, police resources become strained at the margin and the probability of punishment falls, causing other criminals to increase their criminal activities.
As others turn to crime, the probability of punishment falls even further, giving each individual an additional reason to increase his criminal activities.
Joining into a revolution or a riot has the same calculus of independence. You are less likely to be caught and punished if you will face in the crowd.
This interdependence in the probability of detection, arrest and punishment lowers the cost of participation. Not surprisingly, judges of been aware of this for some time and have hand out severe punishments such as after the 2011 London riots. These riots fell away sharply once these penalties were handed out and more police were on the streets to catch rioters.
Chapple and Boston on the extent of welfare benefit fraud in New Zealand
22 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, labour economics, law and economics, welfare reform Tags: child poverty, crime and punishment, deterrence, Jonathan Boston, Simon Chapple, welfare fraud, welfare reform
What is more surprising about this honest disclosure of welfare fraud to the Household Labour Force Survey of Statistics New Zealand in 2011 is these welfare beneficiaries were so upfront about their criminal fraud.
These estimates must underestimate the extent of welfare fraud because some of these criminals would be aware that they should be slightly discreet in the company of any government official when discussing their eligibility for welfare benefits and any false information supplied in their claims for welfare benefits.
Some welfare cheats are alert to this basic criminal skill and do not claim their benefit if called in to the welfare benefits office for a reassessment of their eligibility. They don’t have the front to go near a government official while defrauding the taxpayer.
Yes, welfare fraud is a crime so people who perpetrated these crimes by obtaining welfare benefits under false pretences are criminals. If these criminals are caught, they are prosecuted for a crime and sometimes sent to prison.
HT: Muriel Newman
Some more economics of gun free zones
21 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economics of crime, law and economics Tags: gun control, gun free zones
HT: Dan Mitchell
A true dilemma has emerged for the Anti-science Left
20 Jan 2015 1 Comment
in economics of crime, health economics Tags: activists, antiscience left, GMOs, marijuana decriminalisation, medical marijuana
Some economics of gun free zones
20 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economics of crime, law and economics Tags: gun control, gun free zones
HT: Dan Mitchell
Security services can be stretched quite easily in their surveillance of terrorist suspects
17 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
Recent Comments