via Finland is the poster child for why the euro doesn’t work – The Washington Post.
Finland is the poster child for why the euro doesn’t work
24 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, global financial crisis (GFC), macroeconomics Tags: Euro land, Finland, recessions and recoveries, Sweden
Unemployment rates by education in the USA
21 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, economics of education, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, human capital, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, unemployment Tags: education premium, labour market demographics
June jobless rate for people 25+ with
B.A. or more 2.5%
High school diploma 5.4%
No H.S. 8.2%
on.wsj.com/1LG1B6z http://t.co/luUUuw9h1V—
Sudeep Reddy (@Reddy) July 02, 2015
Trends in labour market freedom in the UK, USA, Germany and France – Index of Economic Freedom rankings
21 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, economics of regulation, global financial crisis (GFC), job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, law and economics, minimum wage, politics - USA, unions Tags: British economy, employment law, employment regulation, Eurosclerosis, France, Germany, Index of Economic Freedom
The writers of the Index of Economic Freedom at the Heritage foundation really loves the USA and didn’t think much of the Conservative Party – Liberal Democratic Party coalition government because labour market freedom actually fell in the UK during their administration. Bring back Tony Blair, all is forgiven. The information on their website throws no insight into why this reduction in labour market freedom in Britain happened.
Figure 1: Index of Economic Freedom, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, 95 – 2015 
Source: Index of Economic Freedom 2015.
Fortunately for Germany, labour market freedom increased over the course of the global financial crisis and its aftermath. This helps explains low unemployment in Germany during that period. Nothing much happened in France in regard to labour market freedom.
Greece debt crisis in 90 seconds
18 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in economic growth, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, international economics, law and economics Tags: Greece, sovereign defaults
A lot of countries borrowed a lot of money recently
18 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in budget deficits, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, macroeconomics Tags: Greece, Italy, Japan, sovereign debt, sovereign default, Spain
Greece is unlikely to be the last sovereign debt restructuring of this cycle wsj.com/articles/greec… via @greg_ip http://t.co/YnvOuDurDL—
Nick Timiraos (@NickTimiraos) July 16, 2015
John Cochrane on a big hole in the Greek bailout (and media analysis of the bailout)
15 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in currency unions, Euro crisis, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, macroeconomics, monetary economics Tags: bank runs, banking panics, Greece, John Cochrane, lender of last resort, sovereign bailouts, sovereign default
An average of 41% of Greek bank assets are non-performing, with loan repayments 90 days overdue or more (Barclays). http://t.co/HfXV8uapkj—
Mike Bird (@Birdyword) July 13, 2015
There were large cross-country differences in long-term unemployment duration both before and after the GFC
15 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in Euro crisis, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, unemployment, welfare reform Tags: equilibrium unemployment rate, Eurosclerosis, natural unemployment rate, unemployment duration
77% more long-term unemployed people than before the crisis – We need them back in work! bit.ly/1JTTzYm #Jobs http://t.co/EFRGclFVms—
OECD Social (@OECD_Social) July 10, 2015
Hysteresis in practice, Delong-Summers Variety @delong @LHSummers http://t.co/urqxQBi6NE—
Roger E. A. Farmer (@farmerrf) July 23, 2015
Unemployment rates across OECD member countries
14 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in Euro crisis, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, job search and matching, labour economics, macroeconomics, unemployment Tags: unemployment rates
Greek and US great depressions compared
14 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, economic history, Euro crisis, global financial crisis (GFC), great depression, great recession, job search and matching, labour economics, macroeconomics, unemployment Tags: Greece
https://twitter.com/ianbremmer/status/620570062538309632/photo/1
Greek Depression vs US Depression:
Unemployment http://t.co/81efYi5Ajy—
ian bremmer (@ianbremmer) July 13, 2015
Financial crises surprisingly common, but few countries close their banks
10 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, currency unions, economic history, economics of regulation, Euro crisis, financial economics, global financial crisis (GFC), law and economics, macroeconomics, monetary economics, property rights Tags: bank runs, banking crises, banking panic, financial crises, Greece, sovereign default
Financial crises surprisingly common, but few countries close their banks pewrsr.ch/1NQyz2P #Greece http://t.co/pK0sfB49Ka—
PewResearch FactTank (@FactTank) July 09, 2015
The left-wing solution to Greek bankruptcy
10 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, currency unions, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), income redistribution, liberalism, macroeconomics, Marxist economics, Public Choice, public economics, rentseeking Tags: Eurosclerosis, expressive voting, Greece, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, sovereign default
Why Greece joined the Euro
06 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, budget deficits, business cycles, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, currency unions, economic growth, economic history, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, fisheries economics, global financial crisis (GFC), international economics, macroeconomics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: Euro sclerosis, Greece, insurance attacks, sovereign defaults, speculative attacks
The roots of Greece’s crisis are simple. Before Greece joined the Eurozone, investors treated it as a middle-income country with poor governance — which is to say, a credit risk.
After Greece joined the Eurozone, investors thought that Greece was no longer a credit risk — they figured, if push came to shove, other Eurozone members like Germany would bail Greece out. They were wrong.
Michael Dooley put forward a theory of speculative attacks on currencies as insurance attacks on currencies for emerging markets after the East Asian financial crisis:
First generation models of speculative attacks show that apparently random speculative attacks on policy regimes can be fully consistent with rational and well-informed speculative behaviour.
Unfortunately, models driven by a conflict between exchange rate policy and other macroeconomic objectives do not seem consistent with important empirical regularities surrounding recent crises in emerging markets. This has generated considerable interest in models that associate crises with self-fulfilling shifts in private expectations.
In this paper we develop a first generation model based on an alternative policy conflict. Credit constrained governments accumulate reserve assets in order to self-insure against shocks to national consumption. Governments also insure poorly regulated domestic financial markets.
Given this policy regime, a variety of internal and external shocks generate capital inflows to emerging markets followed by successful and anticipated speculative attacks.
We argue that a common external shock generated capital inflows to emerging markets in Asia and Latin America after 1989. Country specific factors determined the timing of speculative attacks. Lending policies of industrial country governments and international organizations account for contagion, that is, a bunching of attacks over time.
His model was not within the context of a currency union but his basic theory is correct.
There are speculative attacks on a currency or a bank run after foreign markets revises their estimates of the available central bank reserves and international lines of credit to bail out the banking systems and/or foreign debt.
Michael Dooley was dealing with the emerging economies of Southeast Asia and their official lines of credit that insure their foreign exchange liabilities and domestic banking system. Greece is about lines of credit for similar purposes to other European union member states.
via 12 charts and maps that explain the Greek crisis – Vox and The Most Important Graphs of 2011 – The Atlantic.
The reason why New Zealand should rule out helping Greece!
06 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in budget deficits, business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, financial economics, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), macroeconomics Tags: bank runs, banking panics, Eurosclerosis, Germany, Greece, sovereign defaults
Greece is a tiny part of the European economies so it doesn’t matter that much to the rest of the European Union what happens to Greece. The only people will notice the sovereign default of Greece once the breathless journalism has died down are Greeks themselves as they rebuild their banking and monetary system against a background of a government run by coffee shop Marxists.
Gambling for Redemption and Self-fulfilling Debt Crises in the Eurozone
29 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), international economic law, international economics, macroeconomics Tags: game theory, Greece, Patrick Kehoe, sovereign default
Sir Humphrey was right on why Britain entered the common market in 1973? Real GDP growth per working age British and French, PPP, detrended, 1950 – 2013
11 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economic growth, economic history, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), macroeconomics, monetarism, monetary economics Tags: British disease, British economy, Eurosclerosis, France, Margaret Thatchernomics, sick man of Europe
Figure 1: Real GDP per British and French aged 15-64, converted to 2013 price level with updated 2005 EKS purchasing power parities, 1.9 per cent detrended, 1950-2013
Source: Computed from OECD Stat Extract and The Conference Board, Total Database, January 2014, http://www.conference-board.org/economics
Figure 2: Real GDP per British and French aged 15-64, converted to 2013 price level with updated 2005 EKS purchasing power parities, 1.9 per cent detrended, base 100 = 1974, 1950-2013
Source: Computed from OECD Stat Extract and The Conference Board, Total Database, January 2014, http://www.conference-board.org/economics
In figure 2, a flat line represents annual real GDP growth at a rate of 1.9%, which is the trend rate of annual growth of the USA in the 20th century. A rising line means annual growth at above that trend rate; a falling line means annual growth at below that trend rate of 1.9% per year.
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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